Yemen is probably the most misunderstood international story in the Western mass media since… well, Uganda in September 2009. As was the case during the Uganda uprising, I believe the problem originates in the ignorance of regionalism in Yemen, or as Professor Harm J. De Blij has written time and time again: geography matters.

There are two major yet unrelated conflicts taking place in Yemen—the Sunni and Al Qaeda-linked separatist threat in the central south of the country (a major concern of the United States) and a Shia uprising in the north (alarming to the Yemenis and Saudis, possibly supported by Iran, but of little relevance to the rest of the world). And carefully distinguishing between the two is critical to keep the US out of a real quagmire.

Let’s start from the beginning. A century ago, Yemen was divided into two spheres of influence, with the Ottomans controlling the Red Sea coastal area (North Yemen), while the Aden coast was a protectorate of the British (South Yemen). After World War I, a Shia spiritual leader established himself as King in North Yemen and titled his country the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. Although he initially fought with the growing Saudi state, the Saudis backed the king during the 1960s civil war, whereas the Soviets and Egyptians backed a republican insurgency, which came to an end in 1970. Meanwhile, the former British Protectorate became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1967, also enjoying backing from the Soviets. Perhaps due to the dual Red sympathies, perhaps due to Arab nationalism, the two states agreed to unify in the early 1970s, and ultimately merged in 1990. (A group in South Yemen declared and fought for independence during several months in 1994.)

The Cold War conflicts are essentially unrelated to today’s violence. Back then, the differences were primarily political. Today, the roots of the conflict are religious and tribal. The northern uprising in the mountains along the Saudi border is a Shia rebellion based on anger and frustration with the persecution and neglect of the mountainous region by the (Sunni) government. The Yemeni and Saudi governments are fighting this rebellion, and the Saudis have blockaded the coast, on the pretext of stopping Iranian arms from reaching the rebels. The violence has caused widespread displacement of people in the areas, as the Shia rebels and government troops treat civilian casualties as a secondary concern.

The border with Saudi Arabia and Yemen was definitively demarcated in 2000.

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Recently, we along with many others have been discussing the new African Command (AfriCom) of the US military. It’s temporary quarters is here in Stuttgart, Germany. Yet, a rather interesting geopolitical development could be threatening its mission, namely a bridge linking Yemen and Djibouti.

Where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, a mere 17 miles separates the so-called Horn of Africa from the Middle East. According to the Jamestown Foundation, to top things off, the bridge is being constructed by Tarek Bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s half brother. The article goes on to note his shady background involving Islamic Charities that were involved in less than charitable activities as well as his obviously being relation to a wanted terrorist. However, it fails to mention that the bin Laden family is simply one of the largest and richest construction companies in the region lessening the importance of this. Would linking the two countries really be as dangerous as the authors believe. At the moment, French, German and American soldiers are all stationed and operating in and from Djibouti as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA). Their mission includes monitoring traffic in the HOA area as well as anti-terror operations on the mainland with a focus on Somalia.

Given that any number of small boats can and do cross from Africa to the Yemeni coast daily with both licit and illicit goods, it seems doubtful that a bridge, something far easier to control, would be a real challenge to international anti-terror operations in the region. In fact, given both countries’ worries about radical Islam, border control on the bridge would likely be especially tight. In addition, one would imagine that DHS, for example, would provide plenty of training, support and technical equipment to help monitor the bridge as they’ve done in countries like Georgia.

Lastly, such a bridge could in fact be far more positive than Jamestown notes as it would provide an official conduit through which legitimate trade can flow and thus a source of new tax revenue for each government. While illicit trade will no doubt continue to occur, helping to channel legitimate trade and movement through a bridge could bring more “transparency” to trade between the HOA and Yemen as well as increasing the overall volume. Although I highly respect Jamestown, I have to humbly disagree with their take on this development and fail to see any deeper significance with regard to who is constructing it. Readers?