Via Bruce Schneier. Watch and wait for it.

While recently doing research on Pakistan (my least favorite country in the world), I’ve developed four short scenarios to help myself and others think about alternative futures for that country and the implications for US policy as well as the region. They are NOT meant as predictions, but rather narratives to help the reader set aside his or her personal bias and assumptions and consider different paths, their implications and to better process current developments in Pakistan to discern the direction it is going.

Your Job: Choose which scenario you find to be the most likely and why. What are the implications for US policy?

1) The Territory Formerly Known as Pakistan
As US and NATO forces increase in Afghanistan, the Taleban insurgency in Pakistan spreads and the central government is unable to resist, ceding more and more control to the Taleban.. Government control extends only to the Punjab. The FATA and NWFP remain lawless and a safe haven for international jihadists as well as Afghan and Pakistani Taleban. The economy continues to decline as FDI all but vanishes and foreign nationals leave. Waves of people try to emigrate.
As the Pakistani government moves from one crisis to the next, US support wanes while Pakistan’s government changes several times a year through shifting coalitions and coups. In addition to secret US bases, NATO establishes a series of permanent and official bases in Pakistan 15 miles across the border from Afghanistan. Serious consideration is given to seizing Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, and several covert joint US-Pakistani operations in ungoverned territories seize and relocate part of their arsenal. Kashmir remains unsolved but Pakistan’s weakness essentially seals Indian dominance and control of the region.

2) Nuclear Nightmare
Taleban insurgents infiltrate further into Pakistan proper and the NWFP and FATA remain sanctuaries for the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Suicide bombings and violence increases as an increasingly impotent civilian government fails to improve the situation. The economy falters with even Chinese FDI dramatically shrinking. As unemployment and unrest grow, the military launches a coup. Although the situation initially stabilized, overly aggressive government action against jihadist groups at the behest of NATO/US lead to an increasing split within the military – the nation’s strongest and only truly functioning institution.
As more NATO/US forces are deployed in Afghanistan, Taleban and al-Qaeda activity within Pakistan grows again pitting secular elements against religious ones. When religious factions of the military, partnered with local militia seize 60% of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities (including its nuclear arsenal), Pakistan stands on the bring of outright civil war while India and the US consider preemptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

3) Peace at Home, Peace in the World
Taleban insurgents fight further into Pakistan and the NWFP and FATA remain sanctuaries for the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Violence increases and the civilian government fails stem the tide. The economy falters with even Chinese FDI dramatically shrinking. As unrest grow, the military launches a coup followed by aggressive and large scale military action. Although levels of violence go up, the military successfully defeats extremist elements while making peace with others. It establishes a satisfactory autonomy agreement with the NWFP and FATA which help to expel (but not eliminate) foreign jihadis. The Pakistan/Afghanistan border is formally recognized internationally and violence in Afghanistan is also winding down to manageable levels. The Pakistani military government reaches out to India in a series of confidence building measures and a contact group is setup over Kashmir. Pakistan’s new government makes the strategic decision to treat jihadis/insurgents as its primary national security threat instead of India.

4) Islamic Republic of Pakistan
The creeping Talebanization of Pakistan continues unabated until all but the Punjab is controlled directly or indirectly by Islamic extremists. Nearly powerless the civilian government is forced to form a coalition government with the Pakistani Taleban as the military itself remains divided between secular and religious elements. Over time, Islamists seize control instituting a drastic version of Sharia law, expelling Western diplomats and ending all military agreements and cooperation with the United States. NATO supply routes into Afghanistan are in peril as all of Pakistna becomes a base from which to fight Western troops next door. A nuclear armed Islamic Republic is declared and immediately recognized by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt.
Although Pakistan now serves as a base for exporting Islamic revolution, it maintains basic relations with its neighbors, including India. Bangladesh eventually succums to an Islamist takeover as well. However, both China and India, wary of Pakistani interference in their own Muslim populations, begin covert action against it while China plans for a potential seizure of Pakistanis nuclear facilities and India for a large scale war. The West struggles on in Afghanistan, as the situation worsens and European allies begin to pull out. Slowly, a China-India-US axis forms against a Pakistani-Bangladeshi-Iranian one.

From the WSJ:

With bullets lodged in both arms, suspected terrorist Mohammed Ajmal Kasab could no longer hold the AK-47 rifle police say he used to kill dozens of people during his three-hour rampage through Mumbai. So he and a partner fled the violent upheaval their fellow terrorists were still causing. A police chase led to the death of his partner and Mr. Kasab’s capture, giving authorities what they call a wealth of insights into the plot—and into how they say a disaffected young man joined an Islamic militant group and carried out a terror mission that left 171 people dead.

From repeated interrogations, a portrait of Mr. Kasab is emerging, Mumbai police say. He has told investigators he was from a poor family. His father supported him and four siblings by selling snacks from a cart. He dropped out of school in fourth grade to work but eventually left home. In 2005, he headed to Lahore, one of Pakistan’s biggest cities, to seek work, but was easily recruited two years ago by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant outfit that grew out of Pakistan’s push for independence in India’s contested region of Kashmir. In Lashkar’s fold, police say, Mr. Kasab thrived. He told investigators he passed through a succession of militant training camps with a sense of purpose for the first time in his life. Indian authorities said senior Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders planned last week’s attacks.

“He was led to believe that he was doing something holy,” said the joint commissioner of Mumbai police.

Most counterterrorism policies fail because terrorist motivation is fundamental misunderstood. It is not political. It is, to quote Max Abrams, about social organization (pdf). Abrams theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

Abrams states that the evidence supports this for the following reasons:

1. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group’s political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms.
2. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can’t describe the political goals of their organizations.
3. The great majority of terrorists are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren’t working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

Look at those three factors, and it matches picture perfect with Ajmal Kasab. And it shows that, when we talk about taking care of the

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

Yesterday morning, near Kandahar, an IED claimed the lives of three Canadian soldiers. The CF fatality count in Afghanistan has now reached one hundred.

I do not think that this purely psychological milestone will hinder public support for Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Polling indicates support is already pretty low, and since an exit date has already been decided, I think all sides are just to waiting it out.

As far as any insight into the war in Afghanistan, the following data of how each CF member died shows that IEDs are the most effective weapon for killing Canadian soldiers.

However, considering how many Canadian soldiers have been rotated through that country since 2002, that “effectiveness” is pretty insignificant. Don’t get me wrong, I am not trivializing those that died. Not at all. I am sorry they were killed, and am glad such people are willing to put their lives on the line for the greater peace. My point is that in terms of manpower, we are not doing as bad in Afghanistan as previous wars. IEDs are not as much a threat as they are made out to be. Nevertheless, I am sure the CF (and the US in Iraq) would greatly appreciate a breakthrough in anti-IED tactics. A good area to get into if you are a modern war theorist.

Lastly, since Canada is only one of many in Afghanistan, here are the latest fatality stats by country from iCasualties.org:

Thanks to Chief Wiggum for the head’s up.

Treat this as suspect for the moment, as I’ve only found this article on it so far. But if true, it could be a major turn in Afghanistan.

Brown: Chinese may join Afghan mission

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has announced the possibility of Chinese forces joining the multinational coalition in Afghanistan. Brown told New York’s Council on Foreign Relations on Friday of China’s possible plans for deploying troops to the war-torn country, amid the worst fighting with insurgents since the US-led coalition invaded the country in 2001.

The premier said he expected more nations not currently involved in fighting to join the Afghan mission, comprised of 41 nations. All nations should “see this as the front line” in the battle against terrorism, Brown added. The NATO has called for additional forces, a demand supported by US President-elect Barack Obama, who said he would switch the focus from Iraq to Afghanistan through a phased withdrawal.

My initial thoughts are as follows: Why is Brown speaking for the Chinese? Are they using him to float the idea as a test balloon? And second, are the Chinese interested in supporting the War on Terror and OEF? Are they looking for an opportunity to become a “responsible stakeholder”? Or, are they interested in learning up close and personal how Western troops operate for any potential future conflict? Readers, your first reaction?

Along with secret authorization to step up US attacks in Pakistan, the President has now authorized attacks in Syria. According to the AP,

DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) – U.S. military helicopters attacked territory inside Syria close to its border with Iraq Sunday, killing eight people in a strike the Syrian government condemned as “serious aggression.” A U.S. military official said the raid by special forces targeted the foreign fighter network that travels through Syria into Iraq in an area where the Americans have been unable to shut it down because it was out of the military’s reach.”We are taking matters into our own hands,” the official told The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because of the political sensitivity of cross-border raids.The attack came just days after the commander of U.S. forces in western Iraq said American troops were redoubling efforts to secure the Syrian border, which he called an “uncontrolled” gateway for fighters entering Iraq.

What does this mean?

(1) The U.S. simply got actionable intelligence about a target that was too important not to strike
(2) This is part of a previously decided upon US policy
(3) The US has had similar information in the past but decided to strike now to send a message to Syria or possibly Iran

As the story develops, more information will hopefully appear which will support one of those theories.

Here is a quick summary of an article in the Tagesschau, a German language news source.

Background

Under the German constitution, only parliament has the power to send German troops into combat, not the Chancellor. This condition is based on World War II as well as the clause written into the constitution that Germany may not engage in Angriffskriege, or wars of aggression. It can thus only act with a UN mandate or lacking that, a NATO mandate (as in Kosovo). Additionally, it must vote yearly to renew that mandate. For Afghanistan, the Bundestag votes October 15th of every year.

Renewal

The Bundestag voted to new renew the German army’s mandate for Afghanistan by 14 months, i.e. until December 13th 2009. The vote was 442 yes, 96 no and 32 abstaining indicating overwhelming support for the mission, contrary to news reports. It also raises the maximum troop levels which the Ministry of Defense can send to 4,500, an increase of 1,000 soldiers. Germany is currently the third largest provider of ISAF troops.

However, Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung noted that the increase does not mean an additional thousand soldiers will immediately be sent. He stressed it means more flexibility for Germany in responding to the ongoing situation and that less engagement or pulling out is not an alternative as it would mean breaking Germany’s promises and failing to participate in its international responsibility.

My last post asked readers several questions relating to the threat of jihadist terrorism.

As promised, I’d like to present my take on the current threat picture by answering the question I posed and elaborating further.

How do you breakdown the jihadist threat?

What was clear, from the Spiegel article I mentioned citing seven different experts, the mainstream media and government, is that there is little to no agreement on describing the jihadist threat. The phrase al-Qaeda is widely used, especially for jihadists, threats, disrupted plots and successful attacks that have little to no connection to al-Qaeda. Thus, I will breakdown the threat into the following categories.

National jihadist terrorism: Islamist groups focusing on the “near enemy” defined as local ‘apostate’ regimes such as Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria or Zadari in Pakistan. Their primary goals are national, i.e. local. They may hate the West but their goal is regime change at home. Examples of these groups are Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Egyptian Islamic Jihad etc.

Transnational jihadist terrorism (Global Jihad Movement or GJM): These groups and individuals focus on the “far enemy” which is the West. Their priorities are the United States, Israel, UK and others. They believe that the West would not allow an Islamic state anywhere (see: Algeria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iran) and thus even if local groups overthrew the regime in say Egypt, foreign powers would not allow an Islamist takeover. Their central argument is that the ummah is under direct attack by the West who wants to destroy Islam, and therefore a defensive jihad must be waged against the infidels. Al Qaeda is the largest example of such a group.

However, within the GJM there are three different types of terrorism. Firstly, core/remnant al-Qaeda (AQ). I say remnant because the U.S. destroyed much of the pre 9/11 AQ. AQ is centralized and hierarchical, classic command and control terrorism so to say. Second, you have affiliate groups (sometimes called franchises) which include AQ in Iraq, AQ in the Maghreb and others. They can have some or no direct links to AQ although they subscribe to the same ideology and have the same goals. Thirdly, you have leaderless terrorism which is carried out by individuals or small groups with no connections to terror groups. Richard Reid (the shoebomber) or the attackers in the Madrid subway bombings are examples.

Is al-Qaeda more dangerous today than it was before 9/11?

Using the definition I gave above, no. AQ has been severely damaged since 9/11, however there are indications that it is reconstituting itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. At the moment, it is unclear whether they are regaining strength or not. I believe that AQ, as defined above, is not a major threat to the US homeland. The bigger threats are affiliate groups which carry out more frequent attacks and have better capabilities and leaderless terrorism. Affiliate groups are more prevalent in the Gap (see PNM theory), specifically North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. They pose little to no threat to the U.S. homeland. Leaderless terrorism is a bigger threat in Europe and poses a small threat in the U.S.

What type of threat is al-Qaeda and jihadist terrorism? A strategic threat? An annoyance?

Jihadist terrorism is a security threat but by far not a strategic one. Islamists won’t be overthrowing our government, taking over our territory or invading the United States. Past strategic threats were Germany, Japan and the USSR. In perspective, jihadists are small potatoes. John Kerry was correct that terrorism is, in the bigger picture, an annoyance.

Based on the answers to the previous three, are we winning the battle against jihadist terrorism?

I would first of all disagree with the concept of a war on terror. The jihadi threat is very diverse consisting of many groups with differing, at times opposing goals and many methods of terror. To roll them all into one is not only intellectually lazy, but dangerous as it severely limits our understanding and policy options for dealing with the different threats.

If any answer regarding “winning” can be given, I would say the West is indeed winning but has been slow to realize the importance of the war of ideas (especially the United States). Jihadist terrorism will not be elimiated, it will suffer defeats, setbacks and achieve occasional success but nevertheless fade away over time as it loses its appeal and legitimacy among its constituency and incurs long term international attack.

Now that the seven year anniversary of 9/11 is behind us and readers have seen the many commentaries by leading counterterrorism experts, bloggers and journalists, it is time to ask whether after seven years we have a clear understanding and picture of the threat that faces us. The Spiegel, a German magazine, has a good article with short assessments by seven leading thinkers on whether al-Qaeda is still a threat and how the War on Terror is going. I highly recommend reading it here. With experts from the Israel, Singapore, Germany, Jordan, Sweden and the UK, it is clear that even leading thinkers cannot even agree on the same language and terminology much less whether al-Qaeda is still a threat and whether command and control terrorism or leaderless terrorism represents a bigger danger.

So, I now ask readers to offer their assessment of the following:

1) How do you breakdown the jihadist threat? Al-Qaeda is only one group. There are many regional groups, lone wolves et cetera. List the different types of Islamist threat with a brief description of each.

2) Is al-Qaeda more dangerous today than it was before 9/11?

3) What type of threat is al-Qaeda and jihadist terrorism? A strategic threat? An annoyance?

4) Based on the answers to the previous three, are we winning the battle against jihadist terrorism?

My answers will be posted in the next day or two.

While I and other commentators have welcomed increased US strikes into the ungoverned Pakistani tribal areas, a recent article brings to light part of the complexities of our more aggressive strategy. There have been five strikes within the last twelve days and while it seems some did eliminate both foreign fighters and Taliban members, no high-value-targets have been liquidated. However,

The reputed target of Monday’s attack, veteran Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, was not among those killed, and the devastation left on the ground seems only to have strengthened the Taliban’s influence on local civilians. “After about an hour, the Taliban turned up,” said Khan, who helped in the rescue work at Dande Darpa Khel. “They ringed a building and erected a tent (to treat casualties) nearby,” the 35-year-old said. “Then they recovered more bodies and wounded who were sent to hospital.”

This brings home one of the most difficult parts of organizations like these (Terrorist, criminal, etc.) to overcome, their social operations. Hamas and Hezbollah both engage in extensive social welfare programs and other community services. While the U.S., Israel or ISAF can eliminate terrorists when sighted, their respective groups are the ones on the ground picking up the pieces, tending to the wounded and/or dead and organizing locals.

The administration seems to have reached the conclusion that there is no way to alter the loyalties of those in the FATA and that despite further antagonizing them and possibly increasing local support for the Taliban (is this possible?), a more aggressive policy of UAV strikes and special forces operations is the only way forward. As some have noted, Pakistan cannot claim to be sovereign while at the same time ceding national sovereignty to locals and claiming it has no control over the area. Where this takes us remains to be seen, but it is indeed a welcome change to a strategy that yielded no results. However, it would do well to read the article closely and to step up efforts in Afghanistan to mitigate ill will after missile strikes and other operations in more ways than simply paying off locals.