We somehow missed this Kaplan article from September, 2008, probably because it appeared in a very unusual forum, the progressive Mother Jones.

Mission Creep Dispatch: Robert Kaplan

As part of our special investigation “Mission Creep: US Military Presence Worldwide,” we asked a host of military thinkers to contribute their two cents on topics relating to global Pentagon strategy… The following dispatch comes from Robert D. Kaplan.

In Defense of the Pentagon’s Small, Small World

It is important to realize that dozens of deployments simultaneously around the globe need not overstretch a military if those deployments are by and large small. But one big sustained deployment like Iraq can wreck the whole manpower system. It is also important to realize that all of these deployments are closely monitored by Congress. I was in Nepal in the middle of 2005, covering our military mission there, when its activities were halted for the time being by Washington because the king had suspended the political party process, in addition to other anti-democratic infractions. I was in Algeria the same year to witness the first US military mission there after that country had held free elections. Unlike during the Cold War, these missions for the most part are restricted to fledgling democratic countries.

Between risk-prone invasions like Iraq on one hand and isolationism on the other hand, there are these low-cost, low-risk, tediously unspectacular training missions and other small deployments. I have embedded on these missions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and have found them generally not bellicose, not utopian, not a distortion of our values, and the epitome of half-measures, full of compromises with the host nation, as well as replete with a recognition on a daily basis of our own limitations.

The problem, ironically, is that while small enough to avoid quagmires, they are big enough to get us into trouble sometimes. I was in Georgia in early 2006, embedded with the US Marine training mission of the Georgian army, and I intimated in print and on television in 2007 that we were dangerously close to interfering with a Russian-Georgian feud, even as our limited mission would not provide the Georgians with the means to affect the outcome. Our training mission was provocative to the Russians, but ineffectual in stopping their aggression.

But the fact that we get ourselves in trouble here and there does not mean the concept of small missions worldwide is wrong. It just means that we have to fully consider all the what-ifs of each one. It is these missions that provide the incentive for our troops to learn foreign languages and study local cultures. To wit, what’s the point of a French-language program at Fort Bragg if there are no training missions to former French colonial Africa? These missions, as I’ve witnessed, also pave the way for more adroit disaster-relief interventions like the one that followed the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004-2005. And because populations are growing in absolute terms in environmentally and seismically fragile zones, humanitarian intervention will be part of our military future. Keep these missions going, I say, but with strong civilian oversight.

The increasing likelihood that Iran will successfully acquire a nuclear weapon cannot be avoided. While this author does not predict with certainty that it will happen, nor believe the US and EU shouldn’t do everything in its power to stop it, it is a real possibility. Therefore, policy discussions should also begin to think about the potential implications of a nuclear Iran and consider how the US and others can mitigate the effects thereof.

North Korea has not yet set off a cascade of proliferation, largely because the potential new nuclear states are all US allies (South Korea, Japan, perhaps Taiwan). The same is not true of all the Middle East. In addition, states may react not only to Iran, but to their perceived reaction of others, i.e. Egypt reacting to Iran directly as well as to its belief Saudi Arabia will respond with its own program. Below is a regional map of what a nuclear Iran could lead to:

And to give readers something else to think about, the following countries are currently giving serious consideration to nuclear energy in the near term (within 10 years): Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Vietnam.

As if that were not troubling enough, the following countries have long term plans or studies underway: Algeria, Australia, Chile, Georgia, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen.

This is not to say that all or even most will move forward. Nuclear energy (even for peaceful purposes) requires a massive financial investments in infrastructure, technology, training and more. Additionally, some states may decide against it at various states of their programs, as has happened many times in the past.

Therefore, in the event that Iran does indeed acquire a nuclear weapons capability, which we’ll define as the generally agreed perception that Iran does (whether or not it has tested), the United States and Europe need to think long and hard about instruments of state power which can be applied to prevent a cascade of nuclear weapons states and/or to ensure that peaceful nuclear energy (a legal right of every NPT signatory) stays peaceful and secure.

It would seem there’s a great power vacancy in Latin America and now, several powers are looking to muscle their way in. This represents a growing national security threat to the United States.

China hawks have long been concerned with Chinese involvement in Central and South America. Whether’s its economic aid, gaining potential control over the Panama Canal, or reaching out to diaspora communities, the Chinese are active in our backyard.

Recently, the Russia’s made a big, though largely meaningless show of force sending its naval forces (better at eliciting laughs than fear) to Venezuela. Russia was also apparently considering a nuclear deal with Venezuela. There was also some talk of stationing bombers in Cuba.

Speaking of which, let’s not forget potentially massive new oil findings in Brazil and Cuba (which the Canadians and Chinese are exploting).

Now, it would seem lesser powers are moving in as well.

The government of Iran is following the lead of new ally Venezuela by taking its anti-American message to Bolivia, an impoverished but strategically positioned country in the heart of South America.

A nemesis to U.S. interests in the Middle East for 30 years, Iran is now pouring millions of dollars of aid into Bolivia—including construction of a milk factory in Achacachi. Its real motive, however, is joining Bolivia and Venezuela to counter U.S. interests in Latin America, analysts said. ‘’Is Iran in Bolivia a nuisance to the United States? Of course it is,’’ said Abbas Milani, the co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. “Iran will try to shore up support for Bolivia’s president and help the anti-American message of its regime. And being in Bolivia will give Iran more pawns to play in its dealings with the Europeans and the United States.’’

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, a constant U.S. critic, brought Iran and Bolivia together, even though the two countries have little in common but natural gas, large stretches of desert and official antipathy toward the United States. His government flew Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit Bolivian President Evo Morales in September 2007. Morales traveled to Iran a year later.Chávez has organized Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Cuba into a trade and political alliance that regularly lambastes capitalism and U.S. influence in Latin America.

While this seems to be the equivalent of moving a pawn, it could potentially be a growing threat if it continues. Low energy prices, however, may limit Iran’s involvement. South America watchers will want to play close attention to continued Iranian involvement there (as Hezbollah already operates in the Triborder region) and pay attention to Nicaragua.

I have been trying to think through President-elect Obama’s decision to have the purpose-driven pastor Rick Warren speak at his presidential inauguration. This choice has inflamed both the secular and LGBT community on the web including Andrew Sullivan and John Hodgman. I too had a serious WTF!? moment when I saw the announcement.

However, on further thought, I am starting to think that this is another sign of Obama’s pragmatic politics (a.k.a. what some idealists are calling “post-partisan politics”). Rick Warren is no ally of Obama, and a large portion of the American population is backing Obama. I think this is a matter of Team Obama kicking the ball downfield on the first down to wait and see whether Team Evangelist will fumble it. Obama offers Warren the chance to kiss the ring and come on board, and if Warren shoots his mouth on at the wrong time he relegates his team to the bench in the eyes of the American people (how were those last sentences for literary clichés?). If Warren plays along then Obama can continue his post-partisan policy-making without the direct opposition (an tacit support) of the evangelical movement that has so infected American politics.

Pragmatism, Machiavelli-style.

Robert D. Kaplan’s latest is out in the Washington Post, with the title of “A Gentler Hegemony,” in which he argues against the decline of America and instead pushes for the US to be more humble and more pragmatic. One portion, abridged:

The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the pragmatists in the British power structure lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers. The reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the same with the hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring Christianity and the fruits of Western civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off corner of the world played a role in a violent revolt against imperial authority.

Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc imperium to a calmer, more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology.

That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military—especially a Navy—that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy…

In sum, we may no longer be at Charles Krauthammer’s “Unipolar Moment,” but neither have we become Sweden. Declinism of the sort being preached will go immediately out of fashion at the world’s next humanitarian catastrophe, when the very people enraged at the U.S. military because of Iraq will demand that it lead a coalition to save lives. We might have intervened in Darfur had we not been bogged down in Iraq; after Cyclone Nargis, our ships would have provided large-scale relief, had Burma’s military government allowed them to proceed. As world population rises, and with vast urban areas with tottering infrastructures in the most environmentally and seismically fragile zones, the opportunities for U.S. military-led disaster relief will be legion. The American military remains a force for good, a fact that will become self-evident in the crises to come.

Could this be the opening move towards a policy of engagement with Iran? I think so. According to Haaretz:

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s administration will offer Israel a “nuclear umbrella” against the threat of a nuclear attack by Iran, a well-placed American source said earlier this week. The source, who is close to the new administration, said the U.S. will declare that an attack on Israel by Tehran would result in a devastating U.S. nuclear response against Iran.

There can be no doubt in the minds of anyone that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons against Iran in the even of an Iranian nuclear attack. Additionally, there can be little doubt the Israelis would not retaliate if not with their ICBMs then with their nuclear armed submarines. With that in mind, there is no need for additional deterrence.

I see this as a move to pacify Israel and provide its leaders with a reason for not launching a preventative strike. With Israels government given cover, the next administration will be able to engage Iran diplomatically without the fear of an Israeli strike or pressure to resolve the issue by an Israeli given deadline. Readers?

In 2003, in response to legal loopholes regarding confiscating WMD related materials and increasing concern by the US and others about proliferation, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiatve (PSI). The beauty of the PSI is that it is not a formal organization. There is no secretariat, annual meetings, dues and so forth. Most importantly, there are no new additional laws, rules or protocols for participating countries to pass, accept or follow. It is a type of coalition of the willing in which member countries navies cooperate in boarding and searching ships suspected of carrying illegal WMD related materials.

For example, a Madagascar flagged ship is suspected of carrying nuclear technology to Iran. The US is following it but does not have a legal agreement with Madagascar (just a random country as an example) to board each other’s ships. However, fellow PSI participant Australia just happens to. The US then asks Australia to stop and board the ship in line with its pre-existing bilateral agreement. Thus, it is a beautiful, flexible and so far successful organization.

It is always difficult to form a new international organization, especially something to deal with piracy where issues like deadly force, detention, prosecution and so forth are involved. Using the PSI as a model, I suggest forming something similar for dealing with pirates, whether in Somalia, West Africa, S.E. Asia or elsewhere. Thus, I recommend the White House form a group to compile existing maritime laws (maybe YH knows some?) to investigate how a type of ad hoc group can be established to fight this ongoing threat.

Clinton to accept offer of secretary of state job. Curzon, what do you think? [See background].

In 1963, one of America’s most publicly loved and inspirational leaders was shot dead during a motorcade. My mother, a child living in a small mountain town in western Canada, first heard the news from a teacher at school. All the children were sent home for the day. My mother recalls being very sad. It was a profound experience for all that lived through it, including foreign children. With the amount of attention given to Obama over the past, and the immense expectations he faces next year, how would America and the World react to his sudden death?

Let us consider how much of an assassination risk Barak Hussein Obama is. I would say more than George W Bush (who did survive two attempts himself). Yes, there was much discontent. One could imagine that some leftist anarcho-communist planning the free the Free World. Yet, the spectre of Dick Cheney taking the reins may have stayed their hand.

In the case of Obama I can imagine three types of potential assassins: 1) terrorists bent on popping Obama’s (and the American public’s) high on “hope”; 2) extremist ideologues determined to prevent America’s descent into so-called “socialism”; or 3) a racist group/individual that cannot stand seeing an African-American heading the table in the Oval Office.

With the lack of any successful foreign terrorist activity on American soil in the past few years, I would judge the first instance to be the most unlikely. The second is only slightly less unlikely simply for the the fact that there are not that many violent McCarthyists still around. The last one by far seems to be the most likely. In fact, Obama has already survived an assassination attempt by white extremists earlier this year.

Many newsmedia outlets have been hailing Barack Obama’s election victory as a victory over racism.¹ The election of America’s first black president has struck a serious blow in ending the race politics of Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton. However this does not put an end to the existence of racism in America. Violent racists could make another attempt on Obama. If successful an old white man would rise to the top office, a significant payoff.

The benefit to assassinating the president-elect is plain, the risks to a potential assassin are less easy to determine. In these times domestic terrorism is easier to pull off than international terrorism (e.g. anthrax scares, exploding pipelines, etc.). Authorities have an easier time finding threats outside of the border than from within. A small group or single actor could be hard to catch if they were smart. Hopefully there are a few Jack Bauers within the ranks of America’s domestic security apparatus to keep Obama — and hope — alive.

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1. For example see:
NYT: OBAMA: Racial Barrier Falls as Voters Embrace Call for Change
CNN: Obama to be first African-American president
IHT: Obama wins U.S. election: Racial barriers fall; Bush era rejected
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[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI]

Discussion:
Both the Gulf War II (Option 1) and Collapsing Iran (Option 2) options would demonstrate strong US commitment to uphold the NPT and zero tolerance for nuclear weapons. A successful military campaign against Tehran would dispel any doubt worldwide about US resolve, US power and the ability of rogue states to defy the international community indefinitely. Option 1 would be especially powerful as it would show that despite lingering discontent about the invasion of Iraq, the West is willing to work together on and tackle serious threats. Collapsing Iran would also potentially break the country into several pieces or instigate regime change ending it both a regional power and threat. However, there are risks inherent in any military option. Building a coalition, as in Option 1 could be very difficult given mistrust of US intentions and an unwillingness to engage in military action after Iraq. The fact China would be difficult to convince and Russia near impossible make building a solid coalition harder and a UNSC mandate unlikely. But of the two options, Option 1 would incur the lowest political costs and have more legitimacy both abroad and potentially with Iranians themselves.

Containment (Option 3) would need to walk a fine line between inflicting the highest possible costs on Iran without igniting war. There is considerable leverage to be had over Iran, especially its energy sector, but energy is a double edged sword. While the current financial crisis has significantly lowered the price of oil, taking Iran’s oil and gas offline would raise prices and a lack of spare capacity means it would be difficult to offset potentially drastic price jumps. Containment could harden Iranian resolve and push them towards an all or none mindset leaving only war or acceptance as options. While Iran may eventually cave in, or its regime change, containment still risks isolating Iran without eliminating its nuclear program. It would also exacerbate its security concerns reinforcing the need for nuclear weapons. Yet, the two military options would do the same.
Options 1, 2 and 3 would also not address Iran’s aspirations as a regional power nor for prestige.

A Grand Bargain (Option 4), would address the combination of Iranian motivations for nuclear weapons as part of a larger agreement between the US and Iran. By recognizing the government, establishing ties and not using military force, Iran’s security concerns should be alleviated while it would simultaneously save face,having stood up against the West and come out with something, albeit not nuclear weapons. A Grand Bargain could accomplish all US objectives were both parties truly committed to it. Yet, diplomacy has not worked with some countries such North Korea and containment, coercion and sanctions have worked with others like Libya.

Option 4 also risks legitimizing the ruling regime and turning Iranian public opinion against the West. Even if the US negotiated in good faith, Iran may still decide to acquire nuclear weapons and use the process as political cover to achieve its goals. This could seriously undermine the West’s credibility and military deterrent as well as leave an aggressive nuclear armed Iranian regime. This option risks all or none, either successful elimination of the program or Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Options 1 and 2 could substantially cripple the program, setting it back many years but not prevent its future reconstitution. Containment could swing either way and offers a flexible policy but uncertain timeline for success.

Recommendation: Option 4 a “Grand Bargain” is recommended.