[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI]

Discussion:
Both the Gulf War II (Option 1) and Collapsing Iran (Option 2) options would demonstrate strong US commitment to uphold the NPT and zero tolerance for nuclear weapons. A successful military campaign against Tehran would dispel any doubt worldwide about US resolve, US power and the ability of rogue states to defy the international community indefinitely. Option 1 would be especially powerful as it would show that despite lingering discontent about the invasion of Iraq, the West is willing to work together on and tackle serious threats. Collapsing Iran would also potentially break the country into several pieces or instigate regime change ending it both a regional power and threat. However, there are risks inherent in any military option. Building a coalition, as in Option 1 could be very difficult given mistrust of US intentions and an unwillingness to engage in military action after Iraq. The fact China would be difficult to convince and Russia near impossible make building a solid coalition harder and a UNSC mandate unlikely. But of the two options, Option 1 would incur the lowest political costs and have more legitimacy both abroad and potentially with Iranians themselves.

Containment (Option 3) would need to walk a fine line between inflicting the highest possible costs on Iran without igniting war. There is considerable leverage to be had over Iran, especially its energy sector, but energy is a double edged sword. While the current financial crisis has significantly lowered the price of oil, taking Iran’s oil and gas offline would raise prices and a lack of spare capacity means it would be difficult to offset potentially drastic price jumps. Containment could harden Iranian resolve and push them towards an all or none mindset leaving only war or acceptance as options. While Iran may eventually cave in, or its regime change, containment still risks isolating Iran without eliminating its nuclear program. It would also exacerbate its security concerns reinforcing the need for nuclear weapons. Yet, the two military options would do the same.
Options 1, 2 and 3 would also not address Iran’s aspirations as a regional power nor for prestige.

A Grand Bargain (Option 4), would address the combination of Iranian motivations for nuclear weapons as part of a larger agreement between the US and Iran. By recognizing the government, establishing ties and not using military force, Iran’s security concerns should be alleviated while it would simultaneously save face,having stood up against the West and come out with something, albeit not nuclear weapons. A Grand Bargain could accomplish all US objectives were both parties truly committed to it. Yet, diplomacy has not worked with some countries such North Korea and containment, coercion and sanctions have worked with others like Libya.

Option 4 also risks legitimizing the ruling regime and turning Iranian public opinion against the West. Even if the US negotiated in good faith, Iran may still decide to acquire nuclear weapons and use the process as political cover to achieve its goals. This could seriously undermine the West’s credibility and military deterrent as well as leave an aggressive nuclear armed Iranian regime. This option risks all or none, either successful elimination of the program or Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Options 1 and 2 could substantially cripple the program, setting it back many years but not prevent its future reconstitution. Containment could swing either way and offers a flexible policy but uncertain timeline for success.

Recommendation: Option 4 a “Grand Bargain” is recommended.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V]

Option 4: Grand Bargain – Comprehensive talks to solve most US-Iranian issues

The US would seek to engage Iran diplomatically in comprehensive negotiations to resolve most bilateral political, economic, and security issues. It would begin with secret talks until the Iranian presidential election in June 2009. Ahmadinejad’s reelection is possible but the US should avoid appearing to reward his policies with any public talks before the election. Relatedly, the US should bypass Ahmadinejad and establish a communication channel with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who holds the most power in Iran. Washington would make clear it is interested in a fundamental change in bilateral ties but move carefully, beginning with common interests. It will be critical to keep initial talks secret to prevent spoilers on each side from derailing talks. US-Iranian talks in Baghdad would resume and similar ones in Kabul would open. As progress on those fronts is made, new talks would open on other issues like opposing al-Qaeda, the Arabi-Israeli conflict, regional nuclear proliferation, civilian nuclear power and counterbalancing Russia with Iranian oil and gas. More cultural, sporting and academic exchanges could be initiated to build good will to lay the groundwork for detent. The recent licensing of the American Iranian Council to open an office in Tehran is a good example. Publicly, the US would tone down its threatening rhetoric. The end state would be a normalization of ties and ending Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Pro:
Comprehensive negotiations could achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on Iran’s nuclear activities means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table allowing for a greater range of possible solutions. Additionally,negotiations would last for some time, which would see a change in American leadership in January 2009 and possibly in Iranian leadership in June 2009. It would also allow more time to gauge developments in Afghanistan and Iraq with regard to stability, the nature of their governments and and US troop levels.
It would maintain relationships with regional allies by proving long term U.S. commitment to them and regional security. Should it succeed, Iran would be a valuable ally due to its geographic position straddling Central Asia, the Middle East, Caucasus and Persian Gulf, being both Shia and non-Arab, and a major energy producer. The focus on diplomacy and peaceful negotiations would improve the US image abroad and soft power. Though not a stated objective, credible negotiations would also reassure energy markets and lower prices.

Con:
Comprehensive negotiations with Iran could be seen as rewarding nuclear blackmail and NPT violations. Domestically, it could strengthen Ahmadinejad and justify his policies. It would also reinforce the North Korean example that rogue states can achieve their goals through aggressive and illegal behavior. Even having talks could also undermine the NPT if the US was seen as giving in, especially if talks fail. There is also no guarantee that they will succeed. Lastly, Iran may not negotiate in good faith and use the talks to relieve political and economic pressure while secretly finishing its nuclear weapons program which could lead to an Israeli strike.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV]

Option 3: Containment – Sanctions and/or a blockade on Iran’s energy sector, military buildup & diplomacy
Containing Iran is very flexible employing various of tools of statecraft. Decision makers would choose from and combine the following measures based on Iran’s behavior. Multilateral economic sanctions, outside the UN, against Iran by the US and all or some of Iran’s major trading partners. Iran’s energy sector would also be targeted. One option is blockading its main oil facilities at Kharg island and/or the Strait of Hormuz. A ban onenergy exports from Iran could also be implemented and most importantly, a ban on importing refined energy products. It would also seek to ban all business with Iran’s energy sector. To combat proliferation risks, the US would step up PSI interdictions in concert with allies.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act could be amended to forbid all trade with Iran. A travel ban for some or all Iranian officials as well as a ban on international flights to Iran could be initiated. Diplomatically, the U.S. would maintain its current stance that all uranium enrichment must stop as a precondition to negotiations and refuse any concessions before this condition is met. US military forces in the region would also be bolstered by deploying an additional carrier to the region, providing land and sea based missile defense and anti-WMD capabilities to our regional allies and moving long range bombers to Diego Garcia. The US would also increase funding for opposition groups, separatists and American tv and radio broadcasts into Iran.

Pro:
Firstly, this option is very flexible giving policy makers room to adjust it based on Iranian cooperation or lack thereof. It would also make clear the US is committed to regional security, the NPT and protecting its allies. Containment would also work unilaterally or multilaterally. While dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program would be best for the strengthening the NPT, demonstrating the high costs of non-compliance and a lack of transparency would continue to dissuade others from following Iran’s path. Increased pressure and focus on Iran would help to minimize the risk of proliferation to and from Iran through increased PSI interdictions, sanctions and a greater likelihood of Iran being caught. This option would also put enormous pressure on Iran’s most vulnerable point, its energy sector, thus being the quickest way to cripple Iran and force its cooperation.

Con:
Pressure through containment may not ultimately be enough to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions and would not immediately end its nuclear weapons program. With no ultimate carrot (US-Iran detent) or ultimate stick (military strikes), containment could raise the political and economic costs of nuclear weapons without making the costs unacceptable or unbearable. Policy makers would have to tread carefully keeping the costs as high as possible without crossing the red line for conflict. Containment may also lead Iranians to rally around the flag as sanctions and/or a blockade affect the entire population and turn them against America. A blockade may also be considered an act of war by Iran inadvertently causing war. This option could also raise the price of
energy and destabilize markets, especially a blockade. Another side effect is that the more Iranian oil and gas taken that is taken offline, the more relative power Russia gains. This could also potentially lead Iran to the become so desperate that it lashes out in Iraq or Afghanistan. If it leads Iran to make an irreversible decision to acquire nuclear weapons then no cost would be too high to bear and containment would fail. Lastly, it is unclear whether this policy could deter a unilateral Israeli strike.

[Part I | Part II | Part III]

Option 2: – Collapsing Iran – Unilateral air strikes destroy critical & nuclear infrastructure, disrupt the regime’s ability to govern & retaliate, collapse the country into ethnic factions*

This option would use American air power to destroy Iran’s both Iran’s nuclear and critical national infrastructure. A combination of stealth, precision bombing and special operations would aim to isolate the country’s leadership from its people and military by destroying critical electricity, communications, transportation, military, and industrial nodes, preventing it from exerting government power. Being a large and urbanized country, Iran would be particularly vulnerable. Special Forces would also infiltrate the country arming and organizing the Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis and Kurds, encouraging them to establish ethnic autonomous zones. No-Fly Zones could even be established as in Iraq in 1992. Being unable to command and coordinate its forces, Iran could not mount effective resistance and its government would be forced to accept American demands or may be overthrown. Iran would cease to be a regional power and perhaps even to be a functioning state.

Pro:
Making use of American naval and air forces, this option would be inexpensive relative to a ground invasion. Additionally, given a lack of ground forces, this option is within the US military’s capabilities. Collapsing Iran provides a viable military option that would cost very few American lives. Failure of the Iranian state would prevent the continuation of its nuclear weapons program, lessen proliferation risks and minimize the risk and effects of any Iranian retaliation. It would also provide the chance for Iran’s ethnic minorities to exert more control weakening the central government during and after the campaign. This option does not absolutely
require international participation giving the US more freedom policy wise. However, multilateral participation would be a welcome addition. It would lastly also prevent Israel from bombing Iran.

Con:
Collapsing Iran is fraught with risks. While Iranian nuclear facilities would be destroyed, a lack of intelligence means some sites would survive. Similarly, the real danger is in the knowledge and abilities of Iranian engineers which would remain intact and nuclear materials could be smuggled out in the ensuing chaos. Next, it is difficult to anticipate the effects on Iraq and Afghanistan. This option could increase violence and instability in one or both countries. Were separatist groups to declare independence, it could spell major instability or armed conflict with neighbor such as Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Instability in Azerbaijan would also threaten its energy exports. The price of energy would also likely skyrocket and at least some traffic in the Straits of Hormuz would be disrupted, further raising fears and prices. Lastly, if the Iranian government survived, it would be certain to increase its sponsoring of international terrorist groups and attacks, to fund militias in Iraq, and continue its nuclear weapons program.

* As noted in the first post, I don’t claim all the material as my own. This idea is from John Robb with some elaboration of my own.

[Part I | Part II]

Option 1: Gulf war II: Iran – Intl. coalition with a clear, limited mandate to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities
This option is modeled on the US response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It entails building an international coalition to eliminate only Iran’s nuclear facilities. It would aim to bring the EU3 (France, Germany, UK), Canada, Australia and US allies in the region like the Gulf states, Turkey and Egypt on board for a limited military campaign against Iran, first issuing an ultimatum to allow IAEA and coalition inspectors in. This could be achieved in multiple ways, listed from most to least desirable: a UN mandate, NATO mandate, or coalition of the willing. This option would use air strikes and special forces to destroy all of Iran’s known nuclear facilities, capture scientists working there and procure evidence of illicit activities to present to the world. Intelligence sharing among countries involved would also work to fill in gaps about Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Nothing other than destruction of nuclear facilities would be attempted, i.e. Regime change.

The US would begin by working with France and Britain to reach an understanding about military action. Germany would be approached last as it would be the least likely to support strikes and need the most political cover based on its constitution and domestic politics. The US would reach out to its traditional allies in the English speaking world and work with Middle Eastern friends and allies like the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain to either induce them to join the coalition or simply not oppose it. Lastly, it would work with Russia and China to achieve either their support or lack of opposition. For China, this could be done by the coalition replacing lost energy supplies to China from the US SPR at lower than market prices and emphasizing its desire to a responsible global player. Russia would be far less likely to support a coalition.
Pro:
Having a very limited and clear mandate would help garner support of potential partners wary of all out war, regime change and mission creep for eliminating of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It would help partners to more easily make the case at home and abroad, better plan their participation and use the Gulf War as a precedent. Having so many countries participate would allow each to decide the level and nature of their of involvement (e.g. military or financial). Most crucial is their political participation. The reliance on special forces and not ground forces would lead to low coalition losses helping maintain support for the war.


This option would eliminate most of Iran’s facilities and try to gain information on those unknown to the coalition. By doing so, it would also lower the risk of proliferation by Iran itself and by demonstrating the drastic consequences of illicit nuclear activities. This would be especially important given North Korea’s lack of compliance and a perceived lack of consequences. Such a broad coalition would also make Israel’s participation or a unilateral Israeli strike unnecessary. Lastly, it would make clear to our allies the US will protect them and reassure the world the US prefers to work multilaterally to deal with threats, increasing our soft power.
Con:
Many countries are publicly and privately concerned with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, few have expressed a willingness to resort to military operations to achieve their goals. While France for example has been vocal about military force, the UK and Germany have stuck to diplomacy. In the region, many Arab states have privately expressed concern and support for the US to disarm Iran. However, it is difficult to predict whether they could publicly support the US attacking another Muslim state, no matter how justified. It also carries the risk of Iranians rallying around the flag instead of turning on their own government.
The type of coalition formed would also play a large role in the legitimacy of the operation. A UN Security Council mandate would be ideal though still not make operations invulnerable to criticism. A NATO mandate would also be desirable although open to accusations of the West dictating standards to the rest of the world and some legitimacy questions due to lack of a UN mandate. A coalition of the willing that does not include the EU3 would be seen as illegitimate and could have serious political consequences for the US. Additionally, even with shared intelligence it is unclear whether all nuclear facilities would be destroyed and what would keep Tehran from pursuing the program again after the war was over.

[Part I]

This is the second part of my new series on US policy options towards Iran. The first part layed out some background on Iran. This will deal with our assumptions about them and US objectives.

Assumptions: – Iran does not have nuclear weapons and is covertly pursuing them but its decision is reversible.
– Iran has a legitimate need for civilian nuclear power.
– If attacked, Iran would retaliate with military power, terrorist attacks or both.
– Iran’s nuclear motivations include security, regime survival, prestige and self-sufficiency.
– Iran would neither launch a nuclear first strike nor provide nuclear weapons or material to terrorists
– Current US deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan preclude extensive ground operations against Iran however there would be sufficient air, naval and special forces to mount an attack.
– The US and its allies have limited intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
– The NPT is an important international norm that must be upheld and its credibility maintained.
– Iran is vulnerable to separatism, specifically Kurdish, Azeri, Baluchi and Arab.
– France and the UK would participate in multilateral military action against Iran.
– Germany would only back military action with a UN or NATO mandate and with other EU members
– Russia would likely veto any UNSC resolution for military action against Iran.
– China would likely veto military action and not support sanctions due to its energy dependence.
– Arab states quietly support a tough line against Iran and worry about its nuclear ambitions.
– There is currently little spare oil producing and refining capacity among the world’s oil producers.

Objectives: – Verifiable and irreversible end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
– Prevent proliferation of nuclear technology and fissile material to other states.
– Maintain the integrity of the NPT.
– Maintain alliances with Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Turkey.
– Maintain and/or improve situations in Iraq/Afghanistan
– Prevent Israel from unilaterally or multilaterally attacking Iran

This is the first in a series of post on US policy options for dealing with Iran. The format is similar to the last series on North Korea. But I’ll begin with a caveat, I do not claim that all of the options are entirely my own work. They are compiled from a variety of sources, however, this format of paper does not require sourcing thus there is none.

The aim of this series is to provide some background on Iran, clarify what our assumptions about Iran are, list US policy objectives and then weigh different options for achieving those goals based on the given background and assumptions. Thus, you will not find minute details of each policy but rather a broad description of it and its pros and cons. Since the series is big picture oriented, forgive any omissions the reader may not find. The series is as follows:

Part I: Background
Part II: Assumptions and U.S. Objectives
Part III: Option 1: Gulf war II: Iran
Part IV: Option 2: Collapsing Iran
Part V: Option 3: Containment
Part VI: Option 4: Grand Bargain
Part VII: Discussion & Recommendation

Read the rest of this entry »

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI]

This is the final post in a seven part series of mine looking at U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Discussion:

North Korea is one of the most difficult cases of nuclear proliferation. It is extremely isolated with a history of unpredictability, secrecy and aggression. On top of this, the motivations behind its long pursuit of nuclear weapons are murky. Based on past behavior and statements from North Korea, they include security from external threats, both domestic and international legitimacy, civilian energy and use as a bargaining chip. In order to formulate policy towards the DPRK, decision makers must realize that North Korea is a nuclear power, and will be very difficult to disarm. Military options would be too costly, policies of bribing and accommodating the DPRK have failed and Pyongyang’s history of proliferating WMD and missile technology make it a very dangerous threat to U.S. security.

Libya’s voluntary disarmament in 2003 has proven that long term isolation and negotiation can ultimately lead a state to disarm. However, given the amount of effort and time that has gone into negotiating with North Korea, it is extremely difficult to assess the utility of strategic neglect (Option 1) since it could take months, years or decades before conditions are right. Nevertheless, it would be a viable short term strategy given that the current Six Party Talks are ongoing and hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue for the near future. This would achieve the objectives of preventing attack and maintaining our alliances and the NPT. But uncertainty about the time frame means it would not be a good long term option.

Threating to shift the balance of power by informing Pyongyang that the U.S. would no longer object to a nuclear South Korea and Japan (Option 2) may provide the shock and impetus towards serious negotiations and some form of settlement. It would be a dramatic departure from past American policy and force Pyongyang to reconsider whether its means are achieving the intended ends. It would also aim to shock South Korea and Japan out of their mindsets of appeasement and China into realizing that its current status quo policy is untenable in the long run. The risk of this policy is that it could seriously damage the NPT, especially were it to not result in successful negotiations and disarmament. This could also happen were the information to be leaked that the United States was allowing the ROK and Japan to go nuclear. Allies and enemies may also interpret it as a desperate measure indicative of declining U.S. power. It is more of a gamble than the other options.

Comprehensive negotiations (Option 3) and containment and deterrence (Option 4) both use a much broader mix of statecraft to achieve U.S. objectives yet also involve longer and uncertain time frames to do so. Comprehensive talks with the DPRK contains elements of option 1 as it involves a longer time frame and the ability to intentionally prolong talks. However, all sides could engage in that, drawing out or even killing the negotiations. Nevertheless it would represent the broadest and most in-depth attempt to end North Korea’s nuclear program and resolve problems with its neighbors and the United States, giving it a large degree of flexibility compared to options 1 and 2. Yet, given the North’s negotiation history, they may be just as likely to use their nuclear program to accomplish their goals without making the promised concessions, thus leaving a high degree of uncertainty of success.

Finally, containment and deterrence would send a clear message to North Korea and the world of the United States’ commitment to ending the DPRK’s nuclear program, dedication to regional security and the futility of blackmail. It’s use of wide-ranging instruments of statecraft make it highly flexible and adjustable to changing conditions. But while it could force North Korea into future negotiations and disarmament, it could also antagonize them, making compromise less likely. Regarding U.S. objectives, it provides no clear time frame for eliminating the nuclear or proliferation threats while at the same time minimizing them more than the other three options. The risk of conflict is not significant but still greater than with the others due mainly to the possibilities of miscommunication or desperate North Korean actions. The strategy’s effect on our allies and others in the region could also be positive or negative.

Recommendation:
Option 4, a policy of containment and deterrence, is recommended due to its accomplishing the most U.S. objectives with the least amount of risk.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V]

Here is part 6 of 7 in my discussion of U.S. policy options for a nuclear North Korea

Option 4: Containment and Continued Deterrence

This option implicitly recognizes the fact that America, its allies and the international community have been and will remain unable to end the DPRK’s nuclear program, short of war. It therefore prescribes a wide ranging policy of deterring and containing North Korea using different instruments of power, both hard and soft, with a view to either the eventual collapse of the North or its giving in to international demands. The first part of this strategy is a military buildup, for which there are many options. U.S. forces in the ROK would be reinforced and we would work trilaterally with Japan and South Korea to coordinate and strengthen our land and sea based missile defenses. Other choices include a combination of the following: deploying an additional carrier group to the region, deploying more U.S. nuclear submarines in the area and more long range bombers in Guam. In consultation with Seoul, the U.S. may choose to revert to strategic ambiguity regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on ROK soil and publicly declare that Pyongyang would face nuclear retaliation should it use WMD.


Aside from the military aspects, this policy would aim to bolster the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by increasing interdictions, plugging legal loopholes and bringing more countries on board on a permanent basis. Containment would also escalate sanctions against the DPRK, firstly targeting the DPRK itself as well as international companies and financial institutions doing business with it. It would furthermore call for a partial to total cut off of U.N. food aid, an end to remittances from Koreans abroad and suspension of all energy supplies to the DPRK. Lastly, the United States would engage in a concerted effort to highlight the North Korean regime’s repressive policies, lack of freedom and democracy and abysmal human rights record. This would be especially important in Europe where it would resonate more and potentially lead to increased support for U.S. measures.

This policy would achieve many U.S. objectives in the short term. Such a wide ranging policy would highlight and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region and the credibility of American security guarantees to our allies. While the NPT would still be damaged by the DPRK’s withdrawal in 2003, this policy would clearly support the treaty and illustrate the consequences of withdrawing and pursuing nuclear weapons. It would also deter a military confrontation and increase international and domestic pressure on the North Korean leadership to negotiate. A hastening of regime collapse could be another possible outcome but this is very difficult to measure and should not be counted on. Lastly, increased U.S. forces in East Asia would conveniently serve a double purpose of containing and deterring North Korea while also projecting power towards China and preventing any expansionist tendencies there too. While this could upset Beijing, it may also lead it to put real and effective pressure on the DPRK to avoid an increased American military presence in their neighborhood.

What this policy would not immediately do is end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Indeed, while it may hasten the DPRK’s collapse, it would allow continued development of their program and of more weapons, albeit under increasingly difficult circumstances. While ramping up pressure and increasing PSI interdictions is unquestionably positive, there is no absolute guarantee that it would prevent all instances of weapons or technology transfer, especially if important countries like India and China remain uncooperative. On top of this, it cannot be ruled out with 100% certainty that Pyongyang can be deterred forever, nor that the increase in pressure wouldn’t lead to a North Korea preemptive strike out of pure desperation. The U.S. military build up involved would also be costly, particularly with in light of ongoing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The response of our regional allies as well as North Korea’s neighbors could also possibly turn against us. South Korea and Japan currently have little appetite for confrontation and prefer policies of appeasement and accommodation. Although the costs of China’s support for North Korea may finally become too high, this policy does risk reinforcing China’s support for the DPRK and reluctance to do anything endangering the status quo. Also, increased sanctions may have some effect on Pyongyang but short of China’s cutting off all or most of its energy supplies to the DPRK, it is hard to imagine them affecting a country which has no regard whatsoever for the welfare of its citizens and that is already one of the most isolated in the world. Countries both in the region and elsewhere may see things similarly and be unwilling to support further sanctions which would cause the death of thousands and potentially millions of already oppressed and undernourished North Koreans.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 3: Comprehensive negotiations

This approach involves changing the format of current negotiations and potentially the parties involved. It views the current crisis as one part of a greater set of problems on the Korean peninsula and would therefore widen the content of current talks to include a comprehensive settlement of most or all of the major problems there. The main focus would no longer be the DPRK’s illicit nuclear program and would thus also cover political, security, economic and energy issues. It sees an end to the isolationist policies of the North, increasing openness there and more interdependence on the rest of the world as the most viable solution. This option would also provide an opportunity to remove Russia from negotiations should the administration come to the decision that it would create more room for progress. However, it would not be a must.

Comprehensive negotiations could potentially achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on North Korea’s nuclear activities and related sanctions means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table, important to all parties, and thus allow for a greater range of possible solutions instead of the comparatively smaller range of options currently. Additionally, by their very nature, comprehensive negotiations would likely last for some time, which in and of itself could be beneficial. It would include a change in American leadership with the 2008 elections and potentially the same in North Korea at some point. Importantly, it would postpone any major decision on long term options for dealing with the North to a later date when their willingness, capabilities and goals are clearer. It would sustain our relationships with regional allies, proving long term U.S. commitment to both them and regional security. Lastly, the focus on diplomacy and credible commitment to peaceful negotiations would avoid giving the DPRK reason to resort to military action.

However, while comprehensive negotiations could solve a wide range of problems, theyt would not come without costs. First of all, while North Korea has repeatedly stated its wish to engage in bilateral talks with the U..S. and about issues broader than only its nuclear program, its record of diplomacy makes it a highly unreliable and unpredictable negotiating partner. Thus, despite potentially the largest and most involved effort yet to solve the problem, it may fail. On top of that, with the time frame involved likely to be long, it would give the DPRK the opportunity to continue developing more nuclear weapons and to improve both its bomb design and ballistic missiles, worsening the threat. As negotiations continued, it may erode the legitimacy of the NPT to some degree. Finally, if North Korea’s illegal nuclear program led to comprehensive negotiations, it could be seen as a powerful reward by others, especially Iran, thereby legitimizing the use of nuclear blackmail.