There has been yet another IED attack in Russia on the rail system. After Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia is one of the ‘hottest’ place for IED attacks and yet many go unreported in the mainstream news. Most target critical infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines or transportation.

My immediate thought is whether the future of Russia may one day look like Nigeria. With dozens of ethnic groups, religions and a history of separatism and Islamic extremism it’s not unthinkable. Combine that with the country’s increasing reliance on its oil and gas industries for both economic and political power, and key elements are there for such a campaign.

Aside from current events and geopolitics, we here at Coming Anarchy also dabble in our fair share of other topics including geography, history, law, religion and sociology. One topic we have occasionally covered has been weapons and technology. So, to combine several of our favorite themes, I’d like to bring you a short history of two of my favorite historical weapons with some surprising details you may not know.

The StG44: Father of All Assault Rifles

Ever heard of the StG 44? Probably not. Heard of the AK-47? You bet. But the StG 44 is actually the first assault rifle which all subsequent weapons were based on: the AK, G3, M16, current M4 etc. And as usual, it was the Germans who led the way.

I recently came across this post at War is Boring, which is a fine blog, but it repeated one of the most annoying, ill informed and simply incorrect stock journalistic phrases regarding the AK-47.

“No single weapon — save the atomic bomb — has had as profound an impact on modern warfare and global instability,” Larry Kahaner wrote in his biography of the weapon.

Granted, he was quoting someone else and its something so frequently repeated that few question it, but the quote itself is simply incorrect. The AK-47, while a Russian weapon, is in fact a modified version of a German weapon, which is the actual first assault rifle that revolutionized small arms and warfare, the StG 44 (Sturmgewehr 44). As in so many other cases, the Germans were quick to realize the failure and faults of past methods of warfare and weapons and masterfully designed new ones. Despite having lost WWII, the Germans were technologically far beyond the rest of the world at the time.

As Wikipedia notes, “While the StG44 had less range and power than the more powerful infantry rifles of the day, Wehrmacht studies had shown that most combat engagements occurred at less than 300 m with the majority within 200 m. Full-power rifle cartridges were excessive for the vast majority of uses for the average soldier.” Moreover, the small capcity and low rate of fire of bolt action rifles was simply inadequate.

Those interested in more of the details can read more at the linked Wikipedia article. On a side note, this author recently looked at an authentic StG 44 at a gun show. Its price? $22,000 dollars! This is due in part to its being antique but largely due to ridiculous US restrictions on automatic weapons. Anyone interested in purchasing one would likely need to sell their car(s) first, or perhaps the proverbial arm and a leg.

Lastly, unbeknownst to most people, Germany today is actually the world’s third largest exporter of arms. Specifically, the southwestern state of Baden-Wuerttemberg (where I lived for many years) excells in firearms being home to Mauser, Heckler and Koch and Walther.

The Suomi KP/-31 submachinegun

Those of you familiar with small arms, WWII, or just Call of Duty are certaintly familiar with the infamous PPSH 41, a Russian sub machine gun. And yet, as with so many Russian things, they were not in fact ‘Russian’ but adaptations or copies of other countries’ weapons. There are numerous examples of this but I’d like to focus on the Russian PPSH-41.

After the Winter War, in which the Russians were massacred by little old Finland, the Russians quickly adopted a Finnish weapon which had proven so effective against them, the Suomi.

Indeed, the Russians had realized that such weapons were superior for close quarters combat in the forests of Finland or in urban areas. From Wikipedia:

The Suomi KP/-31 is regarded by many as one of the most successful submachine guns of World War II and it was so successful that many of its features (including the 71-round drum magazine) were later copied and adopted by the Soviets for their PPD-40 and PPSh-41 submachine guns.[2] The accuracy compared to the mass-produced PPSh-41 was superior however, thanks in part to a noticeably longer barrel, with the same rate of fire and the equally large magazine capacity. The major failing of the Suomi-KP was its high production costs.

Originals of either weapon are hard to come by and extremely expensive. However, partially rebuilt models are available for around $600 chambered in the original 9mm parabellum (the cartridge being a German invention of course). However, the changes made to accomodate US laws take some of the fun away (increased barrel length and being semi automatic).

If you’ve enjoyed this historical weapons related thread, do chime in in the comments since it’s not part of our usual programming.

Russia oil production overtakes Saudi Arabia
Russia is extracting more oil than Saudi Arabia, making it the biggest producer of “black gold” in the world, figures show.

The statistics, from the OPEC, reflect a trend that has seen the Russians periodically surpass the Saudis as the world’s biggest oil producers on and off since 2002.

These latest figures are being hailed in Russia as evidence that such periodic production spikes are not one-offs though and that Moscow really does have a right to lay claim to the No 1 spot.

According to OPEC, Russia extracted 9.236 million barrels of oil a day in June, 46,000 more than Saudi Arabia.

Russia has surpassed Saudi Arabia in energy exports for years, thanks to its large exports of natural gas. Now it even surpasses Saudi Arabia in terms of oil exports alone.

It’s become a common occurrence, an event so regularly reported that it’s not longer shocking. Another critic of the Kremlin, specifically with regards to Russia’s conduct in Chechnya, has been murdered. Natalya Estemirova, a human rights lawyer and activist who won numerous international awards for her work, was bundled into a car as she left her home on Wednesday, and her body was later found by the side of a road in the neighbouring province of Ingushetia, with two close-range gunshots to the head.

She was a single mother in her early 40s and the seventh opponent of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov to have been murdered in the past 10 months.

A Fistful of Euros comments:

It’ll be interesting to see where this goes. There have been some hints that the Kremlin is a little tired of Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov. He’s a thug and embarrassingly corrupt; more to the point, his one claim to legitimacy in the Kremlin’s eyes — bringing peace and order to Chechnya — is looking a little frayed around the edges, especially since a lot of the trouble in Chechnya just seems to have moved next door to Ingushetia. (Ms. Estemirova’s killers kidnapped her in Chechnya, but dumped her body over the border in Ingushetia. This looks like a crude attempt to blame the crime on the Ingush resistance. Which would be totally consistent with Kadyrov’s character and M.O.) In theory, the Kremlin could use this — the killing of a photogenic ethnic Russian woman — as a sharp stick to poke him.

But I doubt that will happen; while Medvedev may be getting a little weary of Kadyrov, there isn’t a plausible replacement on the horizon.

With arms control talks underway between the US and Russia, a Russia general noted

Russia must keep at least 1,500 nuclear warheads after talks with the United States on a new arms treaty, Interfax news agency quoted the commander of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces as saying Wednesday. If Moscow’s final position reflects Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov’s view, it would mean Russia is not willing to cut its stockpiles by more than a few hundred strategic warheads – far less than some arms control bodies had hoped.

One of the most critical things to pay attention to in news like this is whether they are discussing strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The article does not make it clear but from what I know, I suspect he means strategic weapons, i.e. larger yield and long range ones. It would therefore not include the thousands of smaller tactical warheads Russia has and which it has refused to reduce or give up. Thus, be wary of any ‘progress’ or agreement that does not specifically mention both types.

Given Russia’s size and the threats it faces on its many borders, tactical weapons are of great use and importance to Moscow, whereas they are not for the United States which finds itself in a very different geographic and security situation. The real danger here is that the current administration, which seems intent on disarming the United States while EVERY other country is increasing its arsenal, will agree to cuts in our forces that do NOT include Russia’s tactical weapons being dismantled. Therefore, while you would read news articles on Russia’s and America’s numbers being about the same, they’d only be counting strategic forces and thus not actually revealing the much weaker and vulnerable position the US would have put itself in.

In Part 1, I looked at the rapid breakup and reassembly of the Russian Empire during the Russian Revolution. This post portrays with maps the breakup of the Soviet Union from 1989-1991. Again, the primary source of these maps is the wikipedia article Timeline of Russian History (20th century).

(East Germany is excluded—I didn’t have room on the map.)

Compared against the Russian Revolution, we see that many of the areas that broke apart—Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, southern Central Asia—were the same “problem areas” during the Russian Revolution. I also find it interesting that Belarus and Kazakhstan were the very last to go independent, and the decision to separate from Mother Russia was controversial with many of the institutions and domestic powers-that-be at the time.

Looking at the geography of these two regions is, I believe, relevant to understanding the geographic dilemmas to Russia’s near future—to be addressed in Part 3.

The Russian Security Council has recently released a new paper outlining its strategy out to 2020. Their website is here but only in Russian. So far, I’ve been unable to find an English version of it (Russian version here I think) and would really appreciate if any readers know of how to find one, or speak enough Russian to add to this conversation. Compiled from a wide variety of news reports found through Google, the new strategy notes the following:

– The US will remain Russia’s primary strategy rival through 2020
– Russia wants to be seen as an equal to the US and NATO (pass me that crack pipe)
– Russia has overcome the “consequences of the systemic political and socioeconomic crisis of the late 20th century”
– America’s increase in its nuclear arsenal (what???) and ballistic missile defense programs are dangerous and may start an arms race.
– Russia will not engage in such an arms race
– Russia expects energy competition to increase and specifically Middle East, Barents Sea, the Arctic Region, Caspian Sea and Central Asia
– Russia will seek a multipolar world.
– To this end, it will increase its G8 participation and improve ties with Brazil, India, China and the CIS.
– Russia will seek a “highly professional community of Russian secret services”

Based on that, it would seem Russia sees the following as major threats:

– US missile defense
– NATO expansion and any kind of global role for NATO
– Moves to diversify energy resources by the US and EU
– US global hegemony

The great challenge here is developing a new relationship with Russia and not resorting to our comfortable Cold War ways. This in no way suggests Russia will become a friend as that is unlikely. However, it is both wrong and dangerous to assume that our interests will always clash. Recent examples of ad hoc cooperation like the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism provide proof cooperation is possible, but may in fact be most successful on such a basis. Given that all four items listed as major threats to Russia are important US policy goals, it indeed seems difficult to imagine large scale cooperation. Lastly, given the poor state of Russia and its lack of attractive power, what means are a Moscow’s disposal to achieve its goals and defend against its threats? Energy blackmail? Nuclear forces? A new series of ‘client states’ (Abkhazia, S. Ossetia, Transdniester etc.)?

So where does this leave the US-Russia relationship?

Russia’s use of its natural resources and their delivery systems for both tactical and strategic leverage is well known by now. Thus, it is interesting to read this NYT article about Russia stockpiling diamonds and surely no coincidence that the Russian company involved is mostly state owned and working with a subsidiary of the infamous Gazprom.

Russia quietly passed a milestone this year: surpassing De Beers as the world’s largest diamond producer. But the global market for diamonds is so dismal that the Alrosa diamond company, 90 percent owned by the Russian government, has not sold a rough stone on the open market since December, and has stockpiled them instead. As a result, Russia has become the arbiter of global diamond prices.

Read the rest here.

One of the threats that has been exaggerated by the echo-chamber media is Russia. Contrast this article with wild fears about Russia landing rusting Cold War museum pieces in Cuba and Venezuela. We’ve discussed this several times in posts here, here, here and here.

Russia’s military was over 4 million strong during the USSR, has dropped to approximately 1.13 million and is slated to be decreased below a million. The fact of the matter is Russia can neither afford to maintain, much less upgrade its conventional military forces. Therefore, it has been and will continue to increasingly rely on its strategic forces. As Russia continues to deteriorate, this will lead to Russia’s more quickly climb up the escalation ladder in potential conflicts. As has been said at tdaxp many a time, Russia is merely a regional power with nuclear weapons. It cannot really project power globally, has no attractive ideology and little to offer allies except domination and backwardness.

Putting aside the absolute fantasy of a nuclear weapons free world, Obama is attempting to improve the US relationship with Russia. The major starting point is negotiating a new START (strategic arms reduction treaty) treaty with the Russians to reduce each country’s respective nuclear weapons. Yet, this blogger feels it runs contrary to the idea of an improved and friendlier relationship with Moscow. After all, how many arms control treaties does the United States have with its allies? Zero. My and others’ great fear is that the Obama administration will let arms control define the US-Russia relationship at a time when a far broader range of issues require attention. Continuing the Cold War era arms control treaties with Moscow continues to define the US-Russia relationship as adversarial, not cooperative. I understand proliferation and nuclear forces reduction are important issues and that since Russia currently possesses the most nuclear weapons in the world, it is a key issue with them. However, I feel this is the wrong way forward.

Readers, your thoughts?