Several days ago, US Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech at the National Defense University outlining the current administration’s arms control agenda. It included pushing for US ratification of the CTBT, the ongoing START talks with Russia and reducing the US nuclear arsenal. While we could discuss all three of these issues at length, I’d like to first concentrate on the idea of ‘getting to zero’ and reducing America’s nuclear capability.

The Vice President (as others) noted that

“We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective.”

Non-nuclear weapons development includes the administration’s plan for an “adaptive” missile-defense shield and conventional warheads “with worldwide reach,” he said. “With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong,” Mr. Biden said.

The idea of replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional capabilities is not new. The argument is that the increasing destructive power of modern conventional weapons combined with the ability of the United States to ‘reach out and touch someone’ anywhere on the globe in a minutes or hours can play the same deterrent role as nuclear weapons currently do.

In order to break down this argument, I’d like to make two things clear. Firstly, the goal of our current nuclear force posture is to deter adversaries from attacking us and our allies. Secondly, the means to accomplish this is not and should not be the focus of discussion but instead the end. What do I mean? Many people focus on the weapons themselves, i.e. nuclear weapons, but as Biden notes, if conventional capabilities can fulfil the same function (i.e. survive a first strike and destroy enemy targets with high certainty), then they can be substituted for nuclear weapons. In short, how we do it doesn’t matter. The key thing is the destruction of enemy targets with high certainty. The fact that we use nuclear weapons for this purpose is a reflection only of the fact that they are the best suited weapon available for this task today.

However, there are very serious problems with the idea of replacing nuclear with conventional weapons.

If we accept the proposition that today, or sometime in the future, conventional weapons will be on par with nuclear weapons in terms of their deterrent capability, then several logical conclusions must follow:

1) These conventional weapons would be just as dangerous as nuclear weapons. Therefore replacing one with the other makes no substantive difference. Moreover, it would require time, money and effort to do this all with no gain.

2) If conventional weapons are used in the future in the same role as nuclear weapons today, they could invite a nuclear response from adversaries whose conventional capabilities do not match our own. This would be possible also in smaller conflicts because an enemy could then never be sure what weapons were employed since both nuclear and conventional are equall bad. It would lead to escalation at a much higher pace.

3) Having more conventional weapons in the US deterrent may lower the threshold for use.This may encourage a first strike by us or others.

4) If conventional and nuclear weapons are ever equal, they will be sought after by other states just as nuclear weapons are. This leaves us in the same situation as today. However, if the conventional capability is more expensive or difficult to achieve than nuclear weapons (which is older technology now), it will actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5) If these conventional weapons are indeed equal, it means countries will be able to acquire destructive power equal to nuclear weapons, but WITHIN the legal framework Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This will lead to the irrelevance and death of the most important and successful nonproliferation regime the world has.

6) If conventional weapons can equal nuclear ones, they will require the same types of arms control agreements and nonproliferation agreements as nuclear weapons.

7) Replacing nuclear weapons with equally capable conventional weapons is a cosmetic change which does nothing to address the underlying nature of the international system which makes deterrence necessary in the first place. It’s a change in form, not substance.

Readers, I’d appreciate any thoughts, criticisms and comments you have on this.

As if the ongoing North Korea and Iran debacles aren’t enough, the IAEA and its unfit head Mohamed ElBaradei have provided yet more reason to doubt their legitimacy and incompetent:

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said Sunday that “Israel is number one threat to Middle East” with its nuclear arms, the official IRNA news agency reported. At a joint press conference with Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief Ali Akbar Salehi in Tehran, ElBaradei brought Israel under spotlight and said that the Tel Aviv regime has refused to allow inspections into its nuclear installations for 30years, the report said.”Israel is the number one threat to the Middle East given the nuclear arms it possesses,” ElBaradei was quoted as saying.

Firstly, Iran being the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and having a revolutionary government would be a seemingly obvious choice for biggest threat to the region. Second of all, Israel’s neighbors have had the opportunity to go nuclear for the past several decades. Some considered it, such as Egypt, but ultimately concluded it wasn’t necessary and understood Israel acquired them as a last resort due to its small geographic size and population. It a major reason the Egyptian program was shut down. Iraq attempted it but this author is not aware of any evidence linking Israel to that decision. Rather, given the nature of the Iraqi regime before 2003, its pursuit of a host of WMD and its belief that Iran (post 1979) was Iraq’s biggest threat, it again seems silly to argue tiny Israel is somehow the region’s largest threat.

For those of you following proliferation issues, it will come as very welcome news that South Korea has finally joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It was created by the United States in 2003 to proactively interdict shipment of WMD related materials and covers land, sea and air. Importantly, it uses existing legal frameworks and agreements as the basis for action and is proactive. This means that the PSI is really an activity, NOT an organization. There is no headquarters, secretariat etc. The State Department describes it as:

The PSI is an innovative and proactive approach to preventing proliferation that relies on voluntary actions by states that are consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. PSI participants use existing authorities—national and international—to put an end to WMD-related trafficking and take steps to strengthen those authorities as necessary. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD. The PSI is a positive way to take such cooperative action.

Previously, South Korea had refused to join for fear of upsetting the North, maintaining the illusion that placating Pyongyang would somehow help achieve its foreign policy goals. It’s good to see them change their minds. This means the US and other PSI members will have a new and valuable partner in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and materials.

The increasing likelihood that Iran will successfully acquire a nuclear weapon cannot be avoided. While this author does not predict with certainty that it will happen, nor believe the US and EU shouldn’t do everything in its power to stop it, it is a real possibility. Therefore, policy discussions should also begin to think about the potential implications of a nuclear Iran and consider how the US and others can mitigate the effects thereof.

North Korea has not yet set off a cascade of proliferation, largely because the potential new nuclear states are all US allies (South Korea, Japan, perhaps Taiwan). The same is not true of all the Middle East. In addition, states may react not only to Iran, but to their perceived reaction of others, i.e. Egypt reacting to Iran directly as well as to its belief Saudi Arabia will respond with its own program. Below is a regional map of what a nuclear Iran could lead to:

And to give readers something else to think about, the following countries are currently giving serious consideration to nuclear energy in the near term (within 10 years): Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Vietnam.

As if that were not troubling enough, the following countries have long term plans or studies underway: Algeria, Australia, Chile, Georgia, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen.

This is not to say that all or even most will move forward. Nuclear energy (even for peaceful purposes) requires a massive financial investments in infrastructure, technology, training and more. Additionally, some states may decide against it at various states of their programs, as has happened many times in the past.

Therefore, in the event that Iran does indeed acquire a nuclear weapons capability, which we’ll define as the generally agreed perception that Iran does (whether or not it has tested), the United States and Europe need to think long and hard about instruments of state power which can be applied to prevent a cascade of nuclear weapons states and/or to ensure that peaceful nuclear energy (a legal right of every NPT signatory) stays peaceful and secure.

In 2003, in response to legal loopholes regarding confiscating WMD related materials and increasing concern by the US and others about proliferation, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiatve (PSI). The beauty of the PSI is that it is not a formal organization. There is no secretariat, annual meetings, dues and so forth. Most importantly, there are no new additional laws, rules or protocols for participating countries to pass, accept or follow. It is a type of coalition of the willing in which member countries navies cooperate in boarding and searching ships suspected of carrying illegal WMD related materials.

For example, a Madagascar flagged ship is suspected of carrying nuclear technology to Iran. The US is following it but does not have a legal agreement with Madagascar (just a random country as an example) to board each other’s ships. However, fellow PSI participant Australia just happens to. The US then asks Australia to stop and board the ship in line with its pre-existing bilateral agreement. Thus, it is a beautiful, flexible and so far successful organization.

It is always difficult to form a new international organization, especially something to deal with piracy where issues like deadly force, detention, prosecution and so forth are involved. Using the PSI as a model, I suggest forming something similar for dealing with pirates, whether in Somalia, West Africa, S.E. Asia or elsewhere. Thus, I recommend the White House form a group to compile existing maritime laws (maybe YH knows some?) to investigate how a type of ad hoc group can be established to fight this ongoing threat.

On September 6th 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed an unknown structure in eastern Syria. Despite such a brazen act, little was said on either sides. Much speculation occurred as to the nuclear nature of the facility. While the following information turns out to be dated, I was only made aware of it this evening and I imagine other readers have missed this as well. The news has completely forgotten it. Below is a link to Globalsecurity.org which has a copy of a declassified CIA briefing regarding the Syrian facilities which goes into a great deal of detail on the intel the U.S. had on it and additionally provides extensive slides and photographs as supporting evidence.

The key points are:

– Syria was building a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium and ultimately nuclear weapons
– The program was clearly not for peaceful purposes
– The design North Korean (an exact copy of the Yongbyon plant)
– North Korean scientists were actively helping build the facility
– North Korea’s motivations were primarily hard currency.
– The facility’s construction began in 2001 and ended in 2007 when Israel destroyed it.
– The facility was very near to being operational when destroyed



The link to the briefing (read it all!) and slides/photos is here.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI]

This is the final post in a seven part series of mine looking at U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Discussion:

North Korea is one of the most difficult cases of nuclear proliferation. It is extremely isolated with a history of unpredictability, secrecy and aggression. On top of this, the motivations behind its long pursuit of nuclear weapons are murky. Based on past behavior and statements from North Korea, they include security from external threats, both domestic and international legitimacy, civilian energy and use as a bargaining chip. In order to formulate policy towards the DPRK, decision makers must realize that North Korea is a nuclear power, and will be very difficult to disarm. Military options would be too costly, policies of bribing and accommodating the DPRK have failed and Pyongyang’s history of proliferating WMD and missile technology make it a very dangerous threat to U.S. security.

Libya’s voluntary disarmament in 2003 has proven that long term isolation and negotiation can ultimately lead a state to disarm. However, given the amount of effort and time that has gone into negotiating with North Korea, it is extremely difficult to assess the utility of strategic neglect (Option 1) since it could take months, years or decades before conditions are right. Nevertheless, it would be a viable short term strategy given that the current Six Party Talks are ongoing and hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue for the near future. This would achieve the objectives of preventing attack and maintaining our alliances and the NPT. But uncertainty about the time frame means it would not be a good long term option.

Threating to shift the balance of power by informing Pyongyang that the U.S. would no longer object to a nuclear South Korea and Japan (Option 2) may provide the shock and impetus towards serious negotiations and some form of settlement. It would be a dramatic departure from past American policy and force Pyongyang to reconsider whether its means are achieving the intended ends. It would also aim to shock South Korea and Japan out of their mindsets of appeasement and China into realizing that its current status quo policy is untenable in the long run. The risk of this policy is that it could seriously damage the NPT, especially were it to not result in successful negotiations and disarmament. This could also happen were the information to be leaked that the United States was allowing the ROK and Japan to go nuclear. Allies and enemies may also interpret it as a desperate measure indicative of declining U.S. power. It is more of a gamble than the other options.

Comprehensive negotiations (Option 3) and containment and deterrence (Option 4) both use a much broader mix of statecraft to achieve U.S. objectives yet also involve longer and uncertain time frames to do so. Comprehensive talks with the DPRK contains elements of option 1 as it involves a longer time frame and the ability to intentionally prolong talks. However, all sides could engage in that, drawing out or even killing the negotiations. Nevertheless it would represent the broadest and most in-depth attempt to end North Korea’s nuclear program and resolve problems with its neighbors and the United States, giving it a large degree of flexibility compared to options 1 and 2. Yet, given the North’s negotiation history, they may be just as likely to use their nuclear program to accomplish their goals without making the promised concessions, thus leaving a high degree of uncertainty of success.

Finally, containment and deterrence would send a clear message to North Korea and the world of the United States’ commitment to ending the DPRK’s nuclear program, dedication to regional security and the futility of blackmail. It’s use of wide-ranging instruments of statecraft make it highly flexible and adjustable to changing conditions. But while it could force North Korea into future negotiations and disarmament, it could also antagonize them, making compromise less likely. Regarding U.S. objectives, it provides no clear time frame for eliminating the nuclear or proliferation threats while at the same time minimizing them more than the other three options. The risk of conflict is not significant but still greater than with the others due mainly to the possibilities of miscommunication or desperate North Korean actions. The strategy’s effect on our allies and others in the region could also be positive or negative.

Recommendation:
Option 4, a policy of containment and deterrence, is recommended due to its accomplishing the most U.S. objectives with the least amount of risk.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V]

Here is part 6 of 7 in my discussion of U.S. policy options for a nuclear North Korea

Option 4: Containment and Continued Deterrence

This option implicitly recognizes the fact that America, its allies and the international community have been and will remain unable to end the DPRK’s nuclear program, short of war. It therefore prescribes a wide ranging policy of deterring and containing North Korea using different instruments of power, both hard and soft, with a view to either the eventual collapse of the North or its giving in to international demands. The first part of this strategy is a military buildup, for which there are many options. U.S. forces in the ROK would be reinforced and we would work trilaterally with Japan and South Korea to coordinate and strengthen our land and sea based missile defenses. Other choices include a combination of the following: deploying an additional carrier group to the region, deploying more U.S. nuclear submarines in the area and more long range bombers in Guam. In consultation with Seoul, the U.S. may choose to revert to strategic ambiguity regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on ROK soil and publicly declare that Pyongyang would face nuclear retaliation should it use WMD.


Aside from the military aspects, this policy would aim to bolster the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by increasing interdictions, plugging legal loopholes and bringing more countries on board on a permanent basis. Containment would also escalate sanctions against the DPRK, firstly targeting the DPRK itself as well as international companies and financial institutions doing business with it. It would furthermore call for a partial to total cut off of U.N. food aid, an end to remittances from Koreans abroad and suspension of all energy supplies to the DPRK. Lastly, the United States would engage in a concerted effort to highlight the North Korean regime’s repressive policies, lack of freedom and democracy and abysmal human rights record. This would be especially important in Europe where it would resonate more and potentially lead to increased support for U.S. measures.

This policy would achieve many U.S. objectives in the short term. Such a wide ranging policy would highlight and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region and the credibility of American security guarantees to our allies. While the NPT would still be damaged by the DPRK’s withdrawal in 2003, this policy would clearly support the treaty and illustrate the consequences of withdrawing and pursuing nuclear weapons. It would also deter a military confrontation and increase international and domestic pressure on the North Korean leadership to negotiate. A hastening of regime collapse could be another possible outcome but this is very difficult to measure and should not be counted on. Lastly, increased U.S. forces in East Asia would conveniently serve a double purpose of containing and deterring North Korea while also projecting power towards China and preventing any expansionist tendencies there too. While this could upset Beijing, it may also lead it to put real and effective pressure on the DPRK to avoid an increased American military presence in their neighborhood.

What this policy would not immediately do is end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Indeed, while it may hasten the DPRK’s collapse, it would allow continued development of their program and of more weapons, albeit under increasingly difficult circumstances. While ramping up pressure and increasing PSI interdictions is unquestionably positive, there is no absolute guarantee that it would prevent all instances of weapons or technology transfer, especially if important countries like India and China remain uncooperative. On top of this, it cannot be ruled out with 100% certainty that Pyongyang can be deterred forever, nor that the increase in pressure wouldn’t lead to a North Korea preemptive strike out of pure desperation. The U.S. military build up involved would also be costly, particularly with in light of ongoing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The response of our regional allies as well as North Korea’s neighbors could also possibly turn against us. South Korea and Japan currently have little appetite for confrontation and prefer policies of appeasement and accommodation. Although the costs of China’s support for North Korea may finally become too high, this policy does risk reinforcing China’s support for the DPRK and reluctance to do anything endangering the status quo. Also, increased sanctions may have some effect on Pyongyang but short of China’s cutting off all or most of its energy supplies to the DPRK, it is hard to imagine them affecting a country which has no regard whatsoever for the welfare of its citizens and that is already one of the most isolated in the world. Countries both in the region and elsewhere may see things similarly and be unwilling to support further sanctions which would cause the death of thousands and potentially millions of already oppressed and undernourished North Koreans.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 3: Comprehensive negotiations

This approach involves changing the format of current negotiations and potentially the parties involved. It views the current crisis as one part of a greater set of problems on the Korean peninsula and would therefore widen the content of current talks to include a comprehensive settlement of most or all of the major problems there. The main focus would no longer be the DPRK’s illicit nuclear program and would thus also cover political, security, economic and energy issues. It sees an end to the isolationist policies of the North, increasing openness there and more interdependence on the rest of the world as the most viable solution. This option would also provide an opportunity to remove Russia from negotiations should the administration come to the decision that it would create more room for progress. However, it would not be a must.

Comprehensive negotiations could potentially achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on North Korea’s nuclear activities and related sanctions means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table, important to all parties, and thus allow for a greater range of possible solutions instead of the comparatively smaller range of options currently. Additionally, by their very nature, comprehensive negotiations would likely last for some time, which in and of itself could be beneficial. It would include a change in American leadership with the 2008 elections and potentially the same in North Korea at some point. Importantly, it would postpone any major decision on long term options for dealing with the North to a later date when their willingness, capabilities and goals are clearer. It would sustain our relationships with regional allies, proving long term U.S. commitment to both them and regional security. Lastly, the focus on diplomacy and credible commitment to peaceful negotiations would avoid giving the DPRK reason to resort to military action.

However, while comprehensive negotiations could solve a wide range of problems, theyt would not come without costs. First of all, while North Korea has repeatedly stated its wish to engage in bilateral talks with the U..S. and about issues broader than only its nuclear program, its record of diplomacy makes it a highly unreliable and unpredictable negotiating partner. Thus, despite potentially the largest and most involved effort yet to solve the problem, it may fail. On top of that, with the time frame involved likely to be long, it would give the DPRK the opportunity to continue developing more nuclear weapons and to improve both its bomb design and ballistic missiles, worsening the threat. As negotiations continued, it may erode the legitimacy of the NPT to some degree. Finally, if North Korea’s illegal nuclear program led to comprehensive negotiations, it could be seen as a powerful reward by others, especially Iran, thereby legitimizing the use of nuclear blackmail.

[Part I | Part II | Part III]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 2: A Regional Nuclear Rebalancing

Since North Korea’s past behavior suggests it is not motivated entirely by security concerns, but also an attempt to secure concessions from the ROK, Japan and the U.S. through intimidation and nuclear blackmail, an entirely new approach may be necessary. A nuclear rebalancing in the region entails the United States making clear to the DPRK that should it continue its current nuclear program, Washington will no longer oppose Tokyo’s or Seoul’s pursuit of their own nuclear deterrent and leave the decision to each respective government. The U.S. would not pressure either country to develop its own capability but inform them we would no longer object. This dramatic change would surprise the DPRK and force them to rethink their strategic calculus, were they to no longer certain they could intimidate through continued nuclear blackmail. The U.S. should not press either Seoul or Tokyo to make any decision as this is very controversial in both countries and may not garner much domestic support at present. Merely lifting our objection would be enough, as well as reassuring both that will still be protected by the American nuclear umbrella, regardless of their decision. Lastly the United States could either choose to explicitly reintroduce its tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or adopt a policy of ambiguity regarding their presence on Korean soil.

The seemingly dramatic nature of this policy is precisely its greatest strength. For years, North Korea has bullied its neighbors and sought and received concessions without fulfilling its obligations. With the U.S. heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan and Iran’s continuing nuclear program, Pyongyang is wagering that the United States is both unable and unwilling to seriously deal with it and would now, more than ever, prefer a diplomatic solution ripe for exploitation by the North Koreans. In addition to forcing North Korea to radically rethink its policies, the prospect of a nuclear South Korea or Japan would put enormous pressure on China and Russia, the DPRK’s principle supporters, to finally put decisive pressure on Pyongyang. Assuming, the ROK and Japan still did not develop their own nuclear deterrent, their infrastructure and advanced knowledge still gives them the ability to very quickly build and test their own weapons. Even this virtual deterrent, not to mention an actual one, would alter the balance of power in Asia not only against North Korea but against China and Russia as well. In the future, if the North were unable to extract concessions from either its neighbors or the US, and in a much worse security situation as a result of its own decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent, it may conclude that its own program is not worth the risks and costs. Lastly, this may set an example to countries such as Iran that the gains of illicit nuclear weapons will be quickly neutralized by newly nuclear neighbors.

Yet, for its many benefits, the potential nuclearization of South Korea and Japan would have significant consequences regionally and internationally. It would risk fatally undermining the NPT, causing other actors to seriously rethink their commitment to it and related regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Regionally, it could spark a destabilizing arms race in East Asia that could later extend to India and Pakistan as well. Internationally, others actors may determine it is in their supreme interest to withdraw from the NPT due to its ineffectiveness and go nuclear themselves. This would be especially dangerous and destabilizing in the Middle East. It is also difficult to foresee the domestic consequences in South Korea and Japan of this scenario. While U.S. reassurances may mitigate some unrest or anger, it could potentially worsen the image of the United States in the eyes of each population as well as lead them to question both American security guarantees and power if we cannot solve the issue short of simply letting them develop nuclear weapons. Lastly, although it may lead to a critical mass of pressure which would lead the DPRK to disarm, it could have the opposite effect, essentially legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and perhaps never eliminating it.