Prelude – Part 1 – Part 2 – Part 3

Countries with a “youth bulge” in the population, are frequently cited as hotspots of social unrest, war and terrorism. Historians link youth bulges in populations to genocides, 20th-century fascism, revolutions (from France to Iran), and ongoing conflicts such as that in Darfur. Youth bulge theory is influential on U.S. foreign policy. Yet major changes are coming over the next twenty years. Check out this map:

Curzon note: Russia should also be in the dark blue category along with the EU and Japan, but its people don’t live long enough.

Countries with youthful age structures and rapidly growing populations form a crescent stretching from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and then through the northern parts of South Asia. But by 2025, the number of countries in this “arc of instability” will have decreased by 35 to 40 percent owing to declining fertility and maturing populations. Three quarters of the three dozen “youth bulge countries” projected to linger beyond 2025 will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder will be located in the Middle East and scattered across Asia and among the Pacific Islands.

Read the rest of this entry »

Click for interactive map

NPR tests the “knowns, unknowns and presumeds” of global migration in an interesting article I recommend you read. It is closely related to Curzon’s recent work on Demographics.

One myth I would like to draw your attention to is about the flow of people between the Gap and the Core:

Most migration is from poor countries to wealthy developed ones.
False. Some 60 percent of all global migration is within the developed world. This so-called “south-south migration” might include a Bangladeshi laborer moving to India or an Indian laborer moving to Kuwait, for example.

Don’t forget to check out the interactive map for a look at the trends and read the conversations in Curzon’s post.

UPDATE: Dr. Barnett responds in an unfortunately typical vitrioled post (“analytically-narrow”… “drunken [sic?] the Kool-Aid”… “Dark Lord”, etc., etc.). If anyone sees a real response in there, please share the substance in the comments.

ORIGINAL POST:

Dr. Thomas Barnett has built his career on describing the world as divided between a rich and developed “Core,” and an unconnected and undeveloped “Gap.” We’ve tried to “map” this gap several times here at CA to try and understand where the exact lines are. But when it comes down to it, the biggest indicator of the gap-core border is not homosexuality laws or war risk insurance policies, but simply looking at birth rates. All the developed societies in North America, Europe, and the Pacific quickly stopped producing babies once they became rich. The undeveloped world in Africa, South America, South Asia and the Middle East continues to grow at astounding rates. Compare a map of birth rates to a map of Barnett’s Gap and you get a crystal clear correlation: the higher the birth rate, the worse off the country.

It almost defies logic. The most miserable, ungoverned disasters of nations on this earth—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan—are the ones with the highest growth rates. Or as Robert D. Kaplan said in this interview on PBS more than a decade ago on April 5 1996:

All the new babies in the world are not being born in Japan or Scarsdale or Singapore. They’re being born in poor African countries, subcontinental India, and the poorest parts of our own societies. It’s like one part of the world is going in one direction, but a large swath of humanity is going in another. And overpopulation, disease pandemics, rising crime, cultural dysfunction, are going to make a critical mass of the Third World so far behind that they won’t be able to catch up.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is optimistic that the core counties can shrink the gap. Perhaps. But to paraphrase from Coming Anarchy, the world population in 1950 was 2.5 billion, it’s 6 billion today, and it will break 9 billion in 40 years. Although optimists have hopes for new resource technologies and free-market development in the global village, a whopping 95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world. Places like the Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan where governments do not function, the economy a wreck, and exports are non-existent. These places are already security black holes, and its only going to get worse as their populations explode.

This population growth will put an increasing strain on our environment and our energy resources. And while neo-Malthusians may underestimate human adaptability in today’s environmental-social system, time may ultimately prove them right.

“Demographics is Destiny” is a common phrase used by historians and geostrategic thinkers. It isn’t entirely true. But demographics does play a major role in the rise and fall of civilizations and world power.

The Telegraph has an article on Japan’s shrinking population. Most of it is old news:

Japan is slowly shrinking. Last year it became the first nation in modern history to tip over into outright demographic contraction, pioneering a path that will soon be followed by Italy, Germany, Spain, and most of Eastern Europe, with China close behind.

Then there’s the economic woes that come with such a decline in the population:

The population peaked at 128m in 2005 and is expected to fall below 100m by the middle of the century, when 36% will be 65 or older. The dynamics of decline are already contaminating every aspect of the economy. The trend rate of growth has dropped to 1.5%. The blistering 10% pace of the early 1970s seems like a distant dream.

Wages have fallen for the last five months in a row, vastly complicating efforts to stave off deflation. Officials at the Bank of Japan blame the subtle effects of ageing. A bulge of baby-boomers is retiring at the top of the pay scale, to be replaced by younger workers – many on part-time contracts, at half the rate. Salaries have fallen 8% over the past decade.

That’s Japan. Yet what makes the article interesting is how it describes China’s future perils in a few short years, which are far greater than Japan:

It will be much worse for China, where the workforce peaks in just eight years before plunging into the fastest downward spiral ever seen in peacetime. The one-child policy of 1980s and 1990s has already baked a population crunch into the pie, whatever is done now…

China’s development is 40 years behind Japan on most indicators, and its return on investment (incremental capital output ratio) is a dismal 4.4, far worse than those of Japan (3.2), South Korea (3.2), and Taiwan (2.7) during their growth spurts.

When the crunch comes around 2015, China’s per capita income will be a sixth of Japanese and western levels. The society will turn grey before it escapes poverty.

The conclusion to be drawn from the article defies all conventional wisdom—it turns out that, if you look at the demographic realities, China isn’t going to be the superpower of the 21st century, but an aging country with an enormous population and an inefficient industrial economy that is barely rich enough to pay the pensions of all the oldies running around.

What of the rest of the world and the future of the balance of power in the 21st century? More on that in part 2, to be posted in 48 hours.