FP Passport notes an article in the Turkish news regarding military preparations for further strikes within both Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish Kurdistan.

The TSK is currently developing its strategy for the operation, which will most likely be launched in the middle of March. The ground operation is planned to be the final strike against the terrorist organization. It will follow upon a series of aerial attacks that have seriously disrupted the organization, bringing it to the brink of collapse. Reports indicate that communications between PKK leaders was seriously disrupted by the operations and that the distrust that emerged following the severing of communications has brought the organization to the edge of dissolution. The TSK has set up military bases at high elevations in the Cudi, Gabar, Küpeli, Tanin and Kato mountains, strategic points used by the PKK militants for infiltration into Turkey. The bases will include helicopter landing facilities, thermal cameras and artillery equipment.

What FP Passport fails to ask is why after numerous air strikes and incursions is Turkey moving against against northern Iraq? The official line is of course that it is aiming a final blow at the PKK (sounds like an Israeli phrase these days), which could very well be true. Information is sketchy regarding how much damage was actually inflicted on the PKK. The second possibility is that Turkey’s initial strikes were not successful and they are moving to correct past mistakes and keep the PKK on the defense. Lastly, the move may come as a “Wag the Dog” style national security diversion from domestic issues such as the headscarf. Indeed, the only think that could distract the Turkish military from the evils of covered hair is the Kurdish independence movement. I’ll continue to follow the issue and watch for signs as to the nature and reasoning behind the preparations.

As as a follow up on my previous post on rumors that the PKK is moving to Nagorno-Karabagh, Jamestown has a new article on the same subject that is well worth reading.

Reviving a Forgotten Threat: The PKK in Nagorno-Karabakh

By Anar Valiyev

The decades-long war between the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish army has had a significant impact on Azerbaijani politics. Being a staunch ally of Turkey and suffering from problems of separatism and terrorism itself, Azerbaijan has always expressed its full support for the counter-terrorist actions of its neighbor and has even offered its assistance. The recent escalation of the conflict in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq has not left the Azerbaijani establishment passive. This time, however, the conflict has directly affected the interests of Azerbaijan. The reason is the alleged decision of the PKK’s leadership to move its bases from the Qandil mountain range in Iraqi Kurdistan to the Armenian-occupied regions of Nagorno-Karabakh (Azeri Press Agency, December 18; UPI, November 30; Today’s Zaman, November 30). Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani press has carried reports about the possible creation of a Kurdish autonomous district in the Armenian-occupied Lachin and Kelbajar regions (Day.az, December 3). While some analysts consider the prospect of establishing a new Kurdish state in the Caucasus as mere fiction, other experts do not deny the possibility of such a scenario developing. Before moving to an analysis of the current situation, it is worthwhile to look at the historical aspects of the problem.

Read the full article at Jamestown.

Today’s German Tagesschau hints at something (German link) I’ve also been wondering, namely, why the Turks are claiming such wild success having deal “strong blows” and stood up against terrorists when almost nobody has been killed and no proof has been given that anything of value was hit.

It is one thing for the Kurds to deny much has been hit but even the Turks have said little about the concrete accomplishments of the mission. Their public statements’ focus has been on taking action, doing whatever is necessary and saving face. Has the reams of intelligence the US is giving Turkey been bad? Have the PKK simply moved, having had weeks of warning from Turkey? Has the US tipped off the Kurds in order to keep both sides happy and find a face saving solution? At the moment it is hard to say. It is exceedingly unlikely that the PKK did not disperse from the Qandil mountains. Having little infrastructure in the first place, there was little to pack up and move and as a successful guerrilla group, melting back into the environment is what they do best.

As Turkey’s limited raids and air strikes continue, it will be interesting to see the ratio of rhetoric to actual success. At the moment, it would seem the former is far greater than the latter.

Since the founding of the Republic, Turkey’s archenemies have been those whose who harbor legitimate claims against their territory: Greeks, Armenians and Kurds. Ankara’s deepest fears always involve some conspiracy consisting of several of the aforementioned groups collaborating against them to dismantle modern Turkey.

Usually these claims are nonsense, if not utterly absurd.The plot of a Turkish bestseller, Metal Storm, dicussed previously at Coming Anarchy, cuts to the heart of Turkey’s paranoid nationalism and its current conflicts with both the Kurds and Armenians. The plot? America invades Turkey and divides the country between the Greeks and Armenians. It may sound far fetched but this populist and reactionary book plays on the country’s ultimate fear: the disintegration of Turkey into various ethnic homelands.

With that in mind, a recent article in Today’s Zaman,a English-language Turkish daily, alleges something along the same lines.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), faced with increasing pressure to end its activities in northern Iraq, may be seeking to re-establish its camps in the Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, intelligence reports indicate.

[...] Confronted with an increasingly hostile environment, the PKK has already begun evacuating its camps in northern Iraq, according to recent intelligence reports from the region. PKK administrators are now having talks with Armenia to relocate their camps to the Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, intelligence reports suggest. PKK leaders have also been talking to 12 Kurdish villages in Armenia, located near the border with Turkey.

While not necessarily unlikely, it would seem to be awfully convenient for Turkey given the escalating situation in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. However, it would not be the first time Turkey’s enemies collaborated. Greece, Iran, Syria and the USSR have all armed and train the PKK at various points in time and Greece is has continued to even through the 90s and most likely today. It is therefore hardly unthinkable that Armenia would do the same.

cui bono?

With the green light to launch operations in northern Iraq, Turkey has nevertheless dropped off the radar. While the occasional anti-terrorist operations make Turkish news, they almost always are within Turkey itself and few real attacks have been carried out within Iraq as far as we know. However, with the many weeks of warning, the PKK had plenty of time to shut down its bases in the Qandil mountains and scatter or relocate. Equally predictable was that the Turks would expect this which also explains the lack of public fireworks there. Any guerilla group needs the spotlight but as international attention grew and everyone who picked up a paper suddenly knew the locations of PKK bases, the time had come for a change.

Yet, today there are few hospitable places for the PKK to go. While operations naturally continue in Turkey and Iran (by PJAC), both Syria and Iran no longer support the PKK making moving physical bases and training areas very difficult. North Iraq was long a safe haven for all of the Kurds, law-abiding citizens and PKK members alike. As that day comes to an end and Iraqi Kurds are less willing to risk their autonomy and success for their kin across the border, the PKK has two options: melt back into the population until things cool down or move shop.

Karabagh?

In most people’s mind, Armenia usually conjures up the faces of local immigrants or perhaps vague ideas about genocide at the hands of the Turks. However, less known is that mountainous Armenia as well as Azerbaijan are both home to a very small number of Kurds. In fact, maps of Kurdistan usually include a sliver of each. Thus, the PKK could indeed have connections to the Caucasus although these groups are not only small and isolated but may not be as sympathetic to the cause. In addition, the PKK has developed links with radical Armenian organizations such as ASALA giving it a potential second network of support or at least contacts in the region.

The Caucasus is full of ethnic strife, long standing grudges and unfinished conflicts and Nagorno-Karabagh is no exception. Largely isolated from the world, poor and mountainous, it is both mountainous and difficult to travel through, both advantages to the PKK. Armenia, of which it is a de facto part (despite a laughable facade of independence), does indeed seek to settle the conflict between it and Azerbaijan but never plans to relinquish control of the area. Thus, they lose little by allowing the use of the territory by the PKK. However, one major obstacle exists: the location. Nagorno-Karabagh may be safely located a fair distance from Turkey and in a difficult to traverse area, but there is a major downside. Launching attacks into Turkey would be considerably difficult. Border countries like Syria, Iraq and Iran have longer, mountainous borders which are easier to sneak through. The distance from Stepanakert to the nearest border area with Turkey is around 115 miles through some of the highest mountains of Armenia proper.

Conclusion

While a PKK relocation to Karabagh is merely unconfirmed intelligence at the moment, Armenian support would be neither unthinkable nor unlikely. However, were Karabagh to be used by the PKK it would likely be for smaller scale training operations rather than a base from which to launch attacks against Turkey. In addition, it seems all too convenient for Turkey that their Kurdish and Armenian “problems” can now be publicly linked together and used to further the government’s aims both domestically and internationally. Whatever the reality, a skeptical positions remains the best for the moment.

NOTE: “Kansas” is a term used by those traveling and living in Armenia and Azerbaijan to refer to Karabagh. Discussing the situation as a foreigner is not always a good idea. Similarly, Israel is often referred to as “Disneyland” among outsiders while in Arab countries.

Disappointed with the weak show of support from America and Europe, Turkey is now looking further east for support for its planned operations in Iraq. And they need look no further than Iran, also battling its own Kurdish independence movement. Al Jazeera reports that the foreign ministers of Iran and Turkey are increasingly expressing their mutual interest in solving the problem:

In Iran, Babacan reiterated that threat, after his meeting with Manouchehr Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister, but said it was one of many options. “We have different instruments. We can use diplomacy or we can resort to military means,” he said following talks with Mottaki. “All of these are on the table.”

“The Turkish people have lost their patience… We are asking all our friends to support us in this endeavour, our fight against terror.” Iran has in recent weeks been echoing Turkey’s frustration over the failure of the authorities in the north of Iraq to crack down on the PKK, though it has drawn short of backing an incursion.

Another Kurdish group, Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), which is affiliated with the PKK, has been responsible for deadly attacks on security forces in northwestern Iran in recent months. “I think that we will be able to overcome these small grouplets,” Mottaki said. “There are various ways of going about this. We hope our co-operation will allow us to solve this as soon as possible.” Babacan thanked Iran for its help in fighting the PKK and said both foreign ministers had discussed continuing the co-operation during their meeting.

Failing to find Western support for an issue which is anyway a regional one, it is only natural Turkey has turned to a neighbor and one which also has a sizable Kurdish minority. Some may see this as continued proof of Turkey’s move eastwards and its subversion by Islamists. Turkey has been an integral part of the Middle East since the beginning of the Ottoman empire in the 1400s. The danger, however, is that if the West continues to fail to provide Ankara with support and reassure it about future support, Turkey may start forging more serious diplomatic ties with less than savory neighbors like Syria and Iran, both of whom are hostile to European and American interests.

The Turkish government is currently hoping to help quench its public’s thirst for action and to protect its regional interests. Though the situation is somewhat suspect and some of the current attacks have been nowhere near Iraq (often in the Tunceli region far away) and Turkey is likely pursuing ulterior motives, the Kurdish and PKK issue is nevertheless a top national concern. While the US and Iraq are unlikely to launch any large scale operation against the PKK for a number of reasons, publicly exhausting realistic options is vital for maintaining ties with Turkey and helping reassure her that a successful Kurdish region in Iraq is not a threat but potentially a positive external influence. Otherwise, though economically integrated in the West, we may indeed see a slow political drift eastwards should the West be chronically unable to fulfill Turkey’s needs.

As the Turkish-Iraqi tensions rise and small scale cross border operations begin, let’s examine Turkey’s situation and options at the moment.

First of all, much fuss was made about the recent weak agreement between Iraq and Turkey which did not include an allowance for Turkish troops to cross into Iraq in so-called “hot pursuit” operations against the PKK. Indeed, Turkey has gone to great lengths to secure some kind of international understanding for intended operations. Behind the rhetoric and seeming belligerence, lies the fear of the government that this could further isolate Turkey from the EU and US and that it may one day have to recognize the PKK or autonomous Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan in some form of official negotiations or through official agreements. While fully in its rights to engage in military operations in Iraq, it nevertheless is seeking some kind of official blessing.

Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Çiçek said today that “We have to explain to the rest of the world that we are right. If we don’t, we might be in a position where we are wrong. At the moment, we are working to conduct good diplomacy—or the price we’ll have to pay will be dear.” Meanwhile, the Turkish public is becoming increasingly angry and feels action is long overdue.

Yet for all the talk of a coming attack, bullets and bombs are already flying. According to the Turkish news:

Turkish warplanes flew as deep as 20 kilometers into Iraqi territory and some 300 ground troops advanced about 10 kilometers, killing 34 PKK terrorists right after a deadly attack on a military unit on Sunday, which claimed the lives of 12 soldiers. [...] yesterday that F-16 jets flew sorties up to 50 kilometers inside Iraq. Heavy artillery also pounded positions inside the Kurdish-administered north, he said.

Turkey has regularly launched small attacks inside Iraqi territory and moreover maintains small forward outposts there as well. The real question, not noted in the news, is of scale. Driving this point home are the nearly 100,000 Turkish soldiers now on the border. In addition to determining the scale of an attack, the increasing Turkish threats and pressure are meant to help internationalize the conflict and gain support for its operations at home and abroad. At the moment, both the US and EU are unofficially sympathetic to the Kurdish cause.

Meanwhile, Turkey is pushing hard for a political settlement meeting with Iraqi and American officials in a last ditch effort to keep the peace. A large scale invasion would almost certainly be a disaster. The Turks would not only face experienced guerrillas on their home turf, but potentially the approximately 100,000 strong Peshmerga who are also battle hardened and have decades of experience fighting Saddam in the same area. The Turks are just as afraid of a large scale invasion as everyone else. RFERL deails what the Iraqi Kurds may be after in letting the situation escalate:

The observers say the recognition demands would at a minimum include accepting the KRG’s representatives as officials. They might also include withdrawing Turkish opposition to including oil-rich Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish self-rule region.

On top of all this, Forward Deployed notes that the whole situation doesn’t make much sense in the first place from the Turkish side.

Many Iraqi Kurds also believe that the Turkish government overplays the attention they give to how many PKK units are operating in northern Iraq in order to deflect attention away from the fact that the vast majority of PKK members operate freely in eastern Turkey and is where most of the attacks are launched from.

I think this fact is obvious considering the fact the PKK is launching these attacks on the Turkish military and killing so many soldiers because the Iraqi Turkish border is very open. The Turks supposedly have around 60,000 soldiers deployed on their border with Iraq and yet PKK terrorists are walking through open territory and sneaking up and killing well armed and trained Turkish soldiers? It doesn’t make sense which leads me to believe these attacks are actually being launched against the military from within Turkey itself and then the fighters are fleeing across the border after the attack.

So what are Turkey’s options?

1) Small scale attacks, air raids and special ops
2) Sanctions including closing the Habur border which would severely damage southeast Turkey as well.
3) Large scale ground offensive
4) Establishment of some kind of buffer zone inside Iraq
5) Secure a political agreement with Iraq (and the US) whereby PKK bases are attacked or a few token fighters captured and extradited for public trial in Turkey to satiate people’s thirst for revenge.

With America reluctant to help, Europe unlikely to give its blessing and Turkey refusing direct talks with the Kurdish Regional Government, vital communication seems to be lacking and the less of it, the more chance there is of war.

The border between Iraq and Turkey has been heating up the past few weeks and has reached a boiling point. Yesterday, a clash on the border claimed the lives of around 17 Turkish soldiers and over 30 PKK militants. The PKK purports to have taken hostages, a claim which has thus far been denied by Turkey although they later admitted to having 8 missing soldiers. With some form of military incursion looming, it would seem odd that the PKK is continuing to provoke Turkey by engaging in ever greater attacks. Are they trying to lure the Turks in? What is the bigger issue, the attacks or their frequency? Why are we only now suddenly hearing so much about the PKK in Iraq?

Turkey’s current Kurdish insurgency dates back to the 70s with the formation of the PKK and the beginning of its struggle for Kurdish independence. Since the 2003 liberation of Iraq, PKK militants have increasingly sought and found safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan and come into possession of a wealth of new weapons. Some sources speculate they receive indirect support from US intelligence services arming PJAC, a similar Kurdish group, against Iran. In any case, the frequency and deadliness of attacks in southeastern Turkey has been on the rise, unsurprisingly especially in the border regions with Iraq. Turkey has had enough.

Turkish parliament approved a bill green lighting the Turkish military to enter Iraq to pursue the PKK and in light of the recent attack, it seems more and more likely they will use it although. It is, however, unclear whether they will in fact do this for two reasons. Firstly, it would greatly anger the United States who wishes to preserve the success being enjoyed in Iraqi Kurdistan. Secondly, it would be exceedingly difficult to accomplish any kind of meaningful attack. The PKK bases in question, in the Qandil mountains, are far inside Iraqi Kurdistan and thus realistically unreachable by ground offensive lest a much larger battle ensue which would defeat the purpose of a quick punitive raid and potentially escalate into a much larger and longer conflict. According to Jamestown, the most likely course of action would be…

[...] the Turkish military will launch a combined air and ground operation in which ground troops will be deployed against the PKK’s forward bases in northwest Iraq, while F-16s will be used to bomb the organization’s camps in the Qandil Mountains (Milliyet, October 12). There have also been suggestions that the Turkish military would follow the F-16 bombing raids by using helicopters to airlift 4-5 teams of special forces, backed by Cobra attack helicopters, into the Qandil Mountains to destroy any remaining PKK forces and infrastructure

In addition, the Turks could expect resistance from the Peshmerga, the army of Iraqi Kurdistan with decades of experience fighting a guerrilla war against Saddam. The PKK in northern Iraq is not a new phenomenon and the border region where Turkey, Iraq and Iran meet is extremely rugged and mountainous, having long been a hideout and staging ground for the Kurds whether fighting against, Saddam, the Iranians or the Turks. With that in mind, Turkey may also consider setting up a buffer zone inside Iraq, where it already has several thousand troops stationed just over the border, and that could get very messy.

Why would the PKK wish to provoke the Turks into attacking Iraq? According to Jamestown’s recent newsletter,

Turkish analysts have speculated that it is hoping that the international community will intervene to curb any military operation before it has had the opportunity to inflict much damage. This would not only humiliate the Turkish government and military but, so the reasoning goes, could increase international pressure on Turkey to sit down at the negotiating table with the PKK.

Indeed. As the saying goes, war is politics by other means and the increasing PKK attacks may well be aimed at achieving several immediate political goals: isolating Turkey, legitimizing the PKK, pushing the US and Turkey further apart and drawing attention to Iraqi Kurdistan as a model for Turkish Kurdistan. As the Turkish Prime Minister’s statements become more belligerent and Turks from all sides call for action, it would seem the PKK is about to get its wish.

SIDENOTE: Although most eyes are currently focused on the Turkey-Iraq situation, one should not forget that the Iranians have and continue to shell northern Iraq and conduct covert operations there against the PKK and PJAK. While large scale operations are similarly unlikely, the danger of a larger regional war with Turkey and Iran seizing parts of Iraq exists.