By the end of the 19th century, the island of New Guinea (the origins of that name can be read at a previous post here) was colonized by three European powers. The Dutch colonized the western portion, the Germans claimed the northeast coast, and the British held the southeast coast adjacent to the colony of Australia. However, the jungles of the island were so thick, and the mountains and valleys in the interior so treacherous, that the colonial interests kept to the coastal fringes. There was little exploration deep into the jungle, and the official border between the territories between the European powers did not need to be properly defined.

After World War I, the British claimed the German territory and the island was then evenly split between the Dutch in the west and the English in the east. Western New Guinea became part of Indonesia when the Dutch possessions gained independence, just as possession of eastern New Guinea (Papua New Guinea, or PNG) passed from England to Australia. Because exploration of the deep interior was limited, the border was only loosely defined as an neat slice down the island.

It was not until 1973 when the land border was finally demarcated. The Indonesian and Australian governments entered into a treaty but which the border would follow the 141st east meridian, cutting neatly down the middle of the island. Looking at the border from a distant view, such as on the left side of the picture above, the border looks perfectly straight—with one small exception. What appears to be a minor deviation on the map is in fact a complicated squiggle when viewed closely, such as on the right side of the picture above.

That is the Fly River, a river that flows mostly through the eastern part of New Guinea but which protrudes slightly to the west of the 141st east meridian longitude line. The impracticality of leaving a minor sliver of land with Indonesia was recognized as the interior was more closely explored, and this territory was ultimately granted to Papua New Guinea. To compensate for this slight gain in territory for PNG, the border south of the Fly River is slightly east of the 141°E longitude line. And another part of this deal was that Indonesia would have the right to use the Fly River to its mouth for navigation to the Ocean.

Such is the logic behind New Guinea’s “squiggly border,” and how a neat compromise can solve potential messy border problems.

New Zealand is a tiny country, right?

Actually, although the human population of New Zealand is barely four million, the territorial expanse of greater New Zealand, known as “The Realm of New Zealand” (defined below), is actually quite large, both in the area of the surface covered and its longitudinal coverage.

New Zealand: The North Island and South Island, plus:

• – Chatham Islands: Special territorial authority
• – Kermadec Islands, Chatham Islands, other outlying islands: Areas outside regional authority

Realm of New Zealand: New Zealand, plus:

• – Tokelau: State administered by New Zealand
• – Cook Islands, Niue: States in free association with New Zealand
• – Ross Dependency: Claimed by New Zealand, but claim “frozen” by the Antarctic Treaty

NEW DEHLI, India – Recent publication of graphic images of cows at an American slaughterhuose released by the Indian Cultural Affairs Office on Thursday mean a stronger legal case against cattle consumption, the Indian government says. Indian government officials have been monitoring American slaughterhouse activity and the nation is still considering what kind of legal action is available, should be taken, and which institutions and individuals should be targeted.

The picture above was released by the Indian Cultural Affairs Office and shows a spinning sawblade about to slit the throat of one cow in an American industrial slaughterhouse. The cow swinging from the mechanical rack was in the same position 30 seconds before.

Environment Minister Gogel Ganguli says the pictures support India’s position in condemning cattle slaughter. “I think it’s explicitly clear from these images that this is industrial-style killing of cows.” Agricultural Minister Kumar Patel said the “shocking images” would support international legal action to stop the mass factory farming of cows that claims the lives of more than a hundred million cows a year in the United States alone. It is not yet clear how the pictures were obtained.

The US State Department has condemned the Indian government and media for “creating emotional propaganda to mislead the public.” The Agricultural Department has further asserted that instead of publication of images that insight fear and hate, “we must handle the issues calmly and avoid damaging friendly relations.” The United States was particular concerned about one leading media report titled, “Death! Dismemberment! Exclusive footage of America’s shocking cattle slaughter!”

Complicating the debate is the finding that red meat can directly and indirectly cause a wide variety of health problems including cancer, high blood pressure, heart disease, and obesity. But the findings have not swayed US government officials. As part of the regular US rebuttal of India’s beef with these matters, Washington says its slaughter is legal and part of its historical food culture. The Hindu practice of revering cows in India is not a value that should be exported overseas at the expense of friendly relations, said a government spokesman.

Yet international pressure on the United States is growing. Jolipimp Wigglebottom, the environment commissioner of ASEAN, released a statement reading in part, “the graphic images on our television screens bring home the reality of cattle slaughter.”

Amid the tensions, a poll published Wednesday said that nearly two-thirds of Americans back beef consumption, although support is apparently waning among vegetarians.

Author notes: Image taken from the documentary film Our Daily Bread. Actual method of execution was either electrical or captive bolt. Thanks as always to Party Pooper for creative inspiration.

Taken by my sister during our Christmas trip to Australia.

I’m not sure what to think of the fact that the rack is empty—is it a sign of no supply or lots of demand?

Via Wikipedia comes this fascinating visual timeline of the demarcation of the borders that make up Australia’s six states, two major mainland territories, and other minor territories that exist today.

This weekend a NATO committee of 26 generals are meeting in Victoria, BC Canada to discuss the future of the mature Atlantic alliance. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean the leaders of America, Australia and Japan met to discuss the future of their young alliance.

Earlier this year Japan forged a joint security declaration with Australia. Understand the importance of this event: this was Japan’s first security outing with a country other than America since the second world war. Japan has always avoided getting involved in the “spaghetti tangle” of bilateral security pacts. Though the Australia declaration isn’t a full-fledged security treaty like Japan’s alliance with the US, be assured that it was a significant step towards the “normalization” of Japan’s foreign policy.

America’s ties with Australia are historically deep from both cultural and security perspectives. Add in Japan and now the Pacific is covered — north, south and west — by a triangular alliance. And the triangle is looking to add a new corner. Both Japan and America have been pushing for India to join in. If India signs up we could well be on our way to an Asia-Pacific Treaty of Brussels. I am sure Singapore could fill in as Luxembourg.

So where will this NATO of the East lead? The ultimate goal is China. China is to the Pacific as the USSR was to Europe — or at least is perceived as such. China becoming a security partner with the likes of Japan and India may not happen for a long time, and might require a bit of cold war action first. But right now we are seeing the foundations of a NATO-like structure that could absorb China, facilitating its constructive participation in collective regional security. Regardless of the “ifs and coulds” this rising alliance structure around the big pond is worth keeping an eye on. As Bob Kaplan said recently: “… the heart of the the post-Cold War military map … is going to be the Pacific.” (18:21)

[It’s Oceania Day again, brought to you by the Strategist. We had some technical difficulties bringing you the post, but better late than never. – YH]

Back so soon? Australian troops patrolling in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

It’s easy to understand why Canberra worries about the island arc to Australia’s north – Indonesia, New Guinea, and Melanesia. In 1942 the Japanese thrust deep into the Southwest Pacific, threatening to invade Australia from island bases. Allied victories at the Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal and Midway averted the threat. But Australians remember the close call, and this is reflected in their approach to defence.

Australia’s defence policy is based on several key principles:

• alliance with the United States, but stand alone if necessary;
• defence of the mainland, and domination of Australia’s air/sea approaches; and
• attacking hostile forces as far away as practicable.

To do this, Australia needs high-tech air and naval forces with a qualitative edge over regional forces. It must also exert strategic influence over the island arc, to prevent hostile powers establishing a presence. For Australia, the island arc is like a fighter’s guard – get inside the guard and the fighter becomes unbalanced and exposed.

The problem for Canberra is that in recent times the arc has become unstable, with failed states, corrupt governments, violence, poverty and environmental degradation. Indonesia is struggling with Islamic extremism, and Melanesia is plagued by political and ethnic conflict. In the 1990s the phrase ‘Arc of Instability’ was coined. As Australian Labor leader Kevin Rudd recently commented, it has “gone from being a strategic concept a decade ago to an unsettling reality today”.

Instability raises the prospect of rising regional powers, such as China, gaining footholds close to Australia. It is not difficult to imagine a failing state seeking financial assistance from Beijing, and providing basing rights in return. For Canberra, China’s rise, and the perceived erosion of Australian influence in the Arc as Pacific states ‘look north’, are of growing concern.

There are more immediate worries. Canberra perceives that the Arc is becoming a haven for terrorists, drug traffickers, people smugglers and criminal financiers. These elements are attracted by growing lawlessness, corruption, and proximity to Australia. Conflict and economic collapse could trigger refugee waves, and require Australian intervention to evacuate nationals and provide humanitarian aid.

Nightmare scenarios include a fragmenting Indonesia, and the collapse of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former Australian colony. With substantial security, economic and consular interests in PNG, Canberra would feel obliged to take control of the country. This would be an enormous drain on finances and manpower, and would expose Australian personnel to great risk.

Recognizing the high stakes involved, Canberra provides PNG with substantial financial support, and assists other governments with reforms. Since 1997 Australia has led a number of regional interventions in response to crises – notably East Timor and Solomon Islands.

There is currently a debate in Canberra about whether Australia should be more proactive in addressing the economic and social roots of instability – more ‘fences at the top of the cliff’. Invariably, this would involve greater cost and intrusion into Pacific sovereignty. One thing is certain – Canberra sees a bleak future for the Arc of Instability, and is resigned to further intervention.

Lihir gold mine, Papua New Guinea

A history of conflict

As has been explored in previous Oceania Day posts, conflict in Oceania – particularly in Melanesia – is often related to resources. The prime example is Bougainville, where in 1989 – in a scene straight out of John Robb’s Brave New War - angry landowners toppled transmission towers, sabotaged equipment and threatened workers at the Panguna copper mine, blaming it for economic inequality and environmental damage. The mine has never reopened, but the resulting insurgency and naval blockade led to 10-20,000 deaths before Australia and New Zealand helped broker a peace deal, finally ending the fighting in the mid-1990s. And when the government hired heavily-armed mercenaries to bring the islanders back into line, the army mutinied and the government toppled.

Bougainville wasn’t the only resource war in Oceania. The Solomons civil war erupted over land, and after the end of war, some linked the Honiara riots to local anger over illegal logging by Asian firms. The 2000 Fiji coup was led by a businessman involved in the timber industry, and it has been alleged that the attempted coup was a grab for money and power on behalf of his investors. In the early 1980s, an increase in nickel mining increased tensions with the indigenous Kanaks of New Caledonia until the independence struggle turned violent, with murders and bombings on both sides. The conflict claimed some 80 lives, culminating in 1988 when FLNKS rebels killed 4 French gendarmes and took 27 others hostage. 2 paratroopers and 19 Kanaks died in the rescue operation.

On the other side of New Guinea, the region’s bloodiest and longest-running conflict still simmers – the West Papuan campaign for independence from Indonesia. Freeport-McMoRan opened the world’s largest gold mine and third largest copper mine there in 1973, and the rebel group OPM first attacked it in 1977, blowing up a pipeline. Since then grievances relating to environmental damage, and human rights abuses by the Indonesian soldiers Freeport pays to guard the mine, have been central to the independence cause. Freeport is Indonesia’s largest taxpayer, and the government has reacted harshly every time mine workers are attacked or equipment is sabotaged.

The resource curse

In 2000, Paul Collier of the World Bank published a controversial study of the causes of civil war, Greed and Grievance. He claimed that statistical analysis could identify states most at risk of civil war based on three factors: a high proportion of primary commodity exports, a high proportion of unemployed young men, and a lack of education. Collier’s analysis has been expanded by various other scholars, and there is now a large body of literature on the causes of resource war.
Natural resources not only create grievances (environmental damage, distribution of profits, etc), they also create opportunities for profit. Resources can either be looted, or obstructed and used to extort wealth. The process of compensating landowners and developing local communities means that violent protest can be effective in extracting concessions from mining companies, for example.
In Melanesia, with a history of intertribal warfare, strong attachment to the land and weak states, conflict is almost inevitable. The forested, mountainous terrain of most of Melanesia also gives locals an advantage when violence does break out.

Future resource wars

Knowing that natural resources often fuel violent conflict in Melanesia, it is possible to find several places where violence has the potential to escalate in the future. Here are a few examples:

In an increasingly interconnected world with high commodity prices, and as high-powered weapons continue to proliferate in Oceania, we will undoubtedly see more wars over resources in the region. Transnational crime, mercenaries, PMCs and militant cults could all gain money and power from a new resource war – the losers would be the ordinary people and local landowners of Melanesia, and the impoverished states which depend on resource exports to pay the bills.

[The latest post in our ongoing Oceania Day series comes from the strategist who teaches us about the military history of his home country, and how it influenced modern warfare. — YH]

In the mid-19th century, fighting raged across much of New Zealand’s North Island as Maori tribes resisted the advance of British troops and land-hungry settlers.These conflicts are called the New Zealand Wars, or Te Rire Pakeha — a Maori phrase meaning ‘the white man’s anger’.

Sparks

Maori are a Polynesian people who migrated from the eastern Pacific around 1350 AD. By 1840, when Britain assumed sovereignty over New Zealand, Maori lived in subsistence-based tribal communities. After 1840 British settlers began arriving in earnest. Many Maori grew concerned about land loss, and formed the ‘King Movement’, a landholding alliance centred on the Waikato confederation. Concurrently, the British became exasperated that Maori tribes retained their independence and seemed disinclined to obey British law.

Land and sovereignty sparked conflict. But not all tribes took up arms against the British — some were neutral, some fought with the Crown, and some did all three at different times.

‘Encampment of Chute’s forces near Putahi pa, on the Whenuakura River’: Major Gustavus von Tempsky.

Conflagration

Although there were limited conflicts in the 1840s, the heaviest fighting occurred between 1860-72. In Taranaki and Waikato (1860-64), imperial and colonial troops were deployed against the King Movement. The Taranaki fighting ended in stalemate, after the British failed to break a line of fortifications. But the British invaded and occupied Waikato, the King Movement’s heartland, fighting pitched battles and using steamships on rivers to outflank Maori defences.

Then came bush fighting campaigns (1864-72), in which units of frontiersmen and their native allies (_kupapa_) fought the war parties of Maori prophets. Using charismatic leadership and skillful tactics, Maori leaders Titokowaru and Te Kooti inflicted severe defeats. But the colonial forces also had inspired leaders – including Major Te Keepa Te Rangihiwinui and the Prussian Major Gustavus von Tempsky. Through irregular tactics and dogged pursuit, such commanders were able to wear down Maori resistance.

The wars featured several innovations, most significantly the ‘modern pa’. These were Maori fortifications, engineered to nullify the British advantage in superior weaponry and numbers, which consisted of anti-artillery bunkers and fighting trenches. Defenders could sit out bombardments, then decimate storming parties from concealed firing positions. Pa were formidable defences, and British forces suffered heavy losses when attacking pa.

Irregular units also featured prominently, partly because imperial troops could not adapt to an unorthodox bush-fighting style. The Forest Rangers, Colonial Defence Force cavalry, and Kupapa bands were used for scouting, pursuit and forest fighting. The Kupapa were independent contingents, armed by the British but led by tribal chiefs, similar in style to Goth contingents who fought for the Western Roman empire.

Embers

Maori resisted the British advance with some success, inflicting reverses on British forces. But ultimate defeat broke Maori independence, and cleared the way for a flood of settlers, land confiscation and laws which by 1900 stripped Maori of most of their land. Today, New Zealand is grappling with the consequences of the ‘white man’s anger’, as tribes seek Government redress, and many Maori continue to suffer poverty, landlessness and crime.

Razed buildings in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

Much of the debate about China’s rise in Oceania focuses on strategic considerations. Will Oceania become an arena of strategic competition between the US and China? How will China’s rise affect the interests of longstanding Pacific players, such as the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan? But what about the impact on Pacific islands themselves? Beijing’s engagement, and the activities of migrant Chinese, is exacerbating poor governance and corruption, fanning the embers of instability, and depleting natural resources.

Exacerbating poor governance and corruption

Most Pacific islanders live in villages, close to the land and the sea, or retain ties to village life. They are resilient and able to cope with hard times. But their governments are often fragile and characterized by poor governance and corruption.

Lavish aid, provided by China and Taiwan as part of their diplomatic rivalry, exacerbates these problems. Aid money is siphoned by corrupt politicians and officials. It perpetuates reliance on outsiders. The ‘no strings attached’ nature of the aid undermines domestic and international efforts to promote effective administration.

Fanning instability

The China-Taiwan rivalry is playing out in domestic politics, with Beijing and Taipei bribing and bankrolling politicians. Consequently, politics in some countries are becoming more corrupt. After the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, politicians were bribed to support pro-Taiwan or pro-China camps. Rioting in Honiara was partly sparked by popular anger about politicians being bought by Asian money.

The influx of Chinese migrants to Oceania is also feeding instability. Chinese increasingly dominate the business sector, and this is resented by locals. During unrest in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006, Chinese businesses were targeted by looters. The situation was particularly serious in Honiara, where the Chinatown was razed and Chinese residents fled the country. And Triads have infiltrated Pacific capitals, trading in drugs, weapons and people, and using the islands as transhipment points to Auckland, Sydney, Los Angeles and Vancouver.

Depleting natural resources

Pacific governments have an abysmal record of protecting their natural resources – principally timber, fisheries, and minerals. Typically, weak governments allow foreign companies to pillage resources, in the process destroying forests and polluting waterways and seas.

China is engaged in a global search for natural resources, and this encompasses Oceania. A Chinese corporation is building a large nickel mine in Papua New Guinea (possibly the first of a number), and Chinese fishing fleets are hammering the Pacific’s fisheries. Unless checked, China’s activities will further deplete Oceania’s resources, degrade the environment, and deprive Pacific islanders of their livelihood.

Unintended consequences?

China’s military involvement in Oceania has so far been low key. This could change quickly. One scenario is that Beijing dispatches troops to protect Chinese nationals caught up in civil unrest. And, as I noted in Dark Side of Paradise, large mines are a major source of conflict in Melanesia. Threats to Chinese mining operations from landowners could see Beijing deploy soldiers as ‘security guards’, or provide Pacific armies with ‘military advisers’. The instability that Beijing is fanning could inadvertently trigger Chinese military intervention.

[This post has been brought to you by the strategist as a part of our ongoing series on Oceania — YH]