This summer we were treated to a very special series here on Coming Anarchy: Oceania Day. Each week our guest bloggers the strategist and Phil Howison from Pacific Empire would school us on what is going on in the south pacific. We learned about the various regions, cultures, security issues and the activities of China in the region. The series started in mid-June and finished at the end of August.

I would like to thank sincerely, and heartily congratulate both of our special guest bloggers for a job well done. Their input has been very educational, and is well appreciated.

Finally, here is a list of all the posts made in the series:

• Dark Side of Paradise: Conflict in Melanesia by the strategist
• Oceania’s regions: Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia by phil
• Oceania: The “arc of instability”? and the “Africanization of the South Pacific”? by phil
• A Long Game: The Rise of China in Oceania by the strategist
• Transnational crime and street gangs in Oceania by phil
• Fanning the Embers: China and Instability in Oceania by the strategist
• The White Man’s Anger by the strategist
• Cursed by riches: Melanesian resource wars by phil
• The Fighter’s Guard: Australia and the ”˜Arc of Instability’ by the strategist

[It’s Oceania Day again, brought to you by the Strategist. We had some technical difficulties bringing you the post, but better late than never. – YH]

Back so soon? Australian troops patrolling in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

It’s easy to understand why Canberra worries about the island arc to Australia’s north – Indonesia, New Guinea, and Melanesia. In 1942 the Japanese thrust deep into the Southwest Pacific, threatening to invade Australia from island bases. Allied victories at the Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal and Midway averted the threat. But Australians remember the close call, and this is reflected in their approach to defence.

Australia’s defence policy is based on several key principles:

• alliance with the United States, but stand alone if necessary;
• defence of the mainland, and domination of Australia’s air/sea approaches; and
• attacking hostile forces as far away as practicable.

To do this, Australia needs high-tech air and naval forces with a qualitative edge over regional forces. It must also exert strategic influence over the island arc, to prevent hostile powers establishing a presence. For Australia, the island arc is like a fighter’s guard – get inside the guard and the fighter becomes unbalanced and exposed.

The problem for Canberra is that in recent times the arc has become unstable, with failed states, corrupt governments, violence, poverty and environmental degradation. Indonesia is struggling with Islamic extremism, and Melanesia is plagued by political and ethnic conflict. In the 1990s the phrase ‘Arc of Instability’ was coined. As Australian Labor leader Kevin Rudd recently commented, it has “gone from being a strategic concept a decade ago to an unsettling reality today”.

Instability raises the prospect of rising regional powers, such as China, gaining footholds close to Australia. It is not difficult to imagine a failing state seeking financial assistance from Beijing, and providing basing rights in return. For Canberra, China’s rise, and the perceived erosion of Australian influence in the Arc as Pacific states ‘look north’, are of growing concern.

There are more immediate worries. Canberra perceives that the Arc is becoming a haven for terrorists, drug traffickers, people smugglers and criminal financiers. These elements are attracted by growing lawlessness, corruption, and proximity to Australia. Conflict and economic collapse could trigger refugee waves, and require Australian intervention to evacuate nationals and provide humanitarian aid.

Nightmare scenarios include a fragmenting Indonesia, and the collapse of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former Australian colony. With substantial security, economic and consular interests in PNG, Canberra would feel obliged to take control of the country. This would be an enormous drain on finances and manpower, and would expose Australian personnel to great risk.

Recognizing the high stakes involved, Canberra provides PNG with substantial financial support, and assists other governments with reforms. Since 1997 Australia has led a number of regional interventions in response to crises – notably East Timor and Solomon Islands.

There is currently a debate in Canberra about whether Australia should be more proactive in addressing the economic and social roots of instability – more ‘fences at the top of the cliff’. Invariably, this would involve greater cost and intrusion into Pacific sovereignty. One thing is certain – Canberra sees a bleak future for the Arc of Instability, and is resigned to further intervention.

Lihir gold mine, Papua New Guinea

A history of conflict

As has been explored in previous Oceania Day posts, conflict in Oceania – particularly in Melanesia – is often related to resources. The prime example is Bougainville, where in 1989 – in a scene straight out of John Robb’s Brave New War - angry landowners toppled transmission towers, sabotaged equipment and threatened workers at the Panguna copper mine, blaming it for economic inequality and environmental damage. The mine has never reopened, but the resulting insurgency and naval blockade led to 10-20,000 deaths before Australia and New Zealand helped broker a peace deal, finally ending the fighting in the mid-1990s. And when the government hired heavily-armed mercenaries to bring the islanders back into line, the army mutinied and the government toppled.

Bougainville wasn’t the only resource war in Oceania. The Solomons civil war erupted over land, and after the end of war, some linked the Honiara riots to local anger over illegal logging by Asian firms. The 2000 Fiji coup was led by a businessman involved in the timber industry, and it has been alleged that the attempted coup was a grab for money and power on behalf of his investors. In the early 1980s, an increase in nickel mining increased tensions with the indigenous Kanaks of New Caledonia until the independence struggle turned violent, with murders and bombings on both sides. The conflict claimed some 80 lives, culminating in 1988 when FLNKS rebels killed 4 French gendarmes and took 27 others hostage. 2 paratroopers and 19 Kanaks died in the rescue operation.

On the other side of New Guinea, the region’s bloodiest and longest-running conflict still simmers – the West Papuan campaign for independence from Indonesia. Freeport-McMoRan opened the world’s largest gold mine and third largest copper mine there in 1973, and the rebel group OPM first attacked it in 1977, blowing up a pipeline. Since then grievances relating to environmental damage, and human rights abuses by the Indonesian soldiers Freeport pays to guard the mine, have been central to the independence cause. Freeport is Indonesia’s largest taxpayer, and the government has reacted harshly every time mine workers are attacked or equipment is sabotaged.

The resource curse

In 2000, Paul Collier of the World Bank published a controversial study of the causes of civil war, Greed and Grievance. He claimed that statistical analysis could identify states most at risk of civil war based on three factors: a high proportion of primary commodity exports, a high proportion of unemployed young men, and a lack of education. Collier’s analysis has been expanded by various other scholars, and there is now a large body of literature on the causes of resource war.
Natural resources not only create grievances (environmental damage, distribution of profits, etc), they also create opportunities for profit. Resources can either be looted, or obstructed and used to extort wealth. The process of compensating landowners and developing local communities means that violent protest can be effective in extracting concessions from mining companies, for example.
In Melanesia, with a history of intertribal warfare, strong attachment to the land and weak states, conflict is almost inevitable. The forested, mountainous terrain of most of Melanesia also gives locals an advantage when violence does break out.

Future resource wars

Knowing that natural resources often fuel violent conflict in Melanesia, it is possible to find several places where violence has the potential to escalate in the future. Here are a few examples:

In an increasingly interconnected world with high commodity prices, and as high-powered weapons continue to proliferate in Oceania, we will undoubtedly see more wars over resources in the region. Transnational crime, mercenaries, PMCs and militant cults could all gain money and power from a new resource war – the losers would be the ordinary people and local landowners of Melanesia, and the impoverished states which depend on resource exports to pay the bills.

[The latest post in our ongoing Oceania Day series comes from the strategist who teaches us about the military history of his home country, and how it influenced modern warfare. — YH]

In the mid-19th century, fighting raged across much of New Zealand’s North Island as Maori tribes resisted the advance of British troops and land-hungry settlers.These conflicts are called the New Zealand Wars, or Te Rire Pakeha — a Maori phrase meaning ‘the white man’s anger’.

Sparks

Maori are a Polynesian people who migrated from the eastern Pacific around 1350 AD. By 1840, when Britain assumed sovereignty over New Zealand, Maori lived in subsistence-based tribal communities. After 1840 British settlers began arriving in earnest. Many Maori grew concerned about land loss, and formed the ‘King Movement’, a landholding alliance centred on the Waikato confederation. Concurrently, the British became exasperated that Maori tribes retained their independence and seemed disinclined to obey British law.

Land and sovereignty sparked conflict. But not all tribes took up arms against the British — some were neutral, some fought with the Crown, and some did all three at different times.

‘Encampment of Chute’s forces near Putahi pa, on the Whenuakura River’: Major Gustavus von Tempsky.

Conflagration

Although there were limited conflicts in the 1840s, the heaviest fighting occurred between 1860-72. In Taranaki and Waikato (1860-64), imperial and colonial troops were deployed against the King Movement. The Taranaki fighting ended in stalemate, after the British failed to break a line of fortifications. But the British invaded and occupied Waikato, the King Movement’s heartland, fighting pitched battles and using steamships on rivers to outflank Maori defences.

Then came bush fighting campaigns (1864-72), in which units of frontiersmen and their native allies (_kupapa_) fought the war parties of Maori prophets. Using charismatic leadership and skillful tactics, Maori leaders Titokowaru and Te Kooti inflicted severe defeats. But the colonial forces also had inspired leaders – including Major Te Keepa Te Rangihiwinui and the Prussian Major Gustavus von Tempsky. Through irregular tactics and dogged pursuit, such commanders were able to wear down Maori resistance.

The wars featured several innovations, most significantly the ‘modern pa’. These were Maori fortifications, engineered to nullify the British advantage in superior weaponry and numbers, which consisted of anti-artillery bunkers and fighting trenches. Defenders could sit out bombardments, then decimate storming parties from concealed firing positions. Pa were formidable defences, and British forces suffered heavy losses when attacking pa.

Irregular units also featured prominently, partly because imperial troops could not adapt to an unorthodox bush-fighting style. The Forest Rangers, Colonial Defence Force cavalry, and Kupapa bands were used for scouting, pursuit and forest fighting. The Kupapa were independent contingents, armed by the British but led by tribal chiefs, similar in style to Goth contingents who fought for the Western Roman empire.

Embers

Maori resisted the British advance with some success, inflicting reverses on British forces. But ultimate defeat broke Maori independence, and cleared the way for a flood of settlers, land confiscation and laws which by 1900 stripped Maori of most of their land. Today, New Zealand is grappling with the consequences of the ‘white man’s anger’, as tribes seek Government redress, and many Maori continue to suffer poverty, landlessness and crime.

Razed buildings in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

Much of the debate about China’s rise in Oceania focuses on strategic considerations. Will Oceania become an arena of strategic competition between the US and China? How will China’s rise affect the interests of longstanding Pacific players, such as the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan? But what about the impact on Pacific islands themselves? Beijing’s engagement, and the activities of migrant Chinese, is exacerbating poor governance and corruption, fanning the embers of instability, and depleting natural resources.

Exacerbating poor governance and corruption

Most Pacific islanders live in villages, close to the land and the sea, or retain ties to village life. They are resilient and able to cope with hard times. But their governments are often fragile and characterized by poor governance and corruption.

Lavish aid, provided by China and Taiwan as part of their diplomatic rivalry, exacerbates these problems. Aid money is siphoned by corrupt politicians and officials. It perpetuates reliance on outsiders. The ‘no strings attached’ nature of the aid undermines domestic and international efforts to promote effective administration.

Fanning instability

The China-Taiwan rivalry is playing out in domestic politics, with Beijing and Taipei bribing and bankrolling politicians. Consequently, politics in some countries are becoming more corrupt. After the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, politicians were bribed to support pro-Taiwan or pro-China camps. Rioting in Honiara was partly sparked by popular anger about politicians being bought by Asian money.

The influx of Chinese migrants to Oceania is also feeding instability. Chinese increasingly dominate the business sector, and this is resented by locals. During unrest in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006, Chinese businesses were targeted by looters. The situation was particularly serious in Honiara, where the Chinatown was razed and Chinese residents fled the country. And Triads have infiltrated Pacific capitals, trading in drugs, weapons and people, and using the islands as transhipment points to Auckland, Sydney, Los Angeles and Vancouver.

Depleting natural resources

Pacific governments have an abysmal record of protecting their natural resources – principally timber, fisheries, and minerals. Typically, weak governments allow foreign companies to pillage resources, in the process destroying forests and polluting waterways and seas.

China is engaged in a global search for natural resources, and this encompasses Oceania. A Chinese corporation is building a large nickel mine in Papua New Guinea (possibly the first of a number), and Chinese fishing fleets are hammering the Pacific’s fisheries. Unless checked, China’s activities will further deplete Oceania’s resources, degrade the environment, and deprive Pacific islanders of their livelihood.

Unintended consequences?

China’s military involvement in Oceania has so far been low key. This could change quickly. One scenario is that Beijing dispatches troops to protect Chinese nationals caught up in civil unrest. And, as I noted in Dark Side of Paradise, large mines are a major source of conflict in Melanesia. Threats to Chinese mining operations from landowners could see Beijing deploy soldiers as ‘security guards’, or provide Pacific armies with ‘military advisers’. The instability that Beijing is fanning could inadvertently trigger Chinese military intervention.

[This post has been brought to you by the strategist as a part of our ongoing series on Oceania — YH]

[Pacific Empire’s Phil Howison brings us this week’s edition of Oceania Day – YH]

Home-grown street gangs are a growing threat to Oceania’s island states. In addition, criminal organizations from around the world have taken advantage of the economic vulnerability and weakness of the Pacific islands, using them as bases for money laundering, drug smuggling, illegal immigration and other nefarious activities. Australia and New Zealand, threatened by illegal immigrants, drugs and the possibility of terrorist cells gaining access from the Pacific, are at the forefront of efforts to maintain law and order in Oceania.

Street gangs

Street gangs in many Pacific islands are a byproduct of economic stagnation, overcrowding and urbanisation in island cities. However, for other Pacific states, notably Tonga and Samoa, the gang problem is imported via re-immigration from South Auckland (as featured in Time), Sydney, Los Angeles and other destinations for Polynesian immigrants. Some Polynesian kids find the gang lifestyle appealing, styling themselves on LA gangsta rappers. In turn, the imposing stature of many Polynesians creates a demand for their services as street enforcers.

A common response to teenage criminality is for either the parents or the host country to send them back to the islands, as veteran Pacific reporter Michael Field explains. He links US gangs to the riots which destroyed part of Tonga’s capital last year, and to the assassination of a Cabinet minister in Samoa in 1999. The gang problem may also have contributed to a growing teenage drug and suicide problem in Samoa and elsewhere in Oceania.

“Third-generation” street gangs have been called a “mutated form of urban insurgency”. If a third-generation street gang has political links and transnational connections, then the gangs of East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands would qualify. In those countries, it is difficult to distinguish between gang violence and insurgency. Port Moresby, capital of PNG, is consistently ranked as the worst city in the world due largely to murders, rape and robbery committed by heavily-armed and politically connected “raskols”. Urbanisation and the growth of squatter settlements provide fertile ground for raskol recruitment, and the lawless Highland areas are a source for guns and drugs, which can be traded across the Torres Strait with Australian gangs. As for East Timor, gangs are a frequent source of political violence as illustrated in David Axe’s “War is Boring” comic, and one report lists 107 such groups.

The growth of squatter settlements outside Suva, Fiji and Port Vila, Vanuatu will probably cause more problems in future. Massive overcrowding in other areas, for example the Marshall — where one island has a population density of over 23,000/sq. km — is also likely to create problems.

These problems are exacerbated by often-ineffective police and prisons in Oceania. While most Pacific states have a high ratio of police to population, some islands have no police presence, and in others the police take orders from tribal leaders. Police forces tend to be underfunded, underpaid and undertrained, and police weapons are frequently stolen or lost. The loss of police loyalty and weapons to militia and gangs in the Solomon Islands led to a civil war.

Transnational crime

However, as dangerous as these street gangs are, there are far more threatening groups targeting the Pacific. Their activities threaten the economic wellbeing, security and international reputation of the most vulnerable islands, and are affecting Australia and New Zealand as well.

Transnational crime in the Pacific includes:

• Illegal fishing, causing environmental damage and economic losses for states barely able to police their own waters.
• Illegal logging, causing erosion and environmental damage in Melanesia.
• Money laundering – billions of dollars every year, a strong temptation for small island states. Nauru, the worst offender, has been pressured into signing international agreements, but was previously accused of laundering billions of dollars for the Russian mafia, and may have helped launder cash for Middle Eastern funds linked to terrrorism.
• Immigration scams and passport sales – an American conman who became the “court jester” for Tonga’s late king sold $20 million worth of Tongan passports, embezzling the proceeds from the Tongan government. Nauruan passports were used by a group of Al-Qaeda suspects. Chinese illegal immigrants have arrived in PNG, Fiji and other countries, and these states have been used to gain access to Australia.
• Drugs: again, linked to Chinese organised crime. Large methamphetamine labs and shipments have been seized in Fiji, thought to be intended for export to Australia and New Zealand. Shipments of cocaine have been seized in Tonga. On a smaller scale, drugs are carried on ferries between Samoa and American Samoa. Papua New Guinea is of increasing importance as cannabis plantations spread in the lawless highlands.
• Arms dealing, usually on a small scale using weapons stolen from government armouries. However, in the 1980s containers full of arms were intercepted on arrival in New Caledonia and Fiji. And a Tongan flag of convenience was used on a freighter carrying 50 tons of weapons for the Palestinian Authority, prompting Tonga to stop offering no-questions-asked registrations.
• Asian gangs: Involved in the above activities, along with illegal gambling and prostitution, this is a growing phenomenon linked to illegal immigration from China, especially in Fiji and PNG, and contributing to an anti-Chinese backlash as seen in the riots in Tonga and Honiara last year. Brutal murders relating to turf wars have included a Chinese prostitute dismembered in Fiji, and two Chinese gangsters killed with hammers in Vanuatu. This Sydney Morning Herald article offers more details and background.

A regional response

The response has been for Australia and New Zealand to offer aid, training and partnership to Pacific police forces, along with a regional Transnational Crime unit set up in Suva and individual Transnational Crime units in most Pacific states. Money laundering in Nauru has been successfully dealt with by the international community. However, Oceania will probably remain an attractive target for criminals as long as the islands remain poor and isolated, with corruptible police and politicians.

Efforts to stamp out street gangs have been less effective. In 2005, an Australian plan to send police officers, judges and lawyers to help improve law and order in Port Moresby, PNG was sunk by a court action which challenged an immunity provision. And even full-scale military interventions in Timor and the Solomons have been unable to halt gang violence.

Hooray! It’s Oceania Day once again. This time the strategist gives us some insight into the changing power balance in the South Pacific. – YH

Oceania is often seen as a strategic backwater, isolated from the whirlpool of great power politics. This is far from true. In the 19th century, Western powers carved up Oceania’s islands. In World War Two and the Cold War, American preponderance in the Pacific was challenged, unsuccessfully, by Japan and the Soviet Union. For well over a century, Oceania has generally been a Western lake.

Rising Asian powers, in particular China, are now quietly contesting the West’s stranglehold. Over the past decade Beijing has boosted its regional profile and presence. This is visible in new embassies, lavish aid and loan packages, high profile political visits, red carpet treatment for Pacific leaders, and substantial commercial investment. This comes at a juncture when US interest in Oceania has waned, and Britain, a former colonial power, has left the region.

There are a number of reasons for Beijing’s interest in Oceania:

• Political machinations: China seeks to counter Taiwanese influence. Six Pacific states recognize Taiwan; the rest recognize China. Beijing wants to keep its allies onside and persuade the others to leave Taiwan’s camp. As inducements, Beijing spends lavishly on aid programmes, and provides soft loans and debt write-offs for struggling Pacific states.

• Raw materials: China needs oil, minerals and timber to fuel its burgeoning economy. East Timor and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have significant oil and gas deposits, while Melanesia is rich in minerals and timber. China has invested heavily in PNG’s mining, timber and fishing sectors. It has carried out extensive oceanographic research in Oceania – this includes surveying seabed minerals and fish stocks. Large Chinese fishing fleets exploit deep sea fisheries.
• Migrants: Beijing has consular responsibility for Chinese people who have recently migrated to Oceania. Migrant Chinese dominate the small business sector in island capitals. In PNG, Chinese businessmen have become influential in the mining and timber industries. Migrants provide Beijing with useful intelligence and links to local politicians and officials.
• Military threats: China keeps a watchful eye on US military movements in Micronesia. If China attacked Taiwan, Guam would be a key staging post for US forces moving to assist Taipei. Until recently the Chinese military maintained a base on Tarawa (Beijing closed the base when Kiribati recognized Taiwan). This base was part of China’s space warfare programme, and spied on the US missile testing range at Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands).

China’s engagement has troubling implications for Pacific island states, and for New Zealand and Australia, which I will explore in a later post. It may also presage a wider Chinese ambition, one in which Oceania forms the outer zone of a Chinese sphere of influence.

One trend is evident. The increasing presence of China, and Japan, Korea and Taiwan, reflects a gradual shift from a Western dominated Pacific order to a more complex situation in which rising North Asian powers challenge the dominance and comfortable assumptions

[Special guest blogger Phil Howison of Pacific Empire brings us his second installment introducing Oceania’s geography for our Oceania Day series. Enjoy! — YH]

Last week I wrote:

But by the 1980s, it was clear that the region was no longer entirely peaceful… Democracy appeared to be weakening, and one academic warned of “Africanisation,” forecasting a dark future for Oceania.

…Meanwhile, Australia and New Zealand are increasingly concerned with maintaining security in their Pacific backyard, fearing an influx of refugees, transnational crime and even terrorism from the “arc of instability”.

With that in mind, lets take a closer look at these influential concepts…

“Arc of instability”

The term “arc of instability” was first used to describe the region in 2000, following another attempted coup in Fiji – this time not bloodless – a civil war and coup in the Solomons, and international intervention in East Timor following Indonesian-sponsored militia violence. Since then, the idea has informed Australian policy towards the region, contributing to the negative “neo-colonial” perception of Australia among some regional leaders.

The idea has justified several regional interventions, in East Timor, the Solomons, Bougainville, Port Moresby and recently Tonga. Most of these were fairly successful, and have been accomplished with very few casualties. However the Solomons and East Timor have seen several resurgences of violence, even after intervention, while Papua New Guinea mounted a successful legal challenge to the presence of Australian police officers, and – despite unprecedented gang violence in the capital – they were sent home.

Curzon recently posted on how instability spreads. Just a few dozen guns or a few million in bribes in the right hands can be enough to bring down a government, due to the small size and poverty of most Pacific island states, making them almost uniquely easy to destabilize.

“Africanisation of the South Pacific”

These terms have been criticized for being alarmist and exaggerated. Perhaps the most extreme view was Ben Reilly’s November 2000 paper, The Africanisation of the South Pacific (.pdf). As the name suggests, Reilly compares the problems of the Pacific to sub-Saharan Africa. But despite all the criticism, events of the last seven years have hardly weakened Reilly’s argument.

According to Reilly, a professor at the Australian National University, there are four major features of African conflict which we can now see in Oceania:

1. Civil/military tensions: For example, coups in Fiji (1987, 2000) and the Solomons (2000), along with mutinies in Papua New Guinea (the Sandline affair) and Vanuatu (1997). Since Reilly wrote, there has been another coup in Fiji and further mutinies in PNG (2001, 2002 etc).
2. Ethnic conflict mixing with competition over natural resources: The Bougainville war, 2000 Fiji coup, and the Solomons civil war all revolved around ethnic conflict over resources. Since then, anti-Chinese riots in the Solomons, protests against corporate mining in New Caledonia and tensions in PNG and West Papua have threatened further ethnic conflict.
3. Weak governance: Political parties are unstable and focused on identity rather than ideology. Political institutions tend to be weak compared to traditional, tribal or religious institutions. This is perhaps most apparent in PNG.
4. Increasing use of the state to gain wealth and exploit resources: Corruption is endemic in many Pacific states, and the problem is exacerbated by the limited private-sector opportunities. This can be linked to traditions in some Pacific cultures of showing respect to leaders by giving generous gifts. This is the case in Samoa, for example, where a dispute over lucrative corruption led to the assassination of a Cabinet minister in 1999. A New Zealand MP of Samoan origin, Taito Phillip Field, is involved in an unprecedented corruption case involving alleged bribe-taking – the first such case in NZ history.

Clearly, these four trends have continued, although the comparison to Africa remains somewhat exaggerated.

“Arc of Instability” and “Africanisation” are both important in understanding security concerns in the Pacific. They have inspired several interventions by Australia and NZ, and are reflected in aid and assistance packages. While this has resulted in accusations of “neo-colonialism” and “imperialism,” most Pacific states admit that there is a need for international involvement to prevent conflict, as demonstrated by the Pacific Forum’s 2000 Biketawa Declaration which provided member states for the first time with a mechanism to request assistance.

[Special guest blogger Phil Howison of Pacific Empire brings us the second installment of our Oceania Day series. Rejoice! — YH]

The Strategist posted last week on conflict in Melanesia, a region within Oceania alongside Micronesia and Polynesia. To keep this series in context, we need to define these sub-regions, as they have distinct security concerns and challenges, as well as widely varying cultures and geography.

The Pacific contains up to 30,000 small islands. These can (broadly) be divided culturally into three regions: Micronesia (“small islands”), Polynesia (“many islands”) and Melanesia (“black islands”).

Micronesia includes the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Guam, the Northern Marianas, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Most islands here are low coral atolls. The dominant external power is the United States, and they last suffered political violence in the 1980s (in Palau). The region is strategically important due to the presence of US military forces, and as such could be drawn into any conflict with China. China has increased its diplomatic involvement here, even more so than elsewhere in the Pacific.

Polynesia extends from Hawaii to Easter Island to New Zealand in a rough triangle. Geographically, this is an enormous and diverse area including all island types: continental islands, volcanic islands and coral atolls. Major powers include the US, France and New Zealand, while Chile and Britain also possess some small islands. New Zealand is by far the largest country in Polynesia, and is home to hundreds of thousands of Polynesians from the other islands. Important security issues include environmental damage and overcrowding, economic stagnation, opposition to French colonialism, increasing Chinese influence, corruption and democracy.

Melanesia faces the most serious internal security problems, which were covered last Oceania Day. It consists of several ethnically and tribally divided countries covering hundreds of large, mountainous islands. Papua New Guinea is the most ethnically diverse country in the world, with a population greater than all the other Pacific islands put together. France, Australia and Indonesia are major external powers. This area includes East Timor, the 20th worst failed state according to the Foreign Policy Failed States Index, while the Solomon Islands (30th), Papua New Guinea (52nd) and Indonesia (55th) also feature on the list. Issues here include resource conflict, civil/military relations, the clash between traditional and modern governance, street gangs, and ethnic conflict.

After 1945, the Pacific was almost entirely peaceful. Several territories were granted independence, and others made the transition to democracy. Foreign aid kept the Soviets out, and resulted in some economic growth. But by the 1980s, it was clear that the region was no longer entirely peaceful. Conflict in Vanuatu and New Caledonia, political violence in Palau and two military coups in Fiji resulted in growing concern in the region. Democracy appeared to be weakening, and one academic warned of “Africanisation,” forecasting a dark future for Oceania.

The geo-strategic environment has heated up as well, as Western dominance is challenged by aggressive Chinese diplomacy. Meanwhile, Australia and New Zealand are increasingly concerned with maintaining security in their Pacific backyard, fearing an influx of refugees, transnational crime and even terrorism from the “arc of instability”.

Tune in next week for a more detailed look at the terms “Arc of Instability” and “Africanisation of the South Pacific.”

[Today is Oceania Day! The following is the first post in the series by special guest blogger the strategist. ”“ Younghusband]

Ask New Zealanders what springs to mind about Oceania, and the answer will involve palm-fringed islands and blue lagoons – paradise. Pacific islands are holiday destinations, places to escape winter. It’s easy to forget that there’s a dark side to Pacific life; people are surprised when an insurrection or coup occurs.

This is odd, as anyone who lived through World War Two, or was born in its shadow, will know. Names of Pacific battles – Coral Sea, Guadalcanal, Kokoda Trail, Tarawa – signified great violence. And since the 1960s Oceania has been plagued by political conflict, particularly in Melanesia – the chain of islands stretching from New Guinea to New Caledonia:

• wars of independence in West Papua (1963 onwards), East Timor (1975-99), Vanuatu (1980), New Caledonia (1980s), Bougainville (1988-1997);
• ethnic warfare in Solomon Islands (1998-2003) and Papua New Guinea’s highlands (ongoing);
• military coups in Fiji (four since 1987) and Solomon Islands (2000), and mutinies in PNG, Fiji and Vanuatu.

So, why the ‘trouble in paradise’? The causes of instability are complex. They include ill-disciplined armies and paramilitary police, volatile ethnic politics, and attempts by states, often weak post-colonial constructs, to impose authority over clans.

The rugged Melanesian terrain has influenced the development of many clan-based ethnic groups, confined to small territories, each with distinct languages. Fiercely independent, these groups resist state control. Large mines are a particular source of trouble. The state appropriates land, resources and mining income, and mining destroy forests, rivers and gardens. Local people protest, and sometimes protest turns violent.

A good example of this is Bougainville’s Panguna mine. From 1972-1989 CRA mined copper and gold on the island of Bougainville, which is notionally part of PNG. Expats who worked at Panguna talk about how the coastal town of Arawa resembled a resort, of scuba diving in crystal water, of playing on the golf course.

Paradise lost. In 1989 Bougainville rebels – angered by land loss and environmental destruction – attacked the mine. Fighting between the rebels and army forced the mine to close and expats to flee. A brutish state of anarchy and civil war ensued in which 10,000 Bougainvilleans died. The conflict also destabilized PNG’s economy and government – the army mutinied in 1997 after the government hired foreign mercenaries to take down the rebels.

In 1987/88 New Zealand brokered a peace deal. By then Arawa was a ruin. The port was smashed. Roads were trails in the undergrowth. The golf links were smothered in tall grass. Mine plant machinery lay rusting. The peace has held, but Bougainvilleans are determined that Panguna, a symbol of violence, must not re-open.

Bougainville is a salutary lesson of how order can quickly turn to chaos. It also suggests that a stable Melanesian government is one that leaves communities alone without trying to ‘develop’ or control them. Such governments, with help from New Zealand and Australia, could be guardians, protecting local communities against rapacious outsiders, such as Asian timber loggers who plunder Melanesia’s rainforests, and guarding maritime frontiers against dangerous intruders – terrorists, drug smugglers and gun runners.