Several days ago, US Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech at the National Defense University outlining the current administration’s arms control agenda. It included pushing for US ratification of the CTBT, the ongoing START talks with Russia and reducing the US nuclear arsenal. While we could discuss all three of these issues at length, I’d like to first concentrate on the idea of ‘getting to zero’ and reducing America’s nuclear capability.

The Vice President (as others) noted that

“We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective.”

Non-nuclear weapons development includes the administration’s plan for an “adaptive” missile-defense shield and conventional warheads “with worldwide reach,” he said. “With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong,” Mr. Biden said.

The idea of replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional capabilities is not new. The argument is that the increasing destructive power of modern conventional weapons combined with the ability of the United States to ‘reach out and touch someone’ anywhere on the globe in a minutes or hours can play the same deterrent role as nuclear weapons currently do.

In order to break down this argument, I’d like to make two things clear. Firstly, the goal of our current nuclear force posture is to deter adversaries from attacking us and our allies. Secondly, the means to accomplish this is not and should not be the focus of discussion but instead the end. What do I mean? Many people focus on the weapons themselves, i.e. nuclear weapons, but as Biden notes, if conventional capabilities can fulfil the same function (i.e. survive a first strike and destroy enemy targets with high certainty), then they can be substituted for nuclear weapons. In short, how we do it doesn’t matter. The key thing is the destruction of enemy targets with high certainty. The fact that we use nuclear weapons for this purpose is a reflection only of the fact that they are the best suited weapon available for this task today.

However, there are very serious problems with the idea of replacing nuclear with conventional weapons.

If we accept the proposition that today, or sometime in the future, conventional weapons will be on par with nuclear weapons in terms of their deterrent capability, then several logical conclusions must follow:

1) These conventional weapons would be just as dangerous as nuclear weapons. Therefore replacing one with the other makes no substantive difference. Moreover, it would require time, money and effort to do this all with no gain.

2) If conventional weapons are used in the future in the same role as nuclear weapons today, they could invite a nuclear response from adversaries whose conventional capabilities do not match our own. This would be possible also in smaller conflicts because an enemy could then never be sure what weapons were employed since both nuclear and conventional are equall bad. It would lead to escalation at a much higher pace.

3) Having more conventional weapons in the US deterrent may lower the threshold for use.This may encourage a first strike by us or others.

4) If conventional and nuclear weapons are ever equal, they will be sought after by other states just as nuclear weapons are. This leaves us in the same situation as today. However, if the conventional capability is more expensive or difficult to achieve than nuclear weapons (which is older technology now), it will actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5) If these conventional weapons are indeed equal, it means countries will be able to acquire destructive power equal to nuclear weapons, but WITHIN the legal framework Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This will lead to the irrelevance and death of the most important and successful nonproliferation regime the world has.

6) If conventional weapons can equal nuclear ones, they will require the same types of arms control agreements and nonproliferation agreements as nuclear weapons.

7) Replacing nuclear weapons with equally capable conventional weapons is a cosmetic change which does nothing to address the underlying nature of the international system which makes deterrence necessary in the first place. It’s a change in form, not substance.

Readers, I’d appreciate any thoughts, criticisms and comments you have on this.

As if the ongoing North Korea and Iran debacles aren’t enough, the IAEA and its unfit head Mohamed ElBaradei have provided yet more reason to doubt their legitimacy and incompetent:

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said Sunday that “Israel is number one threat to Middle East” with its nuclear arms, the official IRNA news agency reported. At a joint press conference with Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief Ali Akbar Salehi in Tehran, ElBaradei brought Israel under spotlight and said that the Tel Aviv regime has refused to allow inspections into its nuclear installations for 30years, the report said.”Israel is the number one threat to the Middle East given the nuclear arms it possesses,” ElBaradei was quoted as saying.

Firstly, Iran being the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and having a revolutionary government would be a seemingly obvious choice for biggest threat to the region. Second of all, Israel’s neighbors have had the opportunity to go nuclear for the past several decades. Some considered it, such as Egypt, but ultimately concluded it wasn’t necessary and understood Israel acquired them as a last resort due to its small geographic size and population. It a major reason the Egyptian program was shut down. Iraq attempted it but this author is not aware of any evidence linking Israel to that decision. Rather, given the nature of the Iraqi regime before 2003, its pursuit of a host of WMD and its belief that Iran (post 1979) was Iraq’s biggest threat, it again seems silly to argue tiny Israel is somehow the region’s largest threat.

Yukiya Amano, a Japanese diplomat and long-time government specialist in arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, has been elected to be the next director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The end of three terms of Mohamed ElBaradei is an important change in itself. Yet I am intrigued by the potential effects of Amano’s nationality on nuclear nonproliferation over the next few years.

This news just broke, so the following is entirely speculation. I would like to start with the Japanese domestic perception, and work my way out.

The election was close, and has been somewhat followed in the Japanese media. The gaining of such a prestigious international security position will be welcome news for the Japanese politicians and pundits that have been longing for the elusive UN security council seat since the early 1990’s. Despite Amano’s internationalist CV and absolutely no indications suggesting Amano will use his position for the gain of the Japanese state, I am sure Japanese nationalists will be ecstatic that one of their nationals will be in a position to put pressure on North Korea. This will not work in Amano’s favour.

Amano is a professional diplomat that has been active on the international scene for many years. He is well-versed in in disarmament issues and was previously the Chair of the Board of Governors for the IAEA (2005-2006). Amano is a professional diplomat that has been active on the international scene for many years. Such nationalist maneuvering is below his integrity, I am sure. Yet wait to see how fast the KCNA paints Amano as a “Japanese reactionary” and accuses the UN of being a “bourgeois beast”. “We will thwart your frantic attempts to stifle us!” (or some such other insult as per the generator).

It will also be interesting to see how China will react to this news. Will China’s hatred of all things Japanese prod it to be more protective of the Hermit Kingdom? With the Norks launching more missiles again today, I can’t see China’s patience lasting much longer. But they still must keep their distance from Japan.

As for Iran, going by my minor experience in the country, the Japanese are well respected there. Japan has close energy relations with Iran. Throughout the 1990’s Japan hosted thousands of Iranian migrant workers. Furthermore, Japan has maintained active cultural exchanges with the Iranians over the years. This close relationship has prevented the Japanese administration from speaking out on the current uprisings in Iran so far. All this in contrast to the Islamic Egyptian ElBaradei. The Japanese, who have never had any imperial ambitions on Persia, and who are not “People of the Book”, are the ultimate neutral arbiters. Being Japanese, Amano might represent a clean break with the past. Back in 2006 foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki asked Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for Japanese participation in Iran’s nuclear power plants. A year before that I argued that Japan is well-positioned to engage with Iran.

Ideally the nationality of a representative of an international organization such as the IAEA should not be relevant. However this is not an ideal world. During Amano’s term as DG, we may see the effects of nationalism preventing progress on the Korean peninsula while simultaneously contributing to a breakthrough in the Middle East.

With arms control talks underway between the US and Russia, a Russia general noted

Russia must keep at least 1,500 nuclear warheads after talks with the United States on a new arms treaty, Interfax news agency quoted the commander of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces as saying Wednesday. If Moscow’s final position reflects Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov’s view, it would mean Russia is not willing to cut its stockpiles by more than a few hundred strategic warheads – far less than some arms control bodies had hoped.

One of the most critical things to pay attention to in news like this is whether they are discussing strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The article does not make it clear but from what I know, I suspect he means strategic weapons, i.e. larger yield and long range ones. It would therefore not include the thousands of smaller tactical warheads Russia has and which it has refused to reduce or give up. Thus, be wary of any ‘progress’ or agreement that does not specifically mention both types.

Given Russia’s size and the threats it faces on its many borders, tactical weapons are of great use and importance to Moscow, whereas they are not for the United States which finds itself in a very different geographic and security situation. The real danger here is that the current administration, which seems intent on disarming the United States while EVERY other country is increasing its arsenal, will agree to cuts in our forces that do NOT include Russia’s tactical weapons being dismantled. Therefore, while you would read news articles on Russia’s and America’s numbers being about the same, they’d only be counting strategic forces and thus not actually revealing the much weaker and vulnerable position the US would have put itself in.

According to North Korea, it has just tested a second nuclear device. Thus far, it remains unconfirmed. This broke about 20 minutes ago and thus there is currently little more to report. My prediction assuming it is true? The world and US will condemn, then we’ll use it to resurrect the worthless 6 Party Talks, give Pyongyang something (money, lifting sanctions, energy etc.) and end up back where we started, essentially paying North Korea for nothing. Funny how history repeats itself. President Obama should take this opportunity to break the cycle, not only refusing further talks but cutting ALL aid to North Korea and seeking further sanctions. It would also be a good time to give the Japanese a nudge to make additional public statements about developing their own weapons. That’ll get China’s attention.

More as the story breaks.

One of the threats that has been exaggerated by the echo-chamber media is Russia. Contrast this article with wild fears about Russia landing rusting Cold War museum pieces in Cuba and Venezuela. We’ve discussed this several times in posts here, here, here and here.

Russia’s military was over 4 million strong during the USSR, has dropped to approximately 1.13 million and is slated to be decreased below a million. The fact of the matter is Russia can neither afford to maintain, much less upgrade its conventional military forces. Therefore, it has been and will continue to increasingly rely on its strategic forces. As Russia continues to deteriorate, this will lead to Russia’s more quickly climb up the escalation ladder in potential conflicts. As has been said at tdaxp many a time, Russia is merely a regional power with nuclear weapons. It cannot really project power globally, has no attractive ideology and little to offer allies except domination and backwardness.

Putting aside the absolute fantasy of a nuclear weapons free world, Obama is attempting to improve the US relationship with Russia. The major starting point is negotiating a new START (strategic arms reduction treaty) treaty with the Russians to reduce each country’s respective nuclear weapons. Yet, this blogger feels it runs contrary to the idea of an improved and friendlier relationship with Moscow. After all, how many arms control treaties does the United States have with its allies? Zero. My and others’ great fear is that the Obama administration will let arms control define the US-Russia relationship at a time when a far broader range of issues require attention. Continuing the Cold War era arms control treaties with Moscow continues to define the US-Russia relationship as adversarial, not cooperative. I understand proliferation and nuclear forces reduction are important issues and that since Russia currently possesses the most nuclear weapons in the world, it is a key issue with them. However, I feel this is the wrong way forward.

Readers, your thoughts?

After revealing some cloak and dagger tales of American covert ops in Iran in recent years, New York Times Washington bureau chief David Sanger asks a great question: Will President Obama stop covert ops in Iran? Or will the weight of history push him to continue Bush’s legacy?

Is “legacy” an important factor in the calculus of being the POTUS? People said Bush was particularly conscious of his legacy. Can anyone provide historical examples of presidents choosing legacy over national interest that will let us gauge what President Obama will do?

By the way, the clip resides on fora.tv, an online community that collects smart and provocative videos from across the interwebs for discussion and debate. It is a kind of an open source TED, or a thinking man’s YouTube. Check it out.

The increasing likelihood that Iran will successfully acquire a nuclear weapon cannot be avoided. While this author does not predict with certainty that it will happen, nor believe the US and EU shouldn’t do everything in its power to stop it, it is a real possibility. Therefore, policy discussions should also begin to think about the potential implications of a nuclear Iran and consider how the US and others can mitigate the effects thereof.

North Korea has not yet set off a cascade of proliferation, largely because the potential new nuclear states are all US allies (South Korea, Japan, perhaps Taiwan). The same is not true of all the Middle East. In addition, states may react not only to Iran, but to their perceived reaction of others, i.e. Egypt reacting to Iran directly as well as to its belief Saudi Arabia will respond with its own program. Below is a regional map of what a nuclear Iran could lead to:

And to give readers something else to think about, the following countries are currently giving serious consideration to nuclear energy in the near term (within 10 years): Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Vietnam.

As if that were not troubling enough, the following countries have long term plans or studies underway: Algeria, Australia, Chile, Georgia, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen.

This is not to say that all or even most will move forward. Nuclear energy (even for peaceful purposes) requires a massive financial investments in infrastructure, technology, training and more. Additionally, some states may decide against it at various states of their programs, as has happened many times in the past.

Therefore, in the event that Iran does indeed acquire a nuclear weapons capability, which we’ll define as the generally agreed perception that Iran does (whether or not it has tested), the United States and Europe need to think long and hard about instruments of state power which can be applied to prevent a cascade of nuclear weapons states and/or to ensure that peaceful nuclear energy (a legal right of every NPT signatory) stays peaceful and secure.

Operating upon the assumption that Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons, how likely do readers think the following are:

1) A quick resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as Arab states move together and ally against Iran.

2) An alliance between Israeli and one or several Arab states. The Saudis and Israelis arguably have the most to fear from a nuclear Iran, and Israel is the only nuclear power in the region. Afterall, the US is around, but we can leave anytime. The Israelis are stuck there.

These ideas came up in a recent discussion. Readers, your thoughts?