Several days ago, US Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech at the National Defense University outlining the current administration’s arms control agenda. It included pushing for US ratification of the CTBT, the ongoing START talks with Russia and reducing the US nuclear arsenal. While we could discuss all three of these issues at length, I’d like to first concentrate on the idea of ‘getting to zero’ and reducing America’s nuclear capability.

The Vice President (as others) noted that

“We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective.”

Non-nuclear weapons development includes the administration’s plan for an “adaptive” missile-defense shield and conventional warheads “with worldwide reach,” he said. “With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong,” Mr. Biden said.

The idea of replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional capabilities is not new. The argument is that the increasing destructive power of modern conventional weapons combined with the ability of the United States to ‘reach out and touch someone’ anywhere on the globe in a minutes or hours can play the same deterrent role as nuclear weapons currently do.

In order to break down this argument, I’d like to make two things clear. Firstly, the goal of our current nuclear force posture is to deter adversaries from attacking us and our allies. Secondly, the means to accomplish this is not and should not be the focus of discussion but instead the end. What do I mean? Many people focus on the weapons themselves, i.e. nuclear weapons, but as Biden notes, if conventional capabilities can fulfil the same function (i.e. survive a first strike and destroy enemy targets with high certainty), then they can be substituted for nuclear weapons. In short, how we do it doesn’t matter. The key thing is the destruction of enemy targets with high certainty. The fact that we use nuclear weapons for this purpose is a reflection only of the fact that they are the best suited weapon available for this task today.

However, there are very serious problems with the idea of replacing nuclear with conventional weapons.

If we accept the proposition that today, or sometime in the future, conventional weapons will be on par with nuclear weapons in terms of their deterrent capability, then several logical conclusions must follow:

1) These conventional weapons would be just as dangerous as nuclear weapons. Therefore replacing one with the other makes no substantive difference. Moreover, it would require time, money and effort to do this all with no gain.

2) If conventional weapons are used in the future in the same role as nuclear weapons today, they could invite a nuclear response from adversaries whose conventional capabilities do not match our own. This would be possible also in smaller conflicts because an enemy could then never be sure what weapons were employed since both nuclear and conventional are equall bad. It would lead to escalation at a much higher pace.

3) Having more conventional weapons in the US deterrent may lower the threshold for use.This may encourage a first strike by us or others.

4) If conventional and nuclear weapons are ever equal, they will be sought after by other states just as nuclear weapons are. This leaves us in the same situation as today. However, if the conventional capability is more expensive or difficult to achieve than nuclear weapons (which is older technology now), it will actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5) If these conventional weapons are indeed equal, it means countries will be able to acquire destructive power equal to nuclear weapons, but WITHIN the legal framework Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This will lead to the irrelevance and death of the most important and successful nonproliferation regime the world has.

6) If conventional weapons can equal nuclear ones, they will require the same types of arms control agreements and nonproliferation agreements as nuclear weapons.

7) Replacing nuclear weapons with equally capable conventional weapons is a cosmetic change which does nothing to address the underlying nature of the international system which makes deterrence necessary in the first place. It’s a change in form, not substance.

Readers, I’d appreciate any thoughts, criticisms and comments you have on this.

With recent revelations of a previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facility for uranium enrichment and a recent fit of long range missile testing, the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambition is reaching critical mass. However, what’s lost in the frenzy of media reports and official denouncements from western leaders is a more fundamental quandary.

Despite its president’s rhetoric I don’t believe the Iranian government, even in its currently fragmented state, is as loony or nihilistic as the world envisions it to be. Ahmadinejad’s calamitous anti-Israeli nonsense is less about Iran’s apocalyptic nuclear intention to incinerate Tel Aviv and much more about exciting his conservative base at home as well as serving a rally cry for Iran’s Arab proxies and allies during a time of waning Iranian, regional influence. Ahmadinejad’s need for a foreign bogey man is at an all time high, given the largely contested recent elections and the virtual, final nail in the coffin of the Khomeini revolution. So what does Iran hope to gain first, by its belligerent non-compliance with the NPT, and second in actually realizing the development of a deliverable nuclear weapon? Some thoughts:

While the world’s custodians of the NPT (specifically the US, UK and France as concerns Iran) envision it as a measure to mitigate nuclear proliferation, Iran utilizes it as a measure of leveling the geopolitical playing field. Lacking a stable, proliferate economy, anything resembling a robust, modern military (Iran lost it’s sole AWACS recently during an airshow) Iran is wholly reliant on three measures to project itself onto the radar screen of global matters. The threat of regional primacy, resource connectivity (Iran is China’s largest oil supplier) and the murky threat of possibly developing a nuclear weapon.

Iran isn’t currently pursuing a functioning and deliverable nuclear weapon. Iran want’s access to a functioning and deliverable nuclear weapon. In one respect, full development would bring Iran into the “Big Boyz Club” of global prominence. However, the mere existence of Iran’s nuclear program poses an existential threat to itself. Not likely from the above mentioned custodian’s of the NPT but almost certainly from Israel. In this Iran skates very thin ice.

In the short term, so long as the Israeli’s believe Iran’s nuke program remains in the nascent stage (partial enrichment of uranium below weapons grade) diplomatic measures remain the mainstay globally and politically feasible in Tel Aviv. The closer intelligence or, more importantly, media reports tie Iran to a viable nuclear weapon the more eminent and politically necessary Israeli interdiction becomes. Iran is neither blind nor deaf to this reality. By staging incremental, if internationally illegal, steps in stockpiling uranium at low levels of enrichment (5%) Iran is building a framework for the ability to piece together a functioning nuke in a relatively short period of time. In going this route Iran gains some weight to throw around regionally and globally while ceding first strike capability to Israel and other nuke states.

The question, of course, is how long Israel is willing to hold back and endure the status quo. I expect nothing in terms of groundbreaking accomplishment from Iran’s October 1st palaver with the Group of Six. However the talks will set the mood, if you will, for what happens next. Should Iran’s representatives bring Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s fire and brimstone nonsense to the table I wouldn’t expect Israeli willingness to stand around waiting for the UN Security Counsel to bicker about sanctions.

Image credit: The Guardian

This Washington Post article presents a “fed up” China,

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has admonished North Korea by saying it is “resolutely opposed” to the nuclear and missile tests. Official government news reports have proclaimed that China is “shocked” by its neighbor’s defiance and that it “demands” an end to “any activity that might worsen the situation.”

North Korea’s unexpected decision that it is prepared to return to the six-party talks caught many by surprise. Announced in Beijing after a hastily scheduled three-way meeting of China, North Korea and the United States, Pyongyang’s change of heart offers signs of hope for the resumption of the process to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.

Without question, China’s role in facilitating North Korea’s return to the negotiation table has been critical. In a major departure from its traditional low-profile diplomatic posture and long-held principle of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, Beijing swiftly joined the international community in condemning the North Korean nuclear test in the strongest terms and adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions.

I’m a bit skeptical. China’s interests are, foremost, mitigating a North Korean “failed state” and the subsequent influx of North Korean refugees and cross border chaos. The “six party” initiative is, at this juncture, an obvious geo-strategic failure in terms of staving off North Korean nuclear proliferation. At the same time it’s coincided with China’s want for a “stable” North Korean regime as international efforts have been focused, primarily, on fruitless diplomacy and subservience to extortion (gimme fuel and food or else!) rather than punitive sanctions that might contain actual “teeth” but at the same time destabilize the regime. I have to wonder if this latest round of “admonishments” aren’t just another rhetorical effort to placate the US, South Korea and Japan. I expect the endgame will be yet another re-run of the obligatory six party talks and we’ll see this circus repeat itself two or three years from now.