Kaplan argues that NATO’s 7000 troop contribution to the Afghan surge should not be considered an end, but a beginning:

Consider: China is rising as a great power, particularly in the naval sphere. The U.S. will not fight a war with China, but it will leverage like-minded, democratic others such as India, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, and Japan to help manage Chinese ascendancy in the maritime rimland of Eurasia. This will take a lot of work, and a lot of ships. And with the U.S. increasingly tied up in the Indian and Pacific oceans as the years and decades march on, it will help to rely increasingly on European forces to cover the the Atlantic and Africa for them.

Although Kaplan continues to be pushing Europe towards a more warlike nature, there seems to be a slight change in tone. Take this quote from the Dispatch:

At home, Europe’s social safety net is estimable. But what will the European Union, now with its own president and foreign minister, work toward abroad?

Now, remember this?

What does the European Union truly stand for besides a cradle-to-grave social welfare system? For without something to struggle for, there can be no civil society—only decadence.

Anyways, read the whole Dispatch at The Atlantic: Let’s Go, Europe.

With all the talk of Pakistan and the Taliban being 60 miles from Islamabad (as if they have tank divisions or conventional forces), I’d like to consider just a few things.

1) The Taleban are an insurgent group, not conventional fighters. If they try to become one, they will be decimated by the Pakistan army just as happened for example during the Tet Offensive.

2) From Pakistan’s perspective, support for the Taliban is a hedge against the future withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan and a slowing or stop of US support. Remember, the US and Pakistan had bad relations since 1989 when the US lost interest and slapped Pakistan with host of nonproliferation sanctions. Pakistan sees the US as an unreliable ally and fair weather friend. Hence, if Pakistan truly does turn on the Taliban and wins, it will inevitably lead towards a situation where the US/NATO accomplishes its mission and leaves. Then Pakistan will be left alone to fight India with no ally in Afghanistan and fewer proxy forces.

India is still seen as Pakistan’s primary threat while the opposite is of course not true.What are the US/NATO’s options here?

Canadian Defence Minister Peter McKay has finally come out to dampen speculation that he may be in the running to be the next secretary general of NATO. This has come out on the heels of news that America has thrown its hat in with Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the post.

I have been watching this news since last January, when The Economist outed McKay as one of the three contenders for the top job. The current SecGen is leaving this summer and next month American President Barack Obama will be having his first meeting with the Allies. Having a freshly minted leader to show off to the president would be a nice start to renewing an old relationship. Having that leader be a North American for the first time would be… I don’t know… a nice change?

Since the article in The Economist the Canadian press has been wondering if McKay was running for the job and who was supporting him. I thought it wasn’t too likely since McKay is still young and active on the Canadian domestic political scene. The leader of the the Conservative Party has been having troubles of late, and McKay is close enough to fill his shoes if need be.

Nevertheless, a couple of weeks back I spoke with a European scholar of NATO who is currently at a prestigious Canadian university. He noted that the naming of McKay “speaks to the respect that Canada has earned in the alliance since 2001.” But he also had a message that may ring familiar to longtime CA readers:

It also speaks to an argument that I have long made and that is that this is all not really new. John Manley was in the ring once before and if he had wanted that job, he probably could have gotten it by having the Prime Minister use some of Canada’s political capital in Brussels to push that through. Manley was certainly well connected and respected in Washington. And virtually nothing happens in NATO without the US if it chooses to lend it its ear for a second or two. Thus, Canada has had influence in the alliance [a] long time before 9/11; it mattered and had a certain reputation that other states admire.

Imagine that: something new is actually something old. And like the last time round, it looks like the Canadian candidate will not push for the job. Mr. Rasmussen is a fine choice, and as our scholar friend pointed out, he is a particularly hot candidate for the Europeans considering his handling of the Mohammed caricature incident in Denmark. All luck to him in Afghanistan and New Europe alike.

The Infowar Monitor reports that Kyrgyzstan is under a massive denial of service attack, flatlining three of four ISPs in the country. The attacks are suspected to be both political and commissioned.

The cost and manpower requirements to black or brown out a nation’s Internet access is exceedingly small while the potential payoff exceedingly large. Consider the following: Last month, the US and NATO closed their Pakistani supply route (which accounts for 80 percent of supplies to the war in Afghanistan) becoming entirely dependent on Central Asia. However, since US bases in Uzbekistan were closed in 2005, and Russian bases in Tajikistan preclude any American ones, only Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan remains. During the original invasion of Afghanistan the technology-dependent American military was plagued by insufficient bandwidth. Eight years later I am assuming this is no longer a problem, but for speculative purposes I wonder how a DOS attack on a bandwidth-starved region such as Central Asia or Africa could affect a technology-dependent military? I do not want to insinuate that the Kyrgyz DOS attack was directed at US/NATO supply lines. Rather, the coincident events caused me to consider future situations as the bandwidth gap is more pronounced in the less stable (and therefore less connected) regions of the globe. Maybe someone with a background in computer security like selil could give us some perspective on this issue.

With the promotion of General David Petraeus to CENTCOM commander, commentators are questioning what it means for Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan but let’s focus on Afghanistan.

On October 7th 2001, the Unites States and United Kingdom launched their attack on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The initial phase of the war consisted of minimal ground troops which coordinated attacks with the Northern Alliance, allowing them to do the lion’s share of the fighting. Some argued too few troops and reliance on the Northern Alliance was a mistake, however, it was the only way to began the war as quickly as was done and to avoid the previous mistakes of the British and Soviet Union who sent overwhelming ground forces in and were soundly defeated.

A small agile force allowed for maximum flexibility, leverage of local know-how and avoidance of being seen as an occupier like the UK and USSR. The country fell quickly and an new government was formed. Avoiding an occupational government was a key part of our Afghan strategy insofar as again avoiding being seen as occupiers as well as avoiding decades long occupation such as in Bosnia and Kosovo where the US and other partners shouldered most of the burden. We were to help them help themselves, not just help them. This too was successful. According to Douglas Feith, “Creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan is desirable, but not necessarily within the power of the US.”

Yet, with the initial war goals accomplished, the US and its coalition partners bumped up against the next set of problems, none of which had much to do with the war itself, but rather with the nature of Afghanistan itself, namely: geography and history. While America’s strategy to win the initial war was built on an understanding of the failures of the UK and USSR, these underlying problems cannot be so easily researched and solved. Afghanistan was created, in short, to serve as a buffer between British India and the expanding Russian Empire and for this it worked rather well. The extremely rugged topography of the country has always made having a central government extremely difficult, regardless whether that government was democratic or dictatorial.

In fact, geography alone goes a long way in terms of explaining the failure to establish any functioning government over history. While the country’s political borders create a single political entity, its geography does the opposite, breaking it into largely isolated pieces. In this sense, the difficulty establishing a single authority is not unlike the problems archipelago nations like Indonesia or the Philippines have. With transportation and communication difficult, basic commerce becomes challenging, much less enough common experience to build the idea of a nation. Additional problems of porous borders and drugs further complicate the situation.

With this in mind, this blogger cannot support the popular criticism that Afghanistan suffers from a dramatic shortage of troops. Indeed, one of the main tenets of US strategy has been a small force, which by the way, did accomplish its tasks. While small increases in troop numbers may make a difference in certain areas, any large increase would ultimately harm our efforts. Our goal should not be more, but rather smarter. This includes more coordination with international NGOs and pressure for partner countries to fulfill their promises such as Germany training the Afghan police, Italy helping build their judicial system and the UK fighting drugs. The US cannot be the fallback for every lazy partner. In addition, success stories such as the training and now active operations of US-trained Afghan commando units. Threat’s Watch notes that:

[...] the development of the Afghan commando force must continue apace if it is to demonstrate the level of operational efficacy and, equally important, sustainability to permit a draw-down of US Special Forces units. Still, the Afghanis and their Green Beret mentors appear to be off to an auspicious start, and if ultimately successful, the entire Western world will reap the benefits of a counterinsurgency force equipped with the technical know-how and linguistic and cultural sensitivity to disrupt insurgent networks in an immeasurably pivotal theater.

Indeed. Additional US forces would largely foster continued dependence on foreigners and create a larger footprint leading to more resentment and incidents. While more boots on the ground may indeed help in certain areas or situations, they are not the answer. A smarter, more resilient and better coordinated strategy must be be adopted by all of the coalition partners in order to make any headway on these deeply rooted historical problems and most important of all, it must be communicated clearly and realistically to locals, partners and the world.

UPDATE: RFERL discusses the importance of road projects for both the Afghan economy and for international forces and counterinsurgency .

Following on the Kissinger post of last week, Kaplan has an Op-Ed in the New York Times on the Nato alliance and the unequal nature of the alliance—but unlike Kissinger, he defends it.

Predictions of NATO’s decline hold it to an impossible cold war standard. Then, a direct mortal threat to Central Europe in the form of Red Army divisions led to an all-for-one and one-for-all mentality. Now that the threat is more subtle and diverse, NATO’s mandate, structure and personality need to change accordingly. NATO, two-tiers or not, potentially holds as much value to the United States in the multipolar future as it did in the cold war past. Indeed, as we look at the possibility of a “Pacific Century” featuring the rise of China as a great power, combined with a resurgent Russia across Eurasia, we should see that an American-European alliance is imperative.

Let’s face it, the threat of a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan is not of the same order as the threat Germany faced from the Soviet Union, so is it any wonder that Germany’s attitude has changed? Rather than bully the Germans into doing what they’re not very good at — counterinsurgency — in the violent south of Afghanistan, we should be grateful that they’re doing something they are good at — nation-building — in the relatively peaceful north. The same holds for countries like Italy and Spain, whose troops are also restricted to northern Afghanistan. In the post-cold-war world, individual NATO members can’t be expected to automatically take part in missions outside the alliance’s traditional European sphere. Participation will be contingent on specific circumstances. And that will lead to an increasingly stratified alliance.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s mandate has been a work in progress: from a sole focus on the defense of the European homeland to a three-dimensional engagement in global issues like terrorism, human rights abuses, military partnerships with fledgling democracies, energy security, nuclear proliferation and outbreaks of chaos…

In fact, a two-tiered NATO has certain advantages for the United States. Eastward expansion acts as a bulwark against a neo-czarist Russia. Countries close to Russia like Poland and Romania feel NATO is every bit as vital as it was to Western Europe during the cold war, which is the real reason they’ve helped us in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO membership represents a seal of good-product approval for former east bloc states seeking investment and stabilization.

NATO is never going to be a rubber stamp for American proposals like in the darkest days of the cold war. By getting bogged down in Iraq and consequently neglecting Afghanistan, the Bush administration has forced NATO members to bear a military responsibility that many in their heart of hearts do not feel is vital to their interests…

The United States will have to forge plenty of other military alliances in the 21st century: area-specific ones for the Pacific and Indian oceans; and culturally specific ones, namely the core group of Anglo-Saxon nations that have borne the brunt of responsibility in Iraq and Afghanistan. But simply because NATO cannot be an alliance of equals does not mean that it won’t play a significant role in our grand strategy: to create a web of global arrangements and liberal institutions that will allow America to gradually retreat from its costly and risky position of overbearing dominance.