Part 2 of my obsessive compulsory coverage of Robert D. Kaplan’s trip to Tokyo.

Yours truly with Robert Kaplan, Tokyo, 12 March 2010

After Robert D. Kaplan spoke at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, I approached him and he graciously invited me to attend the exclusive reception. His assistant whispered the location and time, and I went outside for a breather and to send off this misspelled missive (soon followed by this amelioration).

The reception started at 8PM, at a nearby Italian restaurant. I had to catch a bullet train back to Nagoya that night, so I could only spare an hour. Many of the invitees were already standing around inside the restaurant, drinking wine and talking with one another. I waited outside for Kaplan and his assistant who came a little late. Read the rest of this entry »

I was thinking about a reverse Facebook, an unFacebook . The key difference is that this is not a social network that is populated by willing participants, but populated with people by information gatherers.

For example, I meet you, and unbeknownst to you, I add you to my unFacebook. I meet another person and add them. Later I find out that you and he are business partners. I then “friend” you to him on my unFacebook. I give access to this database to all the people in my organization and send them out with iPhones and a handy little app that they can use to snap facial photos, grab a GPS point for last location, and fill in some quick details about subjects. Sometimes my people use their iPhones to show photos of subjects to other people to verify names or aliases, corroborate last known locations, and make links with other subjects in the database. Multiple aliases could be resolved through face recognition software. Multiple spellings could be resolved through morphological analysis. Personal details, links, and geolocation data can all be captured on the go in a very simple and familiar system (everybody knows how to use Facebook). As these bits of disparate information come into my UnFacebook, I use this data for an advanced type of link analysis, or scalable social network analysis (SSNA). It seems to me that a system like this would be handy for soldiers fighting an insurgency.

I would assume that law enforcement organizations have something like this that has been the result of a long evolution of link analysis technology. Doing a little research I found a list of tools used by the NSA in James Bamford’s The Shadow Factory (pp. 149): PatternTracer, Agility, AMHAS, Anchory, ArcView, Fastscope, Hightide, Hombase, Intelink, Octave math, Document Management Center, Dishfire, CREST, Pinwale, COASTLINE, SNACKS, Cadence, Gamut, Mainway, Marina, Osis, Puzzlecube, Surrey, Tuningfork, Xkeyscore, and Unified Tasking Tool. This is simply a list of tools used by the NSA. I could not find out what many of these did. That may be because they are specific to the NSA, or historical with no trace left on the net. ArcView is the only social network analysis tool I could confirm. Pinwale is data-mining software, which can be used for SSNA. But this is beside the point.

The military has its own needs and different ways of collecting intel than domestic law enforcement agencies, or even the NSA. With all the COIN work Western militaries have been conducting in the past decade, a flexible, automated, unFacebook-style link analysis application could be a benefit. Such an application probably exists, and if anyone has some information on it, please share. If not, this is a potential market for an enterprising startup. Please contact me if you would like to collaborate. ;)

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the review by the Defense Secretary of America’s military strategy, was released at the Pentagon a few days ago. The highlights of the review are as follows:

• The military should move away from the quarter-century old policy of being prepared for “two major, conventional wars at one time” as a guiding principle for its military. Noting that the country is already engaged in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the new focus should be a broader range of security challenges, including fighting insurgencies, dealing with potentially hostile nations such as Iran, and engaging in cyberwarfare.
• Implement a new joint air-sea battle plan in response to threats such as China’s persistent military buildup and Iran’s possession of advanced weapons. This would combine the strengths of each service to conduct long-range strikes that could utilize a new generation of bombers, a new cruise missile, drones launched from aircraft carriers, and unmanned underwater vehicles.
• Transform Guam into a hub for security activities in the Western Pacific while remaining aligned with Japan’s defense forces. No mention is made of the current Futenma base relocation controversy.
• The military forces are under strain and the US should help foreign militaries build capacity. Also, focus on relations with allies and friendly nations and promote training in foreign languages and foreign cultures for US military personnel.
• Climate change and energy dependence were recognized for the first time. The US could see new opportunities and challenges in the Arctic, and there could be an increase on the demand for U.S. forces in humanitarian disasters.

Meanwhile, courtesy Lexington Green comes this a working paper published at the Royal United Services Institute is far less formal but asks the tough questions about the future of British military policy, and itemizes five options for future

Option 1 – Global Guardian: Continue ground operations for robust stabilization in Afghanistan. This will allow British governments to develop and sustain aspirations of global influence. Naval and air forces would have relatively minor supporting roles. The risk of this option is that it creates a force structure that is not well prepared for other uncertainties, and there is a long-term political aversion to commitments to enduring ground occupation.

Option 2 – Strategic Raiding: This ‘maritime’ option recognizes that there is unlikely to be the political will in government or in the electorate for further embroilment in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the foreseeable future, and instead focuses on short-term operations using agile specialist ground forces and special forces. The UK would make a substantial contribution to
maritime security, which would permit a degree of international leadership in this respect.

Option 3 – Contributory Option: A selection would be made from the present capabilities to specifically “contribute” to the needs identified in an international context, both in the US-UK context and the European context. This option would sacrifice any possibility for national autonomy for intervention operations, because the UK would be dependent on other nations for all the capabilities that it had surrendered.

Option 4 – Gendarmerie Option: This option accepts that aspirations to be a major expeditionary power are unaffordable and instead focuses ground forces on contributing to stabilization. This would be a strategic bargain without the aspiration to retain high-intensity combat capability. This option could also include some constabulary naval capability to contribute to maritime security.

Option 5 – ‘Little Britain’: This option focuses specifically on defense and internal security of the British islands. This option abandons any strategic bargain. There is also the question of the UK’s Dependent Territories around the world to which there is a legal obligation for security—either abandon them or force them to take autonomy.

Bat bombs, corkscew tanks, guns that shoot around corners, aircraft carriers made out of ice and wood pulp or landing strips built on top of zeppelins. Crazy stuff that goes beyond war tubas but ranks up there with the First Earth Battalion. Check it out: Weird Military Innovations: 10 Crazy Weapons of War

A note about the anti tank dogs. I don’t know if this is true but I heard a story about the first time the Soviets deployed these dogs on the battlefield. Once unleashed the dogs ran out towards the enemy, paused and then turned back, running under the tanks of the Soviets! The plan had backfired in the worst possible way. You see, the dogs had been trained to run under tanks by putting raw meat under training tanks. Soviet training tanks. When the dogs went to war they looked at all the different types of tanks on the battlefield and knew “where the meat was” so to speak, and ended up turning on their masters.

ADDENDUM: Wikipedia knows all!

Soviets used their own diesel-engine tanks to train the dogs rather than German tanks, which had gasoline engines. As the dogs relied on their acute sense of smell, the dogs sought out familiar Soviet tanks instead of strange-smelling German tanks.

Look at this powerpoint slide! I haven’t seen that many arrows since Agincourt. From Marginal revolution:

It’s all in this military powerpoint, apparently official.  On the positive side they are aware the problem is complex.

In the Novum Organum, published in 1620, Francis Bacon presented his idea of scientific method. In it he lists four “idols of the mind” which hinder correct scientific reasoning. I think Powerpoint should be promoted as a new idol.

Despite its complexity, it is worth reading through the entire document to see how they reached this particular slide. But in no way can I imagine calling this a “model” of dynamics. It is more like a link analysis of To Do’s.

h/t to Joe. Also see: Present Arms! The military and Powerpoint.

Robert D. Kaplan supplies a chapter on Chinese naval strategy to a Center for a New American Security report entitled China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship. Much of the chapter is based on his previous work in Foreign Affairs and The Atlantic with a healthy dose of James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, two academics many will be familiar with. Kaplan’s primary contention is that in the long-term, China is pursuing a two-ocean strategy for its navy:

… the Chinese Navy would prefer to be not a one-ocean, but a two-ocean power, with multiple access routes between the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to ease its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. (pp. 53-54)

Unfortunately much of the analysis is based on the Mahanian concept of physical protection of the sea lanes. This type of thinking has been criticized by naval thinkers in the West, but is considered the norm in Chinese strategic circles (see Mao Zedong, Meet Alfred Thayer Mahan: Strategic Theory and Chinese Sea Power (PDF) by Holmes and Yoshihara). Much of China’s resources pass through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean. It is to this end that China has set up its string of pearls strategy (one being Gwadar Port), contemplating a Kra Canal as well as beefing up its naval power projection capabilities into the Indian Ocean. Thus, quoting Chinese naval analyst Zhang Ming, “India is perhaps China’s most realistic strategic adversary.” Kaplan points out that 90 percent of Chinese arms sales are to Indian Ocean littoral countries, virtually surrounding India on three sides.

This all sounds very ominous but before you begin accusing Kaplan of being a war-monger realize that much of this article is about justifying China’s expansion. Kaplan stresses that “there is nothing illegitimate about the rise of the Chinese military.” and “… it is too facile to suggest that China is acquiring naval power as a means to the end of regional or perhaps global hegemony.”(pp. 46) Chinese expansion is a function of expanding trade, giving rise to economic and strategist interests overseas. Furthermore, Chinese naval expansion, argues Kaplan, is “an indication that its land borders are for the first time in ages not under threat.” (pp. 48)

Kaplan once again makes the comparison of China’s rise to that of America’s rise in the 19th century. He even makes a reference to the Indian Wars and the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890. Reader beware, one must tread carefully when using historical metaphors and analogues. There is learning from history, and there is being blinded by history. A good book to read on this subject is Neustadt and May’s excellent Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. That said, I think Kaplan is doing something more subtle here. Rather than making an argument about the progress of a rising power, he is offering a moral argument to counter anti-Chinese sentiment in the US. Basically he is saying: hey, we went the same route and the world didn’t turn out so bad did it? For some that may seem a very egocentric argument, but remember that the entire report is directed at the American and Chinese decision makers and is titled: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship. Kaplan argues that China’s naval rise can present the US with opportunities for engagement (eg. the Chinese dispatch to the Gulf of Aden as an example), and we know from his previous work that Kaplan supports the military as the harbingers of diplomacy. Furthermore, Kaplan advises that rather than leveraging allies like Japan and India to isolate China, the US should leverage these relationships to bind China in an Asia-centric alliance system. A moment of institutional liberalism from the self-proclaimed pessimistic realist Kaplan?

The rest of the report is written by name-brand academics such as John Ikenberry, Michael Green and Richard Weitz. Often Kaplan is criticized for writing in academic settings. The situation is no different here as he makes a number of claims without sufficient evidence. At least this time he uses endnotes (a whole 16 of them!). Since this is really a think piece, an exploration of a potential naval strategy from a decidedly American point of view, it might not require such adherence to the rigour of the academy. Unless you are a professional academic working on SLOC issues or are familiar with Holmes and Yoshihara’s work, this article is probably worth the read.

h/t to Lex who passed this on oh so long ago!

Kaplan argues that NATO’s 7000 troop contribution to the Afghan surge should not be considered an end, but a beginning:

Consider: China is rising as a great power, particularly in the naval sphere. The U.S. will not fight a war with China, but it will leverage like-minded, democratic others such as India, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, and Japan to help manage Chinese ascendancy in the maritime rimland of Eurasia. This will take a lot of work, and a lot of ships. And with the U.S. increasingly tied up in the Indian and Pacific oceans as the years and decades march on, it will help to rely increasingly on European forces to cover the the Atlantic and Africa for them.

Although Kaplan continues to be pushing Europe towards a more warlike nature, there seems to be a slight change in tone. Take this quote from the Dispatch:

At home, Europe’s social safety net is estimable. But what will the European Union, now with its own president and foreign minister, work toward abroad?

Now, remember this?

What does the European Union truly stand for besides a cradle-to-grave social welfare system? For without something to struggle for, there can be no civil society—only decadence.

Anyways, read the whole Dispatch at The Atlantic: Let’s Go, Europe.

A common theme at Coming Anarchy is the importance of experience in addition to theoretical understanding. Actually visiting a far off locale can lead to insights otherwise unrealized by just reading about it. That is not to disparage book learning, something essential to our overall knowledge. But anyone can read about a topic. Experience plays a differentiating role by giving nuance to understanding. It is like a secret spice that makes the family recipe unique and memorable. This sums up my impression of the science fiction novel Old Man’s War by John Scalzi. Read the rest of this entry »

Poised outside of the newly re-enforced capital of Sparta, the Theban general Epaminondas knew that beginning a siege against the city would only wear down his troops who had already campaigned deep into Spartan territory during the mid-winter of 370BC. His force was a collection of Arcadian peoples and included a large number of Helots — the Spartan underclass — among other “disaffected elements”. Epaminondas decided on a new tack. Rather than conquering the Spartans, he would contain them.

At Mount Ithome, the natural citadel of Messenia, he founded a city as the capital of a new Messenian state, established there all the insurgent elelments that had joined him, and used the booty he had gained during the invasion as an endowment for the new state. This was to be a check and counterpoise to Sparta in southern Greece. By its secure establisment she lost half her territory and more than half her serfs. Through Epiminondas’s foundation of Megalopolis, in Arcadia, as a further check, Sparta was hemmed in both politically and by a chain of fortresses, so that the economic roots of her military supremacy were severed.

Epaminondas’s strategy successfully dislocated the power base of Sparta after just a few months campaigning, and no victories in the field. After all, the object of war is not to destroy your opponent’s military force, but to “obtain a better state of peace — even if only from your own point of view.”

This gem of a story (from pp. 15) is a rarity in BH Liddell Hart’s Strategy, which is otherwise a tiresome slog of a read. Rather than a well argued, economically written thesis, Strategy is a wordy, meandering narrative of the author’s own journey to his theory. Liddell Hart re-tells history with hints and side comments about a hypothesis that is not revealed to the reader. The key term “strategy” itself is finally defined on page 321 (as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”)! The first three quarters of the book are not about understanding history, but a guided tour of how Liddell Hart came to his conclusions. Those conclusions are finally revealed in the last section of the book, which I would almost recommend skipping the rest to read.

This style of presentation, as well as several passages in the book, indicate the level of Liddell Hart’s egotism. Self promotion is almost a second thesis of the book, especially in the latter third. It is an insight into the man behind the controversy.
Read the rest of this entry »

Pictured above is Japan’s Hyuga-class “helicopter destroyer” (different angle) alongside the USS George Washington (see opposite angle here). It is hard to see from this angle but there is a significant size difference. The George Washington is a Nimitz class carrier weighing in at 97,000 tons and capable of 85 aircraft. The Hyuga is just 13,950 tons and carries only 11 helicopters. Still, the Hyuga is the MSDF’s biggest ship to date.

The above is a pretty historic scene. The Hyuga is the first of its class and was commissioned earlier this year. As Scoop Deck notes: “it’s neat that the last time Japan and the U.S. both fielded aircraft carriers, they were at war”.

“Aircraft carrier”?

The Hyuga, like the earlier commissioned Osumi class LST, is a controversial ship. Both have carrier-like capabilities despite Japan’s 1988 declaration that it would never build aircraft carriers again. Thus, these ships are carefully designed to have little to no power projection capabilities. The Hyuga is described as a “destroyer” in Japanese (護衛艦) because of its role as an escort ship. This is in contrast to the central command and control role that US aircraft carriers play. Yet unlike traditional DDH the Hyuga has a longish flat-top, which makes it controversial. This means it can handle VSTOL aircraft such as Harriers and F-35s (which, by the way, Japan does not have). Here is a clip of it in action:

The Hyuga is for deploying helicopters in conducting amphibious operations, humanitarian missions and anti-submarine warfare. Rather than a revolutionary procurement in terms of Japan’s constitution, this is more of an evolution in terms of the kinds of operations Japan currently conducts (ie. sweeping sea lanes for the USN, disaster response in Southeast Asia, etc.). The Hyuga is a sign of Japanese innovation under military restriction. Simultaneously, it can be viewed as practice run for any carrier building program Japan may potentially decide to pursue in the future. Despite these controversies, the above picture is still pretty amazing.

H/T to Fred Z and Dan who shared this through Google Reader.