Robert D. Kaplan supplies a chapter on Chinese naval strategy to a Center for a New American Security report entitled China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship. Much of the chapter is based on his previous work in Foreign Affairs and The Atlantic with a healthy dose of James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, two academics many will be familiar with. Kaplan’s primary contention is that in the long-term, China is pursuing a two-ocean strategy for its navy:

… the Chinese Navy would prefer to be not a one-ocean, but a two-ocean power, with multiple access routes between the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to ease its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. (pp. 53-54)

Unfortunately much of the analysis is based on the Mahanian concept of physical protection of the sea lanes. This type of thinking has been criticized by naval thinkers in the West, but is considered the norm in Chinese strategic circles (see Mao Zedong, Meet Alfred Thayer Mahan: Strategic Theory and Chinese Sea Power (PDF) by Holmes and Yoshihara). Much of China’s resources pass through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean. It is to this end that China has set up its string of pearls strategy (one being Gwadar Port), contemplating a Kra Canal as well as beefing up its naval power projection capabilities into the Indian Ocean. Thus, quoting Chinese naval analyst Zhang Ming, “India is perhaps China’s most realistic strategic adversary.” Kaplan points out that 90 percent of Chinese arms sales are to Indian Ocean littoral countries, virtually surrounding India on three sides.

This all sounds very ominous but before you begin accusing Kaplan of being a war-monger realize that much of this article is about justifying China’s expansion. Kaplan stresses that “there is nothing illegitimate about the rise of the Chinese military.” and “… it is too facile to suggest that China is acquiring naval power as a means to the end of regional or perhaps global hegemony.”(pp. 46) Chinese expansion is a function of expanding trade, giving rise to economic and strategist interests overseas. Furthermore, Chinese naval expansion, argues Kaplan, is “an indication that its land borders are for the first time in ages not under threat.” (pp. 48)

Kaplan once again makes the comparison of China’s rise to that of America’s rise in the 19th century. He even makes a reference to the Indian Wars and the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890. Reader beware, one must tread carefully when using historical metaphors and analogues. There is learning from history, and there is being blinded by history. A good book to read on this subject is Neustadt and May’s excellent Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. That said, I think Kaplan is doing something more subtle here. Rather than making an argument about the progress of a rising power, he is offering a moral argument to counter anti-Chinese sentiment in the US. Basically he is saying: hey, we went the same route and the world didn’t turn out so bad did it? For some that may seem a very egocentric argument, but remember that the entire report is directed at the American and Chinese decision makers and is titled: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship. Kaplan argues that China’s naval rise can present the US with opportunities for engagement (eg. the Chinese dispatch to the Gulf of Aden as an example), and we know from his previous work that Kaplan supports the military as the harbingers of diplomacy. Furthermore, Kaplan advises that rather than leveraging allies like Japan and India to isolate China, the US should leverage these relationships to bind China in an Asia-centric alliance system. A moment of institutional liberalism from the self-proclaimed pessimistic realist Kaplan?

The rest of the report is written by name-brand academics such as John Ikenberry, Michael Green and Richard Weitz. Often Kaplan is criticized for writing in academic settings. The situation is no different here as he makes a number of claims without sufficient evidence. At least this time he uses endnotes (a whole 16 of them!). Since this is really a think piece, an exploration of a potential naval strategy from a decidedly American point of view, it might not require such adherence to the rigour of the academy. Unless you are a professional academic working on SLOC issues or are familiar with Holmes and Yoshihara’s work, this article is probably worth the read.

h/t to Lex who passed this on oh so long ago!

Pictured above is Japan’s Hyuga-class “helicopter destroyer” (different angle) alongside the USS George Washington (see opposite angle here). It is hard to see from this angle but there is a significant size difference. The George Washington is a Nimitz class carrier weighing in at 97,000 tons and capable of 85 aircraft. The Hyuga is just 13,950 tons and carries only 11 helicopters. Still, the Hyuga is the MSDF’s biggest ship to date.

The above is a pretty historic scene. The Hyuga is the first of its class and was commissioned earlier this year. As Scoop Deck notes: “it’s neat that the last time Japan and the U.S. both fielded aircraft carriers, they were at war”.

“Aircraft carrier”?

The Hyuga, like the earlier commissioned Osumi class LST, is a controversial ship. Both have carrier-like capabilities despite Japan’s 1988 declaration that it would never build aircraft carriers again. Thus, these ships are carefully designed to have little to no power projection capabilities. The Hyuga is described as a “destroyer” in Japanese (護衛艦) because of its role as an escort ship. This is in contrast to the central command and control role that US aircraft carriers play. Yet unlike traditional DDH the Hyuga has a longish flat-top, which makes it controversial. This means it can handle VSTOL aircraft such as Harriers and F-35s (which, by the way, Japan does not have). Here is a clip of it in action:

The Hyuga is for deploying helicopters in conducting amphibious operations, humanitarian missions and anti-submarine warfare. Rather than a revolutionary procurement in terms of Japan’s constitution, this is more of an evolution in terms of the kinds of operations Japan currently conducts (ie. sweeping sea lanes for the USN, disaster response in Southeast Asia, etc.). The Hyuga is a sign of Japanese innovation under military restriction. Simultaneously, it can be viewed as practice run for any carrier building program Japan may potentially decide to pursue in the future. Despite these controversies, the above picture is still pretty amazing.

H/T to Fred Z and Dan who shared this through Google Reader.

Amazing map of ship and port traffic using AIS and accurate up to one hour. Brought you by the U of A Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering. This project is so amazingly useful, I don’t know what to say. Zoom in and check out some of the individual ships. See full size here.

Image from Nick Humphries

“[L]ast year less than one-half of one percent of ships transiting the Horn of Africa were attacked, and most of those attacks were not successful.” Despite those low odds Max Boot goes on to argue in Pirates, Then and Now (Foreign Affairs subscription required) that governments should “make ship owners and insurers take the problem [of piracy] more seriously”. His reasoning is twofold: 1) piracy threatens sea lanes through which half the world’s cargo and a third of Europe’s oil is shipped; and 2) “piracy may wind up underwriting an extreme Islamist movement”. Granted, those are pretty serious stakes. However Boot refuses to do any sort of cost-benefit analysis to determine whether taking the problem “more seriously” is in our interest. He just seems to be itching to hang those scurvy seadogs.

Not to say that the article is pointless. It is a great read for his sweeping history of piracy from the 17th century and his overview of anti-piracy strategies to those from the age of sail. For example:

Countries took a dozen or so steps to safeguard the seas during the pirate wars that stretched roughly from 1650 to 1850. These included changing public attitudes, hiring private pirate hunters, rooting out corruption, improving the administration of justice, offering pardons to pirates who voluntarily surrendered, increasing the number of naval ships dedicated to antipiracy duty, cooperating with other nations, convoying merchant ships, blockading and bombarding pirate ports, chasing pirates both at sea and on land, and, finally, occupying and dismantling pirate lairs.

These days ship owners and insurance companies accept increased insurance premiums due to paying out million-dollar ransoms on that less than half of one percent of ships hijacked. It is probably cheaper than sending the navy in, and arming up crews will only escalate the violence, right? Boot replies:

Similar concerns once led airlines to tell crews not to resist hijackers. This approach changed after 9/11, and one hopes it will not take a similar disaster at sea for ship owners to reconsider their policies.

Boot suggests some policies that would help close the gap between modern times and the 17th century. First of all, the US and UK need to stop the shrinkage of their fleets and buy more warships (Boot recommends the LCS). Until the fleet gets back up to scratch, let private security companies fill the gap. That said, Boot thinks reviving letters of marque might be a step overboard (to coin a phrase). The biggest problem that needs tackling is the legal situation: there are no clear-cut rules of engagement. Pirates picked up by military forces are treated as civilians and the web of international human rights laws and conventions make prosecution convoluted. Much like terrorists, there exists no international criminal court for suspected pirates. As German defence minister Franz Josef Jung said: “No one wants a Guantánamo of the sea.”

In fact, I agree with Boot on all accounts. These are all good suggestions — especially the comments about preventing the deterioration of navies and the proposal for new laws for processing captured pirates. These things need to be done, regardless of the current craze over piracy. Note that I am agreeing in the general while disagreeing with Boot’s position as it is stated specifically in this article. It seems to me that Boot is too focused on piracy itself. It reminds me of how the security community a few years back was overly focused on “the terrorists”. Remember: terrorism is a tactic, not an entity. The same could be said of piracy. And like terrorism, tackling root causes could be more effective (and economic) than simply blasting each individual Blackbeard out of the water. Remember what Kaplan said: Anarchy on Land Means Piracy at Sea.

Related: Being realistic about maritime terrorism

With a swipe at Our Bob, Tom Barnett links to an article in Parameters on The End of Seapower as we know it.

The article, written by a captain of the USCG, is a laundry list of complaints about the US Navy with regards to an alleged lack of action in an age of terrorism. He asks many questions about the usefulness of sea power in the face of the “current threat”, but balks at providing answers. Despite his criticisms, the good captain does think sea power is vital, just not the way it is being conducted now. To paraphrase: Death to sea power! Long live sea power!

I think the captain’s criticisms are all valid. In fact, I made a similar call for a Boyd of the sea nearly two years ago. It seems we must wait some more.

There is a common underlying theme in all of these arguments: the arms race culture of the Cold War has turned us into victims of our own procurement systems. The Military-Industrial-Complex is limiting us in achieving true full-spectrum capabilities. This argument is bigger than the navy, but perhaps the navy is the furthest behind in developing solutions. Considering the momentum of that massive ship we call “naval procurement”, it is no wonder that its tactical diameter is far beyond the expectations of those wanting to deal with sudden threats. I have heard it said that in procurement you start building the platforms you plan to use thirty years from now. That is a disadvantage to the high-tech, so-called American Way of War^TM. I sense an opportunity here for a Boyd-like character to discover some tactically efficient solutions with more rapid development cycles. A similar revolution is underway in the tech industry today, with push towards “good enough” tech. Maybe the navy can find some inspiration there.

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The good captain warns against “relying almost exclusively on a vision of frozen history”, and Barnett picks up on this to criticize Kaplan. Yet I wouldn’t throw out the history books just yet. The Cold War was an aberration, a rarity of extreme balance in the international system. There are thousands of years of naval history between the Cold War and the Pelopponesian War that we could learn from. Colin S. Gray, the only notable modern naval war theorist that I can think of, recently advised:

To advance understanding of war and strategy we need to theorize on the basis of history, without being unduly diverted by the singularity of events.

The good captain could start his search for a new strategy in the back issues of Parameters.

h/t to The Chief for bringing this to my attention.

Imagine steering a ship along the desolate northern Russian coast; an endless succession of rocky outcroppings, half-hidden by polar fog. Worse yet, imagine manning one of these frozen outposts, hundreds of miles from civilization and technology. The Communist party of the Soviet Union found a solution to avert the latter fate: self-sustaining nuclear-powered lighthouses. From English Russia:

… special lightweight small atomic reactors were produced in limited series to be delivered to the Polar Circle lands and to be installed on the lighthouses. Those small reactors could work in the independent mode for years and didn’t require any human interference, so it was very handy in the situation like this. It was a kind of robot-lighthouse which counted itself the time of the year and the length of the daylight, turned on its lights when it was needed and sent radio signals to near by ships to warn them on their journey.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the lighthouses lay abandoned, looted by fearless robbers looking for precious metals. They are also apparently a tourist attraction. See all the photos.

Via Warren Ellis

For more spooky architecture of the past see WWII AT-ATs

My first reaction to hearing about prime minister Aso’s push to get the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Gulf of Aden helping to combat piracy was bandwagoning. Here is a typical example of Japan showing international leadership… six months late. That elusive seat on the UN security council does require that Japan show some leadership.

Still, the timing seems odd and there is already a whole swack of countries with a military presence in the Gulf of Aden. Why now? As the Asahi notes “deliberations are unlikely to start in earnest until April at the earliest, after the passage of the fiscal 2009 budget.” Prime minister Aso will have a hard time pushing anything through before then. Aso is suffering serious confidence issues. With the concerns of the electorate focused solidly on the economy and pensions, I would hope Aso would know not to go the route of Shinzo Abe. Read the rest of this entry »

After reading about the latest incident of undersea cables being cut (causing fourteen countries to lose access to the Internet) I found a link describing the fifty cable ships that operate around the world. There are some pretty big and ugly ships in that lineup, registered to some of the most remote places. Up to twenty-five are of these ships are at sea at a time repairing on average three cut or bent cables per day.

Hopefully this round of cut cables doesn’t result in the conspiracy theory frenzy that happened earlier this year.

The problem: The Nazis have been using aircraft to lay mines in the important shipping lanes of the Mersey and Thames estuaries.

The solution: Maunsell Forts.

Like AT-ATs of the sea. I have included a short video below the fold.

Read the rest of this entry »

Kotare (aka “the strategist”) discusses a potential conventional submarine fleet for New Zealand using the new “entry-level” compact sub models coming out of Europe. This might be good news for Canada, which is losing millions on its sad submarine fleet. Only one of the four used diesel powered submarines we purchased from the UK is operational — the others are in dry dock.

Submarines are an important piece of kit for Canada’s interests in the Arctic. Rob Huebert of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies — where I have previously spoken on sealane security — calls submarines “valid” and “necessary” technology. Mr Huebert also points to Asia Pacific as a region with growing submarine procurement.¹ I have compared the submarine fleets of Northeast Asia before, and they do indeed put Canada to shame. Cheap, compact submarines is the direction Canada should go to replace its current shoddy fleet, especially in an era of disintegrating equipment and tight budgets due to the war in the ‘Ghan.
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