Or so says Christopher Hitchens in a compelling piece in Slate on North Korea. Part reminiscence, part reconsidertion, and part book review, Hitchens praises the book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters, recently written by B.R. Myers, in which Hitchens repeats Myer’s theory that communism in North Korea is dead—its most recent constitution drops all mention of the word and there is no dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead, Pyongyang operates like a textbook fascist totalitarian government, maintained by slave labor, and based on racism and xenophobia. (Ironically, many of the principles may be carried over from Japanese imperialism.)

I think the population’s ignorance about their state of affairs is overblown, and I don’t think that Hitchens’ one racist, xenophobic tour guide is quite as representative of the population as he claims to think, and I think that in the past few years the people of the DPRK have learned that their government is dirt poor compared to their southern neighbor. (The country recently backtracked on its currency devaluation after it unleashed public outrage, a mighty rare occurrance.) But that’s about the only point of optimism in the Korea.

Hitchens’ article is titled A Nation of Racist Dwarfs, and the reason is clear only at the end of the article:

Here are the two most shattering facts about North Korea. First, when viewed by satellite photography at night, it is an area of unrelieved darkness. Barely a scintilla of light is visible even in the capital city. Second, a North Korean is on average six inches shorter than a South Korean. You may care to imagine how much surplus value has been wrung out of such a slave, and for how long, in order to feed and sustain the militarized crime family that completely owns both the country and its people.

But this is what proves Myers right. Unlike previous racist dictatorships, the North Korean one has actually succeeded in producing a sort of new species. Starving and stunted dwarves, living in the dark, kept in perpetual ignorance and fear, brainwashed into the hatred of others, regimented and coerced and inculcated with a death cult: This horror show is in our future, and is so ghastly that our own darling leaders dare not face it and can only peep through their fingers at what is coming.

I think the last line is interesting coming from Hitchens, a left-wing radical who supported advocated invading Iraq on the grounds that the civilized nations of the world will inevitably have to face off against such a tyrant, and that it was better to do so on our terms. He stops short of advocating a strike on North Korea, but the dreaded implication is that we are going to have to deal with the fallout from North Korea’s tragic situation at some point, and the legacy will likely be with us for a century or more.

Former South Korean president Roh dead amid suicide probe

FORMER South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has died, sparking an investigation whether he committed suicide amid a corruption investigation.
Roh died on Saturday after falling down a mountain while hiking with an aide, Yonhap news agency said.

Roh, at the centre of a corruption probe, received severe head injuries and died after being moved to a larger hospital in Busan from his hometown of Gimhae, Yonhap said.

Police are investigating whether Roh committed suicide, the report said.

The corruption probe centred around a payment worth one million dollars to his wife from a wealthy shoemaker, and a payment by the same man worth five million dollars to the husband of one of Roh’s nieces, Yeon Cheol-Ho.

Roh, elected partly on an anti-corruption platform, served from 2003 to 2008.

He became the nation’s third former president to be summoned by the prosecution after Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, who were both convicted in 1995 of receiving bribes and inciting mutiny.

Both were sentenced to death but were pardoned in 1997.

The University of Georgia’s Professor Han S. Park, apparently a buddy of leading Obama Asia advisor Frank Jannuzi (also an East Asia specialist for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), had this choice comment in the Korea Times (abridged):

Q: Some people keep raising doubt on whether North Korea will give up nuclear weapons. Will it?

A: My response to that is yes. North Korea is expected to relinquish its nuclear programs and weapons themselves, if it has security assurances. No country, including North Korea, is expected to relinquish its security interest in exchange for economic and political interest. We cannot buy off North Korean nuclear arms. No matter how large the amount, North Korea is not going to relinquish its nuclear arms for money. It’s not an economic matter. We have to address North Korea’s security concerns if, in fact, we’re going to press North Korea effectively to compromise its security means.

That, in and of itself, is a fine point. But what is the definition of “security assurances,” you ask?

Firstly, stop the (South Korea-U.S.) joint military exercises. For North Korea, it’s a direct expression of hostility. Secondly, the conversion of armistice agreement into a peace pact. Thirdly, they want the mission of the U.S. military in South Korea to be redefined so that North Korea will not be the primary enemy target. Fourthly, they want American sanctions to be lifted. North Koreans are not interested in symbolic implication of it. They are interested in the prospect of U.S. lifting of trade sanctions and political sanctions imposed on North Korea. Sanctions include not only the bilateral one with the United States, but also the one imposed by the multinational ones, that is, the United Nations. Finally, diplomatic normalization with the U.S. I think that will be sufficient. Then, North Korea will give up everything.

In the last four sentences he undermines his original assertion—that security assurances are separate from economic and political interests. But I’d rather turn the keyboard over to Marmot for the real commentary:

OK, so all it will take is an end to joint exercises with a close US ally, the mission of US troops to be redirected at some other country (maybe the Mongolians?), the lifting of economic and political sanctions, and diplomatic normalization? Where do we sign? Maybe we’ll send Jessica Alba over to jack-off Kim Jong-il as service.

So why my post title? It terrifies me to think that guys like this are going to have influence in the incoming administration.

Jail for adultery in Korea

Up through World War II, Japan had a law in its criminal code that prescribed criminal punishments for women who committed adultery. This statute was also part of the criminal code in its two colonies, Korea and Taiwan.

After the war, the Americans introduced the concept of gender equality, and the adultery law was one that had to be amended. In Japan, they chose to abolish the statute altogether. In both Korea and Taiwan, the people chose to keep the statute, but apply it to all married persons.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI]

This is the final post in a seven part series of mine looking at U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Discussion:

North Korea is one of the most difficult cases of nuclear proliferation. It is extremely isolated with a history of unpredictability, secrecy and aggression. On top of this, the motivations behind its long pursuit of nuclear weapons are murky. Based on past behavior and statements from North Korea, they include security from external threats, both domestic and international legitimacy, civilian energy and use as a bargaining chip. In order to formulate policy towards the DPRK, decision makers must realize that North Korea is a nuclear power, and will be very difficult to disarm. Military options would be too costly, policies of bribing and accommodating the DPRK have failed and Pyongyang’s history of proliferating WMD and missile technology make it a very dangerous threat to U.S. security.

Libya’s voluntary disarmament in 2003 has proven that long term isolation and negotiation can ultimately lead a state to disarm. However, given the amount of effort and time that has gone into negotiating with North Korea, it is extremely difficult to assess the utility of strategic neglect (Option 1) since it could take months, years or decades before conditions are right. Nevertheless, it would be a viable short term strategy given that the current Six Party Talks are ongoing and hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue for the near future. This would achieve the objectives of preventing attack and maintaining our alliances and the NPT. But uncertainty about the time frame means it would not be a good long term option.

Threating to shift the balance of power by informing Pyongyang that the U.S. would no longer object to a nuclear South Korea and Japan (Option 2) may provide the shock and impetus towards serious negotiations and some form of settlement. It would be a dramatic departure from past American policy and force Pyongyang to reconsider whether its means are achieving the intended ends. It would also aim to shock South Korea and Japan out of their mindsets of appeasement and China into realizing that its current status quo policy is untenable in the long run. The risk of this policy is that it could seriously damage the NPT, especially were it to not result in successful negotiations and disarmament. This could also happen were the information to be leaked that the United States was allowing the ROK and Japan to go nuclear. Allies and enemies may also interpret it as a desperate measure indicative of declining U.S. power. It is more of a gamble than the other options.

Comprehensive negotiations (Option 3) and containment and deterrence (Option 4) both use a much broader mix of statecraft to achieve U.S. objectives yet also involve longer and uncertain time frames to do so. Comprehensive talks with the DPRK contains elements of option 1 as it involves a longer time frame and the ability to intentionally prolong talks. However, all sides could engage in that, drawing out or even killing the negotiations. Nevertheless it would represent the broadest and most in-depth attempt to end North Korea’s nuclear program and resolve problems with its neighbors and the United States, giving it a large degree of flexibility compared to options 1 and 2. Yet, given the North’s negotiation history, they may be just as likely to use their nuclear program to accomplish their goals without making the promised concessions, thus leaving a high degree of uncertainty of success.

Finally, containment and deterrence would send a clear message to North Korea and the world of the United States’ commitment to ending the DPRK’s nuclear program, dedication to regional security and the futility of blackmail. It’s use of wide-ranging instruments of statecraft make it highly flexible and adjustable to changing conditions. But while it could force North Korea into future negotiations and disarmament, it could also antagonize them, making compromise less likely. Regarding U.S. objectives, it provides no clear time frame for eliminating the nuclear or proliferation threats while at the same time minimizing them more than the other three options. The risk of conflict is not significant but still greater than with the others due mainly to the possibilities of miscommunication or desperate North Korean actions. The strategy’s effect on our allies and others in the region could also be positive or negative.

Recommendation:
Option 4, a policy of containment and deterrence, is recommended due to its accomplishing the most U.S. objectives with the least amount of risk.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V]

Here is part 6 of 7 in my discussion of U.S. policy options for a nuclear North Korea

Option 4: Containment and Continued Deterrence

This option implicitly recognizes the fact that America, its allies and the international community have been and will remain unable to end the DPRK’s nuclear program, short of war. It therefore prescribes a wide ranging policy of deterring and containing North Korea using different instruments of power, both hard and soft, with a view to either the eventual collapse of the North or its giving in to international demands. The first part of this strategy is a military buildup, for which there are many options. U.S. forces in the ROK would be reinforced and we would work trilaterally with Japan and South Korea to coordinate and strengthen our land and sea based missile defenses. Other choices include a combination of the following: deploying an additional carrier group to the region, deploying more U.S. nuclear submarines in the area and more long range bombers in Guam. In consultation with Seoul, the U.S. may choose to revert to strategic ambiguity regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on ROK soil and publicly declare that Pyongyang would face nuclear retaliation should it use WMD.


Aside from the military aspects, this policy would aim to bolster the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by increasing interdictions, plugging legal loopholes and bringing more countries on board on a permanent basis. Containment would also escalate sanctions against the DPRK, firstly targeting the DPRK itself as well as international companies and financial institutions doing business with it. It would furthermore call for a partial to total cut off of U.N. food aid, an end to remittances from Koreans abroad and suspension of all energy supplies to the DPRK. Lastly, the United States would engage in a concerted effort to highlight the North Korean regime’s repressive policies, lack of freedom and democracy and abysmal human rights record. This would be especially important in Europe where it would resonate more and potentially lead to increased support for U.S. measures.

This policy would achieve many U.S. objectives in the short term. Such a wide ranging policy would highlight and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region and the credibility of American security guarantees to our allies. While the NPT would still be damaged by the DPRK’s withdrawal in 2003, this policy would clearly support the treaty and illustrate the consequences of withdrawing and pursuing nuclear weapons. It would also deter a military confrontation and increase international and domestic pressure on the North Korean leadership to negotiate. A hastening of regime collapse could be another possible outcome but this is very difficult to measure and should not be counted on. Lastly, increased U.S. forces in East Asia would conveniently serve a double purpose of containing and deterring North Korea while also projecting power towards China and preventing any expansionist tendencies there too. While this could upset Beijing, it may also lead it to put real and effective pressure on the DPRK to avoid an increased American military presence in their neighborhood.

What this policy would not immediately do is end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Indeed, while it may hasten the DPRK’s collapse, it would allow continued development of their program and of more weapons, albeit under increasingly difficult circumstances. While ramping up pressure and increasing PSI interdictions is unquestionably positive, there is no absolute guarantee that it would prevent all instances of weapons or technology transfer, especially if important countries like India and China remain uncooperative. On top of this, it cannot be ruled out with 100% certainty that Pyongyang can be deterred forever, nor that the increase in pressure wouldn’t lead to a North Korea preemptive strike out of pure desperation. The U.S. military build up involved would also be costly, particularly with in light of ongoing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The response of our regional allies as well as North Korea’s neighbors could also possibly turn against us. South Korea and Japan currently have little appetite for confrontation and prefer policies of appeasement and accommodation. Although the costs of China’s support for North Korea may finally become too high, this policy does risk reinforcing China’s support for the DPRK and reluctance to do anything endangering the status quo. Also, increased sanctions may have some effect on Pyongyang but short of China’s cutting off all or most of its energy supplies to the DPRK, it is hard to imagine them affecting a country which has no regard whatsoever for the welfare of its citizens and that is already one of the most isolated in the world. Countries both in the region and elsewhere may see things similarly and be unwilling to support further sanctions which would cause the death of thousands and potentially millions of already oppressed and undernourished North Koreans.

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 3: Comprehensive negotiations

This approach involves changing the format of current negotiations and potentially the parties involved. It views the current crisis as one part of a greater set of problems on the Korean peninsula and would therefore widen the content of current talks to include a comprehensive settlement of most or all of the major problems there. The main focus would no longer be the DPRK’s illicit nuclear program and would thus also cover political, security, economic and energy issues. It sees an end to the isolationist policies of the North, increasing openness there and more interdependence on the rest of the world as the most viable solution. This option would also provide an opportunity to remove Russia from negotiations should the administration come to the decision that it would create more room for progress. However, it would not be a must.

Comprehensive negotiations could potentially achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on North Korea’s nuclear activities and related sanctions means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table, important to all parties, and thus allow for a greater range of possible solutions instead of the comparatively smaller range of options currently. Additionally, by their very nature, comprehensive negotiations would likely last for some time, which in and of itself could be beneficial. It would include a change in American leadership with the 2008 elections and potentially the same in North Korea at some point. Importantly, it would postpone any major decision on long term options for dealing with the North to a later date when their willingness, capabilities and goals are clearer. It would sustain our relationships with regional allies, proving long term U.S. commitment to both them and regional security. Lastly, the focus on diplomacy and credible commitment to peaceful negotiations would avoid giving the DPRK reason to resort to military action.

However, while comprehensive negotiations could solve a wide range of problems, theyt would not come without costs. First of all, while North Korea has repeatedly stated its wish to engage in bilateral talks with the U..S. and about issues broader than only its nuclear program, its record of diplomacy makes it a highly unreliable and unpredictable negotiating partner. Thus, despite potentially the largest and most involved effort yet to solve the problem, it may fail. On top of that, with the time frame involved likely to be long, it would give the DPRK the opportunity to continue developing more nuclear weapons and to improve both its bomb design and ballistic missiles, worsening the threat. As negotiations continued, it may erode the legitimacy of the NPT to some degree. Finally, if North Korea’s illegal nuclear program led to comprehensive negotiations, it could be seen as a powerful reward by others, especially Iran, thereby legitimizing the use of nuclear blackmail.

[Part I | Part II | Part III]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 2: A Regional Nuclear Rebalancing

Since North Korea’s past behavior suggests it is not motivated entirely by security concerns, but also an attempt to secure concessions from the ROK, Japan and the U.S. through intimidation and nuclear blackmail, an entirely new approach may be necessary. A nuclear rebalancing in the region entails the United States making clear to the DPRK that should it continue its current nuclear program, Washington will no longer oppose Tokyo’s or Seoul’s pursuit of their own nuclear deterrent and leave the decision to each respective government. The U.S. would not pressure either country to develop its own capability but inform them we would no longer object. This dramatic change would surprise the DPRK and force them to rethink their strategic calculus, were they to no longer certain they could intimidate through continued nuclear blackmail. The U.S. should not press either Seoul or Tokyo to make any decision as this is very controversial in both countries and may not garner much domestic support at present. Merely lifting our objection would be enough, as well as reassuring both that will still be protected by the American nuclear umbrella, regardless of their decision. Lastly the United States could either choose to explicitly reintroduce its tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or adopt a policy of ambiguity regarding their presence on Korean soil.

The seemingly dramatic nature of this policy is precisely its greatest strength. For years, North Korea has bullied its neighbors and sought and received concessions without fulfilling its obligations. With the U.S. heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan and Iran’s continuing nuclear program, Pyongyang is wagering that the United States is both unable and unwilling to seriously deal with it and would now, more than ever, prefer a diplomatic solution ripe for exploitation by the North Koreans. In addition to forcing North Korea to radically rethink its policies, the prospect of a nuclear South Korea or Japan would put enormous pressure on China and Russia, the DPRK’s principle supporters, to finally put decisive pressure on Pyongyang. Assuming, the ROK and Japan still did not develop their own nuclear deterrent, their infrastructure and advanced knowledge still gives them the ability to very quickly build and test their own weapons. Even this virtual deterrent, not to mention an actual one, would alter the balance of power in Asia not only against North Korea but against China and Russia as well. In the future, if the North were unable to extract concessions from either its neighbors or the US, and in a much worse security situation as a result of its own decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent, it may conclude that its own program is not worth the risks and costs. Lastly, this may set an example to countries such as Iran that the gains of illicit nuclear weapons will be quickly neutralized by newly nuclear neighbors.

Yet, for its many benefits, the potential nuclearization of South Korea and Japan would have significant consequences regionally and internationally. It would risk fatally undermining the NPT, causing other actors to seriously rethink their commitment to it and related regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Regionally, it could spark a destabilizing arms race in East Asia that could later extend to India and Pakistan as well. Internationally, others actors may determine it is in their supreme interest to withdraw from the NPT due to its ineffectiveness and go nuclear themselves. This would be especially dangerous and destabilizing in the Middle East. It is also difficult to foresee the domestic consequences in South Korea and Japan of this scenario. While U.S. reassurances may mitigate some unrest or anger, it could potentially worsen the image of the United States in the eyes of each population as well as lead them to question both American security guarantees and power if we cannot solve the issue short of simply letting them develop nuclear weapons. Lastly, although it may lead to a critical mass of pressure which would lead the DPRK to disarm, it could have the opposite effect, essentially legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and perhaps never eliminating it.

[Part I | Part II]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 1: Strategic Neglect

Strategic neglect in short, involves maintaining the status quo and waiting for more favorable circumstances in which to negotiate. This option entails the United States continuing to pressure North Korea to allow IAEA inspections and negotiate an end to its nuclear program. However, it would avoid firstly making unilateral concessions to Pyongyang which could be interpreted as rewards and secondly any actions which could escalate the conflict or force the DPRK to respond militarily. All current sanctions would remain in place and current negotiations would continue. Strategic Neglect essentially leaves all U.S. options open without committing to any single one and helps mitigate uncertainty and unknown variables, like the state of DPRK leadership, by waiting for more certainty and predictability.

By definition, strategic neglect would not immediately accomplish all U.S. objectives, however, it would reassure the ROK, Japan and Taiwan of ongoing American commitment to both the problem and region. This would underline the long term nature of the American presence in there and maintain U.S. influence. Waiting would continue to keep the ball rolling but avoid making any tough or definitive decisions at a time when there are no good options. It would additionally allow American leadership to change in the upcoming 2008 elections which may lessen the DPRK’s fear of attack. This was heightened by its inclusion in the “Axis of Evil” and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003. On a related note, further passage of time could see a reduction in American forces in and diplomatic focus on Iraq, enabling Washington to later increase pressure on the DPRK and have more credibility and flexibility in terms of military options.

Strategic neglect would also allow and hope for a future change in leadership on the North Korean side but little is known about its current status and future. Lastly, Pyongyang’s diplomatic strategy has been one of unreliability, unpredictability and deception. Allowing more time to pass would decrease the perceived utility of such actions, further undermine the DPRK’s credibility and commitment to disarmament in the eyes of China, the ROK and Japan and finally allow the U.S. leadership more time in which to better understand and counter the DPRK’s diplomatic tactics. A further benefit of strategic neglect would be its lack of reliance on negotiating partners like Russia and China.

Nevertheless, a strategy of neglect with regard to North Korea could inadvertently increase pressure on the DPRK to act aggressively and engage in further brinkmanship to extract concessions. It would, in addition, not provide an immediate end to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and could in fact allow for the production of further nuclear devices in the meantime. With regard to the NPT, other actors in the region and elsewhere may begin to view the treaty as dead, ineffective or unenforceable as time drags on. They may therefore reconsider their own nuclear ambitions. In East Asia, these countries include South Korea, Japan and Taiwan and in the Middle East, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Next, while a strategy of neglect could be seen as long term American commitment to the region, it could also be interpreted oppositely, showing the U.S. lacks the will to enforce the NPT, protect is allies and act decisively. This would not only risk damaging U.S. alliances in the region but would negatively impact our image internationally and meanwhile encourage bad behavior by other actors such as Iran. Another danger of this option is that it could lead some decision makers to assume the North Korean leadership may change soon or that the country may collapse, something predicted as inevitable for many years now. Lastly, were the policy to be pursued too long, it could lead either the South Korean and Japanese leadership, populations or both to tire of the North Korean threat and adopt more conciliatory and appeasing approaches.

[Part I]

Here is part two of U.S. policy options for dealing with a nuclear North Korea.

Unknowns:
Recent reports from U.S. intelligence, the ROK and DPRK about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s health mean that it is currently unknown whether he continues to function as the leader of the DPRK. If he does not, it could have significant consequences as there are various competing factions within the North Korean government, some which are more amenable towards disarmament and others who are not. Additionally, while the DPRK does possess enough nuclear material to make several weapons, the quantity thereof is unknown. The functionality of their bomb design is also uncertain as their 2006 test was not only very small, but possibly a failure. Lastly, it is unknown whether the DPRK has the ability to mount a nuclear weapon inside of a ballistic missile due to uncertainties about the bomb itself and their ballistic missile program.

Assumptions:
– DPRK possesses few nuclear devices
– DPRK would end its nuclear weapons program under some set of circumstances short of war
– DPRK would retaliate if attacked, whether by surgical strikes or full invasion
– DPRK’s motivations include security concerns, domestic and international prestige and intimidating others into political and economic concessions

Objectives:
– Complete, verifiable and irreversible end to DPRK’s nuclear program
– Prevent proliferation to both state and non-state actors
– Prevent nuclear and/or conventional attack by DPRK
– Maintain the credibility and attractiveness of the NPT by brining the DPRK back into it
– Maintain and strengthen U.S. alliances with ROK, Japan and Taiwan