According to a French negotiator, the usual “progress” (that occurs in all peace talks before they fail) is occurring in current talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh. Yet, far more interesting than the lack of actual information from that report and than the talks which are very likely to fail, are the statements coming from the Azerbaijani President.

But in remarks broadcast on Azeri TV on Saturday, Mr Aliyev said that if the Munich talks failed to reach agreement he would be “left with no other option”. “We have the full right to liberate our land by military means,” he said.

Granted, this statement is nothing new. Baku has been crying wolf for years after being thoroughly beaten and embarassed by the (Russian backed) Armenian forces in the 90s. Yet, Azerbaijan seems to be indicating that it sees the current Munich talks as the last ones. On the one hand, this could merely be a tactic to put pressure on Armenia and others to reach a settlement. On the other hand, Baku may be issuing a genuine warning. Given it’s long insistence on the right to use force, its constantly growing military budget, and its clout as a major energy producer, the idea that Baku may have finally had enough of talks and waiting approximately 15 years to get its territory back (from its perspective), is hardly far fetched.

Additionally, it’s not as if hostilities have ceased. Mine fields still abound (as this author saw while carefully walking around NK) and each side still fires on the other almost daily. Since the international community failed to insert peacekeepers or at least monitors along the cease fire line, it would take very little for full scale fighting to resume. Were that to happen, Baku may count on the world’s dire energy situation and the West’s current focus on non-Russian energy routes to come down on Baku’s side. Given Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy and its allowing Russian troops to be stationed on its soil, it would likely find few friends, save Moscow. Lord knows Moscow would surely like to intervene elsewhere in the Caucasus.

While it would be easy to continue with conjecture, it would be wise to follow the current Munich talks closely as well as signs coming from Baku, Yerevan and Moscow. Like so many other rounds in the past this may be nothing again, but when something does happen, it is bound to be big.

Many saw the SCO as an organization that may one day rival NATO. Regardless of whether that assessment was accurate, more evidence against it has come in the form of China and the SCO’s recent joint statement from Tajikistan in which it calls for Georgia’s territorial integrity to be respected. While the language was clearly not as critical and aggressive as that from America and Europe, the message was clear: we don’t support you. While some treat this development as an additional ‘blow’ against Russia, this blogger finds it unlikely Russia counted on any real support from China. Indeed China has Taiwan and its restive Muslim provinces to worry about. Beijing knows better than to take sides on an issue like that. While Medvedev had indeed been quoted as saying he expected the SCO to back Russia, the organization seems to not be as inherently anti-Western as they expected, hence their polite but clear statement as noted above.

Yet, for all the talk of Russia and Georgia, I’ve seen little discussing what America’s overall policy goals should be in dealing with Russian aggression. Is the primary concern defending Georgia itself, or our image which would suffer were we to appear weak in defending an ally? Are we more concerned with Georgia in the first place, or rather with Russian. And indeed, if Russia is our main concern, which I believe it is, does the United States wish to punish or ‘rehabilitate’ Moscow? To be sure, Georgia is not an important strategic interest of the United States, which this blogger says despite being an avid Georgia supporter. Both Zenpundit and Galrahn at Information Dissemination correctly point this out. With that in mind, and in the mind of Moscow, Georgia’s strategic value does not warrant escalation and the taking of high risks by the US and Europe. Thus, wading through the war mongering and Cold War rhetoric, we arrive at the aforementioned question: punish or rehabilitate?

The Europeans have, for example, voiced interest in sanctions against Russia while others have discussed ejecting Russia from international organizations like the G8. Thomas Barnett is in the rehabilitate crowd as he noted today

his fusion model of Russia’s is not that different from China’s—just coupled with Russian political paranoia. Both need to be housebroken by the global economy/Core in coming decades. China’s moving in that direction nicely, Russia’s system far more slowly. But now Georgia gives us a great “teachable moment” here, assuming we don’t go overboard or militarize the response unduly. All levers, my friends, all levers.,

Dan at tdaxp simiarly describes the situation, namely that Russia is a Gap state acting as such against new Core states. That being said, US and European policy must focus on punishing Russia and damaging its economic and political interests while at the same time, opening new and more acceptable routes for Russia to achieve its foreign policy goals. American and European politicians must make the most of this opportunity or “teachable moment” as Barnett calls it lest we leave Moscow with no other route than to remain a repeat offender.

Kaplan has a short, clear and insightful piece up at the Atlantic cutting through the regurgitated cliches and common thinking on the current Russian aggression in Georgia. It begins:

Russian troops have established control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two separatist regions of Georgia. The Russian military, having now secured complete control over the autonomous territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, appears increasingly engaged in an assault on Georgia proper. Distinguished commentators and Western governments alike have demanded action and called for transatlantic unity in the face of the Russian assault.

But it’s unclear what transatlantic unity implies. Does it mean deployment of NATO troops to Tbilisi? A bold and creative move, perhaps, but unlikely, given western Europe’s gun-shy nature. Does anyone seriously want to contemplate a scenario in which the United States and Russia are engaged in combat against each other? Economic sanctions against Russia probably won’t happen, given Russia’s stranglehold on western Europe through natural-gas deliveries.

The truth is, Russia has called the West’s bluff on Georgia and won. It is the advantage of the first move in a situation whose underlying geopolitical realities are starkly different from the diplomatic pretense that often governs media headlines.The main diplomatic pretense has been that Georgia is a thriving, fledgling democracy that the West, and particularly the United States, supports (in part through U.S. Marines’ training Georgian forces at a camp near Tbilisi) in its struggle against Russian intimidation. But the geopolitical reality unravels this description in every aspect. To start with, a nation’s political system is defined by the strength of its institutions more than by the name the system gives itself. Georgia is a democracy in Tbilisi and its environs. Everywhere else, it barely functions. Though small compared to Russia, Gerogia is a sprawling, mountainous, and therefore extremely vulnerable mini-empire of nationalities that will take years to forge into a cohesive nation.

That is not in any way to justify a Russian invasion, but merely to state how vulnerable Georgia is in the best of circumstances. Because it is barely a state, it can barely defend itself. And the U.S. military’s assistance to its Georgian counterparts—specifically to train for Georgia’s limited duties in Iraq—hasn’t prepare the Georgian armed forces to take on an adversary like Russia.

Read the rest at The Atlantic.

While Georgia-Russia tensions have mostly brought involved the US, EU and aforementioned two parties, Germany has stepped in with its own plan for peace in Abkhazia. A Spiegel article notes the plan consists of three phases,

Phase one of the German plan envisages a year of trust-building measures. These would include declarations renouncing violence and the return of around 250,000 refugees to the province. The second phase would see the beginning of reconstruction work, with Berlin organizing a donors’ conference to drum up the necessary funds. The third and crucial phase would involve finding a political solution to the conflict, essentially whether Abkhazia should become reintegrated into Georgia or be granted independence.

Interestingly, the article notes that all sides have found the proposal reasonable. While making declarations renouncing violence should be simple for all parties involved, I’m skeptical of the return of a quarter of a million Georgian refugees. While the UN did recently adopt a resolution calling for the right of return of Georgian IDPs to their homes in Abkhazia. However, given the poor state of Abkhazia’s infrastructure and security, it is questionable how many people would return given that there may be nothing at all to return to and surely no economic or educational opportunities for young people. Additionally, given that the province was historically inhabited by a majority of Georgians, their return would dilute the Abkhaz to the point where the results of a future referendum on the area’s status may be a foregone conclusion.

I’ve checked the UN and German Foreign Office’s websites but have been unable to find further information. If readers have access sources in other languages or are able to find more information, please post links in the comments section. More to come as the situation develops and more details become available.

The WSJ has an op-ed on the recent Abkhaz-Georgian-Russian tensions which for anyone following it, offers mainly a summary of the situation up until now recounting especially Georgian mistakes while spending little time on Russia. In fact, it fails to clearly define Russia’s role. While most articles continue to refer to Russian “peacekeepers” it seems a glaring oversight not to note that ongoing and very public threats against Georgia by Moscow makes it clear there are no peacekeepers in Abkhazia or South Ossetia but instead occupation troops. In what other conflict has the side (UN, NATO, AU) whose job it is to maintain peace constantly threatened the other party while actively violating its airspace and shooting down its planes?

Nevertheless, the op-ed ends with a fascinating suggestion for Tbilisi:

Abkhazia is now virtually lost to Georgia—almost as lost as Kosovo is to Serbia. The only chance for Tbilisi to reverse this process and see Georgian refugees ever returning to their home is, paradoxically, to let go. Tbilisi should open up Abkhazia and free it from dependence on Russia. That means lifting sanctions and permitting a sea link to Turkey and the re-opening of a railway line connecting it with Western Georgia.

Such a policy would change the atmosphere and call the Abkhaz bluff—forcing them to negotiate in earnest and confront the issue that holds the key to their future status: Abkhaz responsibilities to their prewar Georgian population. And the rest of us would sleep a little easier if only this tinderbox in the Caucasus could be damped down.

Such a plan would make Thomas Barnett proud.

Thomas de Waal also wrote the fantastic book Black Garden which I read as research for my trip and can highly recommend.

News from Abkhazia seems to be a broke record these days. The Abkhaz news agency is claiming that two more Georgian drones were shot down today. So what is going on?

As far as I can tell, the drone in question is an Elbit Hermes 450, an Israeli made UAV. However, I haven’t found any details regarding Georgia’s purchase or use of them as neither the Georgian Ministry of Defense nor Globalsecurity.org’s Georgia section have further information. Video can be seen here of an earlier shoot down by a Russian MiG.

• Why would Abkhazia claim to shoot down more than it has?
  —Exaggerate Georgian “aggression.”
  —Exaggerate or show off Abkhaz capabilities
  —Try to deter further Georgian action
  —Mistakenly attempt to take the high ground against Georgia by making Tbilisi the aggressor.
  
  

• Why would Georgia lie about having its drones shot down?
  —Embarrassment?
  —Not allow the situation to escalate too much too fast?
  —Portray the Abkhaz as liars and unreliable.
  —It really isn’t true.
  
  

* Is Georgia intentionally “allowing” its drones to be shot down to paint Russia (rightly) as the aggressor and move for internationalization of the conflict? Does the timing of the change of political power in Moscow present an opportune moment for such a move?

Interestingly enough, this article from the AFP on May 9th says the Abkhaz are claiming one of the Hermes 450s was carrying an air-to-air missile. And indeed, if Georgia only possesses 22 aircraft, it would stand to reason that the UAVs are cheaper alternatives to increasing both personnel and plane numbers and Georgia therefore has larger numbers of them. But for the moment, the mystery remains.

Just yesterday I again recommended that Georgia aim to internationalize its conflict with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia as its only hope for eventual victory is diplomatic and not military. Today, the headlines seem to confirm that either the Georgian Foreign Ministry readers our blog or that this blogger should perhaps go work for them. According to reuters,

Georgia wants the European Union to send police to the separatist region of Abkhazia, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Baramidze said on Wednesday. “We are going to present this request to the European Union, we are going to ask for European police forces to be sent to Abkhazia,” he told a news conference after a Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg. “What we need is for everyone to take part, including Russia.”

Indeed, the Georgian strategy should aim not to exclude Russia but to include them wherever possible, however, along with Europeans and Americans. Additionally, the Georgian strategy must stay on message that it aims to solve the problem or end the conflict and humanitarian crisis, not to take back its territory. In this way, Russia will have difficulty rejecting any offer which indeed includes them and aims not at retaking territory but at solving the problem.

Additionally, the European Union is now dispatching a delegation of foreign ministers to visit Abkhazia, assess the situation and to cool tensions. The makeup of that group should be rather sympathetic towards Tbilisi as it consists of the Slovenian, Swedish, Polish and Lithuanian foreign ministers.

Check back for more as the situation develops. For the moment, a former ambassador of Greece has written an op-ed in support of Georgia and condemning Europe’s cowardice and unwillingness to stand up for its own principles.

Jamestown also has similar advice for Georgia and a further analysis of the peacekeeping situation.

Globalsecurity.org reports that Abkhazia claims it has shot down yet another Georgian drone, bringing the unconfirmed total to five. They include drones shot down (allegedly) on March 18, April 20th, and two more on May 4th. While Georgia denies the report, it would coincide with the rise in tensions with Russia and now, especially with Moscow’s new deployment of soldiers to Abkhazia. It would be reasonable to think that Tbilisi has stepped up surveillance to keep tabs on the Russians and Abkhaz who have become more belligerent. Both Russia and Abkhazia continue to claim that Georgia is preparing military action and building up troop levels in the Kodori Gorge and other border areas although Georgia denies this, a claim supported by UNOMIG observers.

Recently, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate for observers in Georgia (UNOMIG) in a fairly bland and uninteresting statement. What was however noteworthy is that the UNSC did not add language addressing Russia’s illegal actions such as providing citizenship to the Abkhaz to add a further “legitimate” reason for it to annex Georgian territory and station troops there illegally.

War or Diplomacy?

Since Georgia clearly has no way to beat Russia militarily, it must tread carefully and push diplomacy as his only resort, but the Russians know this. One such way in which this author believes Georgia could push harder is urging for real peacekeepers to be stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this way, Georgia could tone down its language, implicitly acknowledge the two breakaway regions and try to push Russia out of the picture, or at least sideline them by diluting their presence with other peacekeepers. While it has attempted such in meetings with other nations, it must be done in a more public manner, using Western media outlets among other things. In addition, Georgia must address European concerns about escalation and angering Russia in a concrete and meaningful way. With Western Europe behavior consistently cowardly vis-a-vis Russia, illustrating that European peacekeepers would actually decrease the risk of war and escalation. While I’m not necessarily optimistic that it would work, it would be difficult for Russia to argue against further peacekeepers since it would technically protect their dear Abkhaz.

While Kosovo may be more or less settled, it would seem the rest of Europe and Asia’s frozen conflicts haven’t begun to thaw after all.

I’ve recently discussed the Georgia/Russia conflict here, here and here. Now, Jamestown weighs in on the Russian troop movements into Abkhazia with additional insight:

If indeed the Georgians have massed 1500 troops with some guns in the upper Kodori, they cannot possibly be used as “a bridgehead” to begin an attack on Abkhazia. The upper Kodori is a geographically bottled up place: Several hundred Georgian solders could possibly infiltrate down through mountain trails without heavy weapons, but on the coastal plane they would surely be outnumbered, outgunned and wiped out by Russian and Abkhaz armor.

Last October at a press conference in Moscow the Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh told journalists that his government was seriously considering an operation to oust Georgian forces and the pro-Georgian Abkhaz government out of the upper Kodori, stating that full control of all of Abkhaz territory might facilitate recognition of the separatist regime. Such an operation by Abkhaz forces with Russian support may now be in the offing. While there is fighting in the Kodori, the reinforcement of Russian peacekeepers on the Inguri separation line makes sense to keep the Georgians at bay. Russian threats maybe intended as a warning to prevent a Georgian overreaction that could transform a relatively limited Kodori operation into all-out war. Such a scenario seems more plausible than Russia’s latest improbable statements about Georgian aggression from a “Kodori bridgehead.”

Jamestown believes the increase in Russian troops may serve to prevent a Georgian “overreaction” and thus full scale war. We’ll be following the situation closely here. Stay tuned.

A question to readers:

I recently predicted that hostilities between Georgia and Russia will increase through the end of the year. This is due primarily to Kosovar independence now being used as an ostensible reason to ramp up aggression against Tbilisi. However, although official annexation is a possibility, using the alleged Kosovo precent (more here), it is indeed more likely that Moscow will neither annex Abkhazia or South Ossetia nor recognize their independence. Why? Because indefinitely prolonging the crisis combined with the ability to instantly inflame it whenever geopolitically useful to Russia is far more valuable a tool.

What would be the short and long term benefits of actually recognizing the two regions? What would be the short/long term benefits of annexing them? Do they outweigh the benefits of the status quo? With the volatility of energy prices and Europe’s reluctance if not cowardice vis-a-vis Russia in mind, isn’t the status quo far more useful? Additionally, with Russia’s own separatist problems in the Caucasus, outright recognition is unlikely leaving annexation as the only remotely likely possibility.

Meanwhile, Abkhazia asks for a formal military alliance with Russia. I’m somehow reminded of a quote about a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.