Robert Kaplan has a new article out in The Atlantic called Talking to the Taliban (via Arab Media Shack).

Kaplan points out that Obama’s new strategy, which consists of convincing Pakistan to sever ties with its long time ally the Taliban, and increase them with its long time foe, India, makes no sense whatsoever and has little chance of success.

No matter how much leverage you hold over a country, it is rare that you can get it to act against its core self-interest. [...] The U.S. demands that Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), its spy agency, sever relations with the Taliban. Based on Pakistan’s own geography, this makes no sense from a Pakistani point of view. First of all, maintaining lines of communications and back channels with the enemy is what intelligence agencies do. What kind of a spy service would ISI be if it had no contacts with one of the key players that will help determine its neighbor’s future?……

Read the rest. As always, it’s well worth it and spot on.

Both Chirol and Eddie wrote several years ago that the US should declare victory in the war on terrorism and move on. Britain ultimately took this policy choice and dropped the “bumper sticker” policy slogan. The U.S. under G.W. Bush did not.

But a policy change has come with the Obama administration, so says Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:

Clinton also acknowledged that administration officials have stopped calling the fight against al-Qaeda “the global war on terror,” the preferred phraseology of the Bush administration.

“The administration has stopped using the phrase and I think that speaks for itself obviously,” she said, adding that there had been no formal policy directive to do so. “It’s just not being used,” she said.

Clinton is the highest level administration official to acknowledge the shift but she did not give a reason for the change. Many Democrats have contended that the “war on terror” label was too broad, potentially enlisting the United States in a war with any militant group; the president’s new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy says it has the central aim of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda.

While recently doing research on Pakistan (my least favorite country in the world), I’ve developed four short scenarios to help myself and others think about alternative futures for that country and the implications for US policy as well as the region. They are NOT meant as predictions, but rather narratives to help the reader set aside his or her personal bias and assumptions and consider different paths, their implications and to better process current developments in Pakistan to discern the direction it is going.

Your Job: Choose which scenario you find to be the most likely and why. What are the implications for US policy?

1) The Territory Formerly Known as Pakistan
As US and NATO forces increase in Afghanistan, the Taleban insurgency in Pakistan spreads and the central government is unable to resist, ceding more and more control to the Taleban.. Government control extends only to the Punjab. The FATA and NWFP remain lawless and a safe haven for international jihadists as well as Afghan and Pakistani Taleban. The economy continues to decline as FDI all but vanishes and foreign nationals leave. Waves of people try to emigrate.
As the Pakistani government moves from one crisis to the next, US support wanes while Pakistan’s government changes several times a year through shifting coalitions and coups. In addition to secret US bases, NATO establishes a series of permanent and official bases in Pakistan 15 miles across the border from Afghanistan. Serious consideration is given to seizing Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, and several covert joint US-Pakistani operations in ungoverned territories seize and relocate part of their arsenal. Kashmir remains unsolved but Pakistan’s weakness essentially seals Indian dominance and control of the region.

2) Nuclear Nightmare
Taleban insurgents infiltrate further into Pakistan proper and the NWFP and FATA remain sanctuaries for the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Suicide bombings and violence increases as an increasingly impotent civilian government fails to improve the situation. The economy falters with even Chinese FDI dramatically shrinking. As unemployment and unrest grow, the military launches a coup. Although the situation initially stabilized, overly aggressive government action against jihadist groups at the behest of NATO/US lead to an increasing split within the military – the nation’s strongest and only truly functioning institution.
As more NATO/US forces are deployed in Afghanistan, Taleban and al-Qaeda activity within Pakistan grows again pitting secular elements against religious ones. When religious factions of the military, partnered with local militia seize 60% of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities (including its nuclear arsenal), Pakistan stands on the bring of outright civil war while India and the US consider preemptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

3) Peace at Home, Peace in the World
Taleban insurgents fight further into Pakistan and the NWFP and FATA remain sanctuaries for the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Violence increases and the civilian government fails stem the tide. The economy falters with even Chinese FDI dramatically shrinking. As unrest grow, the military launches a coup followed by aggressive and large scale military action. Although levels of violence go up, the military successfully defeats extremist elements while making peace with others. It establishes a satisfactory autonomy agreement with the NWFP and FATA which help to expel (but not eliminate) foreign jihadis. The Pakistan/Afghanistan border is formally recognized internationally and violence in Afghanistan is also winding down to manageable levels. The Pakistani military government reaches out to India in a series of confidence building measures and a contact group is setup over Kashmir. Pakistan’s new government makes the strategic decision to treat jihadis/insurgents as its primary national security threat instead of India.

4) Islamic Republic of Pakistan
The creeping Talebanization of Pakistan continues unabated until all but the Punjab is controlled directly or indirectly by Islamic extremists. Nearly powerless the civilian government is forced to form a coalition government with the Pakistani Taleban as the military itself remains divided between secular and religious elements. Over time, Islamists seize control instituting a drastic version of Sharia law, expelling Western diplomats and ending all military agreements and cooperation with the United States. NATO supply routes into Afghanistan are in peril as all of Pakistna becomes a base from which to fight Western troops next door. A nuclear armed Islamic Republic is declared and immediately recognized by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt.
Although Pakistan now serves as a base for exporting Islamic revolution, it maintains basic relations with its neighbors, including India. Bangladesh eventually succums to an Islamist takeover as well. However, both China and India, wary of Pakistani interference in their own Muslim populations, begin covert action against it while China plans for a potential seizure of Pakistanis nuclear facilities and India for a large scale war. The West struggles on in Afghanistan, as the situation worsens and European allies begin to pull out. Slowly, a China-India-US axis forms against a Pakistani-Bangladeshi-Iranian one.

I’ve discussed the issue of the War on Terror, specifically its name and whether is is helpful or counterproductive. Curzon also noted that it could become a nebulous war without end.

So readers: Can the Global War on Terror really even be called a war or is it simply America’s adapting to a new reality?

Does labeling it a war increase the “profit” of terrorism, as the War on Drugs has done to drug prices?