View U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan in a larger map

The New America Foundation has mapped drone strikes in Pakistan over the past 6 years using Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann’s drones database. Their policy paper is here, describing their methodology. Although they estimate the “true civilian fatality rate since 2004” to be “only” 32 percent, they criticize the use of drones as ineffective, and no substitute for a proper strategy in Pakistan. At the same time, “drone attacks in the tribal regions seem to remain the only viable option for the United States to take on the militants based there who threaten the lives of Afghans, Pakistanis, and Westerners alike.”

The drone database is an ongoing project. The latest map update was March 2nd.

News from Abkhazia seems to be a broke record these days. The Abkhaz news agency is claiming that two more Georgian drones were shot down today. So what is going on?

As far as I can tell, the drone in question is an Elbit Hermes 450, an Israeli made UAV. However, I haven’t found any details regarding Georgia’s purchase or use of them as neither the Georgian Ministry of Defense nor Globalsecurity.org’s Georgia section have further information. Video can be seen here of an earlier shoot down by a Russian MiG.

• Why would Abkhazia claim to shoot down more than it has?
  —Exaggerate Georgian “aggression.”
  —Exaggerate or show off Abkhaz capabilities
  —Try to deter further Georgian action
  —Mistakenly attempt to take the high ground against Georgia by making Tbilisi the aggressor.
  
  

• Why would Georgia lie about having its drones shot down?
  —Embarrassment?
  —Not allow the situation to escalate too much too fast?
  —Portray the Abkhaz as liars and unreliable.
  —It really isn’t true.
  
  

* Is Georgia intentionally “allowing” its drones to be shot down to paint Russia (rightly) as the aggressor and move for internationalization of the conflict? Does the timing of the change of political power in Moscow present an opportune moment for such a move?

Interestingly enough, this article from the AFP on May 9th says the Abkhaz are claiming one of the Hermes 450s was carrying an air-to-air missile. And indeed, if Georgia only possesses 22 aircraft, it would stand to reason that the UAVs are cheaper alternatives to increasing both personnel and plane numbers and Georgia therefore has larger numbers of them. But for the moment, the mystery remains.

Globalsecurity.org reports that Abkhazia claims it has shot down yet another Georgian drone, bringing the unconfirmed total to five. They include drones shot down (allegedly) on March 18, April 20th, and two more on May 4th. While Georgia denies the report, it would coincide with the rise in tensions with Russia and now, especially with Moscow’s new deployment of soldiers to Abkhazia. It would be reasonable to think that Tbilisi has stepped up surveillance to keep tabs on the Russians and Abkhaz who have become more belligerent. Both Russia and Abkhazia continue to claim that Georgia is preparing military action and building up troop levels in the Kodori Gorge and other border areas although Georgia denies this, a claim supported by UNOMIG observers.

Recently, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate for observers in Georgia (UNOMIG) in a fairly bland and uninteresting statement. What was however noteworthy is that the UNSC did not add language addressing Russia’s illegal actions such as providing citizenship to the Abkhaz to add a further “legitimate” reason for it to annex Georgian territory and station troops there illegally.

War or Diplomacy?

Since Georgia clearly has no way to beat Russia militarily, it must tread carefully and push diplomacy as his only resort, but the Russians know this. One such way in which this author believes Georgia could push harder is urging for real peacekeepers to be stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this way, Georgia could tone down its language, implicitly acknowledge the two breakaway regions and try to push Russia out of the picture, or at least sideline them by diluting their presence with other peacekeepers. While it has attempted such in meetings with other nations, it must be done in a more public manner, using Western media outlets among other things. In addition, Georgia must address European concerns about escalation and angering Russia in a concrete and meaningful way. With Western Europe behavior consistently cowardly vis-a-vis Russia, illustrating that European peacekeepers would actually decrease the risk of war and escalation. While I’m not necessarily optimistic that it would work, it would be difficult for Russia to argue against further peacekeepers since it would technically protect their dear Abkhaz.

While Kosovo may be more or less settled, it would seem the rest of Europe and Asia’s frozen conflicts haven’t begun to thaw after all.