I was thinking about a reverse Facebook, an unFacebook . The key difference is that this is not a social network that is populated by willing participants, but populated with people by information gatherers.

For example, I meet you, and unbeknownst to you, I add you to my unFacebook. I meet another person and add them. Later I find out that you and he are business partners. I then “friend” you to him on my unFacebook. I give access to this database to all the people in my organization and send them out with iPhones and a handy little app that they can use to snap facial photos, grab a GPS point for last location, and fill in some quick details about subjects. Sometimes my people use their iPhones to show photos of subjects to other people to verify names or aliases, corroborate last known locations, and make links with other subjects in the database. Multiple aliases could be resolved through face recognition software. Multiple spellings could be resolved through morphological analysis. Personal details, links, and geolocation data can all be captured on the go in a very simple and familiar system (everybody knows how to use Facebook). As these bits of disparate information come into my UnFacebook, I use this data for an advanced type of link analysis, or scalable social network analysis (SSNA). It seems to me that a system like this would be handy for soldiers fighting an insurgency.

I would assume that law enforcement organizations have something like this that has been the result of a long evolution of link analysis technology. Doing a little research I found a list of tools used by the NSA in James Bamford’s The Shadow Factory (pp. 149): PatternTracer, Agility, AMHAS, Anchory, ArcView, Fastscope, Hightide, Hombase, Intelink, Octave math, Document Management Center, Dishfire, CREST, Pinwale, COASTLINE, SNACKS, Cadence, Gamut, Mainway, Marina, Osis, Puzzlecube, Surrey, Tuningfork, Xkeyscore, and Unified Tasking Tool. This is simply a list of tools used by the NSA. I could not find out what many of these did. That may be because they are specific to the NSA, or historical with no trace left on the net. ArcView is the only social network analysis tool I could confirm. Pinwale is data-mining software, which can be used for SSNA. But this is beside the point.

The military has its own needs and different ways of collecting intel than domestic law enforcement agencies, or even the NSA. With all the COIN work Western militaries have been conducting in the past decade, a flexible, automated, unFacebook-style link analysis application could be a benefit. Such an application probably exists, and if anyone has some information on it, please share. If not, this is a potential market for an enterprising startup. Please contact me if you would like to collaborate. ;)

For a while now I’ve considered the plausibility or, perhaps, inevitability of insurgent tactics witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan making their way west and finding a new home in the violent counter culture that is the American gangland. Thankfully we have yet to see the drive by shooting evolve into a Los Angeles road side bombing. Thankfully the ethos of the modern “gangbanger” has, at it’s center, a hefty amount of narcissism and so the suicide bomber remains a very remote possibility.

In considering the possibility of native criminals entertaining the tactics of insurgents abroad, I’d also given thought to the “what if” concept of American law enforcement agencies practicing some form of counter insurgency strategy. It turns out the extreme environment of road side bombs and suicide bombers isn’t necessary. Rampant gang related crime has driven one Californian police force to adopt the methods and assistance from some Iraq and Afghanistan war veteran counter-insurgents.

In the space of 11 days this year, seven people were murdered in Salinas. Each killing, like the record 25 homicides the previous year, spilled from the gang warfare that this summer pushed the homicide rate in the city of 140,000 to three times that of Los Angeles. Residents retreated indoors at night, and Mayor Dennis Donohue affirmed his decision to seek help from an unlikely source: the U.S. military.

Since February, combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan have been advising Salinas police on counterinsurgency strategy, bringing lessons from the battlefield to the meanest streets in an American city.

I’m of two mindsets regarding this evolution of law enforcement. In one respect, I see it as a remarkably adaptive effort in domestic law enforcement’s effort to combat rampant gang related crime. On the other hand, I consider this another step toward the militarization of American law enforcement. This shift toward a more militant stance is and has been incremental in varying degrees; from the glaring example of no knock warrants to the more inconspicuous, psychological effects of police attire (specifically boots; sounds ridiculous but think about it for a moment.)

I don’t envision a near future America being dominated by a militocracy. We’re too socially dynamic and generally rebellious to allow that. But I do fear (and yes it’s an age old fear) a gradual allowance of Constitutional privilege to law enforcement for a return of the perception of safety.

With the promotion of General David Petraeus to CENTCOM commander, commentators are questioning what it means for Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan but let’s focus on Afghanistan.

On October 7th 2001, the Unites States and United Kingdom launched their attack on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The initial phase of the war consisted of minimal ground troops which coordinated attacks with the Northern Alliance, allowing them to do the lion’s share of the fighting. Some argued too few troops and reliance on the Northern Alliance was a mistake, however, it was the only way to began the war as quickly as was done and to avoid the previous mistakes of the British and Soviet Union who sent overwhelming ground forces in and were soundly defeated.

A small agile force allowed for maximum flexibility, leverage of local know-how and avoidance of being seen as an occupier like the UK and USSR. The country fell quickly and an new government was formed. Avoiding an occupational government was a key part of our Afghan strategy insofar as again avoiding being seen as occupiers as well as avoiding decades long occupation such as in Bosnia and Kosovo where the US and other partners shouldered most of the burden. We were to help them help themselves, not just help them. This too was successful. According to Douglas Feith, “Creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan is desirable, but not necessarily within the power of the US.”

Yet, with the initial war goals accomplished, the US and its coalition partners bumped up against the next set of problems, none of which had much to do with the war itself, but rather with the nature of Afghanistan itself, namely: geography and history. While America’s strategy to win the initial war was built on an understanding of the failures of the UK and USSR, these underlying problems cannot be so easily researched and solved. Afghanistan was created, in short, to serve as a buffer between British India and the expanding Russian Empire and for this it worked rather well. The extremely rugged topography of the country has always made having a central government extremely difficult, regardless whether that government was democratic or dictatorial.

In fact, geography alone goes a long way in terms of explaining the failure to establish any functioning government over history. While the country’s political borders create a single political entity, its geography does the opposite, breaking it into largely isolated pieces. In this sense, the difficulty establishing a single authority is not unlike the problems archipelago nations like Indonesia or the Philippines have. With transportation and communication difficult, basic commerce becomes challenging, much less enough common experience to build the idea of a nation. Additional problems of porous borders and drugs further complicate the situation.

With this in mind, this blogger cannot support the popular criticism that Afghanistan suffers from a dramatic shortage of troops. Indeed, one of the main tenets of US strategy has been a small force, which by the way, did accomplish its tasks. While small increases in troop numbers may make a difference in certain areas, any large increase would ultimately harm our efforts. Our goal should not be more, but rather smarter. This includes more coordination with international NGOs and pressure for partner countries to fulfill their promises such as Germany training the Afghan police, Italy helping build their judicial system and the UK fighting drugs. The US cannot be the fallback for every lazy partner. In addition, success stories such as the training and now active operations of US-trained Afghan commando units. Threat’s Watch notes that:

[...] the development of the Afghan commando force must continue apace if it is to demonstrate the level of operational efficacy and, equally important, sustainability to permit a draw-down of US Special Forces units. Still, the Afghanis and their Green Beret mentors appear to be off to an auspicious start, and if ultimately successful, the entire Western world will reap the benefits of a counterinsurgency force equipped with the technical know-how and linguistic and cultural sensitivity to disrupt insurgent networks in an immeasurably pivotal theater.

Indeed. Additional US forces would largely foster continued dependence on foreigners and create a larger footprint leading to more resentment and incidents. While more boots on the ground may indeed help in certain areas or situations, they are not the answer. A smarter, more resilient and better coordinated strategy must be be adopted by all of the coalition partners in order to make any headway on these deeply rooted historical problems and most important of all, it must be communicated clearly and realistically to locals, partners and the world.

UPDATE: RFERL discusses the importance of road projects for both the Afghan economy and for international forces and counterinsurgency .

This week’s edition of The Economist discusses problems in fighting counterinsurgency with modern militaries.

The first article, Brains, not bullets, outlines the discussion of force transformation over the past decade and a half. It gives an overview of Future Force Warrior and ends up recommending a different type of ground fighter, “preferably a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology.” Simultaneously it warns against the pendulum-swing away from high technology.

Robert D. Kaplan notes that the next century will belong to the Pacific, which means boats and planes. In spite of much criticism netcentric warfare is not a thing of the past. Originated by a navy Admiral, NCW makes sense for the platform driven services. There are some important philosophical differences between the air and naval services and ground forces — how they are structured, deployed and employed. The concept of NCW came under fire when it was applied to ground forces, especially in the post-cold war context of low intensity conflict. This sparked the recycling of traditional COIN wisdom. Splitting the force concepts could be one way to go, but that debate isn’t over yet. The Economist is correct when it observes that “the emerging answer from America is that a modern power needs to prepare for both challenges.”

The second article, After smart weapons, smart soldiers looks at the debate over COIN itself. The article doesn’t propose anything new, simply listing some of the problems with fighting today’s insurgencies including: globalized media; technocentric militaries; and lack of political will. Importantly, the article discusses the special conditions of the Malayan Emergency, much touted as a model of success for fighting COIN. This is nothing new for the seasoned COIN academic, but many who are unfamiliar with the topic are quick to spout the example of Malaya without knowing the particulars.

The articles may not be particularly enlightening for the CA crowd, but they are solid and well researched I think. For example, I am glad they captured the debate between the “xGW” and “irregular warfare” camps, something I think a more trendy news source would miss.

Interesting events in the Great White North today. It’s like a mini-lesson in COIN.

How a few activists are holding B.C. hostage
Militant poverty activists target the homes and offices of officials in protest of the 2010 Olympics. Reaction: “…there are suggestions that the city is being held as a virtual hostage.”

Stop trains or natives will: chiefs
Native chiefs pressure national railways to close down, or be shut down. Reaction: “They see innocent people being harmed and I am certain that it is leading to an erosion of support for aboriginal programs and services,” said the minister of Indian Affairs.

The government response so far is targetting hearts and minds, spinning the hostage angle to destroy public support for activists. This helps to lay the ground for kinetic action if the groups escalate. Seems to be by the book, but I am surprised that the groups haven’t studied it. At least the native groups should have, they were listed in the latest COIN manual released earlier this year.