[A Ferghana Valley dispatch from serial guest-blogger Dorzhiev. — YH]

Driving through the Tajik portion of the Ferghana Valley at dusk our taxi comes to halt. The man riding shotgun hops out to orient himself towards Mecca and perform his Namuz. While we wait a newly wedded man holding a bouquet of flowers for his wife asks the driver to take a detour to his village.

“How many kilometers is it?”
“Only twelve. I live at the border.”

After some grumbling our driver agrees and we turn down a side road. Ten minutes later we arrive in a small village.

“This is it,” the passenger indicates.
“Which side of the border do you live on. Tajik or Uzbek?” the driver asks.
“This is the Kyrgyz border, and I live on the Tajik side.”

To my foreign ears this conversation sounds the sort of Vaudevillian act that leaves you asking “Who’s on first.”

The confusion, however, is understandable in a region famous for it’s bizarre borders. From our point on the highway roughly 20 kilometers in either direction would put you in a different country. A holdover from Soviet times, today the borders of the Ferghana Valley resemble a jigsaw puzzle that has been cut out without consideration to geographic or ethnic realities. The post-Soviet division of the valley has been a bone of contention between the three states that share it. Arguments over water rights, resources, and enclaves continue to stir the ire of the governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The borders also present a challenge to security forces hunting insurgents.

On October 14th a group of armed men reportedly forced their way across the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. The group of roughly a dozen crossed from the Isfara district of Tajikistan to Batken province in Kyrgyzstan. It is currently believed that they are held up in the area around the Tajik enclave of Vorukh surrounded by Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Province. Batken consists of the southern most portion of Kyrgyzstan’s slice of the Ferghana Valley and has a history of unrest. Most notably in 1999 when a large contingent of insurgents linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were responsible for shootings and a spate of kidnappings including the abduction of three American mountain climbers.

Last month another border crossing in the Batken region was the scene of another shootout prompting the Kyrgyz to tighten their borders. Additionally last month Saidumar Saidov, chief of police of Isfara district in Tajikistan was assassinated, however no one has yet been implicated in the killing. As of yet there is no evidence to suggest that these incidents are related, but their proximity and timing fuel the fears relating to the repatriation of insurgents feeling the heat in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In August Tahir Yuldashev the leader of IMU was killed in Waziristan by a US drone although the implications of his death for his followers is not yet clear.

The governments of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are understandably concerned about the flow of militants across their porous borders. The governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan especially lack the resources to adequately patrol them. This summer at a Tajik-Kyrgyz check point consisting only of a card table I watched as a lone soldier waived bus after bus through without bothering to stop them. Tonight as we return to the main road I take a glance down the dusty track that continues into Kyrgyzstan. There are no card tables and no soldiers. Only a herd of goats.

[And now a travel dispatch from the front lines of the Fergana Valley from guest blogger code-name: Dorzhiev (seems suspicious) – YH]

Chugging up the Syr Daryo at night we look ahead to see swirls of smoke dancing amidst beams of neon light. The scene reminds me of the one in Apocalypse Now where captain Willard and his men encounter a surreal encampment on the Mekong river; an ephemeral outpost that marks the last stop before they reach Kurtz. Having read an account of Curzon and Younghusband’s forays into Central Asia just hours before the association came naturally enough. The melodrama of the scene, however, was somewhat diluted by the fact that our vehicle was not a PT gun boat or imperial caravan, but an oversized paddle duck my guide and I had rented for the half hour. We had wanted to hire the blue water bicycle, but some punk had nicked it from us by jumping in line.

The neon lights reflecting off the water emanated from a forest of technicolor palm trees, and the mingling smoke wafted from nearby barbeques on the bank. Apparently eating grilled meat under gaudy lawn furniture is somewhat of an institution in Tajikistan. At least it’s a popular activity at the fair grounds in Khujand, the capital of Tajikistan’s share of the Fergana Valley. For those whose impression of Tajikistan is either of Soviet styled bureaucracy or rural, subsistent peasantry the sights and smells of the Saturday night carnival might seem out of place. Gaggles of unattended children run between students and young families strolling along the riverside laughing, snacking, or waiting to ride the “mystery machine”.

Surveying the crowed from atop my perch on a rickety Ferris wheel I could be looking down at Perry, Georgia or Des Moines, Iowa. The only giveaway that I am in a precinct of a one time Persian province is that the ride attendant is well groomed and competent. No Carnie hailing from Dothan, Alabama could approach this level of professionalism or number of solid teeth. Granted this attendant is probably a high level bureaucrat employed by the “Ministry of Rotating Attractions” whose wages are paid from an ever shrinking public coffer instead of Barnum & Bailey’s.

If there is one bummer to this surprisingly happy scene it is the knowledge of Tajikistan’s current economic woes seen in the light of the countries young demographic. Like many struggling countries, Tajikistan’s population is growing faster than its economy. What effect will this downturn have on a restless generation who in the past few years have seen their hopes of upward mobility diminish? Will the effects of inflation, failure of the cotton crop (a chief export), and the drying up of foreign remittance push them over the brink? On the whole Tajiks live subsistent enough to be fairly shock resistance. This is, however, not as true for the minority of urbanized Tajiks living in cities like Khujand and Dushanbe whose economies are more tertiary. In times of trouble these people are, paradoxically, less able to cope.

A pithy example of this phenomenon could be seen in the winter of 2007. For Tajikistan it was the coldest in 40 years, and made worse by further rationing of energy from neighboring Uzbekistan. Ironically, this had the worst effect on those living in cities who had become reliant on infrastructure for their heat. In contrast, the villagers who are accustomed to going without electricity proved more resilient. On the whole 85 years of communist rule, civil war, and poverty have toughened the Tajik people. How exactly they will weather this particular storm remains to be seen. Tonight, however, they seem more interested in cotton candy and popcorn. Like the T-shirt of the guy in front of me reads, “No money, no crisis”.

With the scheduled closure of Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan, and increased attacks on Pakistani supply lines, US and NATO forces have been forced to reorganize their supply chain to troops in Afghanistan. The US and NATO have been canvassing countries in and around Central Asia. I suggested Iran, having earlier said that “Russian bases in Tajikistan preclude any American ones”. Last week, the US and Tajikistan signed a deal for the transit of non-military supplies headed for Afghanistan. I suspect it was the earlier and similar deal with Russia that allowed this progress between Tajikistan and the West, rather than any sort of gesture of independence. Regardless, we’ll take what we can get. Still and all, the problem of no alternative air supply routes remains to be solved.

The past six months have made us think that the foreign policy action in 2009 will be seen along the Russia-Georgia border, in Gaza, or off the coast of Somalia. Yet it is Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan where we should see the biggest issues tackled and the biggest changes coming. Elections in Iran and Afghanistan are scheduled that could have a major impact on policy. Other events are already in motion that will make change inevitable. Here’s what we’re seeing.

IRAN
Obama has reached out to the former axis of evil with warm words about talking. For his part, hardline President Ahmadinejad has refused to deal with the US yet, and talked about the need for a US apology for past wrongs before there is any progress.

But now there is movement in Iran as we head into the June presidential election. Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s former reformist president, just announced he would stand as a candidate to try and deprive Ahmadinejad of a second term. Khatami, a 65-year-old reformist cleric, whose served two-terms from 1997 to 2005, retired from politics after he stepped down but saw no one step in to head the reformist faction. There is potential for real change, but any movement seems unlikely before the critical issue of who runs the country is decided. That means waiting another 5 months before anything happens—but expect changes after the election, on both the US and Iranian side.

AFGHANISTAN
Last February, when Joe Biden was a senator who had lost a primary run very badly, was visiting Afghanistan, he queried President Karzai in Afghanistan on the corruption, which Karzai brushed off and which led Biden to storm out of the room.

Today, Biden is the US vice president on a world tour speaking about how the new administration will run foreign policy, Obama has spoken of Karzai as unreliable and ineffective, Secretary of State Clinton said called Afghanistan a narco-state, and the Americans are bypassing Karzai to deal directly with the governors in the countryside. Karzai is unpopular at home, with polls suggesting that 85% of voters want to vote for “the other guy”—and there is an alection scheduled for August.

PAKISTAN
Pakistan is identified as the top priority for the new administration as a nuclear-armed country hurtling towards chaos, namely:

The security situation in Pakistan seems to deteriorate daily. Last week’s headlines, for instance, included: a bombing of a religious procession in the central town of Dera Ghazi Khan, which claimed at least 27 lives; government helicopter gunship attacks that killed 52 militants in the Khyber area of the tribal region; the kidnapping of a senior UN official by gunmen; and the beheading of a Polish engineer who was abducted five months ago. A videotape of the execution was released last night by his captors.

A year ago democracy was restored after eight years of military rule but many believe the government is in a state of paralysis, as an unwieldy coalition and a cabinet of about 70 ministers jockey for position – ever wary of the army, which has ruled Pakistan for most of its existence. Government decision-making is concentrated in the hands of President Asif Zardari, creating a log-jam, critics say.

But behind the new democratic government, the cause of the Taliban uprising and its backing is opaque. Some blame the Indian intelligence agency (RAW) while others accuse Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency ISI. Some even blame the CIA. And India wants questions answered also.

The Infowar Monitor reports that Kyrgyzstan is under a massive denial of service attack, flatlining three of four ISPs in the country. The attacks are suspected to be both political and commissioned.

The cost and manpower requirements to black or brown out a nation’s Internet access is exceedingly small while the potential payoff exceedingly large. Consider the following: Last month, the US and NATO closed their Pakistani supply route (which accounts for 80 percent of supplies to the war in Afghanistan) becoming entirely dependent on Central Asia. However, since US bases in Uzbekistan were closed in 2005, and Russian bases in Tajikistan preclude any American ones, only Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan remains. During the original invasion of Afghanistan the technology-dependent American military was plagued by insufficient bandwidth. Eight years later I am assuming this is no longer a problem, but for speculative purposes I wonder how a DOS attack on a bandwidth-starved region such as Central Asia or Africa could affect a technology-dependent military? I do not want to insinuate that the Kyrgyz DOS attack was directed at US/NATO supply lines. Rather, the coincident events caused me to consider future situations as the bandwidth gap is more pronounced in the less stable (and therefore less connected) regions of the globe. Maybe someone with a background in computer security like selil could give us some perspective on this issue.

Here is a quick summary of an article in the Tagesschau, a German language news source.

Background

Under the German constitution, only parliament has the power to send German troops into combat, not the Chancellor. This condition is based on World War II as well as the clause written into the constitution that Germany may not engage in Angriffskriege, or wars of aggression. It can thus only act with a UN mandate or lacking that, a NATO mandate (as in Kosovo). Additionally, it must vote yearly to renew that mandate. For Afghanistan, the Bundestag votes October 15th of every year.

Renewal

The Bundestag voted to new renew the German army’s mandate for Afghanistan by 14 months, i.e. until December 13th 2009. The vote was 442 yes, 96 no and 32 abstaining indicating overwhelming support for the mission, contrary to news reports. It also raises the maximum troop levels which the Ministry of Defense can send to 4,500, an increase of 1,000 soldiers. Germany is currently the third largest provider of ISAF troops.

However, Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung noted that the increase does not mean an additional thousand soldiers will immediately be sent. He stressed it means more flexibility for Germany in responding to the ongoing situation and that less engagement or pulling out is not an alternative as it would mean breaking Germany’s promises and failing to participate in its international responsibility.

Anyone familiar with Socrates knows his favorite question was why. Those who regularly converse and argue with others, especially about political topics, knows a strategically placed “why” can halt your opponent in his tracks. This simple, yet crucial question is asked far too rarely by both individuals inside and outside the government. Arab Media Shack, a favorite blog of mine, has a fantastic piece which I feel compelled to link to asking: Why is the Taliban the Enemy?

Grandmasta doesn’t claim to have deep knowledge about Afghanistan, but it seems to him that the current US approach is destined for failure. Over the past year violence has gotten worse and the US continues to lose soldiers and waste money there. But here’s Grandmasta’s question: Why is it important that we destroy the Taliban? Why is the Taliban being treated as an ineitable enemy that has to be eliminated in order for security to be achieved?

Afghanistan becomes a security threat to the US and its allies when it serves as a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda types to use as a base to plan and launch attacks against the US. For what other reason is Afghanistan important to the US? The situation that existed in Afghanistan before 9/11 was clearly a security threat to the US as Al-Qaeda could do whatever they wanted, and as we well know, they did just that. But why is the Taliban being lumped together with Al-Qaeda as an implaccable enemy that must be destroyed?

Read the rest here and be sure to leave your thoughts either there or here. Good thinking by Grandmasta, and the kind of basic questioning we don’t see often enough in the blogosphere.

With the promotion of General David Petraeus to CENTCOM commander, commentators are questioning what it means for Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan but let’s focus on Afghanistan.

On October 7th 2001, the Unites States and United Kingdom launched their attack on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The initial phase of the war consisted of minimal ground troops which coordinated attacks with the Northern Alliance, allowing them to do the lion’s share of the fighting. Some argued too few troops and reliance on the Northern Alliance was a mistake, however, it was the only way to began the war as quickly as was done and to avoid the previous mistakes of the British and Soviet Union who sent overwhelming ground forces in and were soundly defeated.

A small agile force allowed for maximum flexibility, leverage of local know-how and avoidance of being seen as an occupier like the UK and USSR. The country fell quickly and an new government was formed. Avoiding an occupational government was a key part of our Afghan strategy insofar as again avoiding being seen as occupiers as well as avoiding decades long occupation such as in Bosnia and Kosovo where the US and other partners shouldered most of the burden. We were to help them help themselves, not just help them. This too was successful. According to Douglas Feith, “Creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan is desirable, but not necessarily within the power of the US.”

Yet, with the initial war goals accomplished, the US and its coalition partners bumped up against the next set of problems, none of which had much to do with the war itself, but rather with the nature of Afghanistan itself, namely: geography and history. While America’s strategy to win the initial war was built on an understanding of the failures of the UK and USSR, these underlying problems cannot be so easily researched and solved. Afghanistan was created, in short, to serve as a buffer between British India and the expanding Russian Empire and for this it worked rather well. The extremely rugged topography of the country has always made having a central government extremely difficult, regardless whether that government was democratic or dictatorial.

In fact, geography alone goes a long way in terms of explaining the failure to establish any functioning government over history. While the country’s political borders create a single political entity, its geography does the opposite, breaking it into largely isolated pieces. In this sense, the difficulty establishing a single authority is not unlike the problems archipelago nations like Indonesia or the Philippines have. With transportation and communication difficult, basic commerce becomes challenging, much less enough common experience to build the idea of a nation. Additional problems of porous borders and drugs further complicate the situation.

With this in mind, this blogger cannot support the popular criticism that Afghanistan suffers from a dramatic shortage of troops. Indeed, one of the main tenets of US strategy has been a small force, which by the way, did accomplish its tasks. While small increases in troop numbers may make a difference in certain areas, any large increase would ultimately harm our efforts. Our goal should not be more, but rather smarter. This includes more coordination with international NGOs and pressure for partner countries to fulfill their promises such as Germany training the Afghan police, Italy helping build their judicial system and the UK fighting drugs. The US cannot be the fallback for every lazy partner. In addition, success stories such as the training and now active operations of US-trained Afghan commando units. Threat’s Watch notes that:

[...] the development of the Afghan commando force must continue apace if it is to demonstrate the level of operational efficacy and, equally important, sustainability to permit a draw-down of US Special Forces units. Still, the Afghanis and their Green Beret mentors appear to be off to an auspicious start, and if ultimately successful, the entire Western world will reap the benefits of a counterinsurgency force equipped with the technical know-how and linguistic and cultural sensitivity to disrupt insurgent networks in an immeasurably pivotal theater.

Indeed. Additional US forces would largely foster continued dependence on foreigners and create a larger footprint leading to more resentment and incidents. While more boots on the ground may indeed help in certain areas or situations, they are not the answer. A smarter, more resilient and better coordinated strategy must be be adopted by all of the coalition partners in order to make any headway on these deeply rooted historical problems and most important of all, it must be communicated clearly and realistically to locals, partners and the world.

UPDATE: RFERL discusses the importance of road projects for both the Afghan economy and for international forces and counterinsurgency .