Several days ago, US Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech at the National Defense University outlining the current administration’s arms control agenda. It included pushing for US ratification of the CTBT, the ongoing START talks with Russia and reducing the US nuclear arsenal. While we could discuss all three of these issues at length, I’d like to first concentrate on the idea of ‘getting to zero’ and reducing America’s nuclear capability.

The Vice President (as others) noted that

“We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective.”

Non-nuclear weapons development includes the administration’s plan for an “adaptive” missile-defense shield and conventional warheads “with worldwide reach,” he said. “With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong,” Mr. Biden said.

The idea of replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional capabilities is not new. The argument is that the increasing destructive power of modern conventional weapons combined with the ability of the United States to ‘reach out and touch someone’ anywhere on the globe in a minutes or hours can play the same deterrent role as nuclear weapons currently do.

In order to break down this argument, I’d like to make two things clear. Firstly, the goal of our current nuclear force posture is to deter adversaries from attacking us and our allies. Secondly, the means to accomplish this is not and should not be the focus of discussion but instead the end. What do I mean? Many people focus on the weapons themselves, i.e. nuclear weapons, but as Biden notes, if conventional capabilities can fulfil the same function (i.e. survive a first strike and destroy enemy targets with high certainty), then they can be substituted for nuclear weapons. In short, how we do it doesn’t matter. The key thing is the destruction of enemy targets with high certainty. The fact that we use nuclear weapons for this purpose is a reflection only of the fact that they are the best suited weapon available for this task today.

However, there are very serious problems with the idea of replacing nuclear with conventional weapons.

If we accept the proposition that today, or sometime in the future, conventional weapons will be on par with nuclear weapons in terms of their deterrent capability, then several logical conclusions must follow:

1) These conventional weapons would be just as dangerous as nuclear weapons. Therefore replacing one with the other makes no substantive difference. Moreover, it would require time, money and effort to do this all with no gain.

2) If conventional weapons are used in the future in the same role as nuclear weapons today, they could invite a nuclear response from adversaries whose conventional capabilities do not match our own. This would be possible also in smaller conflicts because an enemy could then never be sure what weapons were employed since both nuclear and conventional are equall bad. It would lead to escalation at a much higher pace.

3) Having more conventional weapons in the US deterrent may lower the threshold for use.This may encourage a first strike by us or others.

4) If conventional and nuclear weapons are ever equal, they will be sought after by other states just as nuclear weapons are. This leaves us in the same situation as today. However, if the conventional capability is more expensive or difficult to achieve than nuclear weapons (which is older technology now), it will actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5) If these conventional weapons are indeed equal, it means countries will be able to acquire destructive power equal to nuclear weapons, but WITHIN the legal framework Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This will lead to the irrelevance and death of the most important and successful nonproliferation regime the world has.

6) If conventional weapons can equal nuclear ones, they will require the same types of arms control agreements and nonproliferation agreements as nuclear weapons.

7) Replacing nuclear weapons with equally capable conventional weapons is a cosmetic change which does nothing to address the underlying nature of the international system which makes deterrence necessary in the first place. It’s a change in form, not substance.

Readers, I’d appreciate any thoughts, criticisms and comments you have on this.

With arms control talks underway between the US and Russia, a Russia general noted

Russia must keep at least 1,500 nuclear warheads after talks with the United States on a new arms treaty, Interfax news agency quoted the commander of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces as saying Wednesday. If Moscow’s final position reflects Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov’s view, it would mean Russia is not willing to cut its stockpiles by more than a few hundred strategic warheads – far less than some arms control bodies had hoped.

One of the most critical things to pay attention to in news like this is whether they are discussing strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The article does not make it clear but from what I know, I suspect he means strategic weapons, i.e. larger yield and long range ones. It would therefore not include the thousands of smaller tactical warheads Russia has and which it has refused to reduce or give up. Thus, be wary of any ‘progress’ or agreement that does not specifically mention both types.

Given Russia’s size and the threats it faces on its many borders, tactical weapons are of great use and importance to Moscow, whereas they are not for the United States which finds itself in a very different geographic and security situation. The real danger here is that the current administration, which seems intent on disarming the United States while EVERY other country is increasing its arsenal, will agree to cuts in our forces that do NOT include Russia’s tactical weapons being dismantled. Therefore, while you would read news articles on Russia’s and America’s numbers being about the same, they’d only be counting strategic forces and thus not actually revealing the much weaker and vulnerable position the US would have put itself in.

For those of you following proliferation issues, it will come as very welcome news that South Korea has finally joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It was created by the United States in 2003 to proactively interdict shipment of WMD related materials and covers land, sea and air. Importantly, it uses existing legal frameworks and agreements as the basis for action and is proactive. This means that the PSI is really an activity, NOT an organization. There is no headquarters, secretariat etc. The State Department describes it as:

The PSI is an innovative and proactive approach to preventing proliferation that relies on voluntary actions by states that are consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. PSI participants use existing authorities—national and international—to put an end to WMD-related trafficking and take steps to strengthen those authorities as necessary. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD. The PSI is a positive way to take such cooperative action.

Previously, South Korea had refused to join for fear of upsetting the North, maintaining the illusion that placating Pyongyang would somehow help achieve its foreign policy goals. It’s good to see them change their minds. This means the US and other PSI members will have a new and valuable partner in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and materials.

Putting aside the absolute fantasy of a nuclear weapons free world, Obama is attempting to improve the US relationship with Russia. The major starting point is negotiating a new START (strategic arms reduction treaty) treaty with the Russians to reduce each country’s respective nuclear weapons. Yet, this blogger feels it runs contrary to the idea of an improved and friendlier relationship with Moscow. After all, how many arms control treaties does the United States have with its allies? Zero. My and others’ great fear is that the Obama administration will let arms control define the US-Russia relationship at a time when a far broader range of issues require attention. Continuing the Cold War era arms control treaties with Moscow continues to define the US-Russia relationship as adversarial, not cooperative. I understand proliferation and nuclear forces reduction are important issues and that since Russia currently possesses the most nuclear weapons in the world, it is a key issue with them. However, I feel this is the wrong way forward.

Readers, your thoughts?