How do you prevent your interests from being hijacked when in an unequal partnership? This is a question I have been thinking about recently.

For example, America will often pressure smaller and weaker allies to increase their defence spending. It does this to offset its own responsibility for the defence of those allies, but also hopes to encourage allies to take part in coalitions, thereby increasing legitimacy. Think about countries like Canada and Japan, which are highly dependent on the US security umbrella. These dependent countries do not want to spend cash on beefing up a military for the sake of US interests. They worry about entanglement in American “adventures.” They know that they can free ride on American military power to a degree, but do not want to risk abandonment by flouting American “requests.” Thus, they hedge. They react to US pressure by increasing the quality of their forces while simultaneously decreasing the quantity of forces. This satisfies American demands for increased defence spending while simultaneously negating the possibility deployment of expeditionary forces due to lack of numbers. For example, Japan has constantly been upgrading its force structure under pressure from America, but the overall number of ships and planes has been going down. Canada refused to join America in Iraq because it couldn’t spare any more than the 2500 troops it deployed Afghanistan (which has “broken” our army). This is an interesting strategy that maintains alliances without forfeiting foreign and military policy.

I know there must be reams of work done on this sort of thing out there, and I think I remember an example of an ally of Rome doing a similar thing so if anyone has any thoughts or sources to share, please leave them in the comments.

Remember that confusing security debate happening in Japan?

Well, things are looking to get a little more complicated as more international voices join in. Next week eleven envoys will be speaking up to Japanese lawmakers in support of the refueling mission. So far only three countries — United States, Britain, Pakistan — have been named, but what gets me is the location of this little pow-wow: the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo. Hey, they have a nice club there, so why not? So far I can’t find anything else in either the Japanese or Canadian media. We might have to wait until next week. I am interested in seeing what the official Canadian position is on the Japanese mission in the Indian ocean. Though considering how our NATO allies have not been willing to stand up in Afghanistan, I am sure we’ll be ready to accept any help we can get.

This weekend a NATO committee of 26 generals are meeting in Victoria, BC Canada to discuss the future of the mature Atlantic alliance. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean the leaders of America, Australia and Japan met to discuss the future of their young alliance.

Earlier this year Japan forged a joint security declaration with Australia. Understand the importance of this event: this was Japan’s first security outing with a country other than America since the second world war. Japan has always avoided getting involved in the “spaghetti tangle” of bilateral security pacts. Though the Australia declaration isn’t a full-fledged security treaty like Japan’s alliance with the US, be assured that it was a significant step towards the “normalization” of Japan’s foreign policy.

America’s ties with Australia are historically deep from both cultural and security perspectives. Add in Japan and now the Pacific is covered — north, south and west — by a triangular alliance. And the triangle is looking to add a new corner. Both Japan and America have been pushing for India to join in. If India signs up we could well be on our way to an Asia-Pacific Treaty of Brussels. I am sure Singapore could fill in as Luxembourg.

So where will this NATO of the East lead? The ultimate goal is China. China is to the Pacific as the USSR was to Europe — or at least is perceived as such. China becoming a security partner with the likes of Japan and India may not happen for a long time, and might require a bit of cold war action first. But right now we are seeing the foundations of a NATO-like structure that could absorb China, facilitating its constructive participation in collective regional security. Regardless of the “ifs and coulds” this rising alliance structure around the big pond is worth keeping an eye on. As Bob Kaplan said recently: “… the heart of the the post-Cold War military map … is going to be the Pacific.” (18:21)

Being a milcol guy in a pacifist country like Japan can get you into some interesting conversations. the other week one of my new coworkers asked me what I thought of Japan’s North Korea policy, and why the US wasn’t doing more about Pyongyang. In the end he was looking for an explanation why the US didn’t just invade North Korea like it did Iraq. This is a question a lot of people were asking in 2003. Kevin Cooney has an interesting angle in his book Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation: A Quest for Normalcy (pp. 110):

Japan needs the U.S. involved in Northeast Asian [sp.] not just for its own security but also for regional stability. ”¦ by keeping potential regional hegemons in check. ”¦ Without North Korea as a the principal threat facing Japan, the need for the continuing existence of the U.S./Japan alliance could be questioned by the people in both countries. The obvious response that China still remains a threat may be politically impossible to verbalize.

If the threat of North Korea dissolved (somehow) there would no longer be a need for US troops in South Korea. Justification for US troops in Japan would dry up (according to Cooney) and the US would be basically left with Guam. With the US-Japan Security alliance severely weakened — if not nullified outright — Japan would have to start redirecting more cash away from its export-based economy and towards its defense, which would not make some of its regional “partners”? very happy. So, why not keep Kim Jong Il around (alive, kicking and contained) to justify the forward positioning of 80,000 US troops and the opportunity to get a peaceful dialogue going between all the regional players? Remember the real estate agent’s motto: location, location, location!

Addendum

However, if the cause of North Korean dissolution was a US invasion, the Americans would be gaining a new territory and could either give up its real estate in Korea and Japan or justify basing there as part of the supply line. This is somewhat similar to what happened in Iraq: after 2001 the US had to move its troops out of Saudi Arabia but needed real estate in the Middle East to project power in the Arab world (i.e. not Israel or Turkey). Iraq was the home of a bad actor and a twelve year low level conflict. The location was good, the house was a bit of a fixer-upper, but all that was needed was to have the tenant kicked out and we could move on in. The strategic movement of troops to a neighbouring country and giving up of territory for an ally will be familiar to all the Risk players out there.

HT to Joe. Would you believe the post below is two years old? Turns out it’s now finally on the verge of becoming true.

House Speaker Denny Hastert has been named as a possible successor to Howard Baker John Schieffer as US Ambassador to Japan. But what does Hastert know about Japan? Who cares! It doesn’t matter to the Japanese leadership. They want someone seriously connected in Washington, and who more so than Hastert?

Check out this recent list of US Ambassadors to Japan from the past 30 years and their old jobs:

• James Hodgson, 1974-1977 : Secretary of Labor
• Mike Mansfield, 1977-1989 : Senate Majority Leader
• Mike Armascott, 1989-1993 : Ambassador to the Phillipines
• Walter Mondale, 1993-1997 : Vice President
• Tom Foley, 1997-2001 : House Speaker, House Majority Leader
• Howard Baker, 2001-2005: Senate Majority Leader
• John Thomas Schieffer, 2005-2006: Ambassador to Australia.

Five of seven were in Washington’s top legislative positions. Why did they go on to become Ambassadors to Japan?

Believe it or not, Japan doesn’t want East Asian experts like Edwin Reischauer, who served in the position during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies from 1961-1966. Born in Japan in 1910, Reischauer was fluent in Japanese was apparently pretty popular in Japan. But when it came down to real hard politics, he had no political connections in Washington and was never effective at getting clear channels of communication for the Japanese leadership. Starting with Mike Mansfield (who was appointed by Carter but who Reagan kept on), Japan realized that the secret to getting the message through to Washington was having a veteran politico at the helm.

So if you want to be ambassador to Japan (Saru? Adamu?), it’s best to be in a top legislative position, not (just?) an expert on Japan.

“Use the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength” – Sun Tzu

Two longtime members of the anti-American camp met Wednesday for talks about the oil market: Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi, who’s coming from the cold after the U.S. restored relations, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who’s going deeper into the freeze after being hit with a U.S. arms embargo.

Gadhafi, his face partly covered by a large brown scarf draped over his Arab tribal robe, welcomed Hugo Chavez at his house, scarred with bullet holes and showing damage to some of the crenelated concrete at the top of the building from a 1986 U.S. bombing raid. The two leaders met for about an hour in a tent near the wrecked home.

No details from the discussion are available, so I’d like to invite ComingAnarchy readers to suggest their own captions for this photo:

Any takers?

[Prelude | Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3]

Thomas Barnett says that the map from The Pentagon’s New Map came from drawing a line around America’s past military deployments which created the natural demand pattern for the exporting of US security. But what does that same demand pattern look like for our allies? Here’s a look using maps from the German and Canadian Ministries of Defense with Barnett’s Gap overlayed.

Click below for Germany’s current military deployments.

If you refer to a second post of mine on Germany’s past deployments, you see they also fall within the Gap.

Next, we have Canada. Click on the map for their current military deployments.

No surprises here. Again, all are within the Gap. I searched far and wide for an official map from the UK’s Ministry of Defense but couldn’t find one. The MOD’s site isn’t very user friendly. However, the British Army’s site does have a good list of its deployments albeit with a disappointing map. Nevertheless, here it is:

Also all within the Gap. The MOD doesn’t seem to coordinate well so I also found a map of the Royal Air Force’s deployments which is below:

And as usual, more of the same. All in the Gap.

There’s been a lot of stir lately in the blogosphere about PNM theory. Mark of Zenpundit has a fabulous post up as does Dave Schuler from the Glittering Eye on the Wave Theory of the Core and Gap. Dan “Magic Cloud” tdaxp is working on operationalizing the Gap, i.e. running the numbers of which countries exactly belong in the Gap. And last but not least, Chicago Boyz has two hefty posts picking apart PNM.

As our allies slowly look at Tom’s map and compare it to the ones I’ve listed above, they’ll realize preemption and active intervention around the globe isn’t as much of a “cowboy policy” as they think because in fact, they’ve been most all of the same places. Again, this is why you haven’t heard much from Europe lately, they’re starting to see we’re on to something. But even as governments start to slowly realize the same thing, it’ll be a very very very long uphill battle to convince the European public.

In a followup to this post from November of last year,

107 Alerts on Chinese Spy Planes

Japan has scrambled fighter jets 107 times this year to intercept suspected Chinese spy planes, a top general said Thursday, amid growing concern in Tokyo over China’s arms buildup. The 107 alerts in the first three months of 2006 — the most in at least a decade — were a dramatic increase from the previous year, when fighters scrambled only 13 times against Chinese planes, said Gen. Hajime Massaki.

“Chinese activities in areas around Japanese territory have reached unprecedented levels,” the chairman of the Joint Staff Committee told reporters. “We believe these planes to be engaging in information-gathering activity, and behind the trend is the rapid modernization of China’s military,” the general said.

Japan’s policymakers are super-sensitive right now to China’s military buildup. Beijing has a 2.5-million member military, and has increased its military spending by double-digits almost every year since the early 1990s (notably above the growth of its GDP). There are other factors that make the figure higher than it actually is—China does not include R&D in its defense spending, 40% of Japan’s budget goes to salaries compared to 20% for China, not to mention the rations. The BBC has a summary on the topic here. This is the main reason Japan is going out of its way to join up with the American Missile Defense Plan, join them in the reorganization of the military, and try its hard—beef imports notwithstanding—to keep great relations with the US.

Some adroit national security analysis from South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo:

Around this time last year, when the island country’s Shimane Prefecture instituted a “Takeshima Day” even as the increasingly prominent right wing in Japan put out textbooks whitewashing the country’s wartime atrocities, the president said, “We can no longer sit idle before fresh attempts at hegemony. They will be struck down one and all.” You can almost hear Japan snicker at the presidential promise as it turns up the provocation over Dokdo again this year.

If a country is to rebuff another’s designs on its territory, it must plumb for one of two options: rely on its own strength or, failing that, enlist the help of an ally capable of the job. That has been a basic principle of international politics for millennia. If you are merely bluffing, the other side will call your bluff.

For Korea to stand up to a country like Japan with an economy 10 times the size of ours is impossible without a powerful ally. The Korea-U.S. alliance that once sustained us and maintained stability when Seoul-Tokyo relations became brittle, has been shaken to the core in the three years the Roh administration has been in power. Tokyo knows that Seoul has maneuvered itself into a diplomatic corner: that is why it is acting so shamelessly in the Dokdo question.

All very true. Japan has called Seoul’s bluff, and can afford to do so because Tokyo’s relations with the US are great, whereas Seoul’s relations with the US are awful.

ALSO: Domestically, Koizumi’s East Asia diplomacy is the least popular aspect of his administration: more than half opposed the Yasukuni Shrine visits, almost four-fifths of the country want improved relations with China, and I’d wager that figure is even higher for Korea.