Ahh, Africa—the dark continent. I know, I know, I should be more politically correct. But not a week goes by without a story reminding us that Africa is a sprawling realm of utter human misery, despair, and chaos. One nation that we rarely read about in the news, but which Kaplan briefly mentioned in his article The Coming Anarchy, is Guinea. Not to be confused with neighboring Guinea-Bissau (which is also a complete mess), Kaplan described Guinea in 1994 as such:

I got a general sense of the future while driving from the airport to downtown Conakry, the capital of Guinea. The forty-five-minute journey in heavy traffic was through one never-ending shantytown: a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence. The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime. Stores were built out of rusted shipping containers, junked cars, and jumbles of wire mesh. The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere. Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants. When the tide went out, dead rats and the skeletons of cars were exposed on the mucky beach. In twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates.

Guinea actually survived the past fifteen years without a fullblown explosion of violence ala Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, or Liberia. Instead, the collapse in Guinea has been quiet, avoiding headlines perhaps because it lacked such colorful characters as Liberia’s General Butt Naked.

But this may be changing. A year ago, a military coup brought a little-known military corporal Moussa Dadis Camara to power. At first glance, Camara had the resume to suggest he could be the best leader the country could hope for. He served in the UN mission in pacifying Sierra Leone and was later trained for eighteen months at the Bremen Military Management School in Bremen, Germany. This is the type of character that Kaplan said we needed in his chapter on Chad in his recent book Imperial Grunts—a military commander with the discipline and international background and training to steer the country in the right direction.

If only. Following the coup, Camara immediately cancelled the Constitution and declared the establishment of a military junta government. He said elections would be held shortly but then refused to hold them, causing violence to break out that resulted in his government cracking down on the opposition, followed by nasty tales of violence such as murder and videotaped gang rapes.

It also turns out that Camara was shot in the head, either during the coup, or in the violence that followed, or just days ago (reports vary wildly). Whether or not this is affecting his mental condition is unknown, but the stories we read coming from Guinea suggest a James Bond-esque mad villian—he sleeps all day and emerges only after dark, broadcasts rambling tirades on the radio that last for hours, and has his official guests wait to meet him in a gallery adorned with life-size portraits of himself. Camara is currently in Morocco seeking medical treatment, and we can only hope that this cures him of the megolomania that reminds us of the golden days of North Korea and Turkmenistan.

As it happens, Guinea sits on top of Saudi-esque riches in the form of diamonds, gold, iron and half the world’s reserves of bauxite, the raw material used to make aluminum. Camara has signed a major deal with Chinese mining interests to exploit the resources. Hopefully they’ll get a chance to exploit that before the country falls into complete chaos.

For those still peddling the line that piracy is carried out by poor, starving Africans, victimized by evil European fisherman, this article not only provides evidence to the contrary, but speaks to the advanced nature of it in both a business and social sense.

It is a lucrative business that has drawn financiers from the Somali diaspora and other nations—and now the gangs in Haradheere have set up an exchange to manage their investments.

[...] “Four months ago, during the monsoon rains, we decided to set up this stock exchange. We started with 15 ‘maritime companies’ and now we are hosting 72. Ten of them have so far been successful at hijacking,” Mohammed said. “The shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials … we’ve made piracy a community activity.”
[...] “The district gets a percentage of every ransom from ships that have been released, and that goes on public infrastructure, including our hospital and our public schools.”

Reading the article, I almost think I’m reading Global Guerillas. As pirates continue to extend their reach offshore, and Western nations continue to needlessly devise ridiculous non-lethal anti-pirate weapons, despite the fact that the problem of piracy was solved centuries ago with firearms, it would seem naive to believe a few semi-coordinated naval ships unwilling to actually use lethal force will solve the problem. If anything, I’d wager that piracy will actually increase due to the international naval presence as that will drive up the profit margin for successful raids, similar to the failed American War on Drugs where the DEA serves only to maintain and ensure the profitibility of drugs.

Lastly, given a previous Wired article discussion of the international side of the business, this blogger wonders whether such a new “stock exchange” will further internationalize the business past the traditional diaspora connections and secondly, whether this could be an early attempt, or even precedent for similar “black stock exchanges” in other illicit businesses such as drugs, weapons, people and other smuggling for example. If decentralization and internationalization are key driving forces in crime and terrorism, it would seem that “publicly traded criminal enterprise” may be a logical extension. Readers?

Although the news is currently focusing on the shooting of over a hundred protesters in Guinea, another side of the story unheard in English language news regards the background of the country’s current president, Moussa Dadis Camara. Prior to overthrowing the government in his native country, he received 18 months of military training in Bremen, Germany (link in German) at the Führungsakadamie der Bundeswehr (link in German). Needless to say, Germany is less than thrilled about the news. However, no one would likely have known had Camara not been speaking German in public. According to reports, several of his closest friends were also sent to Germany for training and thus speak fluent German, very rare in Guinea. Therefore, he has apparently been using it as a ‘secret language.’ Additionally, he apparently talks to the foreign press in German as well.

Most humorous was an exchange between him and the German ambassador in which the ambassador carefully asked about the future return of elections and civilian leadership. Camara began yelling that it was his country and he could do as he liked because he was president and in an Eric Cartman-esque moment, to “Respect my authority.” Whether this turns out to be a domestic issue is unclear at the moment but overall unlikely. With the election Sunday, the economic crisis and many other big fish to fry, this will probably remain an interesting side story. However, as Germany trains more and more foreign students (both police and military) these types of events may come back to haunt them down the road similar to our School of the Americas which had to undergo a name change. Given that the German people are uneasy about all military matters, bad press like this will only serve to further decrease public support for any kind of military engagement whether training foreigners at home or operating abroad.

A Fistful of Euros has an interesting collection of first impressions in a visit to Senegal, and takes not on how French it is. I would recommend reading the entire post in its entirety, but one interesting comment is noted below on the relative calm and stability of the nation:

One interesting thing about Senegal: politically, it’s West Africa’s great success story. Senegal has no history of ethnic strife. It’s never had a military dictatorship or a coup. Their first President stepped down from power peacefully and voluntarily; their second one was defeated in a fair election. There’s a free press and a lively political opposition. They’ve never had martial law or a civil war. (There was a regionalist rebellion down south, but it never got past the guerrillas-in-the-bush stage, and has since been resolved.) So, while it has the full complement of African problems — poverty, disease, bad infrastructure, illiteracy — it’s not a place where the government may suddenly take away your passport or your business, or where armed men may bang on your door in the middle of the night. I suspect that’s one reason the diasporid communities are so healthy.

Uganda, as a landlocked African nation, experienced colonialism only in the late 19th century, well after European interests had taken control in most other regions of Africa. In the late 19th century it became a protectorate under the British, and unlike many other colonies, the kingdoms and nations within the protectorate retained a wide degree of self-determination. For example, many of the Bantu kings that ruled in the south continued to rule despite the British interests controlling many economic and inter-kingdom affairs. (Like most of Africa’s nations, Uganda’s political boundaries are nonsensical when looking at the peoples that make up its border—see a visualization of this phenomenon here.) Because of this, many aspects of late-nineteenth century African society and the ancient political system survived the colonial experience in Uganda, despite being wiped out in most other parts of the continent.

Perhaps ironically, the Bantu kingdoms that survived the British did not survive their departure. When Uganda became independent in 1963 and abolished commonwealth monarchy, it then proceeded in 1967 to abolish the remaining monarchies. In 1993, the government of President Museveni permitted the Bantu kingdoms to reincorporate, to the extent they were “cultural institutions,” not political insitutions. Of course, politics is inevitable in everything—but the real meaning of the restoration of the kingdoms was that the kings have no powers to tax, and recieve little funding from the government, requiring them to survive on their own business acumen and their connections.

The regions of the five restored kingdoms today look something like this:

There is very little information on the constitutent kingdoms of Uganda available on the Internet, so I’ve compiled this post from a variety of sources. You can read more on the pdf files here, here, and here. I’ve briefly explained the recent history of each kingdom below, referencing the (often very brief) wikipedia page on each kingdom. Read the rest of this entry »

João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, President of Guinea-Bissau for several decades, was assasinated yesterday by soldiers of the country’s army, apparently in retaliation for the killing of General Batista Tagme Na Waie, Vieira’s chief rival and who had previously survived a purge but lived on exile, the day before. Vieira publicly described himself as “God’s gift” to the country.

Vieira was first president of Guinea-Bissau from 1980 through 1999. Like many sub-saharan countries, Guinea-Bissau moved from a dictatorship to a multi-party democracy in the 1990s, and Vieira was unable to hold onto power after he lost reelection in 1999. His successor was disfunctional, so Vieira managed to win back power, and as he forced the resignation of parliamentary officials and purged many of his opponents, the military became his chief rival. Part of it was linked to tribal and ethnic rivalries, with the general hailing from the Balante group, traditionally dominant in the armed forces, and the President hailing from the smaller Papel community.

Literally hours after Na Waie’s death in an explosion, the army ordered two private radio stations in the city to cease broadcasting. Soldiers then went to the president’s house and killed him, largely destroyed the house in the assault. Soldiers looted it for valuables. The cabinet has announced seven days of national mourning for both leaders and launched a judicial inquiry into the deaths. The army has denied there has been a coup, a naval commander has said the military “gave guarantees to the prime minister that it will remain faithful to democratic principles and respect for the constitution,” and the national assembly speaker has taken over at the helm of a transitional government and must organize presidential elections by early May.

The tiny country of Guinea-Bissau should not be confused with it’s larger neighbor Guinea, also known as Guinea-Conakry. However, the two countries are very similar, and its worth repeating Kaplan’s writings on Guinea to get some perspective, quoting The Coming Anarchy:

I got a general sense of the future while driving from the airport to downtown Conakry, the capital of Guinea. The forty-five-minute journey in heavy traffic was through one never-ending shantytown: a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence. The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime. Stores were built out of rusted shipping containers, junked cars, and jumbles of wire mesh. The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere. Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants. When the tide went out, dead rats and the skeletons of cars were exposed on the mucky beach. In twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates. Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed, and people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry. It seemed to me that here, as elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, man is challenging nature far beyond its limits, and nature is now beginning to take its revenge.

Guinea-Bissau actually has a higher population growth rate, and its population of 1.3 million in 2002 is expected to grow to 2 million by 2020. It’s hard to tell what comes next, but don’t expect any change from what think-tank Crisis Group calls “a recurrent cycle of political crises and coups d’etat, while criminal networks have proliferated”.

UPDATE: The US is relieved.

Previously: Which Iberia? – Which Alexandria? – Which Albania?

Ghana, Mali and Benin are the names of three modern Africa republics. They are also the names of medieval African kingdoms with little if any connection to the modern states that go by the same names. This post explains the how and why.

The script notes the borders of the old kingdom; the modern print notes the borders of the current state

Ghana

Medieval Ghana was established in around the 4th century and lasted until the 13th Century, when it was absorbed into the larger Mali Empire.

Approximately 500 miles (800 km) south of Ghana was the shores of a region that came under the control of the British and which became known as the Gold Coast, taking from the Portugese name of the region. When the region became independent in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the independent state and a strong believer in Pan-Africanism, chose the name Ghana to more broadly identify the country with the greater region. There is no ethnic, linguistic, or historical links to the two states.

Mali

Mali was one of the largest African empires in history. Although we are not aware of its boundaries, and understand it did not have rigid political borders, it dominated West Africa through the 8th century through 14th century. It was bankrupted by the collapse in gold prices in the 12th century, invaded by the Berbers from the north in the 15th century, and then came under French rule beginning in the late 19th century. During the colonial rule it was part of French Sudan.

Upon independence in 1959, the region was known as the Sudanese Republic, and united with Senegal to become the Mali Federation, which officially gained independence in June 20, 1960, only to have Senegal withdrew from the federation in August. The independent nation of Mali was then created in September. Of the three African nations that are subject to this post, Mali is the most logical naming of the three, as its borders fitting losely with that of its ancient predecessor.

Benin

The Kingdom of Benin was founded in the 12th century and lasted until the 19th century as a fierce militaristic kingdom famous for exporting ivory and slaves to Europe. It was the paramount power in the region and remained independent until 1897, when the capital was burned to the ground and much of the artwork (“Benin Bronzes”) sent to the great European museums, where it still exists today.

The kingdom’s capital city of Benin survived as a smaller city that is now part of Nigeria. It became independent as a puppet state of Biafra for about one day in 1969 as the Republic of Benin.

Several hundred miles to the west of Benin City and the old Kingdom of Benin is a nation known before and during the colonial period as Dahomey. It was changed in 1975 to the People’s Republic of Benin after the nearby body of water known as the Bight of Benin. This had been named after the Benin Empire. Thus it happens that Benin, like Ghana, is another modern African state with no direct connection to the medieval nation of the same name.

The wikipedia page for the Republic of Benin warns readers: Not to be confused with the current Republic of Benin, formerly known as Dahomey, or the Kingdom of Benin from the Benin City area. That type of disclaimer is required for Ghana and Mali as well.

Somali piracy has become a major news item, and most are blaming Somalia’s chronic anarchy. In truth, the pirates have become a highly organized business that originates in the stable civic society of Puntland in the north, not the chaos of the warring south.

Somali pirates who previously targeted small vessels have grown in sophistication and have now hijacked luxuy liners, container ships, and now supertankers.

Somali piracy has been headline news over the past half year. In April, pirates off the coast of Somalia took control of Le Ponant, a French luxury yacht. In October, the Ukrainian cargo MV Faina was captured, which included in its hold 25 armormed tanks. And earlier this month, a tanker carrying oil up to $100 million in value was hijacked off the coast of Somalia. Shipping “war insurance”—covered previously at CA here—is becoming expensive, as ships such as the Sirius and Le Ponant, previously thought to be beyond the grasp of pirates, are now seen as vulnerable. The range of the Somali pirates is growing as well. Until just last month, ships were thought to be safe if they kept 200 nautical miles from Somalia, but the Sirius Star was 450 nautical miles from the coast when it was hijacked in a lightening 16 minute takeover. Read how another tanker captain avoided capture with S-manuevers and other unpredictable navigation here.

Some analysts write fearful tracts that the pirates have links with terrorists and extremists, that the chaos is a direct result of international neglect of Somalia, and try to link pirates to the islamist insurgency that control much of the south or the recent terrorist bombings in Somaliland. This is nonsense. The origins of Somali piracy are not found in the southern half of the country, where a “transitional government” is dueling the Union of Islamic Courts with the half-hearted assistance of the Ethiopian military. Somali piracy originates in Puntland, a self-declared autonomous region of Somalia at the horn, hailed for years by policymakers as a model of a stable Somali state. Read the rest of this entry »

Eddie beat me to this, but he doesn’t have a cool map =)

The BBC reports that 26 African countries, which were previously split into three trading blocs, The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) and the East African Community (EAC), have signed a free trade agreement covering a vast part of the African continent.

While Africa is mostly a Gap continent, this is an important move towards the Core in the long term. The agreement also detailed further goals of the block, namely: a single customs union and harmonizing their transport, technology and energy infrastructure. A Free Trade Zone will begin to better integrate the continent, giving it more weight internationally and allowing it to deal as a bloc in negotiating agreements with the rest of the world. The free trade zone will not just integrate Africa economically, but slowly lead towards more political and popular integration as both governments and peoples better see their shared fates and interdependence. A South African government official hit the nail on the head:

“We don’t think its going to be an easy process… (but it’s) the only viable path the continent can take if it wants to play in this global environment,” Ntsaluba said.

African leaders have understood the Core/Gap divide and may be a long way from entering, but seem to have decided their path. It will be important to see how well the new group can effectively open and police their borders, coordinate and improve transportation infrastructure and fight corruption. Although the agreement is grounds for optimism, transportation and corruption will now be the two biggest factors in determining how well this agreement functions.

As U.S. Navy warships continue to surround the Ukrainian cargo ship holding weaponry in the Gulf of Aden recently hijacked by Somali pirates—who, realizing the reality of their situation, decrease their ransom daily—our patron saint Robert D. Kaplan writes about an unintended benefit of piracy: multilateral cooperation among the world’s navies.

The one upside of piracy is that it creates incentives for cooperation among navies of countries who often have tense relations with each other. The U.S. and the Russians cooperate off the Gulf of Aden, and we might begin to work with the Chinese and other navies off the coast of Indonesia, too. As a transnational threat tied to anarchy, piracy brings nations together, helping to form the new coalitions of the 21st century.

Kaplan also gives a beautiful summary of what life is like as a pirate, abridged and bolded below by myself:

Somali pirate confederations consist of cells of ten men, with each cell distributed among three skiffs that are ratty, and roach-infested, and made of decaying wood or fiberglass. A typical pirate cell goes into the open ocean for three weeks at a time, navigating by the stars, equipped with only drinking water, fuel, grappling hooks, short ladders, knives, AK-47 assault rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades. They bring millet and qat (the local narcotic of choice), and they use lines and nets to catch fish, which they eat raw. One captured pirate skiff held a hunk of shark meat so tough it had teeth marks all over it. Their existence is painfully rugged.

The classic tactic of Somali pirates is to take over a slightly larger dhow, often a fishing boat manned by Indians, Taiwanese, or South Koreans, and then live on it, with the skiff attached. Once in possession of a dhow, they can seize an even bigger ship. As they leapfrog to yet bigger ships, they let the smaller ships go free. Because the sea is vast, only when a large ship issues a distress call do foreign navies know to look. If Somali pirates hunted only small boats, no warship would know about the piracy.

Off-hand cruelty is the pirates’ signature behavior. “Forget the Johnny Depp charm,” one Navy officer told me. “Theirs is a savage brutality not born of malice or evil, like a lion killing an antelope. There is almost a natural innocence about what they do.”