While Georgia-Russia tensions have mostly brought involved the US, EU and aforementioned two parties, Germany has stepped in with its own plan for peace in Abkhazia. A Spiegel article notes the plan consists of three phases,

Phase one of the German plan envisages a year of trust-building measures. These would include declarations renouncing violence and the return of around 250,000 refugees to the province. The second phase would see the beginning of reconstruction work, with Berlin organizing a donors’ conference to drum up the necessary funds. The third and crucial phase would involve finding a political solution to the conflict, essentially whether Abkhazia should become reintegrated into Georgia or be granted independence.

Interestingly, the article notes that all sides have found the proposal reasonable. While making declarations renouncing violence should be simple for all parties involved, I’m skeptical of the return of a quarter of a million Georgian refugees. While the UN did recently adopt a resolution calling for the right of return of Georgian IDPs to their homes in Abkhazia. However, given the poor state of Abkhazia’s infrastructure and security, it is questionable how many people would return given that there may be nothing at all to return to and surely no economic or educational opportunities for young people. Additionally, given that the province was historically inhabited by a majority of Georgians, their return would dilute the Abkhaz to the point where the results of a future referendum on the area’s status may be a foregone conclusion.

I’ve checked the UN and German Foreign Office’s websites but have been unable to find further information. If readers have access sources in other languages or are able to find more information, please post links in the comments section. More to come as the situation develops and more details become available.

The WSJ has an op-ed on the recent Abkhaz-Georgian-Russian tensions which for anyone following it, offers mainly a summary of the situation up until now recounting especially Georgian mistakes while spending little time on Russia. In fact, it fails to clearly define Russia’s role. While most articles continue to refer to Russian “peacekeepers” it seems a glaring oversight not to note that ongoing and very public threats against Georgia by Moscow makes it clear there are no peacekeepers in Abkhazia or South Ossetia but instead occupation troops. In what other conflict has the side (UN, NATO, AU) whose job it is to maintain peace constantly threatened the other party while actively violating its airspace and shooting down its planes?

Nevertheless, the op-ed ends with a fascinating suggestion for Tbilisi:

Abkhazia is now virtually lost to Georgia—almost as lost as Kosovo is to Serbia. The only chance for Tbilisi to reverse this process and see Georgian refugees ever returning to their home is, paradoxically, to let go. Tbilisi should open up Abkhazia and free it from dependence on Russia. That means lifting sanctions and permitting a sea link to Turkey and the re-opening of a railway line connecting it with Western Georgia.

Such a policy would change the atmosphere and call the Abkhaz bluff—forcing them to negotiate in earnest and confront the issue that holds the key to their future status: Abkhaz responsibilities to their prewar Georgian population. And the rest of us would sleep a little easier if only this tinderbox in the Caucasus could be damped down.

Such a plan would make Thomas Barnett proud.

Thomas de Waal also wrote the fantastic book Black Garden which I read as research for my trip and can highly recommend.

Just yesterday I again recommended that Georgia aim to internationalize its conflict with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia as its only hope for eventual victory is diplomatic and not military. Today, the headlines seem to confirm that either the Georgian Foreign Ministry readers our blog or that this blogger should perhaps go work for them. According to reuters,

Georgia wants the European Union to send police to the separatist region of Abkhazia, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Baramidze said on Wednesday. “We are going to present this request to the European Union, we are going to ask for European police forces to be sent to Abkhazia,” he told a news conference after a Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg. “What we need is for everyone to take part, including Russia.”

Indeed, the Georgian strategy should aim not to exclude Russia but to include them wherever possible, however, along with Europeans and Americans. Additionally, the Georgian strategy must stay on message that it aims to solve the problem or end the conflict and humanitarian crisis, not to take back its territory. In this way, Russia will have difficulty rejecting any offer which indeed includes them and aims not at retaking territory but at solving the problem.

Additionally, the European Union is now dispatching a delegation of foreign ministers to visit Abkhazia, assess the situation and to cool tensions. The makeup of that group should be rather sympathetic towards Tbilisi as it consists of the Slovenian, Swedish, Polish and Lithuanian foreign ministers.

Check back for more as the situation develops. For the moment, a former ambassador of Greece has written an op-ed in support of Georgia and condemning Europe’s cowardice and unwillingness to stand up for its own principles.

Jamestown also has similar advice for Georgia and a further analysis of the peacekeeping situation.

Globalsecurity.org reports that Abkhazia claims it has shot down yet another Georgian drone, bringing the unconfirmed total to five. They include drones shot down (allegedly) on March 18, April 20th, and two more on May 4th. While Georgia denies the report, it would coincide with the rise in tensions with Russia and now, especially with Moscow’s new deployment of soldiers to Abkhazia. It would be reasonable to think that Tbilisi has stepped up surveillance to keep tabs on the Russians and Abkhaz who have become more belligerent. Both Russia and Abkhazia continue to claim that Georgia is preparing military action and building up troop levels in the Kodori Gorge and other border areas although Georgia denies this, a claim supported by UNOMIG observers.

Recently, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate for observers in Georgia (UNOMIG) in a fairly bland and uninteresting statement. What was however noteworthy is that the UNSC did not add language addressing Russia’s illegal actions such as providing citizenship to the Abkhaz to add a further “legitimate” reason for it to annex Georgian territory and station troops there illegally.

War or Diplomacy?

Since Georgia clearly has no way to beat Russia militarily, it must tread carefully and push diplomacy as his only resort, but the Russians know this. One such way in which this author believes Georgia could push harder is urging for real peacekeepers to be stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this way, Georgia could tone down its language, implicitly acknowledge the two breakaway regions and try to push Russia out of the picture, or at least sideline them by diluting their presence with other peacekeepers. While it has attempted such in meetings with other nations, it must be done in a more public manner, using Western media outlets among other things. In addition, Georgia must address European concerns about escalation and angering Russia in a concrete and meaningful way. With Western Europe behavior consistently cowardly vis-a-vis Russia, illustrating that European peacekeepers would actually decrease the risk of war and escalation. While I’m not necessarily optimistic that it would work, it would be difficult for Russia to argue against further peacekeepers since it would technically protect their dear Abkhaz.

While Kosovo may be more or less settled, it would seem the rest of Europe and Asia’s frozen conflicts haven’t begun to thaw after all.

I’ve recently discussed the Georgia/Russia conflict here, here and here. Now, Jamestown weighs in on the Russian troop movements into Abkhazia with additional insight:

If indeed the Georgians have massed 1500 troops with some guns in the upper Kodori, they cannot possibly be used as “a bridgehead” to begin an attack on Abkhazia. The upper Kodori is a geographically bottled up place: Several hundred Georgian solders could possibly infiltrate down through mountain trails without heavy weapons, but on the coastal plane they would surely be outnumbered, outgunned and wiped out by Russian and Abkhaz armor.

Last October at a press conference in Moscow the Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh told journalists that his government was seriously considering an operation to oust Georgian forces and the pro-Georgian Abkhaz government out of the upper Kodori, stating that full control of all of Abkhaz territory might facilitate recognition of the separatist regime. Such an operation by Abkhaz forces with Russian support may now be in the offing. While there is fighting in the Kodori, the reinforcement of Russian peacekeepers on the Inguri separation line makes sense to keep the Georgians at bay. Russian threats maybe intended as a warning to prevent a Georgian overreaction that could transform a relatively limited Kodori operation into all-out war. Such a scenario seems more plausible than Russia’s latest improbable statements about Georgian aggression from a “Kodori bridgehead.”

Jamestown believes the increase in Russian troops may serve to prevent a Georgian “overreaction” and thus full scale war. We’ll be following the situation closely here. Stay tuned.

A question to readers:

I recently predicted that hostilities between Georgia and Russia will increase through the end of the year. This is due primarily to Kosovar independence now being used as an ostensible reason to ramp up aggression against Tbilisi. However, although official annexation is a possibility, using the alleged Kosovo precent (more here), it is indeed more likely that Moscow will neither annex Abkhazia or South Ossetia nor recognize their independence. Why? Because indefinitely prolonging the crisis combined with the ability to instantly inflame it whenever geopolitically useful to Russia is far more valuable a tool.

What would be the short and long term benefits of actually recognizing the two regions? What would be the short/long term benefits of annexing them? Do they outweigh the benefits of the status quo? With the volatility of energy prices and Europe’s reluctance if not cowardice vis-a-vis Russia in mind, isn’t the status quo far more useful? Additionally, with Russia’s own separatist problems in the Caucasus, outright recognition is unlikely leaving annexation as the only remotely likely possibility.

Meanwhile, Abkhazia asks for a formal military alliance with Russia. I’m somehow reminded of a quote about a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.

Yesterday I mentioned the increasing belligerence of Russia and its aggression towards Georgia. Today, Moscow has threated force should Georgia attempt to retake its own territory militarily. The first assumption here, is that Georgia is somehow preparing for war, a charge which Moscow has almost certainly invented to buy a short term advantage. In doing so, it opens a short window of time in which it can move additional “peacekeepers” into Abkhazia and South Ossetia ostensibly for peaceful purposes. By the time there’s a consensus among the West about whether Georgia indeed took such provocative actions, it will be too late. Its first step was to formalize ties with each of the two regions and Russia’s current action should be seen clearly as a second step towards the same goal, annexation of Georgia’s sovereign territory.

By the time the OSCE, NATO or the EU ever formally meet to discuss the situation, which is as clear as daylight. However, the Russians are clever and have developed a “legitimate” reason to intercede: the safety of Russian citizens. As the BBC notes,

Mr Lavrov said that Russia had to protect Russian-passport holders in the regions and that if Georgia took military action, Russia would have to take “retaliatory measures”.

This tactic has been ongoing in both regions as Russia freely hands out passports to locals in order to put a legitimate face on its illegal occupation of both regions. The EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said “Even if the increase in peacekeepers is within limits, if we want to diminish the perception of tensions, I don’t think it is a wise measure to increase now”. But as I noted yesterday, these limp wristed and spineless comments will only convince Russia of Europe’s lack of will to do anything, should Russia go to war with Georgia. The US and what’s left of our NATO allies must take a clear stand and back Georgia with equally convincing threats of force.

With the independence of Kosovo, it seemed that Russia had backed down on its threats to recognize other separatist regions and indeed it did. But it was unlikely there would be no reaction which left analysts wondering when the second shoe would fall. It has:

The breakaway Abkhazia region in Georgia has called on the UN and other international bodies to recognise it as independent. The appeal was made by the separatist Abkhaz parliament on Friday, a day after Russia said it was lifting trade restrictions on the territory. [...]

On Wednesday, Georgia’s other breakaway region, South Ossetia, asked the UN and other international bodies to recognise its independence. [...]

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov said the situation regarding Abkhazia had completely changed. He denied the move had anything to do with recognition by some states of Kosovo’s independence. Russia says Kosovo remains part of Serbia.

In lifting trade restrictions and thus withdrawing from a 1996 treaty which bans trade, economic, financial, transport, and other links with Abkhazia, Russia opens the door to openly support the Abkhaz with weapons among other things. The treaty was signed by 12 CIS members and it remains to be seen whether any others can be cajoled into following Moscow’s lead. Indeed, as RFERL notes, the timing was meant to coincide with the recent NATO meeting and remind Europeans, wary of NATO expansion, that Russia will do whatever necessary to block its march eastward.

The move by Russia could be a first step towards annexation of the territory, a move that would essentially go unpunished unless Georgia were a member of NATO. After all, Moscow has already issued Russian passports to Abkazians and South Ossetians in a clever move to provide cover for future involvement to “protect its citizens.” In fact, both regions even voted in Russia’s recent elections. One thing is for sure, although Russia has nothing to offer the world, it can and will continue to play the spoiler.