Somali pirates who previously targeted small vessels have grown in sophistication and have now hijacked luxuy liners, container ships, and now supertankers.

Somali piracy has been headline news over the past half year. In April, pirates off the coast of Somalia took control of Le Ponant, a French luxury yacht. In October, the Ukrainian cargo MV Faina was captured, which included in its hold 25 armormed tanks. And earlier this month, a tanker carrying oil up to $100 million in value was hijacked off the coast of Somalia. Shipping “war insurance”—covered previously at CA here—is becoming expensive, as ships such as the Sirius and Le Ponant, previously thought to be beyond the grasp of pirates, are now seen as vulnerable. The range of the Somali pirates is growing as well. Until just last month, ships were thought to be safe if they kept 200 nautical miles from Somalia, but the Sirius Star was 450 nautical miles from the coast when it was hijacked in a lightening 16 minute takeover. Read how another tanker captain avoided capture with S-manuevers and other unpredictable navigation here.

Some analysts write fearful tracts that the pirates have links with terrorists and extremists, that the chaos is a direct result of international neglect of Somalia, and try to link pirates to the islamist insurgency that control much of the south or the recent terrorist bombings in Somaliland. This is nonsense. The origins of Somali piracy are not found in the southern half of the country, where a “transitional government” is dueling the Union of Islamic Courts with the half-hearted assistance of the Ethiopian military. Somali piracy originates in Puntland, a self-declared autonomous region of Somalia at the horn, hailed for years by policymakers as a model of a stable future state. (more…)

Clinton to accept offer of secretary of state job. Curzon, what do you think? [See background].

Thanks to Dr. Russel Alfred Wallace for the background story.

Treat this as suspect for the moment, as I’ve only found this article on it so far. But if true, it could be a major turn in Afghanistan.

Brown: Chinese may join Afghan mission

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has announced the possibility of Chinese forces joining the multinational coalition in Afghanistan. Brown told New York’s Council on Foreign Relations on Friday of China’s possible plans for deploying troops to the war-torn country, amid the worst fighting with insurgents since the US-led coalition invaded the country in 2001.

The premier said he expected more nations not currently involved in fighting to join the Afghan mission, comprised of 41 nations. All nations should “see this as the front line” in the battle against terrorism, Brown added. The NATO has called for additional forces, a demand supported by US President-elect Barack Obama, who said he would switch the focus from Iraq to Afghanistan through a phased withdrawal.

My initial thoughts are as follows: Why is Brown speaking for the Chinese? Are they using him to float the idea as a test balloon? And second, are the Chinese interested in supporting the War on Terror and OEF? Are they looking for an opportunity to become a “responsible stakeholder”? Or, are they interested in learning up close and personal how Western troops operate for any potential future conflict? Readers, your first reaction?

To summarize (and slightly abridge) the conclusion:

Motoya Toshio is a very successful construction and real estate entrepeneur, with extreme right wing views, an obsession with political leaders and celebrities, and an otaku-esque fascination with military things. Having built his company into the massive APA Group, he used his company’s publicity apparatus to promote his political ideas, and his significant financial leverage to support Japanese politicians supportive of his militaristic agenda. He appears to have also used those political connections to promote large business projects, and when his company became embroiled in a serious construction inspection scandal, he also turned to his political allies for help.

Combining his attraction to both power and military, he invited ASDF General Tamogami Toshio into his circle, bringing him to address the launch party for his latest right-wing tract. Motoya then had APA sponsor an essay contest promoting his book—possibly an illicit use of corporate funds—with the grand prize awarded to Tamogami, in a decision I suspect was actually arranged by Motoya personally.

Motoya was probably hoping that Tamogami, who had a history of making controversial public statements and escaping serious censure, would be able to continue the main-streaming of right-wing militaristic views, but his gamble failed. His friend Abe Shinzo was no longer Prime Minister, having perhaps spent too much of his political capital defending Motoya’s APA Group and Huser during the earthquake proofing inspection scandals, and Aso’s government was not interested in risking blow-back by defending a general who had so egregiously violated the rules on political speech by uniformed officers. Fukuda Yasuo had worked to improve relations with China and other neighbors following the Abe administration, and perhaps newly appointed Prime Minster Aso Taro, despite his right-wing views and his own well-earned reputation for making gaffes decided to take the pragmatic route.

And to answer one question of Roy’s in his post—Apa is not a listed company and is not publicly traded on any stock exchange. It’s shareholders are not disclosed and through a cursory search no information is available online.

Q: Some people keep raising doubt on whether North Korea will give up nuclear weapons. Will it?

A: My response to that is yes. North Korea is expected to relinquish its nuclear programs and weapons themselves, if it has security assurances. No country, including North Korea, is expected to relinquish its security interest in exchange for economic and political interest. We cannot buy off North Korean nuclear arms. No matter how large the amount, North Korea is not going to relinquish its nuclear arms for money. It’s not an economic matter. We have to address North Korea’s security concerns if, in fact, we’re going to press North Korea effectively to compromise its security means.

That, in and of itself, is a fine point. But what is the definition of “security assurances,” you ask?

Firstly, stop the (South Korea-U.S.) joint military exercises. For North Korea, it’s a direct expression of hostility. Secondly, the conversion of armistice agreement into a peace pact. Thirdly, they want the mission of the U.S. military in South Korea to be redefined so that North Korea will not be the primary enemy target. Fourthly, they want American sanctions to be lifted. North Koreans are not interested in symbolic implication of it. They are interested in the prospect of U.S. lifting of trade sanctions and political sanctions imposed on North Korea. Sanctions include not only the bilateral one with the United States, but also the one imposed by the multinational ones, that is, the United Nations. Finally, diplomatic normalization with the U.S. I think that will be sufficient. Then, North Korea will give up everything.

In the last four sentences he undermines his original assertion—that security assurances are separate from economic and political interests. But I’d rather turn the keyboard over to Marmot for the real commentary:

OK, so all it will take is an end to joint exercises with a close US ally, the mission of US troops to be redirected at some other country (maybe the Mongolians?), the lifting of economic and political sanctions, and diplomatic normalization? Where do we sign? Maybe we’ll send Jessica Alba over to jack-off Kim Jong-il as service.

So why my post title? It terrifies me to think that guys like this are going to have influence in the incoming administration.

Denny Hassert and Al Gore may sound like unlikely candidates, but check out this list of US Ambassadors to Japan from the past 35 years and their old jobs:

1. James Hodgson, 1974-1977 : Secretary of Labor

1. Mike Mansfield, 1977-1989 : Senate Majority Leader

1. Mike Armascott, 1989-1993 : Ambassador to the Phillipines

1. Walter Mondale, 1993-1997 : Vice President

1. Tom Foley, 1997-2001 : House Speaker, House Majority Leader

1. Howard Baker, 2001-present : Senate Majority Leader

1. Tom Schieffer, 2005-present : Congressman, Ambassador to Australia

There is precedent in that list for both Hassert and Gore to serve in the post. Believe it or not, Japan doesn’t want East Asian experts like Edwin Reischauer, who served in the position during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies from 1961-1966. Born in Japan in 1910, Reischauer was fluent in Japanese was apparently pretty popular in Japan. But when it came down to real hard politics, he had no political connections in Washington and was never effective at getting clear channels of communication for the Japanese leadership. Starting with Mike Mansfield (who was appointed by Carter but who Reagan kept on), Japan realized that the secret to getting the message through to Washington was having a vetetran politico at the helm.

That being said, it seems highly unlikely that Gore would want this job. More realistically, as Obama likely looks to someone to replace Schieffer, he should look to people connected to power. Knowledge to Japan isn’t what matters—it’s a legislative career or experience in government that counts.

But things are changing. The Wall Street Journal recently published an article on Phnom Penh that said it is “tamed and transformed.”

Today, Phnom Penh still has plenty of rough edges and crime. At certain places, visitors can still order “happy pizza,” or pizza with marijuana topping. But in other ways, it’s a different city entirely. But the government has destroyed 200,000 or more firearms through a program in which citizens voluntarily lay down their guns. It has also shut down the military-hardware market and closed some of the most infamous brothels. Foreign cash is pouring in, with some investors calling Phnom Penh “The New Ho Chi Minh City” after the city that’s Vietnam’s emerging center of consumption. Property values have soared and Phnom Penh is getting its first skyscrapers. One Cambodian developer even wants to dredge the Mekong River all the way to Vietnam, some 60 or so miles south, to create a deepwater megaport, and other financiers are planning a satellite city with offices and malls.

All that activity has brought more well-heeled visitors and more hotels. The Quay Hotel along the riverfront, opened earlier this year, which calls itself Phnom Penh’s first “carbon-friendly” hotel (it measures carbon emissions and then buys “offsets” through carbon-reduction programs) and features minimalist décor of the “2001: A Space Odyssey” variety, spaces “infused with aromatherapy” and a rooftop wine bar. Other new hotels include the Pavilion, an elegant boutique property in a colonial mansion hidden behind the Royal Palace.

Some have complaints. Many of the hardened expats who have turned Cambodia into their adopted home are upset at the gentrification. Tuk-tuks, the ramshackle taxis used for short trips around town, now sometimes cost $2 instead of $1. Rents have soared and the average Cambodian hasn’t yet seen the benefits, and their incomes remain the lowest in the region. But it’s a start on what should be positive changes.

Click on the image below to see the BBC’s interactive display of the battlefields of the first world war.

Economists Warn Anti-Bush Merchandise Market Close To Collapse

Nuclear power plants smaller than a garden shed and able to power 20,000 homes will be on sale within five years, say scientists at Los Alamos, the US government laboratory which developed the first atomic bomb. The miniature reactors will be factory-sealed, contain no weapons-grade material, have no moving parts and will be nearly impossible to steal because they will be encased in concrete and buried underground.

The US government has licensed the technology to Hyperion, a New Mexico-based company which said last week that it has taken its first firm orders and plans to start mass production within five years. ‘Our goal is to generate electricity for 10 cents a watt anywhere in the world,’ said John Deal, chief executive of Hyperion. ‘They will cost approximately $25m [£13m] each. For a community with 10,000 households, that is a very affordable $250 per home.’

Deal claims to have more than 100 firm orders, largely from the oil and electricity industries, but says the company is also targeting developing countries and isolated communities. ‘It’s leapfrog technology,’ he said.

Nice.

A zoo in Japan went to extreme measures recently to make sure they were prepared in case a rhino broke loose. Two people wearing a massive rhino costume pranced around while workers practice their response in such an event. First they put up a net barricade—sure to stop any rhino in its tracks—and poke it with long poles through the net. People are knocked over and fall to the ground like a bad school play, and the rhino is finally downed with a tranquilizer dart.

Oh, and I love the soundtrack.

While amusing as a joke, it scares me to think about what the authorities have in mind for when a major earthquake happens.

Up through World War II, Japan had a law in its criminal code that prescribed criminal punishments for women who committed adultery. This statute was also part of the criminal code in its two colonies, Korea and Taiwan.

After the war, the Americans introduced the concept of gender equality, and the adultery law was one that had to be amended. In Japan, they chose to abolish the statute altogether. In both Korea and Taiwan, the people chose to keep the statute, but apply it to all married persons.

Let us consider how much of an assassination risk Barak Hussein Obama is. I would say more than George W Bush (who did survive two attempts himself). Yes, there was much discontent. One could imagine that some leftist anarcho-communist planning the free the Free World. Yet, the spectre of Dick Cheney taking the reins may have stayed their hand.

In the case of Obama I can imagine three types of potential assassins: 1) terrorists bent on popping Obama’s (and the American public’s) high on “hope”; 2) extremist ideologues determined to prevent America’s descent into so-called “socialism”; or 3) a racist group/individual that cannot stand seeing an African-American heading the table in the Oval Office.

With the lack of any successful foreign terrorist activity on American soil in the past few years, I would judge the first instance to be the most unlikely. The second is only slightly less unlikely simply for the the fact that there are not that many violent McCarthyists still around. The last one by far seems to be the most likely. In fact, Obama has already survived an assassination attempt by white extremists earlier this year.

Many newsmedia outlets have been hailing Barack Obama’s election victory as a victory over racism.¹ The election of America’s first black president has struck a serious blow in ending the race politics of Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton. However this does not put an end to the existence of racism in America. Violent racists could make another attempt on Obama. If successful an old white man would rise to the top office, a significant payoff.

The benefit to assassinating the president-elect is plain, the risks to a potential assassin are less easy to determine. In these times domestic terrorism is easier to pull off than international terrorism (e.g. anthrax scares, exploding pipelines, etc.). Authorities have an easier time finding threats outside of the border than from within. A small group or single actor could be hard to catch if they were smart. Hopefully there are a few Jack Bauers within the ranks of America’s domestic security apparatus to keep Obama — and hope — alive.

_________

1. For example see:
NYT: OBAMA: Racial Barrier Falls as Voters Embrace Call for Change
CNN: Obama to be first African-American president
IHT: Obama wins U.S. election: Racial barriers fall; Bush era rejected
↩

Run, Obama, Run!
October 27, 2006
By Charles Krauthammer

When just a week ago Barack Obama showed a bit of ankle and declared the mere possibility of his running for the presidency, the chattering classes swooned. Now that every columnist in the country has given him advice, here’s mine: He should run in ’08. He will lose in ’08.

...These are strong reasons for Obama to run. Nonetheless, he will not win. The reason is 9/11. The country will simply not elect a novice in wartime.

Discussion:
Both the Gulf War II (Option 1) and Collapsing Iran (Option 2) options would demonstrate strong US commitment to uphold the NPT and zero tolerance for nuclear weapons. A successful military campaign against Tehran would dispel any doubt worldwide about US resolve, US power and the ability of rogue states to defy the international community indefinitely. Option 1 would be especially powerful as it would show that despite lingering discontent about the invasion of Iraq, the West is willing to work together on and tackle serious threats. Collapsing Iran would also potentially break the country into several pieces or instigate regime change ending it both a regional power and threat. However, there are risks inherent in any military option. Building a coalition, as in Option 1 could be very difficult given mistrust of US intentions and an unwillingness to engage in military action after Iraq. The fact China would be difficult to convince and Russia near impossible make building a solid coalition harder and a UNSC mandate unlikely. But of the two options, Option 1 would incur the lowest political costs and have more legitimacy both abroad and potentially with Iranians themselves.

Containment (Option 3) would need to walk a fine line between inflicting the highest possible costs on Iran without igniting war. There is considerable leverage to be had over Iran, especially its energy sector, but energy is a double edged sword. While the current financial crisis has significantly lowered the price of oil, taking Iran’s oil and gas offline would raise prices and a lack of spare capacity means it would be difficult to offset potentially drastic price jumps. Containment could harden Iranian resolve and push them towards an all or none mindset leaving only war or acceptance as options. While Iran may eventually cave in, or its regime change, containment still risks isolating Iran without eliminating its nuclear program. It would also exacerbate its security concerns reinforcing the need for nuclear weapons. Yet, the two military options would do the same.
Options 1, 2 and 3 would also not address Iran’s aspirations as a regional power nor for prestige.

A Grand Bargain (Option 4), would address the combination of Iranian motivations for nuclear weapons as part of a larger agreement between the US and Iran. By recognizing the government, establishing ties and not using military force, Iran’s security concerns should be alleviated while it would simultaneously save face,having stood up against the West and come out with something, albeit not nuclear weapons. A Grand Bargain could accomplish all US objectives were both parties truly committed to it. Yet, diplomacy has not worked with some countries such North Korea and containment, coercion and sanctions have worked with others like Libya.

Option 4 also risks legitimizing the ruling regime and turning Iranian public opinion against the West. Even if the US negotiated in good faith, Iran may still decide to acquire nuclear weapons and use the process as political cover to achieve its goals. This could seriously undermine the West’s credibility and military deterrent as well as leave an aggressive nuclear armed Iranian regime. This option risks all or none, either successful elimination of the program or Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Options 1 and 2 could substantially cripple the program, setting it back many years but not prevent its future reconstitution. Containment could swing either way and offers a flexible policy but uncertain timeline for success.

Recommendation: Option 4 a “Grand Bargain” is recommended.

ORIGINAL POST: From the LA Times comes an article by Robert D. Kaplan on President Obama handling Iraq. Kaplan also lays down why I believe the vote of the responsible adult is to choose John McCain. But that’s my last line of endorsement for the campaign, and the choice morsels appear below.

Alot of ink has been spilled decrying Democratic vice presidential candidate Joe Biden’s comment that Barack Obama—if elected—will be tested in a foreign policy crisis early in his term. In fact, Biden was only being responsible and realistic…

I refer to Iraq. The very issue that Obama wishes to put behind him in order to get on with other challenges, such as Afghanistan and climate change, has the power to drag him down—and it will do so, if he becomes president, precisely because he wants it out of sight. Obama is not emotionally invested in Iraq; he was against the war, and he only grudgingly admitted the success of the “surge.” Biden, for his part, has fervently promised voters that he and Obama will “end this war.”

The problem is that both Iran and Al Qaeda—like all of us—have been listening to both men. And both the jihadists and the mullahs in Tehran are invested in not just an American withdrawal, but a humiliating one at that.

So what could happen? I fear a measurable uptick in violence in Iraq if Obama wins on Tuesday. The uptick will be significant enough to muddy the results of the surge, and the president-elect, rather than respond vigorously, will be tempted to say “I told you so” and thus win the Iraq debate with his Republican critics. The upturn in violence, he will be tempted to argue, only means we need to get out of Iraq even faster.

To succeed as president, Obama would have to keep Iraq off the front pages. Indeed, the more Iraq remains on the back pages in coming months, the better. He needs to delicately withdraw from Iraq and move forces into Afghanistan while keeping Iraq on a low burner and quelling gradually the fires in Afghanistan. He can’t do that by rushing for the exits. Yes, the Iraqi government, by virtue of the status of forces agreement it is negotiating with the United States, is committed to a quick American troop pullout. But that is the public display; behind the scenes, Iraqi defense officials are hoping for a slower, more careful withdrawal.

Getting out of Iraq is an art, not a science, and it would require Obama to move halfway to the McCain position the moment he is elected. In truth, slow is fast in Iraq. The message that Obama needs to send now, from the Nile to the Euphrates, is, I’m not the guy you thought I was. I’m not Jimmy Carter or even Bill Clinton early in his first term, when he failed to intervene in Bosnia. I’m not the candidate who had a tepid response to the Russian invasion of Georgia.

Winning the domestic debate over Iraq has no relevance after Nov. 4, when it would instantly become Obama’s war. And however irresponsibly President Bush has performed in Iraq, he also dramatically improved our strategic position and reduced the violence there between 2007 and 2008. Obama’s goal, now that he seems likely to be elected, should be to consolidate Bush’s gains, not squander them. With that done, other successes in the wider region and throughout the world beckon.

I’m sure we’ll be discussing this article in greater depth on these pages if Obama is our newly elected president come tomorrow.

At latest tally, Obama leads McCain 240 to 114 in US newspaper endorsements. Last Friday The Economist, one of the heavies of international news, also endorsed Obama. The endorsement has spawned a deluge of negative comments. I think this reflects that The Economist cannot be pigeonholed as a “conservative” newspaper, which makes me feel warm inside.

The endorsement was heavily qualified. In fact half of it was a laundry list of McCain’s failings: his swing to the right, endorsement of the Bush tax cuts, acceptance of “theocratic culture warriors,” and worst of all the choice of Sarah Palin (who according to a NYT/CBS poll weighs down the Republican ticket). The Economist chalks these failings up to McCain being the “victim of political sorcery,” a view somewhat similar to my own.

So, head on over to The Economist and take a read. Come back and tell me whether or not you think it is “irresponsible” of The Economist to endorse “[taking] a chance with the most powerful office on the planet,” or if you think they should just keep quiet and “mind [their] own business.” Related: Obama demolished McCain 9115 to 203 in the Global Electoral College.

Option 4: Grand Bargain – Comprehensive talks to solve most US-Iranian issues

The US would seek to engage Iran diplomatically in comprehensive negotiations to resolve most bilateral political, economic, and security issues. It would begin with secret talks until the Iranian presidential election in June 2009. Ahmadinejad’s reelection is possible but the US should avoid appearing to reward his policies with any public talks before the election. Relatedly, the US should bypass Ahmadinejad and establish a communication channel with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who holds the most power in Iran. Washington would make clear it is interested in a fundamental change in bilateral ties but move carefully, beginning with common interests. It will be critical to keep initial talks secret to prevent spoilers on each side from derailing talks. US-Iranian talks in Baghdad would resume and similar ones in Kabul would open. As progress on those fronts is made, new talks would open on other issues like opposing al-Qaeda, the Arabi-Israeli conflict, regional nuclear proliferation, civilian nuclear power and counterbalancing Russia with Iranian oil and gas. More cultural, sporting and academic exchanges could be initiated to build good will to lay the groundwork for detent. The recent licensing of the American Iranian Council to open an office in Tehran is a good example. Publicly, the US would tone down its threatening rhetoric. The end state would be a normalization of ties and ending Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Pro:
Comprehensive negotiations could achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on Iran’s nuclear activities means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table allowing for a greater range of possible solutions. Additionally,negotiations would last for some time, which would see a change in American leadership in January 2009 and possibly in Iranian leadership in June 2009. It would also allow more time to gauge developments in Afghanistan and Iraq with regard to stability, the nature of their governments and and US troop levels.
It would maintain relationships with regional allies by proving long term U.S. commitment to them and regional security. Should it succeed, Iran would be a valuable ally due to its geographic position straddling Central Asia, the Middle East, Caucasus and Persian Gulf, being both Shia and non-Arab, and a major energy producer. The focus on diplomacy and peaceful negotiations would improve the US image abroad and soft power. Though not a stated objective, credible negotiations would also reassure energy markets and lower prices.

Con:
Comprehensive negotiations with Iran could be seen as rewarding nuclear blackmail and NPT violations. Domestically, it could strengthen Ahmadinejad and justify his policies. It would also reinforce the North Korean example that rogue states can achieve their goals through aggressive and illegal behavior. Even having talks could also undermine the NPT if the US was seen as giving in, especially if talks fail. There is also no guarantee that they will succeed. Lastly, Iran may not negotiate in good faith and use the talks to relieve political and economic pressure while secretly finishing its nuclear weapons program which could lead to an Israeli strike.

Japan fires air force head for controversial essay

Japan’s defense minister dismissed his air force chief on Friday for writing an essay that claimed the country was not an “aggressor” in World War II and was trapped into getting involved in the conflict by the United States.

Toshio Tamogami’s essay will likely upset relations with China and South Korea, who remain bitter about Japan’s wartime occupation and say Tokyo has failed to properly atone for its invasion of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and parts of China.

“His views are different from the government’s. It is not desirable for him to stay in the job,” Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada told reporters soon after the essay was made public Friday.

To note the bullet points and the key quotes from Tamogami’s article:

• – It was “certainly a false accusation” to say Japan was “an aggressor nation” during World War II.
• – “The current Chinese government obstinately insists that there was a ‘Japanese invasion,’ but Japan obtained its interests in the Chinese mainland legally under international law through the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and so on, and it placed its troops there based on treaties in order to protect those interests.”
• – Life under Japanese occupation was “very moderate” and cited a rise in the population on the Korean peninsula during Japan’s 1910-1945 occupation as “proof that Korea under Japanese rule was also prosperous and safe.”
• – Japan was tricked into attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who wanted a war with Japan.

Long-time readers of this blog won’t be surprised to hear that I mainly agree with the content of Tamogami’s article. It’s no mystery as to why the two societies where Japan established colonial rule for half a century—Korea and Taiwan—found it easy to transition into a modern state with a strong foundation of law and order, civil society, compulsory education, high literacy rates, and strong infrastructure.

But that being said, it’s problematic when a top military officer goes rogue and publishes an article like this freelance (it won a prize in an essay contest hosted by hotel and condominium developer Apa Group), and makes it tough for Japan as it repeats over and over that its really, really sorry for what it did during its expantionist era and won’t do it again, honestly.

SIDENOTE: Just so we don’t forget what the JSDF is really all about, let me recall this story—the AFP is a month late with this story on the new crass and hip recruiting tactics of the JSDF, a story which Aceface and Curzon broke one month ago—although we didn’t pick up on this choice morsel:

The Shibuya office displays the ultimate non-aggressive symbol of the SDF —big-eyed, apple-cheeked characters named Prince Pickles and his girlfriend Parsley. “As pickles and parsley bring out the best in the main dish in cuisine, they match the (SDF) image of bringing the best out of the people and supporting them,” explains the defence ministry.

Option 3: Containment – Sanctions and/or a blockade on Iran’s energy sector, military buildup & diplomacy
Containing Iran is very flexible employing various of tools of statecraft. Decision makers would choose from and combine the following measures based on Iran’s behavior. Multilateral economic sanctions, outside the UN, against Iran by the US and all or some of Iran’s major trading partners. Iran’s energy sector would also be targeted. One option is blockading its main oil facilities at Kharg island and/or the Strait of Hormuz. A ban onenergy exports from Iran could also be implemented and most importantly, a ban on importing refined energy products. It would also seek to ban all business with Iran’s energy sector. To combat proliferation risks, the US would step up PSI interdictions in concert with allies.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act could be amended to forbid all trade with Iran. A travel ban for some or all Iranian officials as well as a ban on international flights to Iran could be initiated. Diplomatically, the U.S. would maintain its current stance that all uranium enrichment must stop as a precondition to negotiations and refuse any concessions before this condition is met. US military forces in the region would also be bolstered by deploying an additional carrier to the region, providing land and sea based missile defense and anti-WMD capabilities to our regional allies and moving long range bombers to Diego Garcia. The US would also increase funding for opposition groups, separatists and American tv and radio broadcasts into Iran.

Pro:
Firstly, this option is very flexible giving policy makers room to adjust it based on Iranian cooperation or lack thereof. It would also make clear the US is committed to regional security, the NPT and protecting its allies. Containment would also work unilaterally or multilaterally. While dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program would be best for the strengthening the NPT, demonstrating the high costs of non-compliance and a lack of transparency would continue to dissuade others from following Iran’s path. Increased pressure and focus on Iran would help to minimize the risk of proliferation to and from Iran through increased PSI interdictions, sanctions and a greater likelihood of Iran being caught. This option would also put enormous pressure on Iran’s most vulnerable point, its energy sector, thus being the quickest way to cripple Iran and force its cooperation.

Con:
Pressure through containment may not ultimately be enough to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions and would not immediately end its nuclear weapons program. With no ultimate carrot (US-Iran detent) or ultimate stick (military strikes), containment could raise the political and economic costs of nuclear weapons without making the costs unacceptable or unbearable. Policy makers would have to tread carefully keeping the costs as high as possible without crossing the red line for conflict. Containment may also lead Iranians to rally around the flag as sanctions and/or a blockade affect the entire population and turn them against America. A blockade may also be considered an act of war by Iran inadvertently causing war. This option could also raise the price of
energy and destabilize markets, especially a blockade. Another side effect is that the more Iranian oil and gas taken that is taken offline, the more relative power Russia gains. This could also potentially lead Iran to the become so desperate that it lashes out in Iraq or Afghanistan. If it leads Iran to make an irreversible decision to acquire nuclear weapons then no cost would be too high to bear and containment would fail. Lastly, it is unclear whether this policy could deter a unilateral Israeli strike.

The Economist recently launched its audio-visual site, and the material available is worthy viewing. Check it out here.

Option 2: – Collapsing Iran – Unilateral air strikes destroy critical & nuclear infrastructure, disrupt the regime’s ability to govern & retaliate, collapse the country into ethnic factions*

This option would use American air power to destroy Iran’s both Iran’s nuclear and critical national infrastructure. A combination of stealth, precision bombing and special operations would aim to isolate the country’s leadership from its people and military by destroying critical electricity, communications, transportation, military, and industrial nodes, preventing it from exerting government power. Being a large and urbanized country, Iran would be particularly vulnerable. Special Forces would also infiltrate the country arming and organizing the Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis and Kurds, encouraging them to establish ethnic autonomous zones. No-Fly Zones could even be established as in Iraq in 1992. Being unable to command and coordinate its forces, Iran could not mount effective resistance and its government would be forced to accept American demands or may be overthrown. Iran would cease to be a regional power and perhaps even to be a functioning state.

Pro:
Making use of American naval and air forces, this option would be inexpensive relative to a ground invasion. Additionally, given a lack of ground forces, this option is within the US military’s capabilities. Collapsing Iran provides a viable military option that would cost very few American lives. Failure of the Iranian state would prevent the continuation of its nuclear weapons program, lessen proliferation risks and minimize the risk and effects of any Iranian retaliation. It would also provide the chance for Iran’s ethnic minorities to exert more control weakening the central government during and after the campaign. This option does not absolutely
require international participation giving the US more freedom policy wise. However, multilateral participation would be a welcome addition. It would lastly also prevent Israel from bombing Iran.

Con:
Collapsing Iran is fraught with risks. While Iranian nuclear facilities would be destroyed, a lack of intelligence means some sites would survive. Similarly, the real danger is in the knowledge and abilities of Iranian engineers which would remain intact and nuclear materials could be smuggled out in the ensuing chaos. Next, it is difficult to anticipate the effects on Iraq and Afghanistan. This option could increase violence and instability in one or both countries. Were separatist groups to declare independence, it could spell major instability or armed conflict with neighbor such as Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Instability in Azerbaijan would also threaten its energy exports. The price of energy would also likely skyrocket and at least some traffic in the Straits of Hormuz would be disrupted, further raising fears and prices. Lastly, if the Iranian government survived, it would be certain to increase its sponsoring of international terrorist groups and attacks, to fund militias in Iraq, and continue its nuclear weapons program.

* As noted in the first post, I don’t claim all the material as my own. This idea is from John Robb with some elaboration of my own.

Option 1: Gulf war II: Iran – Intl. coalition with a clear, limited mandate to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities
This option is modeled on the US response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It entails building an international coalition to eliminate only Iran’s nuclear facilities. It would aim to bring the EU3 (France, Germany, UK), Canada, Australia and US allies in the region like the Gulf states, Turkey and Egypt on board for a limited military campaign against Iran, first issuing an ultimatum to allow IAEA and coalition inspectors in. This could be achieved in multiple ways, listed from most to least desirable: a UN mandate, NATO mandate, or coalition of the willing. This option would use air strikes and special forces to destroy all of Iran’s known nuclear facilities, capture scientists working there and procure evidence of illicit activities to present to the world. Intelligence sharing among countries involved would also work to fill in gaps about Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Nothing other than destruction of nuclear facilities would be attempted, i.e. Regime change.

The US would begin by working with France and Britain to reach an understanding about military action. Germany would be approached last as it would be the least likely to support strikes and need the most political cover based on its constitution and domestic politics. The US would reach out to its traditional allies in the English speaking world and work with Middle Eastern friends and allies like the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain to either induce them to join the coalition or simply not oppose it. Lastly, it would work with Russia and China to achieve either their support or lack of opposition. For China, this could be done by the coalition replacing lost energy supplies to China from the US SPR at lower than market prices and emphasizing its desire to a responsible global player. Russia would be far less likely to support a coalition.
Pro:
Having a very limited and clear mandate would help garner support of potential partners wary of all out war, regime change and mission creep for eliminating of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It would help partners to more easily make the case at home and abroad, better plan their participation and use the Gulf War as a precedent. Having so many countries participate would allow each to decide the level and nature of their of involvement (e.g. military or financial). Most crucial is their political participation. The reliance on special forces and not ground forces would lead to low coalition losses helping maintain support for the war.


This option would eliminate most of Iran’s facilities and try to gain information on those unknown to the coalition. By doing so, it would also lower the risk of proliferation by Iran itself and by demonstrating the drastic consequences of illicit nuclear activities. This would be especially important given North Korea’s lack of compliance and a perceived lack of consequences. Such a broad coalition would also make Israel’s participation or a unilateral Israeli strike unnecessary. Lastly, it would make clear to our allies the US will protect them and reassure the world the US prefers to work multilaterally to deal with threats, increasing our soft power.
Con:
Many countries are publicly and privately concerned with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, few have expressed a willingness to resort to military operations to achieve their goals. While France for example has been vocal about military force, the UK and Germany have stuck to diplomacy. In the region, many Arab states have privately expressed concern and support for the US to disarm Iran. However, it is difficult to predict whether they could publicly support the US attacking another Muslim state, no matter how justified. It also carries the risk of Iranians rallying around the flag instead of turning on their own government.
The type of coalition formed would also play a large role in the legitimacy of the operation. A UN Security Council mandate would be ideal though still not make operations invulnerable to criticism. A NATO mandate would also be desirable although open to accusations of the West dictating standards to the rest of the world and some legitimacy questions due to lack of a UN mandate. A coalition of the willing that does not include the EU3 would be seen as illegitimate and could have serious political consequences for the US. Additionally, even with shared intelligence it is unclear whether all nuclear facilities would be destroyed and what would keep Tehran from pursuing the program again after the war was over.

This is the second part of my new series on US policy options towards Iran. The first part layed out some background on Iran. This will deal with our assumptions about them and US objectives.

Assumptions: – Iran does not have nuclear weapons and is covertly pursuing them but its decision is reversible.
– Iran has a legitimate need for civilian nuclear power.
– If attacked, Iran would retaliate with military power, terrorist attacks or both.
– Iran’s nuclear motivations include security, regime survival, prestige and self-sufficiency.
– Iran would neither launch a nuclear first strike nor provide nuclear weapons or material to terrorists
– Current US deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan preclude extensive ground operations against Iran however there would be sufficient air, naval and special forces to mount an attack.
– The US and its allies have limited intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
– The NPT is an important international norm that must be upheld and its credibility maintained.
– Iran is vulnerable to separatism, specifically Kurdish, Azeri, Baluchi and Arab.
– France and the UK would participate in multilateral military action against Iran.
– Germany would only back military action with a UN or NATO mandate and with other EU members
– Russia would likely veto any UNSC resolution for military action against Iran.
– China would likely veto military action and not support sanctions due to its energy dependence.
– Arab states quietly support a tough line against Iran and worry about its nuclear ambitions.
– There is currently little spare oil producing and refining capacity among the world’s oil producers.

Objectives: – Verifiable and irreversible end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
– Prevent proliferation of nuclear technology and fissile material to other states.
– Maintain the integrity of the NPT.
– Maintain alliances with Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Turkey.
– Maintain and/or improve situations in Iraq/Afghanistan
– Prevent Israel from unilaterally or multilaterally attacking Iran