Many Western governments heaved a hefty sigh of relief when Lebanon’s pro-Western political bloc unexpectedly took Monday’s elections. What I find to be particularly interesting is the conciliatory reaction of the opposition’s most infamous and militant faction, Hezbollah. To wit:
Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary General):
We accept the official results in a sporting spirit… I would like to congratulate all those who won, those in the majority and those in the opposition.
Hassan Fadlallah (Hezbollah MP):
We consider that Lebanon is ruled by partnership and whatever the results of the elections are, we cannot change the standing delicate balances or repeat the experiences of the past which led to catastrophes on Lebanon and showed the inability of one party monopolizing power. Whoever wants political stability, the preservation of national unity and the resurrection of Lebanon will find no choice but to accept the principle of consensus.
Certainly looks promising , doesn’t it? Has what began as a single minded, anti-Zionist faction of terrorism evolved into a functioning (if well armed and oft belligerent) member of Lebanon’s political system? I have my doubts. An electoral defeat works for Hezbollah in ways that a victory would not. As Abu Muqawama observes:
Hey, look on the bright side, boys! Now you don’t have to govern. It’s a lot easier to be in the opposition if you’re Hizballah. You still keep your arms, and there is less pressure from the outside. I can’t help but think not everyone in Hizballah was looking forward to all the attention that would have come along with an electoral victory.
Additionally, while Hezbollah may have been defeated in the overall election, it carried the day on it’s home turf along the Lebanese/Israeli border. The true test will come when and if the March 14 coalition follows through with it’s promise to revoke Hezbollah’s veto power, the one device that allows them to legitimately remain armed. Hezbollah lawmaker, Mohammad Raad has insisted the March 14 coalition;
commit not to question our role as a resistance party, the legitimacy of our weapons arsenal and the fact that Israel is an enemy state.
This suggests that whatever it’s political position, Hezbollah’s first priority isn’t Lebanon’s stability, rather is maintaining it’s function as a stateless military faction. The question isn’t whether or not Hezbollah will resist disarmament but to what extent they’ll go in their resistance. Beyond stirring up internal turmoil, they could ratchet up tensions with Israel, who’s position regarding the new government’s responsibilities was, again, made clear:
Israel considers the Lebanese government responsible for any military or otherwise hostile activity that emanates from its territory.
Which means, that if provoked by Hezbollah (a rocket attack or maybe snagging a few more IDF soldiers,) Israeli retaliation could be aimed not only at the border but at Beirut. The summer of 2006 redux. That’s one hell of a bargaining chip for Hezbollah.
I see interesting times ahead for Lebanon.
Photo via NYTimes

Comments to this entry
Kirk Sowell
June 10, 2009
10:34 pm
I say "formal legitimacy of the secular Lebanese state" because no sovereign state could be considered such with an armed militia maintaining control over a significant portion of its terrority. Having the state there as a covering is useful.
My main addition to what you have here is that the first big test will not be disarmament, but the removing of the "blocking veto" which currently allows Hizbullah to veto any state action which threatens the interests of itself, Syria or Iran. This was the first major statement Hariri made after the election - they want to get rid of the veto that Hizbullah extracted from them last summer as the price for the election of a president following their invasion of Beirut. That is the test to watch now.
Munro Ferguson
June 10, 2009
11:32 pm
I agree with your addition though I'd point to this portion of my post:
"The true test will come when and if the March 14 coalition follows through with it’s promise to revoke Hezbollah’s veto power, the one device that allows them to legitimately remain armed."
Without veto power (assuming the new government drafts legal measures to disarm Hez) an armed Hezbollah loses state legitimacy. As you say, being part of the state political machine serves as "cover."
"formal legitimacy of the secular Lebanese state"
That's a marked caveat and certainly makes sense. I've had a couple of personal discussions that brought this seemingly obvious (yet realistically complex) notion to the front, specifically in terms of Israel's position.
Any thoughts on how Lebanon could disarm Hezbollah without (consider the make up, in terms of religion, of the March 14 coalition vs Hez/Auon) plunging Lebanon into yet another civil war?
Kirk Sowell
June 11, 2009
2:28 am
In response to your question, first for context I would note that Hizbullah got the veto power because the March 14 coalition tried to take a first step at disarming them - they announced that Hizbullah had a secret communications system and an officer within the military around the int'l airport, that this was a violation of state sovereignty, and that they were removing the individual and cutting the communications network. Then HA invaded Beirut, and that's how we got the Doha accord, which was misinterpreted by some (like British FM David Milibrand) as a positive, when in fact it was a victory for Iran.
Yet at the same time the two issues are separate - Hizbullah was secure in its private army for years without the veto, which was the reason they left the government in late 2006. Their leaving the government had no impact on their position within Lebanon - that came from guns and the willingness to use them - but it did paralyze the government system itself. So if the new majority votes to eliminate the veto, HA will withdraw from the government, and we will be back to pre-May 2008, but with more national wounds.
The real key is Hizbullah's relationship to Iran and Syria - as long as Syria remains HA's patron/partner, HA will be able to maintain itself within Lebanon as it is. And since a high percentage of the enlisted ranks in the Lebanese army are Shia, then no, I don't think the Lebanese state can disarm HA without causing a new civil war. Take away HA's external support, then that changes everything. But simply taking away the veto would only help the formal institutions of state function better at a purely political level - e.g. HA wouldn't be able to veto anything with regard to the UN investigation - but it wouldn't change anything on the ground.
Munro Ferguson
June 12, 2009
12:08 am
Heh, I was so focused on the worse case scenario I never even considered the possibility of governmental paralysis via Hez pull out. Thanks for the grounding and the insight, Kirk.
Michael
June 15, 2009
12:32 am