On the potential Japanese naval dispatch to Somalia

My first reaction to hearing about prime minister Aso’s push to get the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Gulf of Aden helping to combat piracy was _bandwagoning_. Here is a typical example of Japan showing international leadership… six months late ((The UN passed Resolution 1816 last June, and Resolution 1838 in October)). That elusive seat on the UN security council does require that Japan show some leadership.

Still, the timing seems odd and there is already a whole swack of countries ((Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indian, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.)) with a military presence in the Gulf of Aden. Why now? As the “Asahi notes”:http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200812270052.html “deliberations are unlikely to start in earnest until April at the earliest, after the passage of the fiscal 2009 budget.” Prime minister Aso will have a hard time pushing anything through before then. Aso is suffering serious confidence issues. With the concerns of the electorate focused solidly on the economy and pensions, I would hope Aso would know not to go the route of Shinzo Abe.

The cynic in me says that Aso may argue for the dispatch as protecting the interests of the fragile Japanese economy (an argument used in the case of Malacca — see below) and hope that a foreign military foray might pull some heat off of himself. But this strikes me as quite a stretch. I will leave the domestic politics analysis in the capable hands of “Toby Harris”:http://www.observingjapan.com/ and “TPR”:http://transpacificradio.com/.

So, what else could explain this timing? How about China, who recently “sent three of its own ships”:http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/12/26/asia/OUKWD-UK-SOMALIA-PIRACY.php to the Gulf. It has been rumoured that China has turned a blind eye to pirates targeting Japanese ships in the South China Seas. Aso could be thinking about preventing some of that alleged intentional neglect on the part of the Chinese. On the other hand, this could be a good opportunity for Japan to work _with_ China for once. Japan and China share most of the same SLOCs for Middle Eastern oil and European trade. Without any sort of security framework in East Asia Japan and China have a hard time cooperating in home waters. This could be a chance to build ties without having to worry about nationalist claims over who has the longest “continental shelf” or the biggest “rocks.”

However, working with China also brings its own risks. What if some sort of conflagration happens at sea that fans the fires of nationalism at home? The rate of fratricide in a war zone tends to be 3~5%. Aden may not technically be a war zone, but that many military boats in one area does increase the risk of something bad happening.

Ships assigned to Combined Task Force One Five Zero in formation – Gulf of Oman, May 06, 2004

If not China, what about the rest of the international community? Bob Angel mentioned in his latest “Japan Considered podcast”:http://www.japanconsidered.com/Podcasts/Scripts/081224JapanConsideredPodcastTranscript.html that some countries have been pressuring Japan to participate. I have not seen any specific evidence of this. Is it diplomatic pressure or just guilt? Are the Japanese simply pressuring themselves into thinking they need to participate as some sort of penance for the “cheque book diplomacy” of the first Gulf War? I thought that was paid up with Japan’s participation in Iraq (which recently ended after 4 years) and the Indian Ocean refueling mission (“recently extended”:http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/12/japan.mission/ for the 8th year). Not that I doubt Bob, who is very credible. I have just not seen the evidence of this pressure.

Regardless of all these questions of motivation, a dispatch will promise to be a constitutional headache. Sending the MSDF to protect Japanese shipping interests may be justified as “self defense” but the real problem with the dispatch is what happens if a ship from _another_ country comes under attack and Japan has the only boat within spyglass range. This issue of collective self defense is still problematic in the face of Japan’s “peace” constitution.

h2. For answers to the future, look to the past

Piracy has been raised as a concern in Japan since the end of the cold war. One particularly sensational incident was the hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow, a Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier transporting aluminum ingots to Miike, Japan. The ship was hijacked in the Malacca Straits in 1999. The Japanese captain and chief engineer, along with 15 other crew-members were cast off in life rafts without food or water. Luckily they were rescued by a passing ship a week later ((For a detailed account see The Outlaw Sea)). The Malacca Strait has served as an important debating point about what Japan can do about piracy. However, any military action has been refused by the Indonesians and Malays on nationalist grounds. They even turned down offers from the US Navy to participate in a Regional Maritime Security Initiative. Only Singapore has been positive on Japanese participation. Furthermore, senior Japanese officials have repeatedly affirmed that the primary mission of the MSDF is to secure the safety of maritime traffic to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. The “peace” constitution of Japan is a further impediment to dispatch of military assets abroad.

To get around these obstacles, Japanese naval analyst and retired MSDF Rear Admiral Akimoto Kazumine proposed the concept of a multilateral Ocean Peacekeeping (OPK) force, something backed by former Minister of Defense Ishiba Shigeru. This looks similar to the EU’s active naval task group “Operation Atalanta”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta which has already deployed to the region to relieve the NATO forces. A dusting off of the OPK concept could mean a proposal for Japan to join Atalanta might be tabled within the next few months. Could that be what Aso is aiming for?

The original OPK proposal was met with skepticism by several Southeast Asian states, particularly Indonesia, and … ahem … sunk. The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) has had much more luck. ((Since 2001 the JCG has conducted bilateral exercises with Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.)) The JCG is a much less controversial vehicle for cooperation than the MSDF. ((However, the increase in capabilities of the JCG in recent years has been regarded by some as a sort of backdoor militarization.)) If a constitutional loophole cannot be found for the Gulf of Aden, the JCG might just be the answer.

A final option that comes to mind is for the MSDF to steam around the Gulf of Aden with a Australian escort (yes, an escort for the escort). The Aussies provided force protection for Japan’s military contingent in southern Iraq.