Iran Policy Options Part VI

[Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V]

Option 4: Grand Bargain – Comprehensive talks to solve most US-Iranian issues

The US would seek to engage Iran diplomatically in comprehensive negotiations to resolve most bilateral political, economic, and security issues. It would begin with secret talks until the Iranian presidential election in June 2009. Ahmadinejad’s reelection is possible but the US should avoid appearing to reward his policies with any public talks before the election. Relatedly, the US should bypass Ahmadinejad and establish a communication channel with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who holds the most power in Iran. Washington would make clear it is interested in a fundamental change in bilateral ties but move carefully, beginning with common interests. It will be critical to keep initial talks secret to prevent spoilers on each side from derailing talks. US-Iranian talks in Baghdad would resume and similar ones in Kabul would open. As progress on those fronts is made, new talks would open on other issues like opposing al-Qaeda, the Arabi-Israeli conflict, regional nuclear proliferation, civilian nuclear power and counterbalancing Russia with Iranian oil and gas. More cultural, sporting and academic exchanges could be initiated to build good will to lay the groundwork for detent. The recent licensing of the American Iranian Council to open an office in Tehran is a good example. Publicly, the US would tone down its threatening rhetoric. The end state would be a normalization of ties and ending Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Pro:
Comprehensive negotiations could achieve all stated U.S. objectives and more. The current narrow focus on Iran’s nuclear activities means that only a limited range of negotiating approaches are available. Widening the scope would put far more issues on the table allowing for a greater range of possible solutions. Additionally,negotiations would last for some time, which would see a change in American leadership in January 2009 and possibly in Iranian leadership in June 2009. It would also allow more time to gauge developments in Afghanistan and Iraq with regard to stability, the nature of their governments and and US troop levels.
It would maintain relationships with regional allies by proving long term U.S. commitment to them and regional security. Should it succeed, Iran would be a valuable ally due to its geographic position straddling Central Asia, the Middle East, Caucasus and Persian Gulf, being both Shia and non-Arab, and a major energy producer. The focus on diplomacy and peaceful negotiations would improve the US image abroad and soft power. Though not a stated objective, credible negotiations would also reassure energy markets and lower prices.

Con:
Comprehensive negotiations with Iran could be seen as rewarding nuclear blackmail and NPT violations. Domestically, it could strengthen Ahmadinejad and justify his policies. It would also reinforce the North Korean example that rogue states can achieve their goals through aggressive and illegal behavior. Even having talks could also undermine the NPT if the US was seen as giving in, especially if talks fail. There is also no guarantee that they will succeed. Lastly, Iran may not negotiate in good faith and use the talks to relieve political and economic pressure while secretly finishing its nuclear weapons program which could lead to an Israeli strike.