I’m currently working on an options paper with US policy options towards Iran. One thing that constantly comes up in discussions with others about Iran are three assumptions that seem to go unchallenged. They are
(1) Iran is seeking nuclear weapons.
(2) Iran would conduct a nuclear first strike against Israel.
(3) Iran would supply terrorist groups with nuclear weapons. (presumably Hezbollah)
I already touched on the first assumption in a previous post. Here are my short answers.
(1) Maybe. Iran is considering pursuing nuclear weapons but has not made an irreversible decision to do so.
(2) No. It would firstly bring about the complete destruction of Iran by Israeli/US nuclear retaliation. Next, it would kill the Palestinians, destroy the al-Aqsa mosque and Dome of the Rock and affect Syria/Jordan/Egypt with fallout.
(3) No. Iran isn’t currently incurring the multitude of political and economic costs of pursuing nukes only to give them away. Besides, giving away the ultimate means of power eliminates Iran’s sway over terrorists groups who would no longer need to take orders from Iran. Lastly, if found out, it would invite nuclear annihiliation by the US and Israel guaranteed.
Readers, please provide a Yes/No answer followed by a short supporting argument.
1. Maybe, your argument entirely on its irreversibility
2. No, the possible consequences are too dire.
3. Again, no, I don’t think the Iranian leadership would take actions that would surely cause its own destruction.
Take Hezbollah as Iran’s soft power approach in the Middle East. Regardless of political rhetoric, I think it will behave in the same way as any state actor on the political scene. And I think any other way to analyze it would be primarily alarmist.
1. Yes but not if the cost is more than some unfavorable Western press.
2. No. Nothing to gain.
3. No. Nothing to gain.
1. Yes. The only way to insure the USA and/or Israel do not attack is to have nuclear weapons. Both countries have openly threatened the regime. They will do whatever they need to do to obtain nuclear weapons.
2. No. What Chirol said.
3. See 2.
1. Yes.
2. Yes – if it thought an attack was imminent.
3. Yes – ‘plausible deniability’/Thought an attack was imminent.
There you go.
Oh, and as for your third point: Hezbollah has recently been restructured. Iran now has total control over the Lebanese terror group.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1222017499123&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081013.aspx
Brad: But the question wasn’t “if attack was imminent” In that situation, almost every country would launch a preemptive strike. The question was about a _First Strike_
As for number three, what’s your argument that Iran would have any plausibile deniability if Hezbollah magically had a nuclear weapon or nuclear material?
Chirol, this is a good set of questions and answers, but its based on the premise that the leaders or Iran are rational and accountable. The bigger fear is what happens if rogue commanders inside or outside the army have control over nuclear weapons, or the army feels an attack could come and decides to strike first.
I see no evidence of Iran’s past behavior that it acts in an irrational manor, i.e. something other than cost/benefit analysis.
While one can always argue what-ifs like rogue commanders, the same can be said of Russia and Pakistan. Since Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons, it is impossible to know what it’s nuclear force structure would be.
One would also have to be familiar with Iran’s potential delivery mechanisms. Most likely this would be ballistic missile as I’m not aware whether they could deliver them by plane and we know they don’t have sub capabilities.
My answers:
1/ They are clearly building the capability and enjoying the fuss it’s causing. I don’t think they’ve committed either way at this point
2/ No.
3/ No. #2 would come first, but either 2 or 3 are just as much a Samson option as any use of nuclear weapons by Israel
In fact, there’s only one country that could contemplate using nuclear weapons as anything but complete suicide – USA. And there’s record that it was contemplated for use on Iran last year (though it was hard to tell how serious that was).
And I can’t see why the rogue commanders issue doesn’t apply to every country that has nuclear weapons.
Your answers are correct, in my opinion. Re. question #1, I suspect they’ve taken a page from the late, unlamented Saddam Hussein’s playbook and wish to create the impression of defiance to the Great Satan through obfuscating on the issue of nuclear weapons while actually (and secretly) having abandoned that program.
With the vast array of knowledge and experience I command as an undergraduate Political Science Major, I will attempt to answer these questions:
q)Is Iran after the bomb?
a)I think they want to know that if they needed to make one, they could. They have the ballistic missile capability worked out (sort of), they’re going to get the enriched uranium (sort of). They’ll study bomb design, and maybe even machine the conventional parts of the weapon. I believe they’ll go for something like the Japan or Israeli approach to nuclear deterrence. Either getting them and not admitting it, or developing the capability but not assembling it until they see an unfriendly UNSC Resolution on the horizon.
q)Would Iran strike first?
a)The perception that they would strike first seems to be built upon the idea that the Iranian government is too irrational to be deterred, in spite of any evidence that they have ever acted with anything less than careful planning and completely rational strategic planning. These guys invented chess, and have the luxury of strategic leadership in the government that don’t have to worry about getting kicked out of office. The mullahs are a political organization with a religious ideology, not a religious organization with a political ideology.
q) Would Iran keep control of the bomb if they got it, or would it be at risk of slipping into hands of unreliable or irrational actors?
a) Iran knows who they deal with, and they want control of everything in their domain. Whether its the military, the Strait of Hormuz, or their own population. If they get the bomb they aren’t going to give it to someone they can’t control. They know that no matter how much plausible deniability they have, any nuclear attack in Southwest Asia is going to result in Tehran becoming the worlds largest parking lot. They aren’t going to give it to the IRGC, or the Hezzies, or Hamas, or their slightly inbred second cousin. Those things are all good to have around, but you can’t completely control them. I wouldn’t be surprised if they tried to maintain direct control over them within the Revolutionary Council.
The fundamental assertion driving all three questions is that Iran is somehow on some kind of irrational drive for nuclear power. Iran went for the bomb because we took down the country on either side of them, and control the Gulf below them, things are scary from their point of view. The assertion of the irrationality of their government is only justified if they are indeed a religious, apolitical organization which puts ideology over the most basic concern of any organization: survival. Yet this belief is commonly held despite an astounding lack of evidence to support it. We all fear what we don’t know, fear leads to anger, anger leads to hate, etc . . . Not a proper basis for a policy decision.