US Policy Options for North Korea, Part III

[Part I | Part II]

Here is the next part in my series on U.S. policy options for North Korea.

Option 1: Strategic Neglect

Strategic neglect in short, involves maintaining the status quo and waiting for more favorable circumstances in which to negotiate. This option entails the United States continuing to pressure North Korea to allow IAEA inspections and negotiate an end to its nuclear program. However, it would avoid firstly making unilateral concessions to Pyongyang which could be interpreted as rewards and secondly any actions which could escalate the conflict or force the DPRK to respond militarily. All current sanctions would remain in place and current negotiations would continue. Strategic Neglect essentially leaves all U.S. options open without committing to any single one and helps mitigate uncertainty and unknown variables, like the state of DPRK leadership, by waiting for more certainty and predictability.

By definition, strategic neglect would not immediately accomplish all U.S. objectives, however, it would reassure the ROK, Japan and Taiwan of ongoing American commitment to both the problem and region. This would underline the long term nature of the American presence in there and maintain U.S. influence. Waiting would continue to keep the ball rolling but avoid making any tough or definitive decisions at a time when there are no good options. It would additionally allow American leadership to change in the upcoming 2008 elections which may lessen the DPRK’s fear of attack. This was heightened by its inclusion in the “Axis of Evil” and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003. On a related note, further passage of time could see a reduction in American forces in and diplomatic focus on Iraq, enabling Washington to later increase pressure on the DPRK and have more credibility and flexibility in terms of military options.

Strategic neglect would also allow and hope for a future change in leadership on the North Korean side but little is known about its current status and future. Lastly, Pyongyang’s diplomatic strategy has been one of unreliability, unpredictability and deception. Allowing more time to pass would decrease the perceived utility of such actions, further undermine the DPRK’s credibility and commitment to disarmament in the eyes of China, the ROK and Japan and finally allow the U.S. leadership more time in which to better understand and counter the DPRK’s diplomatic tactics. A further benefit of strategic neglect would be its lack of reliance on negotiating partners like Russia and China.

Nevertheless, a strategy of neglect with regard to North Korea could inadvertently increase pressure on the DPRK to act aggressively and engage in further brinkmanship to extract concessions. It would, in addition, not provide an immediate end to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and could in fact allow for the production of further nuclear devices in the meantime. With regard to the NPT, other actors in the region and elsewhere may begin to view the treaty as dead, ineffective or unenforceable as time drags on. They may therefore reconsider their own nuclear ambitions. In East Asia, these countries include South Korea, Japan and Taiwan and in the Middle East, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Next, while a strategy of neglect could be seen as long term American commitment to the region, it could also be interpreted oppositely, showing the U.S. lacks the will to enforce the NPT, protect is allies and act decisively. This would not only risk damaging U.S. alliances in the region but would negatively impact our image internationally and meanwhile encourage bad behavior by other actors such as Iran. Another danger of this option is that it could lead some decision makers to assume the North Korean leadership may change soon or that the country may collapse, something predicted as inevitable for many years now. Lastly, were the policy to be pursued too long, it could lead either the South Korean and Japanese leadership, populations or both to tire of the North Korean threat and adopt more conciliatory and appeasing approaches.