US Policy Options for North Korea, Part II

[Part I]

Here is part two of U.S. policy options for dealing with a nuclear North Korea.

Unknowns:
Recent reports from U.S. intelligence, the ROK and DPRK about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s health mean that it is currently unknown whether he continues to function as the leader of the DPRK. If he does not, it could have significant consequences as there are various competing factions within the North Korean government, some which are more amenable towards disarmament and others who are not. Additionally, while the DPRK does possess enough nuclear material to make several weapons, the quantity thereof is unknown. The functionality of their bomb design is also uncertain as their 2006 test was not only very small, but possibly a failure. Lastly, it is unknown whether the DPRK has the ability to mount a nuclear weapon inside of a ballistic missile due to uncertainties about the bomb itself and their ballistic missile program.

Assumptions:
– DPRK possesses few nuclear devices
– DPRK would end its nuclear weapons program under some set of circumstances short of war
– DPRK would retaliate if attacked, whether by surgical strikes or full invasion
– DPRK’s motivations include security concerns, domestic and international prestige and intimidating others into political and economic concessions

Objectives:
– Complete, verifiable and irreversible end to DPRK’s nuclear program
– Prevent proliferation to both state and non-state actors
– Prevent nuclear and/or conventional attack by DPRK
– Maintain the credibility and attractiveness of the NPT by brining the DPRK back into it
– Maintain and strengthen U.S. alliances with ROK, Japan and Taiwan