My last post asked readers several questions relating to the threat of jihadist terrorism.

As promised, I’d like to present my take on the current threat picture by answering the question I posed and elaborating further.

How do you breakdown the jihadist threat?

What was clear, from the Spiegel article I mentioned citing seven different experts, the mainstream media and government, is that there is little to no agreement on describing the jihadist threat. The phrase al-Qaeda is widely used, especially for jihadists, threats, disrupted plots and successful attacks that have little to no connection to al-Qaeda. Thus, I will breakdown the threat into the following categories.

National jihadist terrorism: Islamist groups focusing on the “near enemy” defined as local ‘apostate’ regimes such as Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria or Zadari in Pakistan. Their primary goals are national, i.e. local. They may hate the West but their goal is regime change at home. Examples of these groups are Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Egyptian Islamic Jihad etc.

Transnational jihadist terrorism (Global Jihad Movement or GJM): These groups and individuals focus on the “far enemy” which is the West. Their priorities are the United States, Israel, UK and others. They believe that the West would not allow an Islamic state anywhere (see: Algeria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iran) and thus even if local groups overthrew the regime in say Egypt, foreign powers would not allow an Islamist takeover. Their central argument is that the ummah is under direct attack by the West who wants to destroy Islam, and therefore a defensive jihad must be waged against the infidels. Al Qaeda is the largest example of such a group.

However, within the GJM there are three different types of terrorism. Firstly, core/remnant al-Qaeda (AQ). I say remnant because the U.S. destroyed much of the pre 9/11 AQ. AQ is centralized and hierarchical, classic command and control terrorism so to say. Second, you have affiliate groups (sometimes called franchises) which include AQ in Iraq, AQ in the Maghreb and others. They can have some or no direct links to AQ although they subscribe to the same ideology and have the same goals. Thirdly, you have leaderless terrorism which is carried out by individuals or small groups with no connections to terror groups. Richard Reid (the shoebomber) or the attackers in the Madrid subway bombings are examples.

Is al-Qaeda more dangerous today than it was before 9/11?

Using the definition I gave above, no. AQ has been severely damaged since 9/11, however there are indications that it is reconstituting itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. At the moment, it is unclear whether they are regaining strength or not. I believe that AQ, as defined above, is not a major threat to the US homeland. The bigger threats are affiliate groups which carry out more frequent attacks and have better capabilities and leaderless terrorism. Affiliate groups are more prevalent in the Gap (see PNM theory), specifically North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. They pose little to no threat to the U.S. homeland. Leaderless terrorism is a bigger threat in Europe and poses a small threat in the U.S.

What type of threat is al-Qaeda and jihadist terrorism? A strategic threat? An annoyance?

Jihadist terrorism is a security threat but by far not a strategic one. Islamists won’t be overthrowing our government, taking over our territory or invading the United States. Past strategic threats were Germany, Japan and the USSR. In perspective, jihadists are small potatoes. John Kerry was correct that terrorism is, in the bigger picture, an annoyance.

Based on the answers to the previous three, are we winning the battle against jihadist terrorism?

I would first of all disagree with the concept of a war on terror. The jihadi threat is very diverse consisting of many groups with differing, at times opposing goals and many methods of terror. To roll them all into one is not only intellectually lazy, but dangerous as it severely limits our understanding and policy options for dealing with the different threats.

If any answer regarding “winning” can be given, I would say the West is indeed winning but has been slow to realize the importance of the war of ideas (especially the United States). Jihadist terrorism will not be elimiated, it will suffer defeats, setbacks and achieve occasional success but nevertheless fade away over time as it loses its appeal and legitimacy among its constituency and incurs long term international attack.

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