Contemplating Georgia, Part 4: Scrutinizing the Russian Military

The Russian invasion of Georgia saw Moscow’s troops steamroll over Tbilisi’s soldiers with ease. But the end result of the invasion was never truly in doubt considering the relative size and strength of Russia compared to Georgia. And in fact, a joint analysis in Reuters by military analysts Aydar Buribaev (in Moscow), James Kilner (in Tbilisi), Oleg Shchedrov (in Sochi), written up by Christian Lowe, has a completely different analysis: Russia’s biggest combat operation since USSR occupied Afghanistan revealed terrifying weaknesses in its military strength.

Here’s a summary of relevant points:

+ The Russian commander that spearheaded the invasion was wounded by a Georgian ambush attack on day two of the deployment. Later, Russian soldiers rode into battle riding on top of their armored personnel carriers instead of inside, because the flawed amour makes it highly vulnerable to rockets and land mines.

+ Four Russian aircraft, including one long-range supersonic bomber, were shot down by Georgia’s air defenses, because the Russian military probably lacked the technology to locate and destroy Georgia’s anti-aircraft platforms from a distance.

+ The troop deployment by Russia was many times that of the standing army of Georgia, but this was necessary because of a lack of long range offensive technology that could have reduced the required number of troops.

+ The invasion gave NATO planners an opportunity to carefully scrutinize Russian military strategy, hardware, and conduct. Current Russian tactics generally follow the Soviet pattern, with an air and artillery attack followed by the deployment of a large ground force, and in all practicality lack the sophistication of modern tech-heavy 21st century warfare.