Contemplating Georgia, Part 2: Taiwan

Taiwan was a big geopolitical topic in the 1990s and into the 2000s. It is a small independent nation that could be subject to an invasion from China. Such talk has moved off the international newspaper pages, what with a newly elected moderate government in Taiwan, a growing China that appears more rational in how it handles itself on the world stage, not to mention the Olympics. But plenty of analysts in Taiwan are worried about what the Russian push into Georgia means for its relationships with China.

From the Atlantic:

One has to assume that Taiwan has watched the tepid American response to Russia’s power-grab very closely.

Too true. Says political commentator Antonio Chiang in a column titled “A Small But Smart War”:

Georgia’s tragedy is a warning for Taiwan. Georgia sees a Russia which wants to regain its past power. Taiwan sees a China which has already risen… Every now and then, thug leaders pick out a weakling and knock his head against the wall, to remind others who is in charge. This time Georgia was hit so hard that it suffered a concussion. The whole world saw this. To Putin, this is a small but smart war. He paid a small price but achieved great results.

There is some smart thinking on ambiguity coming from Kevin Drum: the lack of a formal treaty with Taiwan maintains “strategic ambiguity” restrains Taiwan’s options to act. Why? If they were guaranteed American help, they might declare formal independence from China and touch off a war that no one wants. US ambiguity maintains the status quo. The misstep in Georgia may have been that Saakashvili felt he could count on Western help if he took on Russia. Georgian troops entered Southern Ossetia and Russia called the bluff. More strategic ambiguity might have been in everyone’s best interests here.

But that only works as long as no one calls a bluff. In 1996, after China launched so-called “test” missiles toward Taiwan to intimidate the country and influence the election, President Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the area. The appearance of resolve by the US to defend a small democratic nation appeared solid. Would the same support materialize today? As deterence, probably. But what about after an invasion had begun? The experience in Russia suggests otherwise.