Maturing Japanese foriegn policy analysis

It is interesting how soon nuance enters the analysis of IR theorists. After the cold war many analysts had dire outlooks on Asia. Predictions of Japanese rearmament and war were abound with such book and article titles as _The Coming War with Japan_ and _The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan_. Yet nearly two decades after the end of the cold war Japan has yet to rearm to its full potential and there have been no wars in Asia. A common argument made by realists is that Japan yearns to be a great power, and return to a “normal” foreign policy by casting off its pacifist constitution and rearming to a level commensurate with its economic power. Though there has been a minuscule increase in defence spending, Japan has yet to rearm to the level consistent with its economy and technological advancement.

Once the influence of the _zeitgeist_ wore off (bursting of the economic bubble?) more nuanced analyses come to the fore. Some twist the old theories to capture the empirical evidence, creating new splinters such as “mercantile realism” and “realism through neoliberal institutionalism.” Some simply says that Japan is neither pacifist nor militaristic but that its survival and economic strength depend on a stable order. Japan is not in danger of being attacked by China because of the American security umbrella. Moreover, Japan need not balance against the United States since it does not fear an attack. Richard Samuels seems to have come around to a similar outlook. I am currently reading his new book “Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia “:http://www.amazon.com/Securing-Japan-Strategy-Cornell-Security/dp/0801446120 which was released at the end of the summer. It attempts to trace the history of Japan’s grand strategy and forecast its future aims. A tall order. Samuels argues that Japan will strike a balance between strength and autonomy, preventing it from becoming too dependent on America or too vulnerable to China. This is a more moderate position than the other post-cold war analyses, but still within the realm of balance-of-power realists. Still, it is a difficult proposition.

My view is much more culture based. I believe that the Japanese government won’t act until it is too late. It will take an emergency for them to get their act together. They will stall and try to maintain the status quo as long as possible, without preparing for the worst. Then everything hits the fan. In other words, there is a lack of a grand strategy. Consider it part of the greater arc of Japanese history. Japan has a sort of island mentality. They will keep on doing the same old thing until some sort of disruption causes everything to change: think Mongols, Jesuits, Black Ships, SCAP. I know it isn’t some grand theory of international relations, but my view is limited by my personal experience living in Japan for so many years. That’s my two yen… back to the book.