The US may be in Iraq for longer than many expected, but it seems now it will be much shorter than some thought. Debates will continue, partisan bickering will press on and the public disillusion will remain. However, the outcome is already clear. The US won’t be in Iraq for the long haul. Either a full withdrawal or a partial withdrawal (to Kurdistan/Kuwait) will occur after which Iraq’s current violence will seem tame compared to the civil war that follows. But how much does it really matter?
Let them fight it out
Critics often peddle cheap Vietnam comparisons to describe the mess Iraq has turned into. However, the one point often overlooked and which is worth taking from it is that the US withdrawal from Vietnam wasn’t as painful in the long run as expected. If you pull the band aid off fast, you barely notice the pain, if you do it slowly, you do. In the mid 1990s, after the no-fly zone was setup over Iraqi Kurdistan, the two major Kurdish parties, the PUK and KDP began to split and ultimately a civil war ensued. Yet, afterwards, the Kurds not only emerged united but went on to setup their own government, and a democratic one at that. Today, a combination of national maturation and security has allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to become a safe and successful quasi-state. While some states remain mired in civil war for decades, others end up better in the long run such as Vietnam, Yugoslavia and even the United States.
Readers will rightly point out there are many factors involved in civil wars, both internal and external. One of the most important for the aforementioned ones was the external security structures. Vietnam had the Cold War, Yugoslavia had NATO and the UN and the United States was too far removed from other powers to be interfered with. Outside influences and covert intervention did of course occur, but the state(s) held on to their territorial integrity and the conflict was contained.
While a civil war in Iraq wasn’t inevitable, the failure of the United States to monopolize violence and provide security for the population has allowed deeply rooted ethnic and religious hatreds to boil over. Created by the British in the wake of WWI and ruled first by puppet goverments and later dictators, Iraq has no history of having a popular government nor have its people ever learned to live together. Whether Arabs killing Kurds or Sunnis oppressing Shia, the people of Iraq have been held together by violence and violence may be the only thing that can bring them back together.
Policy Implications
As time goes on, it seems clear the US lacks the popular support and political will to continue pacifying the country. This inevitably leads to some for of withdrawal leaving the only point realistically worth discussing: how. Some have argued for full withdrawal, others for a phased out one and still others for splitting the country up for good. Recently, president Bush floated the idea of withdrawing north into Kurdistan and south into Kuwait. This would allow US forces to prevent external aggression and occasionally intervene or pursue terrorist targets. With external security maintained, Iraq’s civil war can finally get officially underway and ultimately lead to a rebalancing of power that more accurately reflects the country’s demographics, namely a Shia majority followed by the Kurds with Sunni Arabs at the bottom. Other regional actors will continue to and likely step up support for their favorite groups within Iraq. Contrary to what one often reads, this is already happening and has occured in many civil wars. France supported the Confederate States. The Russians helped the north Vietnamese and everyone and their grandmother intervened in the Spanish civil war. Yet, overall, the outcome wasn’t as nightmarish as thought.
Iraq’s internal balance of power may be the business of the Iraqis, but it affects neighboring states and it is therefore natural that they interfere and exert influence there towards the goals and outcome they desire. It has happened in nearly every civil war. The major difference today is that while Vietnam occurred during the Cold War and within a very rigid and clearly defined global order, Iraq is happening during a breakdown of the world order we once knew.
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COMMENTS / 7 COMMENTS
Mihnea Dumitru added these pithy words on 26 Jul 07 at 2:39 pmWhen I read the title I thought you’d agree with a conclusion I myself had reached a while ago, in that Iraq doesn’t matter because the problems of the entire region are temporary. Regardless of the outcome of the events in Iraq, or Palestine, or the emerging primacy of Iran as a regional power, they all stem from a much larger grind of forces coupled with the scramble for resources of such states. The issues will always play out primarily between the great powers of the world, with the regional play only secondary to their direct or indirect interests.
Whatever might happen in Iraq, this long and protracted conflict that did little else but spark regional rivalries and polarized chaos, the long-term effects are minimal to the interests of such greater powers.
Dan tdaxp added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 12:56 amThere are two-and-a-half good reasons to stay in Iraq
1. Futher humiliate al Qaeda by demonstrating their failure to cause an Qaedast popular revolt, even under the most favorable circumstances imagineable.
2. Oversee the soft ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from mixed areas, allowing a future partition to be cleaner than it otherwise would be.
3. Spoil Iran.
Curzon added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 3:21 am
the emerging primacy of Iran as a regional powerHm… I’d like to hear my colleagues Messrs. Chirol and Younghusband on this one, but I think Iran has a long, long way to go before its the emerging regional power. It is naturally hemmed in because of its unique Shia version of Islam and its language, its education and energy supplies are a mess. It has potential. But emerging? Not as I see it.
Mihnea Dumitru added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 6:06 amCurzon, I think it sees itself that way, and as long as it can project its interests outside its borders through Hezbollah in Palestine and through Sadrists in Iraq, it pretty much comes close to an emerging regional power.
Chirol added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 7:20 amI think in the discussion of Iran, one thing is often overlooked, that Iran’s natural position is that of regional power and the last four decade have been an exception rather than the rule.
Iran does indeed face many problems, both domestic and foreign and isn’t about to overrun the Middle East just yet. That said though, the US take down of Iraq removed its biggest enemy thus pushing Iran towards number 1 by default.
Bill Petti added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 10:40 amDan tdaxp said:
“There are two-and-a-half good reasons to stay in Iraq
1. Futher humiliate al Qaeda by demonstrating their failure to cause an Qaedast popular revolt, even under the most favorable circumstances imagineable.
3. Spoil Iran.”
Number one implies that AQ has been humiliated already and that our further presence will somehow enhance that humiliation—we must be talking about a different conflict. What humiliation has AQ experienced to-date? The specific group in Iraq seems to have done pretty much what it set out to do (stir up ethnic violence that becomes largely self-organized and perpetuating with minimal maintenance, etc) and the ‘global ultimate
of AQ has seen the US do exactly what it wanted—bind itself down in a resource draining conflict for years.
As for the third point, it assumes that our continued presence will lead to some favorable outcome—what evidence is there for that assumption? What do you see as Iran’s goals and how will our continued presence in Iraq negatively affect those goals?
Dan tdaxp added these pithy words on 27 Jul 07 at 12:35 pmBill,
Number one implies that AQ has been humiliated already and that our further presence will somehow enhance that humiliation—we must be talking about a different conflict. What humiliation has AQ experienced to-date? The specific group in Iraq seems to have done pretty much what it set out to do (stir up ethnic violence that becomes largely self-organized and perpetuating with minimal maintenance, etc) and the ”˜global ultimateof AQ has seen the US do exactly what it wanted—bind itself down in a resource draining conflict for years.
al Qaeda’s goal has been to remove Western support for apostate governments or, failing that, at least overthrow those governments. In no state is Western support and governmental apostacy no clear than in Iraq, and in no state, and in no state does can al Qaeda operate as freely (owing to the general lack of security). The post-invasion Iraq War has demonstrated that while coalitions of forces can spoil American objectives and even make forward on creating a new kind of state, al Qaeda is not part of that victorious coalition.
“Stirring up ethnic trouble” is a means for al Qaeda in Iraq, and not an end. (Indeed, it’s not even a means that the global al Qaeda leadership endorsed!)
The US spending resources in defense of apostate “Muslim” governments is the opposite of what al Qaeda wants—indeed, it is the problem that it believes its approach can solve.
As for the third point, it assumes that our continued presence will lead to some favorable outcome—what evidence is there for that assumption? What do you see as Iran’s goals and how will our continued presence in Iraq negatively affect those goals?Iran has numerous goals in Iraq, including a stable client government safe passage for Shia pilgrims, etc. America has prevented these things from happening.
I think Iran is a progressive force in the region, but from a realist point of view, the advantage of spoiling Iran remains.
