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Curzon
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Curzon

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April 7th, 2007

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How much is enough?

Via JoshNathan at Registan, originally from Afghanistanica:

One of my big complaints about military policy in Afghanistan (and, by extension, Iraq) is how it can’t even match the DoD’s own estimations, to say nothing of any other issues that need to be addressed. General Petraeus, who now runs the U.S. military in Iraq, wrote the new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. In it, he establishes metrics that indicate about 650,000 troops would be needed in Afghanistan for an effective COIN operation.

Funny thing. Turns out that’s the same number the Soviet General Staff thought they’d need to pacify the country. The Politburo capped them at 150,000””?which is still three times as many troops as the U.S. has currently there. Funny.

An eerie parallel indeed

Comments to this entry

A.R.Yngve
April 7, 2007
4:42 pm
You mean it's no coincidence that with each passing day, Dick Cheney is looking more and more like Yuri Andropov ??
O_o
subadei
April 7, 2007
10:36 pm
Funny, but it doesn't take into account the current Pakistan effect.
Joshua Foust
April 8, 2007
4:24 am
Not to be picky, but I wrote that, not Nathan. And I cover Pakistan quite a bit in other posts on the broader conflict - this was only a comment about troop levels, and how that indicates the government's level of seriousness.
Afghanistanica
April 8, 2007
6:23 pm
Far be it from me to disagree with a general who is also a Princeton PhD, but I think, if possible theoretically, that the 650,000 needed for a successful COIN operation in Afghanistan is massive overkill.

I should track down the manual. Maybe Petraeus is looking at a model where the entire population is unfriendly.
Curzon
April 9, 2007
3:14 am
Sorry Josh, my bad -- I just think of Registan as being Nathan's blog, and I've made corrections accordingly.
cirby
April 9, 2007
4:47 am
I can't seem to find anything in that COIN manual (the latest version, from late 2006) that has "metrics" of the sort suggestd by that article.

I do find this (and a lot more in the same vein):

"Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is
1-150. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. As noted above, the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed"”?and when it might be counterproductive.
This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents' actions."

From the history of Afghanistan, a huge number of COIN troops would seem to be exactly the opposite of what might work there...
Joshua Foust
April 10, 2007
3:32 am
It's cool - it still is his blog. I'm just a contributor.

Afghanistanica, you might well be right. The 650,000 number (which is approximate anyway) is based off this manual (link). In paragraph 1-67, Gen. Petraeus describes the troop density necessary to successfully beat back an insurgency: a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over the insurgents, or a minimum 20 (and ideally at least 25) counterinsurgents per 1000 local residents. In Afghanistan, there is far less than 1 counterinsurgent per 1000 residents (assuming every single soldier on the ground is COIN, itself a bad assumption). This would mean even should NATO muster up twenty times the current deployment level, or about 600,000 troops, they would still fall way short of what the DoD says is the bare minimum for success

Then again, the problems in Afghanistan are more than troops can solve, and the point about overkill is well taken. I think Afghanistanica has done an admirable job discussing some of the thornier cultural aspects to it, though even that ignores that kings have ruled Afghanistan well when they've left locals mostly to their own devices.

I think in either case, we can all agree that 30,000 troops in a country like Afghanistan is a joke.
Joshua Foust
April 10, 2007
3:36 am
I forgot I should mention: that density - of 20 to 25 COIN troops per 1000 would include national military and police units as well. So in that sense, Afghanistan is going better than the number of NATO troops would indicate (80,000 instead of 30,000). But it's still drastically short.
cirby
April 10, 2007
10:01 pm
...except that the 25/1000 number is pretty much for putting down a popular or widespread insurgency, and what they have in Afghanistan is really not a "popular" one - or as widespread as many seem to think.

What they have is a sporadic, seasonal, localized insurgency that is despised by most of the regular folks in the country, with third-rate foreign support (even the Pakistanis, the primary support for the Taliban, are getting really tired of them). For that matter, it's not even "an" insurgency, it's a handful of separate insurgencies that are often working at cross-purposes to each other (and, quite often killing each other off).

The recent switch from actual military-style attacks to suicide bombing as a primary mode of operation shows that the insurgency in Afghanistan is really getting desperate - which makes the "shortage" argument seem a big off.
zenpundit
April 11, 2007
6:45 pm
The Soviets had different goals and faced a different insurgency in Afghanistan than does the U.S. Moreover their clients (Taraki-Amin,Karmal) were adept at starting more fires than they or the Soviets could put out.

The Soviets, point of fact, had tried to steer Taraki and Amin away from implementing radical measures in the countryside that would inflame the tribes and the pious but the Afghan Communists listened to advice even less well than did Nigo Dinh Diem to American advisers. And of course, Taraki and Amin spent much time trying to assassinate one another and their successor, Barbarak Karmal, was an inert and incompetent puppet.

Only the brutal and clever Najibullah was an energetic and effective satrap, though he came to a richly deserved and bad end as well.
Michael
April 13, 2007
1:16 am
I'm reminded of a blurb on the cover of one of my favorite fantasy series: "In which Vlad Taltos learns that, while violence never solves anything, it does keep people off your back until you figure out what to do."

The extra troops wouldn't have solved the problems, but how much more effective might the real problem solvers be if they didn't have to dodge Taliban effects.

Then too, do we have enough of the problem solvers on the ground, and do they have all the resources and expertise they need? No matter how you look at it, Afganistan and Iraq were done on the cheap:P
Michael
April 13, 2007
1:17 am
Taliban effects?? I need to go home, eat, sleep. . .