@Snow: On Taiwan: not if they can help it. They may be willing to make the sacrifices, but I don’t think they have any illusions about how major the consequences would be. For one thing, all of the assets Taiwan has would not survive a conflict, and the prospect of Chinese on Chinese warfare again would be a major psychic problem. Not to mention international condemnation, casualties, possible World War III/IV/V/XI depending on your personal political calendar…

On Christianity: it certainly seems to be growing, and will have a role to play. But I find the future of indigeneous religions far more interesting, as it has deeper roots, has been manifesting itself more and more, and seems to be less and less a political issue based on the old division of the KMT support traditional beliefs and the Communists condemning them as feudal. It’ll probably still be political, but not in that old cast. Christianity will continue to be a minority, whereas Buddhism and Taoism will have resonance with anyone, whether rural or urban. This is probably one of the reasons Falun Gong was considered such a threat, because it could communicate immediately in spiritual terms that everyone grew up with.

But this is all speculation, and I’d say I’m no expert except that I don’t think that would even help. So much can happen in a year, let alone 10.

p.s. i heard harry harding has a good article on China recently, on Carnegie Endowment, but am unable to locate it. it addresses many of the issues discussed here as well.

Your vision for the future of China hews closely to how I think China will change in the aggregate. I do worry a little about the structure of the economy and its ability to withstand the ups and downs of the business cylcle. However, as brutal as those in charge are, they are really savvy economic managers. It is evident just in their announcements.

thanks again.

I also feel that talking about the PLA as the organ for hardliners against liberals is oversimplifying. In the early 90s, when Jiang Zemin was attempting to consolidate power against the old leftist guard, the military was not a tool for infighting within Zhongnanhai (as far as I know). They were not part of the debate, except perhaps when it came to discussing the military budget.

China in ten/twenty years? Further economic integration with Taiwan, a growing backoffice sector, continued economic inequality with an across the board modest increase in income, increased emigration abroad, an increasingly splintered and diverse media though still censored, a surge in religion particularly Chinese Buddhism and Taoism, tensions followed by a modest re-partitioning of spheres of influence in the Sea of Japan and South China seas. There’ll probably a worldwide recession in there, but I don’t believe it will provoke some political earthquake in China. It’ll just suck for a while.

The political factions within the PLA are far less fractured than within the CCP. Power does come from the barrel of the gun and the military holds it. Mao used his power over the PLA to ignore then subvert the power of the party central commity. Throughout China’s history military forces have been the source of splintering.

As I stated above, it’s merely conjecture based upon what limited resources I can observe. The discussion is half the fun.

Critiques of my thoughts taken openly, how do you see China in 10 and 20 years? What problems might it face?

I defer to your expertise.

The problem with so much China analysis in the west is that so few people know anything credible about China, so few people have a command of the language, and so many are willing to throw common sense out the window in the face of grand narratives. The problem is compounded by the fact that the same narratives end up being repeated over and over again even if incorrect simply because few people have the resources at hand to delve deeper. Honestly sometimes it’s like listening to a blind man confidently describing what a rainbow looks like.

@Tuor,
Economic indicators seem to show an economy slowing down. Consumer spending for the last quarter was down, below expectations. We’ve just been through a long boom, fueled by a pretty big bubble in the real estate market. Although sub-prime loans are only 7-8% of all loans, the failure of a couple of sub-prime lenders could effect other lenders, particularly if they make their lending parameters stricter [I'm a RE developer - fun year for me].

Recessions are a natural part of the business cycle and we are certainly due, truth be told, though I expected it already; so I am an imperfect economic prognosticator.

I’m curious what you base this on. I’m not convinced the anti-satellite test was done without Beijing’s approval, and I don’t think the PLA has any interest in usurping the Party’s power. As Willy Lam has pointed out, Hu Jintao is concerned about PLA units circumventing orders from the CMC or the Party, but it seems centered around graft and corruption, not any interests in breaking away from the Party during a period of social unrest. The PLA does still have its own economic assets, but Jiang Zemin insisted they sell a great deal off in 1998.

Excellent posts. I expect China will continue to grow for about another 8-10 years before things start to deteriorate internally. I also am optimistic about the long-term prospects, although not without this period of massive internal readjustment, which I expect will have a large religious component.

Elam, what makes you think the US will enter into a recession in the next twelve months? I am not so confident, although things must be bad if the Economist runs articles on the economic system as a giant Ponzi scheme.

Also, do either of you post elsewhere? I run a forum that is always looking for new members.

Though I am confident in China’s longterm prospects, it will have to go through the business cycle like any other country. Keep in mind that last year there were more skyscrapers built in Shanghai than all of Manhatten. This kind of rapid development lends itself to boom-bust cycles. The US is almost certain to go through a recession in the next twelve months. The effect on the Chinese could be twofold: an economic slowdown because American consumers are purchasing less goods & a deflation of their reserves because the dollar falls. It could be short and just a blip, but they haven’t had to weather a downturn yet since the great expansion began.

The PLA has its own economic base and could really represent a separate power structure should it lose faith in the CCP.

Joe et al,
As for a general decline of the U.S. I think the general youth of the commentors (me included) lead us to discount just how bad it was in the 1970’s, or in times of double-digit interest rates in the early eighties. But the late seventies, I shudder at the thought.

“If that’s not intellectual enough for you, you can go fuck yourself with a World Almanac.”

I was going to write that utterances like that one really drag down the comment section, but it wouldn’t be fair to tarnish the otherwise civil comments here.

Sunbin wrote:

“US has a long, long way to slide before it truly stands to closely resemble China, on every level imaginable.”

Sunbin is right. The Chinese government estimates that it will take 50 years for China’s economy to reach the level of Taiwan’s and Korea’s and an additional 30 years to reach fully developed status.

The economic arguments here are all very sound, I think, but nobody has really brought the military into the picture. Is it just a tool for protecting the economic determinist miracle, or is it something that’s going to get in the way? I’m curious to hear from the China experts on this…

I would agree with Mann about the window dressing insofar as any steps China has taken towards making the government primarily an elected body of representatives. In that sense, there’s nothing really happening, and I don’t expect it to change quickly or any time soon. More importantly, I think the key point to remember in encouraging such change is that the Chinese public, never mind the govt, is extremely sensitive to any other nation, especially the US, telling it how to organize its own society. That means that there’s a high likelihood that many tactics to encourage such changes will backfire, and simply result in more support to the Chinese govt from a nationalist-leaning polity.

On the other hand, as far as civil liberties in China, I do think that the Internet and growing wealth (for some) is transforming what people can do without facing censorship or punishment, simply because the government just can’t control it all.

The key myth that US policy centers around, however, is that Tiananmen Square expressed the true desires of the Chinese people, which have been repressed and will one day resurface. I don’t think that’s true; Tiananmen has become such a massive symbol for Americans re: China but its misleading to think it is a key to understanding China today.

For example: pockets of wealth and high technology (littoral cities and their hinterlands) and swathes of devastated and depopulated landscapes; regions under tight central control, and regions that answer primarily to local tyrants; an expansionist CCP-directed foreign policy (fuelled primarily by the drive for foreign oil and minerals), and littoral cities and provinces effectively running their own foreign and trade policies to suit their particular circumstances. Beijing will still be strong, but a great deal of power will have flowed to other centres, organizations and individuals.

China in 2010 will probably be much like China today. Except 30% wealthier.

2020 is naturally is naturally a far harder projection to make because of more variables. Socially and economically speaking, it will be safe to say that China will be “free-er”. Politically I expect the Communist Party to still wield control as much as it does today.

p.s. I’ve come to despise the term “internal contradiction” when discussing China. I have begun to realize that it is really an awful, terrible, horrible, simply bad term that doesn’t really mean anything. There is no such thing as a contradiction, only an incomplete understanding or inaccurate interpretation of the facts. Thats just my personal peeve speaking of course.

There seems to be a bit of a meltdown starting in the US in terms of the real estate subprime market and some analysts say this is only a prelude to further problems, but I really am sceptical about those who claim things are generally worse across the board. The US is less free than in the past? Ridiculous. I grew up in the 70s and 80s and there is no comparison to what is available and even acceptable in society nowadays. If anything, there is a strong streak of political correctness, that is, in my opinion, a step backwards, but certainly, a person can certainly say alot more in public than in the past. What can’t you say nowadays?

At the same time, I really find it hard to believe that most people are worse off than in the past. I remember when the idea of owning your own home was like a fantasy. My mother finally bought her first home when she was in her late 30s and she had a good job. Nowadays, people with no money can buy a house in certain areas (a friend sold his father’s place an hour outside a Canadian city for a $1,000 recently). People can get work and find work, if they want it. I remember how difficult it was in the past looking for work, even the lowest paying crap was a struggle to get. Immigrants are probably having difficulties, but that’s to be expected when someone is new to a country. Some people are likely struggling with the skyrocketing real estate prices (still going up in Canada), but jobs are available. And what would anyone propose to hold down real estate prices? Market solutions only, please.

As for the patriot act, we’ve joined European nations in having a relatively strong security act. The Europeans have had to deal with terrorism for a long time and put in similar measures long before the US did. The French have not said much about our supposedly extreme measures because theirs are at least as stringent. The Germans also have strong security measures as do the Brits.

If anything, the US is in a difficult position on many fronts, but it still could come through (hopefully) and carry on its relative success streak in most areas. The US faces some severe problems financially and could tip into a nasty recession, and if things don’t improve in Iraq, or worse, if they cut and run, it could be another nail in the coffin of US military supremacy (it could be another indicator of sliding US military power, in other words). If the US can’t even ‘win’ in Iraq, do they have the political will to win any other wars in the future or will we delude ourselves into thinking that war is no longer necessary, no matter what the threat? The direction that Iraq takes could portend a downturn in what we can accomplish on a geopolitical scale. It could even be the forerunner of a serious dimishing in our overall power in the world.

At the same time, I don’t think China will want to take over from the US, at least not for a long time, until the US is no longer useful to China. Now China needs an open US market and the US is such a powerful engine for the world economy that anyone wishing to see the US decline is in effect hoping for a decline in the world economy.

I reckon tdaxp is just having a bad day. If he really is going to leave the comment sections, it would be a loss for all of us.

Eddie> Simplistic narratives are just the MO of political consultants these days. The problem is that it’s psychologically effective for their particular goals: fund-raising from the core constituents to fund advertising targeting the undecideds with the same tired lines.

No high-profile politicians have the balls to kick the consultants out of the room, and as a result our country’s top-level political debate is just that handful of watered-down themes repeated over and over. It’s dishonest because dishonesty works.

I wonder what you mean by “sacrifice,” though. Politicians don’t seem to mind asking us to sacrifice our tax dollars or high school graduates for whatever hare-brained scheme is on their agenda…

Anyway, I agree that the decline may not be permanent. My original comment was only extrapolating the trends I see today. I think that many Americans forget that large geographic and demographic pockets of their own country are effectively part of the Gap, and that those problems are not being effectively addressed by the people in charge. It’s the elephant in the room, so to speak. We have no problems seeing the elephants in China but we forget the elephants in the US.