The Comeback of the Coup d’état

As Pinochet’s death is celebrated and mourned in Chile, its worth remembering that, the General’s notoriety notwithstanding, military coups are definitely not a thing of the past. In fact, if the last half of 2006 is any indicator, they may be making a comeback.

In September, the Royal Thai Army staged a coup against the government of Prime Minister Thaksin while he was visiting the United Nations in New York. The military cancelled the upcoming elections, suspended the Constitution, dissolved Parliament, banned protests and all political activities, suppressed and censored the media, declared martial law, and arrested Cabinet members. Yet as barbaric as this may sound, it was welcomed by many Thais: the coup followed a long political crisis involving Thaksin and his opponents, and many had come to seem the regime as anti-democratic, anti-liberal, populist, crass, and quasi-dictatorial.

Then there’s Madagascar. President Marc Ravalomanana just won reelection last weekend by an impressive 54% of the vote in a nine-way race and survived an attempted coup just weeks before the election. Yet his eight opponents _all_ publicly supported the coup. The general said the coup was aimed at defending the constitution and in the best interest of the nation, and the candidates agreed.

Most recently is Fiji, enjoying its fourth coup since 1987, and recently covered at ComingAnarchy here and here.

The electorates of rich nations, accustomed as they are to a stable democratic system, would be appalled by a military takeover of the government. But plenty of younger democracies with less stable economies and a more fragile civil society are not so timid. Indeed, when the legislature, police, courts, and other institutions of government are seen as corrupt and illegitimate, the military often has some of the highest approval ratings of any branch of government. In some countries such as Turkey, the military is enshrined as the equivalent of the Supreme Court in the United States. And with the spread of democracy across the globe over the past decades without the requisite growth of civil society, a middle class, literacy, and outstanding ethnic and religious strife, and as new democratic governments are unable to meet these challenges, coups may become more, not less, common in the coming years.

On that note, regular readers may remember my original pessimism about the so-called “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan. With what I read about the current internal situation, I really wouldn’t be surprised if Kyrgyzstan was the next unlucky candidate for a coup.

About Curzon

Lord George Nathaniel Curzon (1859 - 1925) entered the British House of Commons as a Conservative MP in 1886, where he served as undersecretary of India and Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Viceroy of India at the turn of the 20th century where he delineated the North West Frontier Province, ordered a military expedition to Tibet, and unsuccessfully tried to partition the province of Bengal during his six-year tenure. Curzon served as Leader of the House of Lords in Prime Minister Lloyd George's War Cabinet and became Foreign Secretary in January 1919, where his most famous act was the drawing of the Curzon Line between a new Polish state and Russia. His publications include Russia in Central Asia (1889) and Persia and the Persian Question (1892). In real life, "Curzon" is a US citizen from the East Coast who has been a financial analyst, freelance translator, and university professor; he is currently on assignment in Tokyo.
This entry was posted in Future Threats, Politics & Elections and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

17 Responses to The Comeback of the Coup d’état

  1. Mutantfrog says:

    There was also a thwarted coup attempt in the Philippines earlier this year, which had been in the works for long enough so there were some rumors of it when I was visiting this time last year.

  2. IJ says:

    _many had come to seem the regime as anti-democratic, anti-liberal, populist, crass, and quasi-dictatorial._

    Some governments in Latin America were recently accused in the press of being populist. The following day a letter from that region pointed out that when people criticise populism, they are really criticising democracy. Global economics and national democracy play to constituents with hugely different priorities; the Lisbon agenda of the EU is struggling because a middle way between the protagonists can’t be easily found.

  3. Curzon says:

    IJ: Populism, inasmuch as it can be called a “philosophy,” holds that the interests of the lower classes are oppressed by upper classes. You can call that democracy if you like, but it’s a pretty narrow/warped view of how a republic should operate. America’s political system works for two reasons: 1.) the majority rules, but 2.) it’s safe to be in the minority, i.e. the minority is protected from the majority. And that’s why it’s increasingly hard to call places like Bolivia and Venezuela real democracies.

    Or “as Jonah Goldberg put it…”:http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg030503.asp

    …in its purest form, democracy is little more than the system by which 51 percent of the people can pee in the cornflakes of 49 percent of the people. In a pure democracy — i.e. no courts, no constitution, no authority given to tradition — the mob rules. If numbers make the law, then whoever has the most numbers on his side can do whatever he likes. If ten men can vote to rape one women in a democracy, you can see how democracy and liberty aren’t synonymous.

  4. IJ says:

    Very helpful, Curzon. Some forms of governance are unacceptable. Isn’t this an important difference of opinion between the US and China, especially when dealing with countries in Africa?

    We learn in that continent that the business of China is business, not the politics of other sovereign nations.

    Politics or economics? The EU’s Lisbon agenda is pushing members towards the Chinese view.

  5. IJ says:

    “More on the EU-China relationship”:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HL13Cb04.html. They seem to be coming to an agreement that the level for acceptable political behaviour should be set by the WTO.

  6. Nathan says:

    If Kyrgyzstan suffers a coup, don’t bet on it to be led by the military. One positive element of the Soviet legacy is strong civilian control of the military.

  7. TDL says:

    Aren’t coups going to be the typical result of political systems that are grafted onto a society? Maybe, we Westerners, should begin to re-assess the value of democracy. Most Americans look at the U.S. as a democratic state, despite the fact that the framers of the constitution were rather offended by the idea of democracy (the pure Athenian type.) Yet most Americans can not differentiate between a participatory, federal republic and democracy. Maybe, it is time to discard the buzz word “democracy” and begin to allow non-Western countries to develop their own civil institutions that will lead to political structures that allow for the attainments of their own ends (and not Western ends.) Just a thought.

    Regards,
    TDL

  8. germanicus says:

    TDL, another line of thought re: coups: what about considering Rome? I think one could make an argument that when the Praetorian Guard disposed of one Emperor and installed another, that prosses could be considered a “coup.” Just a thought.

  9. TDL says:

    Germanicus,
    My knowledge of that specific period of Imperial Rome (and Imperial Rome in general) is limited. At that stage of Roman power, however, hadn’t the Praetorian Guard essentially institutionalized coups? I remember reading that the Praetorian Guard in one year (I do not not what year) assassinated three different emperors, after all (?) had bought the position from the Praetorians. I wonder if there is a more recent example of institutionalized coups (maybe Turkey?)

    Regards,
    TDL

  10. alec says:

    I’ll call my longshot for the next coup: Turkey. The military inherited the position of upholding Ataturk’s vision of a democratic, secular Turkey, a vision that seems to be increasingly threatened by the rise of rightist Islamic parties.

    I’ll let Kaplan explain the rest

  11. Curzon says:

    TDL: I believe you’re talking about the “Year of the Three/Four Emperors”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_of_the_Four_Emperors between the downfall of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty and the Flavian Dynasty, and only one, Galba, was killed by the Praetorians.

    But certainly the point is correct: the Praetorians were institutionalized as the only armed power permanently within the walls of Rome, and they meddled in Imperial affairs for at least two centuries. The difference between then and now is that today, military coups require the strong backing of at very least a large minority of the populace to be successful. Back in ancient times, it was the raw pecuniary interests of the cohort and little else.

    Alec: Kaplan is basically saying what I said above: the military is institutionalized as an important part of the balance of powers: “Whereas power in the United States is divided among the president, Congress and the Supreme Court, in Turkey it is divided between generals and politicians. But the Turkish military is not a branch of government: It operates more like a powerful lobby that has managed to run government from within.”

  12. lirelou says:

    There have been positive coups. The 13 Mar 58 coup that toppled the 4th Republic (Francaise, bien sur) brought “le Grand Charles” back to power, and it was he who cut Algeria out of the body politic and reordered the constitution that gives France its present stable government. And frankly, Pinochet doesn’t seem to have done too badly by the Chileans. His reputation will forever be stained (though he appears to have made much less than Fidel, if reports of the latters wealth are true), but he did bring in the “Chicago Boys” and left Chile with a real economy. While the mechanics of each coup bear necessary similarities, the triggering mechanisms, composition, goals, and results obviously differ according to the societies from which they spring. Of interest, I note that the French qualify 13 Mar 58 as a coup, and Apr 1961 as a “Putsch”. Perhaps because the required majority among the military never coalesced in support of the would-be 1961 coupsters?

  13. ‘And with the spread of democracy across the globe over the past decades without the requisite growth of civil society, a middle class, literacy, and outstanding ethnic and religious strife, and as new democratic governments are unable to meet these challenges, coups may become more, not less, common in the coming years.’ = a meaningless sentence!! Ignoring the fact you started the sentence with a preposition, I presume what you mean is: ‘And with the spread of democracy across the globe over the past decades, without the requisite growth of civil society, a middle class, and literacy, and as newly democratic governments are unable to meet the challenges of continuing ethnic and religious strife, coups may become more, not less, common in the coming years.’ Or something of the sort? (Ignoring the fact that I just started a sentence with a preposition.)

  14. subadei says:

    lirelou: As far as positive coups go, what of Musharraf?

    Curzon: Wasn’t Claudius found “hiding” by the Praetorian guard and subsequently installed as emperor after Caligula’s assassination?

  15. Curzon says:

    Subadei: TDL said:

    I remember reading that the Praetorian Guard in one year (I do not not what year) assassinated three different emperors, after all (?) had bought the position from the Praetorians.

    To which I responded:

    I believe you’re talking about the Year of the Three/Four Emperors between the downfall of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty and the Flavian Dynasty, and only one, Galba, was killed by the Praetorians… the Praetorians were institutionalized as the only armed power permanently within the walls of Rome, and they meddled in Imperial affairs for at least two centuries.

    So yes, yours is one popular example of Praetorian meddling. (Of course, Caligula’s assassination was carried out by “a” Praetorian; the cohort played no role in the the assassination, and probably annointed Claudius because they feared a return to the Republic would lose them their jobs.)

    Interesting chart on imperial relations with the guard “here.”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praetorians#Relationships_between_emperors_and_their_Guard It’s worth noting that while the Praetorians may have done the actual killing, they never acted on whim and were frequently carrying out the will of both the aristocrats and the plebs in hastening regime change.

  16. subadei says:

    Curzon: You seem to have a sound command of Roman history and a particular interest. You might enjoy “this”:http://www.unrv.com/ website(assuming you are unaware of it.) It’s a rather extensive collection of Roman history and maintains an interesting debate forum.

  17. Pingback: Dealing With Military Governments In The 21st Century « Hidden Unities