Becoming a Micropower

With the row between Russia and Georgia showing no signs of abating, the situation continues to deteriorate (albeit slowly) as both politicians and bloggers consider the implications of further escalation.

Yet, stopping to consider the bigger picture, John Robb asks the question: could Georgia become a micrpower? As power becomes more diffuse and states are having more difficulty fighting non-state actors and 4GW tactics, a wealth of opportunity may have opened up for small states like Georgia. As Wikipedia unseats Encyclopedia Britannica, Google shakes up the MSM and groups like Hizballah and Iraqi insurgents deny Israel and the US victories, one has to start taking the idea of micropowers seriously. FP writes that

This trend, where players can rapidly accumulate immense power, where the power of traditional megaplayers is successfully challenged, and where power is both ephemeral and harder to exercise, is evident in every facet of human life

[...] What may be coming””?and in some ways is already here””?is a hyper-polar world where many large, powerful actors coexist with myriad smaller powers (not all of which are nation-states) that greatly limit the dominance of any single nation or institution. Such a world opens many new attractive opportunities for the little guy, whether a small country, a new company, or a talented individual

John Robb has consistently argued for the same, namely that:

[...] smaller organizations are often better suited for success (more agile, responsive, and cohesive) within the fluid/chaotic environment spawned by globalization’s new rule set””?as with all ubiquitous platforms, this new global rule set is minimalist (that’s all we can agree on). The same is true for economic “white”Â? competition at the nation-state level.

I have also discussed the proliferation of microstates and micropowers and the resulting fragmentation and instability. So what exactly is a micropower? I’d like to propose my own definition (concentrating on states) and leave it open for constructive criticism. I’m intentionally leaving out non-state actors though they make up a large portion of potential micropowers (as nonprofits like wikipedia and other organizations outside a said system challenge actors in other systems)

• Be a small state actor in control of some amount of territory.


• Concentrate on soft power, 4GW and Global Guerilla methods for projecting power. Hard power is almost never used, and almost never feasible. Asymmetry is the key.


• Important location (like real estate, location is everything)


• Can be unusually flexible. Can join/leave ad hoc coalitions, practice a certain amount of Realpolitik


• May or may not be under an external security umbrella (Bilateral, regional, national)


• Seek strategic connectivity vis-a-vis its geographical location. Be critical but not vulnerable. Be a node whose disconnection would precipitate cascading failure. Create external vulnerability and thus internal stability.


• Use international organizations, communications and NGOs to champion your cause and promote/defend your interests. Target populations more than governments. Make bilateral problems multilateral.

Yet, certain challenges face states who wish to quickly accumulate power and become critical nodes. Resiliant networks tend to avoid creating too many critical nodes by creating redundant ones thus ensuring continued function in case of one node’s failure. That said, there could be a limited time frame for holding such a position. Moreover, a state may quickly become a micropower if its “real estate” suddenly skyrockets in value due to outside circumstances. Thus, their power would likely be temporary.

One example of a future micropower (albeit a struggling one) is the Ukraine. It plays a vital connecting role between Europe and Russia and betwen its Orange Revolution and dispute with Russia over natural gas, is becoming a micropower having successfully portrayed itself as a newly democratic country victimized by an autocratic Russia.

Using network terminology, the Ukraine’s “betweenness” means it plays a pivotal role in what flows and what doesn’t. In other words, empty pipelines leading out of the Ukraine (regardless of the reason) quickly leads to a cascading failure, cutting off European supplies. Although Russia meant to isolate the Ukraine and not Europe, Kiev naturally began siphoning off gas to fill its needs leaving Europeans in the cold. Failing to see the network dynamic at play, they succeeded in destroying their reputation as a reliable energy partner and are already suffering for it.

As the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 2005 showed, although the Ukraine was technically in the wrong, it won the media war in its portrayal as the victim of Russian aggression. Similar to the recent Israel-Hizballah conflict, victory is meaningless if nobody believes you won as Israel found out the hard way. In addition, the Ukraine was not any kind of a power without its pipelines. The flows are important, not the nodes. Turkey by contrast, was and is an important regional power whose power is bolstered by its increasingly becoming an energy hub between east and west.

I now open the floor for readers who surely have much to add to the discussion. The next post will focus on Georgia and discussing John Robb’s question within the framework of the discussion by Foreign Policy.