There’s the question of what would happen to Pakistani lands if you did away with them? Unfortunately, you’d probably get a Yugoslavia-style disintegration on the Indus, not the Danube. You’d wind up with at least four weak, unstable states, at war with each other and probably not able to exert their own power over their own nominal holdings.

Would you give them to India? My mother actually is Indian, so I have some interest in this subject. Certainly most Indians would agree that Pakistan (and Bangladesh) should have stayed part of India. (Actually, most Indians would say that Nepal and Sri Lanka and maybe even Arakan and Chin in Burma should all be part of India!) But there’s a difference between then and now. The Pakistan of 1947 was a religiously-mixed territory that was about 30% non-Muslim. It’s largest cities in the Punjab, like Lahore, Rawalpundi, and Multan were linked very closely with Delhi, Agra, and the northern cities of India. The Baluchis and the Pashtuns remained largely tribal. Islam was far less politicized and more Sufi-influenced. THAT state could have fit in fine with India.

Now, 60 years later, most Pakistanis would assert that they feel certifiably “Pakistani.” The non-Muslim minorities are gone; the previously small cities are now overpopulated megapoli; Islamic parties hold a great deal of political power (out of proportion with their actual numbers); the old trade networks are gone and new ones have arisen; their are millions of poor Afghan refugees and thousands of fundamentalist, Talibanists; even the language has changed with Urdu having been “purified” and Punjabi now written in the Perso-Arabic script. Plus, Pakistan’s population has grown such that their reaccession to India would immediately strike fear into Hindus of being overwhelmed by Muslims, who would instantly form over 1/3 of India’s population.

Truthfully, for all its faults, it would be best for the Pakistanis, for the world, and greatly for the Indians if Pakistan were to remain a single country. India’s security and the security of the world will be best assured by a democratic, religiously-tolerant, prosperous and united Pakistan. There’s very little to suggest that its breakup would increase the potential for ANY of those outcomes.

The closest that realistically and desirably a “reunification” of sorts could occur would be the eventual creation of a South Asian Union. Given the small number of states involved and the overwhelming size of India, it’s unlikely that such an entity would be an EU-style one with its own parliament, etc. It could however be a free trade zone and common market, a common currency with a customs union and free movement of people and goods, along with a military alliance and a no-war pact. But while I think this is desirable on many levels and while many (even in Pakistan) may be open to the idea, we’re at least a few decades away from that happening. First, there needs to a solution over Kashmir and secondly, Pakistan and Bangladesh must register similarly high and sustained levels of economic growth as India. There’s no way that India would throw open its borders to countries that lag behind economically.

Another thought that occurs to me is that if one assumes that the dismemberment of Pakistan is a good idea, why not do away with it altogether. India is already multiculturally pretty much a success while Jinnah’s pipe dream of an pure muslim enclave was a disaster from the get-go and continues to be such.

Of course, none of this will ever come to pass, but it is a fascinating exercise…

The idea of creating discrete, ethnically pure nation-states is a fool’s game; only Europe succeeded at doing so and that only came about through historical accidents, two world wars, massive ethnic cleansing and genocide. What’s more, even THAT homogeneity is now under seige from increased immigration.

The historical experience suggests that splitting up larger nations into smaller ones and wrecking pre-established boundaries tends to actually do more harm than good. Firstly, it’s enormously disruptive socially and economically. Old trade networks are split, as are families and friends. Secondly, it tends to promote militarism and constant disputes as both sides clammer for more territory.

I agree that the boundaries of the Middle East are imperfect, but with the giant exception of the Kurds and the Israelis, they aren’t anywhere near as big an issue in Middle Eastern countries as people in the West make them out to be. Travelling in Jordan – a wholly artificial country – I was struck by how defiantly the people defined themselves as “Jordanian.” Syrians saw themselves as Syrian, and the Lebanese – even amongst warring communities – saw themselves as Lebanese. All of those people held second identities as Arabs or Muslims, but there was very little sentiment for merging with another country or forming a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic superstate.

The fact is that borders DO acquire legitimacy to most people. No matter how arbitrary, if they are in place long enough, people tend to grow used to them. That’s less true in sub-Saharan Africa where governments have been very weak, and it’s less true in Central Asia, where the borders were irrelevant in Soviet times and continue to be absurd (actually, the most logical boundary in Central Asia would be for them all to be one large Central Asian superstate although perhaps excluding Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). But in the Middle East it remains true.

Recall that even during Lebanon’s civil war, few Lebanese from any faction argued for a reabsorption into Syria or outright secession. It is only with the instability of the last 2 years that Shias in Iraq have been contemplating splitting, although even there there is so far virtually no support for outright secession among Shias (just schemes that allow them to control the oil revenue).

The only places Peters’ boundaries have any relevancy are Kurdistan and Pakistani Baluchistan (and even in Kurdistan, there is no practical way a pan-Kurdish state can be created – only an Iraqi-Kurdish one). Maybe his rump Pakistan is a little more coherent (there’s a big split between those West of the Indus and those East of the Indus; those West are more like Afghans, those East more like Indians).

The most absurd boundaries have to be his boundaries for Iran. Is he aware that Iran has had the same boundaries for centuries and that Europeans were only partially responsible for them (i.e. the Western Iranian boundary was negotiated between the Ottoman Empire and Persia)? Yes, the inclusion of Eastern Afghanistan would make sense (actually all of Afghanistan could conceivably be in Iran), but does Peters actually know ANYTHING about Iran? He talks of “restoring” a Persian charater to the country, despite the fact that Persia/Iran has ALWAYS been multicultural and has been bilingual Persian/Turkic (Azeri) for centuries. There’s virtually no Azeri separatism in Iran because Azeris are heavily integrated into Iranian society; they’re bilingual in Persian, intermarry frequently, and occupy top ranks of academia, politics, and business. Plus, they’ve been separated from their kin in the Azerbaijan Republic for two centuries, during which time the northern branch has become significantly Russified.

His Saudi map is alright. Perhaps if the Saud Dynasty falls, the Western Coast (Hejaz) could become independent again; as it is, ironically, that portion was historically quite open and liberal.

Overall though it’s a pretty ignorant map that would cause even MORE bloodshed than the agreements he condemns.

Nathan: “By the way, why does he keep Tajiks, Uzbeks, the Hazara, and Turkmen under the Pashtun yoke in Afghanistan?”

Probably he couldn’t figure out who should get Kabul, either.

These colonial creations were held together by and large throughout the Cold War, but that is changing. Southern Sudan (which votes on independence in 5 more years), Kurdish Iraq, Katanga (Congo) and Baluchistan will all likely see independent or autonomous realities within the next decade. A US policy of standing athwart history, yelling “Stop”Â?, is bound to fail. Trying to sacrifice geographical, ethnic and demographic common sense at the altar of stability is going to prove untenable over time, as our problems in Iraq with the largely three separate communities of Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis prove.

WRT # 2 & 3, we should ask the question: does ethnic cleansing work? One can see it alive and well as a policy instrument of dictators, from Zimbabwe to Sudan, and it was used to brutal effect by Saddam and (in a lesser sense WRT body counts) Turkey’s military in the past few decades.

Indeed, in his recent essay “Hostage to Fortune”Â?, Robert Kaplan makes the strongest argument for the thought exercise Peters invoked here.

“The countries that lie between the Mediterranean Sea and Persia had little meaning before the 20th century. Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were but vague geographical expressions. Jordan wasn’t thought of. When we remove the official lines on the map, we find a crude finger-painting of Sunni and Shiite population clusters that contradict national borders. Inside these borders, the governing authorities in Lebanon and Iraq barely exist. The one in Syria is tyrannical but fundamentally unstable; the one in Jordan rational but under quiet siege. If there is a part of the Middle East that dimly approximates the former Yugoslavia it is the region from Lebanon to Iran. We face the unraveling of the state system that for a century was the solution to the demise of the Ottoman empire.”

We can ignore history, culture, religious sects and demographics and try to milk a few years out of an antiquated colonial nightmare, or we can move on to the sweeping AND gradual alterations of borders and nations that are bound to happen sooner than later. Granted, a multitude of options exist for how these (and other) hypothetical borders will come about; free trade zones, conflict corridors or bloody fundamentalist nightmares realized. Lastly, the prospect of failed states within the region invites questions of how neighboring states and groups will respond. Some ethnic dreams could be realized, others will be shattered.

Sorry, meant to type “not being part of France or Germany”.

German Swiss and French Swiss are perfectly happy not being part of France or Switzerland, and many Middle Eastern minorities might prefer to cut a deal with their majority populations than to be united with their compatriots, depending on the quality of the deal. But permitting some minorities to establish their own states gives greater bargaining power to their compatriots elsewhere.

Because Britain wasn’t sole arbiter of power in the Middle East – it had to jockey for position with other colonial states. Hence the Sykes-Picot Agreement. As to the wider issue of redrawing borders, I agree with Curzon’s assertion that “no state can be ethnically pure”, and think that attempts to divide up regions according to ethnic groupings will make for more conflict, not less.

Most of the other issues have been mentioned above.

One question: why didn’t Britain draw this map following World War I? The answer may tell us a good deal about why it’s a good or (as I believe) a bad idea.

The purposeful creation of ethnic states leads to wars of expansion, in order to gain all of “Ëœour’ land and to ethnic clensing to get rid of “Ëœthem.’

and Catholicgauze,

It seems man is doomed in this world either way.

I’m reminded of some lines by Jervis, on pages 173-174 of The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values [notes]

It appears that we adjust or renormalize much more quicly for gains than for losses. Very soon after we have gained territory, influence, status, or wealth, we consider our new position to be the status quo from which we will judge future gians or losses. .. This means that at any particular time many states are likely to feel themselves in the realm of losses because they can look back at an earlier ‘golden age.’

We can not gain peace simply through rearranging borders, because at any time most states and nations will be feeling cheated. We can, however, rationalize borders to create sane polities while focusing on building systems that create economic growth. That is the way we will not be doomed.

But, I did want to say about Kazakhstan that if I wanted to be a stickler, I’d argue that ethnic diversity does directly not make it richer exactly. Kazakhstan would benefit from homogeneity in some ways. It would reduce the tensions created by trying to raise the status of the Kazakh language, for one. But there simply aren’t enough Kazakhs to populate the country’s vast territory, and it would lose many well-trained citizens crucial to the country’s industries. Making national minorities content is more or less a requirement for the state to survive in its current borders, and the government is competent enough to pull it off. One could argue that the same is the case in the Middle East (and elsewhere in Central Asia) but that there is far less interest in pulling it off.

Anyhow, I agree with you Curzon especially on the point that redrawing the borders shifts around national minority problems in new ways (that are potentially far more dangerous because new situations inherently carry more uncertainty).

Most of the West Bank should go to Israel at this point, with only the Palestinian populated areas being given to Jordan as exclaves. Gaza can be its own microstate.

Ideally I’d also return the Sinai to Israel and put most of Sudan (excluding Darfur and co.) within the new borders of Egypt.

Moving further south, Somalia should be partitioned into Somaliland, new Ethiopian coastal territory, slightly expanded Kenyan territory, and a much smaller area for Somali tribal control around Mogadishu.

Yes, the packaging on this map making kit should explicitly state “Jedi Powers NOT Included”. But leaving that aside for just a moment, I wonder what it would realistically take to find ourselves in a period of history again where a dominant power could rewrite borders like our drunken friend did those few decades ago.

[heavy sarcasm]Of course with the rise to power of Juliani Caeser in the New American Empire, we could just annex the globe entire and put our pesky crayons away.[/heavy sarcasm]

The only sillier notion than engineering borders is allowing terrorists to rewrite them.

There are big advantages to having minority populations of neighboring nations in each state: more fluidity of trade across borders, a kinder nationalism, and t…

Very true.

the current political borders of the region are nothing but a drop in the ocean when considered on a time line, to somehow pretend they are sacred and involiable is to forget the thousands of years of history before.

And again.

The problem is, while it’s fun to think about for the purpose of understanding the region, it invites absurd policy stances. I stick to my Jedi powers analogy.

However, you may not agree on the value of such cartography, but in places like Central Asia and the Middle East, one can achieve a better understanding of the real dynamics at play by looking at ethnic borders rather than by looking at political ones. That doesn’t mean one automatically equals the other, but it’s indeed a useful exercise. After all, the current political borders of the region are nothing but a drop in the ocean when considered on a time line, to somehow pretend they are sacred and involiable is to forget the thousands of years of history before.

As for everyone wanting in on the map altering action, I’m opening up Fireworks right now!