I ask the basic political question: What is in it for us to be heavily involved? My conclusion: Nothing. My solution, detach our landpower commitment to ROK. You say (1) impossible and (2) stupid. Impossible because of treaty commitments. I say, revise them. The ROKs neither want us nor need us. You say, stupid, because our landpower commitment in ROK has kept the peace of 60 years. I say, the situation has changed. The threat of an NK attack has become much less, and it can be better handled by China and ROK.

I’d like to see a quote where I say it’s “impossible”Ã�? to withdraw. You won’t find one in either explicit or implicit form. You’ve misread/mixed up what I wrote on the order of arms race and war, so it’s also not surprising that you misinterpret other elements of what I wrote. So be it.

But surely it would be incredibly stupid. I’ve laid out why on several occasions; you get it or you don’t, no need to spell it out again. Get the explanation again here “â�� it explain why the new situation requires a continued USFK presence. In fact this is more critical now that it has been since the 1980s.

You say, well, the US presence has prevented an arms race. That presents the tradeoff between inevitable Americans deaths when NK goes down if we stay on the ground there versus the hypothetical risks to the USA of an arms race”â��?risks to other people don’t concern me. . .

I understand the reality as well as you do, sir.

Look, this whole thread arose from an article by Kaplan. In that article he says NK is going to fall apart. Let’s assume arguendo he is right. He posits two scenarios, (1) NK attack on ROK, or (2) NK collapse. He says USA will be heavily involved in either.

I ask the basic political question: What is in it for us to be heavily involved?

My conclusion: Nothing. My solution, detach our landpower commitment to ROK. You say (1) impossible and (2) stupid. Impossible because of treaty commitments. I say, revise them. The ROKs neither want us nor need us. You say, stupid, because our landpower commitment in ROK has kept the peace of 60 years. I say, the situation has changed. The threat of an NK attack has become much less, and it can be better handled by China and ROK. You say, well, the US presence has prevented an arms race. That presents the tradeoff between inevitable Americans deaths when NK goes down if we stay on the ground there versus the hypothetical risks to the USA of an arms race — risks to other people don’t concern me. I say, I weigh the inevitable deaths higher. I think this is a political question that should be put to the American public, so we don’t drift into a war that we need not be in. You also say, well, there will be an arms race between Japan and Korea, which is something of a novelty in the foregoing discussion. I say, I discount that risk compared to the American deaths in a ROK-NK war we don’t need to be in.

I say, we should minimize our involvement to reconstructing NK. Many people will die in the effort. I see no reason any American should die in it. I also say it will be very expensive and I see no reason Americans should pay for it. You say, well, historically it is inevitable we will be involved. OK. In that case, get our landpower out of ROK, so that when reconstruction begins we can pick at our own discretion where, when and how and at what expense we get involved.

I don’t think anything I have said denies the existing reality. It is all a matter of political decisions. Our country has been drifting with regard to Korea.

Kaplan’s article shows that there are huge costs about to come due in lives and treasure and I want the USA to bear as little of it as possible. That is realism, not fantasy, and it is not an unattainable goal. The American public could be informed about how little the ROKs like us or want us there. We could then ratchet down our involvement.

I understand the reality as well as you do, sir. I am afraid that nothing is going to happen, we will continue to drift along, then there will be a war, and a lot of Americans will be killed for a cause which is not our own. When the Cold War was on, it made sense to be in ROK, on the ground. It no longer does. We should act accordingly

I have just re-read what I wrote and do not see any point at which I am detached from reality, or what is politically possible if someone would exercise some leadership.

2) One must note that the military power balance in the korean peninsular has reversed compared with 1950s. NK does not have the resource, or the capability to attack SK. SK is probably strong enough to defend, or even invade NK alone.
this makes the US-SK pact very differenct vs 20-40 years ago.

we are talking about how SK deal with a NK collapse, not how SK resist a (much weakened) NK invasion.

The Chinese … will be forced to keep the peace.

If you want to change the facts as they are (yes facts), maybe you should run for office. Before (if) you do, I hope you grasp the effects of isolationism since those lesson apparently don’t inform your current worldview.

You’re also still focused on the misconceptions that an arms race would not hurt America’s ability to project influence and that the U.S. won’t be intimately involved, in many ways, in a Korean reunification. I’ve not seen an argument close to convincing of that, and don’t expect to. I may not prefer that these things be true, but I’m a realist that recognizes that they are. And as I have an internal locus of control, I don’t spin my wheels with scenarios not based on the baseline realities, but focus on the actually practical.

“…projecting ones desires…” I am talking about what our policies should be. This is still a democracy, we elect people, and major policies must be supported democratically. I’m not projecting, I’m suggesting.

“…treaty obliations…” Amend or revoke any treaty that compels us to get involved in a land war in Korea. This is not insurmountable.

I disagree that a so-called arms race will make Asia more dangerous. I also disagree that the USA moving to a less exposed posture in ROK will increase any danger. The Chinese are the ones with the most to lose and will be forced to keep the peace. To the extent that ROK or Japan obtain nuclear weapons, this will make war less, not more, likely. Nuclear weapons are the great peace makers. To the extent that Japan or ROK even obtained greater conventional capability, this would help keep the peace vis-a-vis NK. As to China, China can decide to engage in an arms race, or to invest in its economy. The leadership there seems to be more driven by greed, which is good, than by dreams of military glory. And China already has nuclear weapons.

This talk of arms races obscures the issue which was raised by Kaplan’s article. He says, plausibly, NK is not going to last. It is going to fall apart. When it does one of two things will happen, there will be a war with ROK in the process, or NK will dissolve into disorder without a war. If it is the former, there is no benefit to the USA having land forces in the way. If we build down, the ROKs will spend what it takes to defend themselves, or take their chances. If it is the latter, not having land forces next door will give us more options as to how, when, and how deeply we get involved in any rebuilding effort. The American public would probably not be interested in a major commitment to that project, especially if we had not been sucked into it merely by being there when it started.

You’ve missed the point entirely; it is not about distrust of Japan, it’s about the reaction by China and the Koreas (or Korea if reunified).

Arms races alone are not dangerous, but what happens when nations participating in arms races miscalculate and respond to real or perceived threats is.

The argument has been advanced that the USA must maintain that presence, and lose thousands of people in an intra-Korean war, so that there won’t be an “arms race” in Asia.

Actually, that’s an incorrect summary of the argument. You’ve confused cause and effect in this case; the U.S. (a) should remain in the ROK in order to maintain the stability, that is has unquestionable achieved in the past six decades, (b) in order to head off said arms race. A second Korean War is not inevitable or even likely – unless there is an arms race.

To me the risk of being compelled to participate in such a war, and compelled to pay for much of the post-NK-collapse cleanup is a price which exceeds the risk of a hypothetical Asian arms race if we move to an offshore posture that gives us more options and pushes China and ROK into taking the lead on winding up the NK mess.

First (and again), it is the arms race which increases chances of another Korean (and East Asian) War, not the other way around.

Second, the U.S. would end up participating in an East Asian or Korean War regardless of a USFK withdrawal; we have both treaty obligations and broad financial interests in the region.

Third, if you think the U.S. would not bear a large part of Korean reconstruction, if USFK remains or not, then you have not been paying attention to our foreign policy since WWII.

I find that projecting ones desires as the reality of the situation, as opposed to looking at the uncomfortable facts of the matter(s), does little good in coming to any plausible understanding of the situation.

but again, why would anyone want nuke for japan? even most japanese don’t want it. this proposal is as bad as curzon’s nuke NK plan a year ago.

Uh, I can see an upside for everybody if Japan’s military upgraded to a full ministry (as they are doing now) and became more of a force in peacekeeping, relief and stabilization missions (except in Korea). But getting nukes? My rule of thumb on China’s nuclear position is that unless you have enough nukes to wipe out the entire landmass of China Proper, you don’t deter – you simply make them more testy and angry. This goes triple for Japan since that’s the last nuclear power China (or Korea) wants to see. Japan would have to go major Daddy Warbucks to build up a credible nuclear deterrent to China, and China wouldn’t have to lift a finger for most of that time, except perhaps to actually put their missiles on alert launch status since they’ve been mothballed for years. All that would be accomplished by Japan nuclear would be a major escalation of tensions and distract Japan from doing other more useful things. Useful things like helping the U.S. or UN in their global strategies. Nope, don’t see the plus side here. Japan, don’t waste time on nukes.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html

Obviously, the original purpose of the US-South Korea alliance was to counter the North Korean threat. However, as that threat has waned, a more important, diplomatically incorrect mission has evolved in addition to deterring North Korea: ensuring stability among China, Japan and Korea.

You tend towards isolationism, which has a proven track record of allowing situations to fester until we get involved. And then the going is much tougher and many more Americans usually end up dead. Saying that the US “should”Ã�? not be involved doesn’t reflect what we all know “will”Ã�? be the case.

Nothing I’ve seen here convinces me that pulling out of Korea and leaving a security vacuum will do anything to maintain regional stability, far from it.

The situation has changed. NK is relatively weaker compared to ROK. ROK is wealthy now and can afford most of its own defense. The USSR is gone and NK has lost a major patron. China is no longer interested in supporting NK as it once did, hence losing its other major patron. NK is now more of a danger because of something crazy happening, not because it might overrun ROK. We could wind down our ocmmitment of ground troops, which would be popular in ROK. ROK used to be a reliable ally of the USA. They no longer are, and would like us out of their country, which they are within their rights to want.

The dynamics have changed. The 60 year old model worked well in its time. It is time to reassess.

I am somewhat simple in my thinking. I care very much about Americans getting killed and that occupies much of my thinking, how to avoid that. I don’t want that to happen unless there is a very, very good reason for it. Getting in the way of foreigners who may want to kill each other, or defending foreigners who don’t like us and can afford to defend themselves don’t strike me as good reasons.

As to cleaning up NK, I agree we probably will be involved. I wish we would not be. Ideally, I’d like to see us say, we did not cause this problem, we are not paying for it. But, I cheered when Bush said he was not going to do nation building. If we try to do “nation buiiding” in NK, the terrorist resistance we will face from psychos and die-hards will make Iraq look like nursery school. How many tons of explosives are cached all over the place in NK? It will be a nightmare. I say let the Chinese and ROKs do it. They have no choice. We can afford to be hard-nosed about it.

I think you need to define what “build up” means first.

what is a reasonable (non built up) size of defense?

IMHO % GDP for the past 10-15 years is perhaps a good measure (or per border length, or per sum of the arms force of your neighbor).
in such measure China’s armed force is perhaps weaker than India’s in any measure, not to mention Japan, or the 2 Koreas.

I’ll find/post sources/stats on the buildup tomorrow.

There simply is no massive arms build up. What there is, is a modernization program designed to turn the PLA from obsolescence into a modern military that is capable of defending Chinese interests. This may seem a matter of semantics but it is not. A buildup is when Hitler was massing aircraft and tanks by the thousands in preparation for war. What the Chinese military is experiencing is nearly the opposite, the shedding of antiquated equipment and extraneous personnel by the score in favour more lean and effective military. As I said earlier, it is a defense modernization plan. The only people who would view this as an arms build up are those that won’t be satisified unless the Chinese military is reduced to merely boyscouts and a coastguard.

I agree that there is currently no arms race, as races include more than one and China is building up along.

But China is building up. I invite you to cite some credible research to back up your claims that China is not in the midst of a massive build up.

Actually, yes. An arms race sets the stage for more things to go wrong in the event of North Korea collapse and drains resources from South Korea and Japan that would be better spent rebuilding a reunified Korea than arming the peninsula and the archipelago.

If NK falls apart and there is a war as part of the unravelling process thousands of our people will probably die.

IfIf NK falls apart and we are sitting there we will be expected to pick up the cleanup tab, which will be in the trillion dollar range probably. Why is this good for us? The ROKs have made it clear they don’t like us. Fine. Defend yourself, or make an alliance with China.

Simply being there or not won’t matter. Do you seriously believe the U.S. wouldn’t be a major contributor to such an effort? That’s not realistic. Japan, China, Russia, the UN, etc. will all be in for that one.

No matter if the U.S. is in Korea or not, it is likely that North Korea will eventually collapse and the U.S. will offer massive assistance. To assert otherwise is to ignore history from WWII to present.

As to an arms race, I see no problem. China has nukes and is arming fast already. If they want to “race”Ã�? more, so be it.

China is building up, not in a race (i.e., races include more than one party).

If you don’t see a problem with an arms race, at least plenty of others do. It’s a race Korea could not win, which would push it to go nuclear. That in turn would put pressure on Japan to do the same. In such a case perceptions of vulnerabilities matter just as much (or more) than the realities, and it would take one miscalculation to spark something much larger.

I see a major problem with an arms race. It would be irresponsible and foolish to set conditions to usher in one.

Every reason I hear for our continued presence in Korea consists of abstractions.

Six decades without a regional war “â�� is that concrete enough for you? It’s not an accident.