Back in March, renowned scenario planner Peter Schwartz gave a talk for the John’s Hopkins series Rethinking the Future Nature of Competition and Conflict. In it he mentioned that Putin’s decision to cut off gas to the Ukraine and inadvertently to Europe, was a major mistake which would cost Russia round 10 trillion dollars over the next decade. It also showed, and rightly so, that Russia was an unreliable partner and it was time to diversify. Today there’s this:
EU Signs Deal To Back Nabucco Pipeline
June 27, 2006—The European Commission and representatives of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria have backed the building of a pipeline to transport Caspian and Middle East gas to the European Union.A joint declaration supporting the Nabucco pipeline was agreed June 26 in Vienna, Austria.The planned 3,300-kilometer pipeline is part of EU moves to diversify its energy supplies after gas supplies from Russia were briefly interrupted during a pricing row between Russia and Ukraine at the start of this year. Russia supplies about one-quarter of Europe’s gas.The pipeline is expected to cost 4.6 billion euros ($5.8 billion), and reports said construction is expected to start in 2008, with the first gas flowing in 2011. Plans call for the pipeline to eventually transport about 30 billion cubic meters of gas from the Caspian region to Central Europe per year.
Once completed, it will allow natural gas to be transported from producers countries like Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Western Europe as well as all the countries along the way such as Bulgaria and Romania. While this bypasses the Russians, let’s not forget about the North European Gas Pipeline which will bring natural gas in directly from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. In the future, that pipeline may be extended from Germany through the Netherlands and into the UK. While Europe can now better understand the importance the US attaches to energy security, the US could stand to learn a thing or two about conservation
Meanwhile, things are looking interesting in Central Asia. More on that later.
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Comments to this entry
Dan tdaxp
June 27, 2006
1:30 pm
Chirol
June 27, 2006
2:37 pm
Dan tdaxp
June 27, 2006
3:49 pm
Russia grew over centuries, and may decline over centuries. Indeed, 2014 will mark the 100th anniversary of the start of the decline. What reason is there to think that this long-term trajectory will change?
Gollios
June 27, 2006
5:08 pm
1. Will Russian remain a lingua franca in the central asian 'stans and will it continue to be an important language for eastern Europe?
2. Will cultural affinity continue to keep Georgia & the Ukraine tied to Moscow? What about the Orthodox Balkan states? Chirol said:
"I think Russia will always occupy a strange middle space between east and west, core and gap"
This is true of Georgia and Ukraine as well, and I think the history these states share with Russia will prevent them from going their own way entirely.
3. Population. Will the current trends reverse? And will more Russians work abroad in the countries that used to be part of the Russian empire? Or will those that can continue to immigrate to Europe and the U.S.?
I think if Russia can get the fundamentals right there is tremendous potential for it to return to great-power status. However, using the gas weapon doesn't bode well for the future--it indicates that their leaders may continue their habit of overstretch.
One more note...apparently Moscow is now the world's most expensive city.
IJ
June 27, 2006
5:24 pm
Moreover the EU would become less dependent on the US.
Chirol
June 27, 2006
6:37 pm
Dan: Indeed an interesting question. Russia basically has two good cards in its hand: natural resources and nukes. Otherwise, it's on the decline and it will be interesting to see how it recovers. Post-imperial European countries were at least small, homogenous and far away from their colonies allowing them a much easier transition back to bachelorhood. Russia doesn't have any of those luxuries.
IJ: IMO Russia will never join the EU, that's where Schwartz and I disagree. Much more realistically, I see a special relationship, but Moscow wouldn't yield to Europe. Never has, never will. I could only see this under extreme circumstances, i.e. imminent collapse, or dramatic decline, in which they'd look to the EU for a boost.
Dan tdaxp
June 27, 2006
8:36 pm
Agreed. Russia's position is much more similar to Turkey's than the other Empires. Turkey has been in long-term decline since 1683, and if the Kurds manage to break away, that decline will continue into the 21st century.
Because Russia is, like Turkey, a land empire, there is no logical end to the decline.
IJ
June 27, 2006
9:08 pm
The current partnership agreement with the EU (ten years) is due to expire in 2007, and the article discusses what should take its place. EU membership is "something that neither Brussels nor Moscow is interested in today". The opponents in Russia and the EU, who are in the majority, argue that Russia is too big for the EU; Russia won't cede any of its sovereignty; and the EU don't want to share borders with China.
But the future is uncertain. "The rapid radicalization of the Islamic world amid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of terrorism, however, could lead to a new lineup of forces along the North-South line, to new alliances and coalitions. . . Furthermore, an unbalanced, excessive rapprochement with China could lead to a situation in which Russia loses its Far Eastern and Siberian regions to Chinese demographic expansion, thus becoming China's raw-materials adjunct and waste-disposal grounds for its dynamic economy."
Never say never?
Nathan
June 28, 2006
12:15 am
And Dan, you have some strange views about Russia. Do you really think Russia is at serious risk of losing control of its territory? If so, name what territories you think it will lose, and if it's long term, how long term are you talking? Is it really meaningful to talk about a decline happening over the next few centuries when so much can change in the near- and mid-term? Are you really calling Russia "unimportant"? (And an alliance of Muscovy and Novgorod? Why not just call it the inheritor of the Golden Horde?)
Dan tdaxp
June 28, 2006
2:18 am
To what level must Russian in East Europe sink before it is unimportant. The third language? Fourth? Ever?
Data on Central Asian education would be interesting.
Chechnya, Kaliningrad, Primorsky, and Tatarstan are secessionist centers of gravity. (And federal republic that has Islamists, Europeans, Chinese, and greedy locals nipping at it at the same time is in some trouble). I talked about something similar earlier.
It will be interesting to observe the form the decline takes. The 19th century showed China and Africa divided by the Europeans, but in different manners.
Muscovy and Novgorod would appear to the geographic heart of center -- the maximum limit of territorial collapse (much as Ankara was the geographic heart of the Ottoman Empire). That doesn't mean that the boundaries will quickly fall to this, only that absent great structural changes they should approach this.
But then, is it meaningful of a turn-around over the next few generations when so much can change in the near- and mid- term?
Russia is exactly as important as any nuclear-wielding, energy-exporting state. So more important than either Saudi Arabia or North Korea. About as important as both combined, in fact.
Nathan Hamm
June 28, 2006
5:35 am
On what evidence do you call Primorsky and Kaliningrad "secessionist centers of gravity" other than their geography? Why not Sakha with its vast mineral wealth and past attempt to declare its sovereignty? Why not Dagestan, which, like Tatarstan, is one of the few administrative units without an ethnic Russian minority.
Saying that Russia will retreat to Novgorod and Muscovy strikes me as awfully Kaplanesque in that it follows his three part process of: 1) Historical fact; 2) Something vague and unexplained; and, 3) we're heading back to 1. That these are the historical center does not mean all that much when the demographics of almost every territory of the Russian federation is either ethnically tied or, as is still increasingly the case, culturally and linguistically tied, to Moscow. Hell, you might even get somewhere near half of the populations of some former Republics in Central Asia who would be in favor of putting Moscow back in charge of them. For lack of anything resembling a compelling argument for territorial retreat, I just can't find it a plausible assertion.
What would you like to know about Central Asian education? If it is about the Russian language, almost everyone still learns it and it is widely used. Even in Uzbekistan, where there's a pretty strong bias in favor of using the titular tongue, both Russian language and literature are taught in schools.
sun bin
June 28, 2006
4:01 pm
let's be fair to the russians. yes, they are greedy, aggressive polar bears. but,
1) 'inadvertently" was caused by Ukrane diverting the gas to its own use
2) yes, time to diversify. but the reason is the uncertainly when you have to pass a third country who may have dispute with the supplier (hence risk). it is unfair to lay the blame on the supplier alone
sun bin
June 28, 2006
4:05 pm
could you explain why it would cost russian $10 trillions? the lost revenue on fee for transporting the gas?
Dan tdaxp
June 28, 2006
5:44 pm
Geography is part of both. Primorsky faces a declining Russian population and a rising Chinese population in an area within easy travel of Beijing and difficult travel of Moscow. Even absent any Sino-Russian hostility, Primorsky should expect a rapid cultural Sinoization. And as China everywhere supports the dismemberment of the Russian Near Abroad (subsidization of the post-Soviet 'stans) and opposes such aid for Russian allies (such as Iran), China definitely is in soft rivalry with Russia.
The land border of Kaliningrad is exclusively with the European Union, which has a long history of strong (even military) intervention to reduce Russian influence. (Witness the painful and ongoing dismemberment of Greater Serbia). Today it is difficult for Kaliningraders to travel to Russia by train, and the EU can make it harder in a heartbeat. As Kaliningrad is now grindingly poor, the EU at anytime could stir up trouble with talk of aid for a more "autonomous" state, &c.
A long list supports my thesis. You can't criticize a view of a collapsing Russia by saying "No, wait, it's even worse for Russia than that!"
Indeed.
As I said before, Russia is a land empire with no place where dismemberment logically stops. This is similar to Turkey and even to Serbia, and that the Turks and Serbs had ethnically and racially close kin in gradients around their states didn't save them.
All in all the comparison to Kaplan is a distraction from the argument. Instead of stating "No, Russia is stronger than that" you effectively say "This view shares thematic qualities of a guy I disagree with."
So instead of being territorically integrating forces correlating with Russia, they are now territorially disintegrated forces. Hardly a counter-argument.
(And of course as Russians abroad continue to move to the motherland, and Russians at home continue to die off, an increasingly weak counter-argument at that.)
Yes, that's exactly what I would like to know. I am aware that Russian is a fourth language in much of Eastern Europe now (after domestic, English, and French or German). What is its status in Central Asia? I do not know.
Nathan
June 28, 2006
9:23 pm
I'm not adding to your list. Sakha and Tatarstan both declared themselves sovereign and it didn't work in either case. In the case of Sakha, the majority population--ethnic Russians--still strongly identify with Moscow. And in the case of Tatarstan, all it took was a stern look and a special arrangement that lets Tatarstan pretend on paper that it has some degree of sovereignty. In Dagestan, I would hazard to guess that most ethnic groups, like many other small ethnic groups both in the Russian Federation and in the near abroad, see many more advantages to being tied to Moscow than having to deal with one another on their own.
What I'm saying is that there are very few serious secessionist threats in the Russian federation, not that there are many. And where they currently exist, they are primarily ethnic. So long as its territories and economy are dominated by ethnic and cultural Russians, I see little reason to believe that secessionist pressures will tear the country apart. For example, you say that Russians will become a minority in Primorsky. (For the record, I've been to neighboring Khabarovsk Krai, and while there were Chinese there, Asians were essentially invisible members of society.) But, just like Europe can cut off Kaliningrad, cannot Russia close off Primorsky? China is not any more sly than Russia and Russia is certainly not foolish (or prone to act with mercy) when it comes to maintaining and controlling its territory.
A quick note on the comparison between Russia and the Ottomans: Russia's population isn't just ethnically "close." It is ethnically identical and sees itself as one single entity. A Russian is a Russian is a Russian, and increasingly often, so is a Mari, a Bashkort, a Sami, or an Avar. In terms of ethnicity, Russians in St. Petersburg are closer to the ones in Magadan than I am to my next door neighbor of German heritage. And in terms of culture and national identity (Russian nationalism has a strong civic element, not just an ethnic one), many of the country's national minorities identify strongly as Russians (Rossiyane), that is, members of the Russian civic community. And this will likely continue as national languages and identities are erased by pressures from the dominant position of Russian language and culture.
One thing about Central Asia that many seem not to know is that none of these countries were particularly interested in independence. Their economies were highly dependent on ties to Moscow, but during the collapse of the USSR, Russia wasn't particularly interested in subsidizing these territories. Many Central Asians--particularly ones who grew up under the Soviets--have somewhat ambivalent views about independence. It hasn't brought most of them all that much, after all. And Vladimir Putin is highly adored there.
Russian's status in Central Asia is that it is more or less the language of inter-ethnic communication, business, and academia. It's number 2, and I don't see it going anywhere.
The reason I made the comparison to Kaplan is not to say, "You argue like him, therefore I don't believe you." Rather, it is to point out that you, like him, are making a conclusion that doesn't fit the evidence. I am highly skeptical of any long-term predictions, and don't view as set in stone population trends. I entirely agree with you that there are Russian regions where there are pressures that could possibly lead to the loss of territory. But how do we get to the claim that territory will retreat to Moscow and Novgorod? What will cause ethnic Russians, the majority population in almost every region of the Russian federation (and of a good chunk of Kazakhstan) going to stop identifying with Russia and seek independence? Why will Russia allow China to become dominant in the Far East? Why should we assume that Russian population trends will continue? Why are only superficially similar historical situations like the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a template for the Russian Federation? You're the one positing a claim. It's a big one, but you're not backing it up any more than in a superficial way that reveals a better understanding of other historical cases than the actual case at hand. That's what's Kaplanesque about the argument.
sunbin
June 28, 2006
11:56 pm
Pretty good word to use.
1. to those who have faith (in kaplan) it is a compliment
2. to those who value logic it reminds us it is a different type of animal
everybody is happy. :)
I will remember that word.
Elizabeth
June 29, 2006
10:28 am
"Russia's attack on new European democracies"
Er, sorry, selling gas at an agreed price, namely, the world price, is an "attack"? Gee. With enemies like that, who needs friends? I'd take Russia's free transport of natural resources, sold on the free market, according to a pre-set agreement, any day.
Regarding Central Asia, Russia remains the only lingua franca. There are nearly no qualified English teachers to help make the transition to English (unlike in Eastern Europe, where one is nearly as likely to meet someone speaking broken English as passable Russian). At present, there are Russian schools in nearly every provincial center of Central Asia, and these remain the schools of choice (over Turkish) among the literati and anyone who has the connections to get their kid in. The only exception would be presidential lyceums in the capitals, and Turkish lyceums, but those are paid, and are not as highly regarded as Slavyanskiy and Russian schools (they take too many bribes and have too little accountability towards the local population, whereas Russian schools answer to Russian and Tatar and rich parents).
However, Russian is fading fast among the uneducated. It is not possible to use Russian in communications to the general public, especially if you hope to reach women. While youth used to be fluent in Russian by the sixth or seventh grades, moreover, now education has deteriorated to such an extent (and so many Russians have left) that many kids do not speak more than broken Russian by the end of high school. Many people in the provinces have forgotten Russian entirely, and recently, when trying to stop the bus in Russian, I realized that the teenage boy in Dushanbe responsible for calling the stops didn't even know the simple and (normally ubiquitous) ostanovite pozhaluysta! (stop, please)- he had to confirm what this meant with an older passenger.
We'll see how this pans out, but at present, it's not clear.
Nathan
I fully agree about the cohesiveness of Russian society.
About Central Asia, though: "none of these countries were particularly interested in independence".
This is not, strictly speaking, correct. There were strong nationalist movements in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in particular. Riots and protests had been going on since the mid-1980s. However, the powers that had been installed and that were dependent on the socialist system were opposed to independence, because they were afraid of losing power. The problem in Central Asia was that it remained throughout the Soviet Union, as always, a very hierarchial and traditional society, and the literati (unlike in the Baltics) were unable to carry their ideas through to independence sooner.
It should be acknowledged that in Tajikistan, the Islamists (the only group organized to attempt a real takeover from the communist leaders, who to this day remain in place under different names) were defeated after a very hard fight for independence. To suggest that Tajiks didn't want independence is to ignore the fact that thousands willingly lost their lives for a totally independent and new country. Nowadays, with the benefit of hindsight, people are nostalgic for the USSR. But at the time, it was not that clear.
Dan tdaxp
June 29, 2006
12:58 pm
Of course raising prices on a state as political retaliation is an attack. It correlates forces against your opponents.
Thank you very much for your description of Russia in Central Asia. It sheds light on the issue and makes a lot of sense.
Nathan,
Nope. For one, Russia is much more dependent on Chinese kindness than the EU is on Russian kindness. For another, Russia is much more corrupt than the EU, and that corruption leads to difficulty with border security.
"Mercy" isn't an issue. "Competence" is. Rusisa has repeatedly shown an inability to control her internal and external borders.
Increasingly? How to judge this?
If you mean that economic & political collapse increases petty loyalties, then I agree with you. And that's hardly a good & stablizing thing for the Russian State.
So is it that you discount the evidence, or discount the trend the evidence shows?
The long-, medium-, and short- term trends of Russian diminishment are there (with further humiliation yesterday).
Nathan Hamm
June 29, 2006
1:49 pm
It's that I don't accept without question that those trends will continue. Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and all that...
Easily. With each generation, fewer and fewer people from most of the national groups are speaking their national languages, keeping alive their national cultures, or identifying themselves as national minorities.
sun bin
June 29, 2006
2:11 pm
when we were buddies, I have been giving you free gifts. now we break up. i stop giving you free gift. well, 'retaliation', maybe yes, in a stretch. attack? only bad journalist will say that.
sun bin
June 29, 2006
2:18 pm
now US is asking China to attack N Korea, because China, fearing a collapse of N Korea and refugee wave (plus perhaps needing the 'NK card' to counter 'containment'), refused to attack N Korea even though KJI ignored China's advice, by continuing its aid to NK.
Dan tdaxp
June 29, 2006
5:10 pm
You are correct on the dangers of linear extrapolation. Certainly the world is complex. Nonetheless, when the economic infrastructure of a state is so poor as to lead to repeated fracturings, I would not expect the fracturings to cease without fundamnetal economic change. It does not seem this change is happening.
The last part of your comment argues for a melting in of local minorities. Do you know how this is distributed? That is, are Chinese is Vladivostok becoming Russian? What about Muslims? Is this primarily limited to Christian minorities? &c.
Sun Bin,
The confusion over the word "attack" seems to be moralistic or absolutist. That is, your point seems be that if hostile political action is somehow moral, justified, within one's rights, within what is fair, &c it is not an "attack." Adopting this normative language is troublesome, thus I do not do so.
The Cuban analogy is interesting. In that case, ending of aid seemed to be both from Moscow appeared to come from both a hostility toward Communism and an inability to provide aid. Perhaps the situation in Urkaine &c is similar -- Moscow both dislikes Kiev and the status quo was increasingly painful for Moscow.
sun bin
June 29, 2006
5:24 pm
I guess my trouble is the word 'hostile'. there may be hostile motives behind russian minds, but the act itself does not qualify as something 'hostile'.
it is at worse unfriendly, or cold, or indifferent (as opposed to being sweet and appeasing in the past).
Dan tdaxp
June 29, 2006
5:31 pm
I take it your original trouble wasn't with the word hostile, but anyway...
It seems that an act would be hostile to thing if it is designed to worsen the correlation of forces for that thing, and friendly to a thing if it is designed to improve the correlation of forces for a thing.
Surely you do not imagine that Russia's attack ("retaliation," whatever) on Ukraine was not done to improve the correlation of forces for the Ukrainian government! Indeed, it was done to do just the opposite.
sun bin
June 29, 2006
5:46 pm
1. the cuban swallowed it, because they knew they had nothing to offer to russian in exchange and therefore they are not entitled to anything. the ukranians could not take it and whines -- but i would not blame the ukrainians either as it was really a legitimate ploy in negotiation (though diverting gas from the pipe is dubious and blamable)
2. my complain is the 'double standard' US media applied to Cuba and Ukraine, and to a certain extent Chirol's tone in this post, plus that many people are blaming russia for being "hostile". ok, ukraine govt is pro-western/pro-US, with a gorgeous female premier, but the biase has been too outrageous.
don't get me wrong, i think russia has been and is a big bully. but playing the 'double standard' game may not be doing good service to the new democracies in the world, in the long term.
Dan tdaxp
June 29, 2006
6:16 pm
Interesting thought on a double standard... Hopefully today I'll have time for a post on this...
Nathan Hamm
June 29, 2006
9:33 pm
Well, I guess that depends on what "change" means. It certainly has already bottomed out, is definitely growing, and is attracting people (such as the Chinese...) as economic migrants. Russia's apparently doing something right.
Regarding the melting of national minorities, it's not evenly distributed. The smaller groups and those with the most contact with Russians are being swallowed more quickly than others. To be extremely broad, the Finno-Ugrians tend to be under more pressure than the Turkic peoples. This is the case for many reasons, but I wouldn't count religion as chief among them.
As for Chinese integration, I know nothing about it. But doing some quick reading on migration to the region, I think it's worth asking whether or not there's even an opportunity for migrants to Russify. It's not clear that individual migrants are staying long enough. Interestingly though, a century ago people thought the large numbers of Chinese flowing into the Far East would result in territorial losses for the Empire. Funny how trends can rapidly go the other way.
Dan tdaxp
June 29, 2006
11:22 pm
Really? Is the core economy growing? That is, any tinpot state (from Venezuela to Saudi Arabia) can see GDP "growth," but it's not a structura improvement to the economy. Indeed, as states that get oil before they get rich tend toward ruin, newly tapped oil and natural gas reserves are yet another long-term disaster for Moscow.
True. The 20th century saw the collapse of nearly every Empire. Chinese, Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German (again), Italian, Japanese, British, French, Portuguese, Russian (again)...
The question for future historians will be if the collapse of the Russian Federatoin will count as a third collapse for Russia, or just an ungodly continuation of the second...
Elizabeth
June 30, 2006
10:56 am
This is an attack?
I agree fully with Sun Bin on this one. The US and British press presented this case without ever even mentioning the pre-existing agreements on price normalization, and without ever mentioning that the so-called "price hike" was not EVEN fully to the going rate.
Not surprising, though, for countries which believe it's okay to bomb the living daylights out of a country because it does or doesn't uh we're not sure okay we were wrong "weapons of mass destruction".
Dan tdaxp
June 30, 2006
11:18 am
Your apolegetic is essentially normative. As I already said, it is dangerous to confuse the normative and the substantive, and I try not to do so.
Your last paragraph is besides the point.
Elizabeth
June 30, 2006
11:22 am
It is not normative. The fact that the price rise was pre-set and Ukraine was the first to break the agreement shows that Russia was not the agressor (only the stronger) in this incident. This is extremely important, since if Russia is not the agressor, then why are we trying to punish her?
The last paragraph may be difficult to connect with my agreement with Sun Bin, however, the point, to put it bluntly is: America and Great Britain are not concerned with facts at all. They act in their own interests regardless of the truth.
Dan tdaxp
June 30, 2006
12:00 pm
Russia may or may not be an aggressor, but that's besides the fact that Russia attacked Ukraine. Your argument is saying that "At no time in World War II did America attack Japan, because Japan was the aggressor in the conflict."
You say your criticism "is not normative," but then slip into this moralism again. It's even a bizarre moralism, because I did not mention punishment. Unless you believe that every action every state takes must be seen through a lense of right and wrong -- which is a stance that is "not concerned with facts at all" but rather exclusively concerned with normative criticism.
Elizabeth
June 30, 2006
12:14 pm
When I said Russia was not the agressor, I should have said, Russia was not the agressor and did not do anything constituting an attack. It merely held its ground.
And no, you did not mention punishment, however the tone of the CA article (and your posts) implies that Russia somehow "deserves" to lose business, although it contintues to sell gas and petrol at the world rates.
I don't believe that every action made (by any actor) "must" be seen through a lense of right and wrong, but I do believe that all actions can be seen through a lense of right and wrong.
Chirol
June 30, 2006
12:32 pm
Elizabeth
June 30, 2006
12:45 pm
Now, Russia did not cut gas to Europe, it simply has pipes going THROUGH Ukraine. When it told Ukraine the time was up, as per their agreement, and Ukraine refused to pay the set rate, it told Ukraine that unfortunately it would then have to stop selling gas to Ukraine. (And yes, the communiques and news briefs did use the word "unfortunately" and were polite.)
Ukraine refused and took as much gas as it needed to prevent counter-revolution.
Who is the unreliable business partner?
Europe should not put all its eggs in one basket, but on the other hand, they didn't need Ukraine siphoning off gas at third-world prices in order to learn that lesson.
Chirol
June 30, 2006
12:47 pm
Indeed, but that's what it took. And it was both necessary and positive for the Europeans.
sun bin
June 30, 2006
4:12 pm
however, the post above seem to suggest it was russia's fault, which is quite different from sayiing its "their fault" as in chirol's comment above.
i would also argue the lesson is not that ukraine+russia is together unreliable, but that any pipe that involves 2 coutnries is less reliable that via direct neighbor, and 3 countries less reliable than 2 countries, and so on.
this is why Japan tried so hard to lobby for russia to build "the pipe all the way to Nahodka (vs going through NE China)":http://sun-bin.blogspot.com/2005/11/siberia-pipeline-odyssey-myth-i-have.html
sun bin
June 30, 2006
4:27 pm
from where the discussions has reached, it seems to point to EU.
in the post it seems to point to russia's "major mistake", "$10rt in potential revenue in next decade". i asked but i still don't know how they arrived at that number.
i believe it is totally faulty calculation schwartz quoted, trying to deliberately muddle the issue by accusing russia.
Chirol
June 30, 2006
4:50 pm
sun bin
June 30, 2006
4:59 pm
but then you said 'stupidity' is 'expensive'. i would say it is not expensive at all, maybe a few billions, definitely not at the order of 10trillions.
Dan tdaxp
June 30, 2006
5:44 pm
In answer to
See my previous reply to you:
You can say that the definition of attack is bad (which is fine, but then you need to provide an alternative word for politcally-oriented harmful behavior), or that Russia's actions weren't politically motivated, or weren't intented to correlate forces against their opponent.
sun bin
June 30, 2006
6:01 pm
i guess we are speculating on russia's intention, though i think your speculation may well be within reason.
but i would rather understand this act as a composition of motivation. i.e. even before the relationship went sour, there are people in russia arguing why they should subsidize ukraine (bylerorussia as well). but the higher up said, for whatever realpolitik reason. then on dec 2005 the higher just said the premise was gone now......
the (hypothetical) question i would ask is, had ukraine been neutral to russia, i.e. lukewarm to russia but not pro-US either. would they raise the price (and hence cut the supply when ukraine refused to pay)? i think the russian may still do the same.
why? because the price they were asking was actually lower than what some other central asian CIS nations got, who were more friendly to russia than ukraine.
so in that sense, it think it is unfair to call this an act of attack or hostility. had russia ask for an outrageous price (i.e. above market price, or above ther average it supplies to other CIS neighbors), you may then argue that it was 'hostile'.
Dan tdaxp
June 30, 2006
9:01 pm
(On your hypothetical: Political power is the ability to get a party to do what they would not otherwise do. Thus a state that Russia had a lot of power over would not receive a discount, becase Russia would translate that power into wealth.)
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