In the first post, Forget the Gap, try the Middle Ages, I discussed ungoverned space, and how it relates to gangs, international criminal networks, terrorists and Feudalism. While doing various research for follow up posts, I began thinking about PNM Theory.
The aforementioned organizations all operate in ungoverned spaces, physical and non-physical areas where the state fails to govern. So, continuing with the comparison to the Middle Ages, I’d like to go back in history. The onset of the Middle Ages was caused by the collapse of Rome, which shattered the empire into various pieces, each disconnected from the other. This meant roads in disrepair, the collapse of money and the return of bartering and that land was the source of power and legitmacy. What brought on the collapse of Rome? According to Henri Pirenne, it was the Arab invasions which closed the Mediterranean to trade. The Mediterranean was Rome’s heart, the most vital connecting point which pumped energy, people, security and money throughout the empire. After the heart stopped, the body parts died quickly.
But ironically, as the Umayyad Caliphate expanded and developed, it was Europe who was backwards, becoming more and more disconnected. The Muslim invasions of Spain and small parts of France was in part, their attempt to shrink the Gap. After all, historically, Spain was much better off than the rest of Europe while under Islamic control.
Two events ended the Caliphate and began the slow process of reconnecting Europe. The first was the Crusades, or the original Clash of Civilizations, as some like to say. The second was the Mongols, who decapitated the Caliphate in 1258 by laying waste to Baghdad and permanantly ending Arab rule. Thereafter, the Mediterannean slowly reopened for business, but not before the center of gravity of European civilization had been shifted north which was a result of the original fall of the Mediterranean. If disconnectedness defines danger, then it should come as no surprise that Rome was constantly threatened by the onslaught of barbarians, disconnected and jealous of Rome and that the Arabs were then attacked by the Europeans, who were also disconnected from the Core of the times.
Today, the reverse is true. Though the Ottoman Empire did pick up the pieces of the Caliphate and run with them, for quite some time, it too fell leaving a mess of pieces which, in turn, European empires scooped back up. After World War II and the decolonization process, they were again left alone and disconnected.
However, we must now turn to the rest of the world. Just as the fall of Rome brought about the Middle Ages and Feudalism in Europe, so too has decolonization brought about a similar situation to much of the world. In areas which have a very weak unifying bond, if any, the new state, is equally weak and fragile. Thus, neo-feudal lords have created their own fiefdoms all over the world. Whether they are favelas in Brazil, slums in the US, narco-states in Columbia, or tribes in the Middle East and Central Asia, large portions of humanity have moved backwards into primary loyalties, what some consider to be the most basic social units, the tribe or gang. On top of that, communications and travel have also facilitated international networks which are based on common causes, whether it be Greenpeace of Al Qaeda. The nexus thereof, ungoverned space, creates a network of internationally connected fiefdoms which engage in smuggling, trafficking, terrorism and other forms of organized crime. The Coming Anarchy meets Global Guerillas.
Is the Gap-Core theory appropriate when there were multiple super-powers in the past? The Eastern Roman Empire never had a cultural fall and Byzantine occupation brought peace to troubled Western Europe. Also, one cannot forget Charlemagne civilizing the barbarians.
I think Don Meinig’s nuclei and regions would be a better way to study the ancient and medieval worlds.
There’s been quite some discussion of “neo-medievalism” in IR theory for something like twenty years. I think the argument ultimately (1) relies on a fairly stylized account of what medieval Europe looked like and (2) a view that ideal-typical descriptions of sovereign, nation-states actually reflected the empirical reality of the modern world.
Anyway, I’m sure you know the problems with Pirenne’s argument, so we won’t go there.
Chirol: a thought-provoking post, although there is much with which to disagree. Can you date that map? Although much of Europe did decay at certain periods, southern Europe, Byzantium, and other regions flourished during some parts of the Middle Ages. I wouldn’t necessarily disagree with your map, but it is a big generalization.
Ditto to Dr. Nexon. You may be interested to know that the term “New Middle Ages” spanned into a whole sub-discipline in Japanese political science, evaluating what many in the Japanese academic world believe to be the decline of American global power in the 1990s. It was Paul Kennedy-light, and the quality of the scholarship so poor that only one meager tome was ever translated, and which is not currently available on Amazon.com (a brief synopsis of that work in Japanese is “here).”:http://www6.plala.or.jp/Djehuti/369.htm
Pingback: PurpleSlog » Blog Archive » Coming Anarcy’s Neo-Medievalism, Ungoverned Spaces, PNM Theory, and Network Science
I agree that throwing in Byzantium with the Gap is probably a mistake. It both undersells Eastern Imperial culture, and the damage that centuries of “embargo” did on the West.
The grinding interdiction of Mediterranean trade away from Western Europe changed world history.
Wait a minute, what does it mean that Rome fell because of the Arabs? Rome fell centuries before Muhammed was born, everybody knows that. During those two centuries the Goths, Franks, etc. destroyed everything that was left from Roman power.
And can you really say the muslims lands were “much better off” than Christian Europe? Was there that much of a difference? Certainly today the difference between America and Ghana are enormous, but you cannot call Al-Andalus a “core” while France a “gap”. The Arabs were stopped at Poitiers for something.
I don’t understand why it’s ironic that the spread of Umayyid power should coincide with increasing anarchy in Europe.
You’re all correct that there was a fair amount of generalization in the post.
Dan Nexon: Do you have any links with more info on that. I’d be interested as I wasn’t aware that so much had already been done.
Yago: Read more about Muhammed and Charlemagne for an explanation of the theory.
Elizabeth: Ironic in the sens that the Arabs thought of us then, the same as we think of the Arabs today. While Europeans were burning witches and bartering, the Arabs were translating and reading Greek texts, pioneering new forms of navigation and more. After all, when the crusaders reached the Middle East, they were astonished at how developed the heathens were.
Chirol- I see. I think it’s funny that we should expect to always be “on top”. Civilizations rise and fall. On another note- don’t really agree with the use of “heathen”. Wouldn’t they more be unbelievers? I’ve always heard of heathen in terms of idoltarous, polygamous, etc. types, never applied to Muslims. But that’s another point altogether.
Chirol wrote:
“Thus, neo-feudal lords have created their own fiefdoms all over the world. Whether they are favelas in Brazil, slums in the US, narco-states in Columbia, or tribes in the Middle East and Central Asia, large portions of humanity have moved backwards into primary loyalties, what some consider to be the most basic social units, the tribe or gang. ”
Feudalism was enormously stable as a social and political system, most likely because of the absence of (or very low levels of localized) market activity. Today’s ” neo-feudal” groups are operating in an era of globalized markets and increasing transaction rates. In other words, don’t count on these groups being able to make their temporary fiefdoms ” stick” unless they have something else going for them beyond guns. The rate and flow of exchange-and thus creative destruction – is too high.
I agree about Byzantium. I’d actually like to see a more Eurasian view of the map – the Core should include much of Central, South, and East Asia and parts of West and East Africa (depending on the date.) I’d also put Venice in Genoa as part of the frontier between the Core and the Gap. I think the map and the argument are on to something, just needs some polishing.
I think that there is value in Chirol’s theory at the economic and cultural levels, and some excessive generalization regarding the issue of political control. I think that the explanation of the fall of the Arab-led caliphate is simply inaccurate, in in all good humor I would suggest deleting or rewriting that entire paragraph running from “Two events ended the caliphate…” to “…again left alone and disconnected.” There are a number of statements that I would modify, but most specifically, the crusades had no relation at all with the fall of the caliphate, and the Mongols had only a little to do with it. I’ll explain below.
For those who want to understand the dynamics of this period in more detail, I suggest reading chapters 3-7 of my book, The Arab World: An Illustrated History.
Sidenote: Regarding the role of gangs, see an excellent study put out by the U.S. Army War College, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency.
Now to address Chirol’s main argument:
The Muslim states which created what we could call the “Muslim Core” stretching from the Indian subcontinent through the Arab world to Spain did create an interconnected “core” in some key respects, thus creating a kind of “free trade zone” in which merchants, preachers, writers and scientists could travel across territories peddling their goods or ideas. That Arabic was the administrative language for most of this area helped, and Arabic function somewhat like English today in another regard; educated Turks and Persians learned Arabic, but Arabs rarely learned the languages of others.
Take Islamic Spain as an example: documents indicate that there were 13,000 weavers just in Cordoba, Spain, who made garments which were traded all over the Mediterranean and beyond. On the intellectual side, think about Ibn Rushd/Averroes (1126-98) and Ibn Sina/Avicenna (980-1037), whose works in philosophy and medicine were known across the Muslim Core as well as in Europe (the latter names were the European names). The former was from Spain, and the latter from what is now Uzbekistan (but his works travelled through Spain). None of this would have been possible without the Islamic “free trade zone.”
With regard to the long paragraph, a few points:
(1) Remember that political control by both the Umayyads (661-750), based in Damascus, and the Abbasids (750-945, or maybe some later date), based in Baghdad, over everything west of the Nile River was either slight or nonexistent. Even during their strongest periods, North Africa was to a large degree controlled by unruly Berbers or dissident Kharijites, who were (broad generalization here) basically militant Muslims. Spain was taken by the Umayyads politically but militarily mainly by the Berbers, and an anti-Arab Berber revolt was barely put down by reinforcements who founded a second Umayyad dynasty in the 740s just as the original Umayyads were going down in defeat to the Abbasids. And then in 800 the Abassid Caliph Harun al-Rashid granted the Aghlabs independent rule over Abbasid north Africa (mainly Tunisia) in exchange for some token tribute and a formal recognition of sovereignty. But the Abbasids had no control.
In 909 the Aghlabs were overthrown by the Shia Fatimids, and they came to rule not only Abbasid north Africa but took Egypt in 669. So from 669 on, the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad had nothing west of the Sinai.
(2) Even in the “core” areas of Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Arabia, the Abbasids had a hard time maintaining control and were figureheads by the end of the ninth century. It was under Mu’tasim (833-842) that the Abbasids shifted from dependence on Persian troops to the migrating Turks from Central Asia, and this within a century led to real power in Iraq and Syria being held by Turkic military factions. I date the real end of the Abbasid caliphate to 945, when the Shia Persian Buyids took over Baghdad and made the Sunni Abbasids figureheads, but they were figureheads of their Turkic guards already.
(3) The first crusade took Jerusalem in 1099 from the (Shia) Fatimids, were were ruling Palestine from Cairo. It barely caused a ripple, since none of the commercial centers of the Muslim world had been taken. Even the Fatimids made peace with the Christians in order to maintain their trade with the Italians. The Latin states survived in large part due to Muslim indulgence, since they weren’t a major threat. The Muslims continued to fight amongst themselves as much as they fought the Christians.
(4) The Mongols did sack Baghdad in 1258 and kill every member of the Abbasi family they could find, but by this point the Abbasid caliphs had been figureheads for a very long time. There was a brief and partial revival of Abbasid power under Caliph Nasir (1180-1225), but it was very tenous and they didn’t even completely control Iraq. The Seljuks, who had previously ruled Iraq, were about to retake it in the early 13th century, but were crushed by the Mongols. The Abbasids would have likely gone down anyway.
(5) I wouldn’t credit the Ottomans with maintaining what existed of value in the Arab world. They ruled much of the Arab world from 1517-1918, and it was a period of total stagnation for the Arabs; printing presses weren’t legalized for Arabic and Turkish writings until 1795. The Ottomans were great warriors and had an incredible elan, but I think they were successful in large part because they faced weak enemies. The Europeans they faced were divided, weak and backward, and the Mamluks they defeated to take the Arab world refused to use gunpowder as a matter of principle. What does that tell you.
So I would expand on the economic, cultural and scientific aspects of this argument, but modify some of the others.
One more thing: Those who say that the crusades were the original “clash of civilizations” should take a look at the late 7th-century clash between the Umayyad caliphs and the Byzantines. For the first time the conflict became explicitly cultural, as the Umayyads converted from Byzantine to Islamic coinage, made Arabic the language of administration and propaganda campaign against latent Christian influence was increased. The building of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem was part of this.
CORRECTION: The second paragraph under point (1) above refers to the Fatimids taking Egypt in 669 – obviously, that was 969, and the date immediately following it also 969.
I’m curious as to why you would characterize the crusades as the first “Clash of Civilizations” rather than the Umayyid Caliphate expansion which you mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Also, in what sense was “Spain” better off under Moslem rule? Certainly it was better for Moslems living in Spain, but less wonderful for Christians. Don’t buy too much into the myth of Al-Andalus, at least not on borrowed funds.
Consul-at-Arms:
Regarding the clash of civ idea, my comment two above makes the same point in more detail. I don’t know if you noticed that or not.
I do agree with Chirol that Muslim rule improved the situation in Spain economically. When the Umayyads came in, Spain was in horrible shape, with bandits everywhere and nothing to boast of in terms of economic or intellectual development. The “Splendor of Al-Andalus” is I believe overblown at times, for while the Muslim rulers were relatively tolerant for their time, Christians and Jews were still legally subordinate, as is always the case under Islamic law.
“When the Umayyads came in, Spain was in horrible shape, with bandits everywhere and nothing to boast of in terms of economic or intellectual development.”
It was Visigothic Spain after all, not the Spain of Charles V or Phillip II.
Curzon – I believe I’ve had the misfortune of reading that one translated book. It may, in fact, be sitting in my office back in DC. As for English-language IR cites, I’ll try to post something about that in the near future.
Mark:
Yes, it was Visigothic Spain, but my understanding is that even under the kings which ruled during the height of Spain’s imperial phase, there wasn’t a lot of economic and intellectual vitality. They had splendor from all the gold that came in through the mercantile system, but from what I’ve read they were still heavily dependent on the Italians for commercial services and others for finished goods.
Incidentally, I agree with your original point regarding the ephemeral nature of the new medievalism. Gangs, transnational mafias and terrorist groups will never provide the stability that feudalism did. It wasn’t very economically productive, but the old system sustained society and civilization. Today the failure of these groups leads to either total anarchy – e.g. Somalia and Sierre Leon – or the rise of a hyper-repressive regime which is the only way out of the chaos – e.g. Islamist Sudan or the Taliban’s Afghanistan.
To add to this: the Spain of Charles V and Philip II — or, at least, Castile — was in terrible shape. Charles V made a bargain with the aristocracy towards the end of the Comuneros rebellion to basically dump the tax burden on the productive sectors of Castilian society. That, and his high fiscal demands, drove much of the populace to abjection.
Philip II recognized how bad things were when he came to power, but his rule also didn’t do much for the long-term viability of the Castilian economy.
Some might argue that the Habsburgs wound up ruining Castile.
I think that a Core/Gap analysis really doesn’t work when you have multiple serious contenders for counter-core. We have one contender for counter-core today, Islam. This analysis reduces the Mongols, Chinese, Byzantines all to paper cut-outs. I don’t think that this simplification is warranted or defensible.
As much as I love my neighbours in the Muslim world, I have to say, the Muslim world is not really what they are talking about as a “core” here. It might be an alternative civilization, but not a core in terms of rule of law, etc.
it’s natural to look at the growth of ‘feudal’ aspects from their beginnings in the west, vis a vis, ‘Charlemagne and Mohammed’. But I think it’s even more instructive to see the paralells of globalization, mercantile growth, changes in military strategies and even constitutional reforms in the early Renaissance for all european and mid-eastern players: compared to today’s changes in all these matters with the same players and the US, of course included. In those days, the Church was the limiting factor on a prince or a republic’s rule. But it was losing that credibility and legitimacy. So too were the feudal laws of fealty. Italian princes and popes could buy whatever army they needed to get a job done by the 15th cent. The sworn throngs of knights and their codes had become a laughingstock for Chaucer but Malory kept the model perpetuating. Just so today, corporate memoranda continually keep a fleet ‘focused, determined, resilient’ for the common departmental goal etc. But the goal changes depending on which house you’re in, because we are today changing our loyalties away from the national and toward the corporate leader. In the late Midieval, God was owed ultimate allegiance. By the Renaissance, all over, allegiance was owed to where the money came from, unless you were serf. In which case you had no choice. The Spanish story, interestingly is a natural example of ‘what went wrong’ when a recently unified kingdom who has purged itself of outsiders (Spain c 1500) finds itself in arears financially and has to continually find donors . . . but Charles V had so much else to contend with thru-out the continent being Emporer and so was always strapped for cash. What were the wars over, generally, for Charles? Christian interpretation mostly, a mantle Philip would take on as well.
Simply put the bifurcating fragmentation of ‘civil society’ in the west and the networks that people thus fall into align themselves with what’s most needful for their local situation as in any time. In S America today, people want to unionize and collect themselves in worker solidarity. That’s not what’s happening in the states but the time may come yet. I think we’re still trying to figure out what things are gonna be like when the smoke clears . . . It’s been a while hasn’t it?
Pingback: ComingAnarchy.com » Blog Archive » Cutting out the Middle Man