Once again CA is behind CG. :)
http://catholicgauze.blogspot.com/2006/04/iraq-war-victory.html

This will be news to those who have only followed the “if it bleeds it leads” headlines from the mass media on Iraq. There are basically two reasons for this:

One, since the Falluja Operation in Nov. 2004, al-Qaeda has lost one open base of operations after another. First they lost Falluja itself, the nerve center of the terror network, and then town by town they lost the western province of the Anbar, which previously had been controlled by them or by no one. Ramadi has remained the biggest weak point for the Iraqi government (and the U.S.).

Two, they have alienated their only real base of support in Iraq, the Sunnis. It isn’t that Sunni Islamists have come to love America, they have just gotten tired of having members of their tribes killed by al-Qaeda’s bombs. So the more moderate elements within what remains of the Sunni insurgency have pointedly distanced themselves from Zarqawi and Bin Laden.

So yes, al-Qaeda has lost in Iraq. We haven’t won yet; Sadr’s militia is still a problem, and much of the Sunni population isn’t reconciled to the new democratic order, they just don’t accept al-Qaeda. And the police are a mess. But the army has performed well in the wake of the Askariyya bombing, and so the main challenge in my mind is taking care of Sadr and his thugs. To modify a phrase from Reuel Marc Gerecht, the Sunnis will be brought to compromise by the sight of one thing – a well-armed and determined Shia-dominated Iraqi army. That process has already well begun.

That Iraq is in a death spiral?

Demons are popping up everywhere, it seems. Pretty soon, we’ll need the return of the Prime Angel (or some variant) to combat the pesky little dervishes and save us from their spinning…

But on another note. I think that AQ has suffered losses, am not certain that the Iraq plan went according to…er, plan, but am also not ready to discount AQ on the world stage. Until Osama and Zarqawi are pilloried, we should expect a reformation in AQ. I.e., even if the Iraq plan was not successful—(it may have been)—or, particularly if it was not successful, AQ is likely to try a new tactic or three.

But I’m wondering, given Shloky’s evaluation, how AQ might attempt to reform the Iraqi populace. If AQ has endeavored to “revert the majority of the Iraqi populace to their primary loyalties” from the start, what’s their ultimate plan for capitalizing on this? Perhaps they, like GWB, have misinterpreted the Iraqi reaction to America’s involvement (along with the reaction of so-called moderate Muslims or even nominal, autocratic, Muslim leaders). So, really, the question is, what do they do next?

Is that really their sole objective though? It’s a risky one as it can either be seen as fighting the invaders or helping to ruin another Muslim country. Seems easily spinnable for both sides.

The world is a big place. How many people does al Qaeda need to convince to be a viable movement? .000001 %? This isn’t a mass movement. It is a smarter version of a foco with system disruption as a weapon of state destruction.

“How many people does al Qaeda need to convince to be a viable movement? .000001 %? This isn’t a mass movement”

True. It is an elite. In the past AQ had the luxury of screening applicants and they rejected many of them.

I’m sure the philosophy is the same today though the lack of security (perhaps) means the screening process amounts to what cells in the decentralized jihadi community bin Laden-zawahiri will bestow their seal of approval upon

They are talking about a return to feudal relationships.

aQ believs in Islamic Law, and Islamic Jurisprudence. That’s not feudalism. Sharia and Feudalism are both unpleasant states, but one is not the other.