In the wake of Korean reunification

This is a guest post by regular commenter Lirelou. A multilingual former US military officer with experience across the globe, the Korea-based veteran wrote a fine piece of pessimistic realism about the threats to future peace in East Asia. Published with permission.

My personal assessment about the chances of long term peace in East Asia are pessimistic. The “pax Americana” is coming to an end, but I do not see an Asian “age of aquarius” on the horizon. Rather, we are seeing a nationalist resurgence in China, Korea, and Japan—the legacy of state indoctrination programs in the two former, and recidivist nationalism in the latter.

The reunification of Korea is inevitable, but it will be a far more painful process than many Koreans expect. Once that pain is felt, who will they blame? The extreme left, which may be discredited when Nork gulags are revealed, will point the finger at the U.S. Right-wing nationalists will look to Japan, as Korea would never have been divided and developed into a modern nation much like Singapore and Taiwan were it not for Japan’s colonialism. That argument is likely to find support among the Korean populace, and will likely whet their appetite for revenge. Add to this the very real possibility that China’s continued economic rise has by that time cut into the Korean GDP (adding to real price of reunification), and you may have a social discontent factor that is presently absent in South Korea.

The North Koreans and Iranians, neither one of which may currently possess the bomb, have in essence pulled out the cork on the nuclear issue. In the early post-reunification phase, U.S. pressure will keep the Koreans from going nuclear. Once U.S. forces leave the Peninsula, which I believe will be within two to three years following reunification, the gloves will be off. Depending upon Japanese assessment of the “Korean threat” at that time, Japan will have to decide on whether to remain under the U.S. “nuclear umbrulla”, which will imply both a continued U.S. troop presence in Japan, and perhaps an increase in U.S. air power capabilities, or whether to begin developing its own nuclear and force projection options to counter those of Korea.

An external factor that must be considered will be the U.S. political scene in the post-reunification period. If the Iraq and Afgan wars are perceived to have been failures, the American public will be less supportive of a continued U.S. troop presence in Asia, particularly if that presence could draw us into a Korean-Japanese conflict. My own suspicion is that the sizeable Korean-American community will prove as formidable at applying political pressure as the Irish-Americans in the Northeast, the Jewish communities of the major cities, and the Cuban-Americans in South Florida, all of which have had their say in American domestic and foreign policy. They have not always obtained what they wanted, but their power is recognized and respected. Korean-Americans have the further advantage of potential ties to the religious right. Thus Japan’s assessment of Korean-American political influence (vis-a-vis Japanese-American political influence) may be another factor that could possibly spur its own nuclear program.

All in all, not a rosy picture for peace in East Asia in the wake of Korean reunification. Of course, I’ve been wrong before. And I hope I’m wrong this time. Unfortunately, I have also been right at times when all the analysts were saying something else. That’s the part that bothers me.