The Magical Merkel Tour Part II

[Part I]

My first post in the series summarized German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent visits to foreign countries. Even before taking office, the news and blogosphere were awash with predictions of dramatic changes in German foreign policy. Though they have been disappointed, others who predicted more of a rebalancing instead of a new direction have found their forecasts on target thusfar.

Chancellor Merkel has quite a balancing act on her hands and has handled it quite well the past three months. Running a country always involves juggling various players, issues and problems but running a country by a grand coalition between two opposing parties is even more difficult. Schröder moved Germany away from the US and UK and towards France and Russia. This led to declining support in Eastern Europe as countries who’ve suffered under Germany and Russia feared the informal alliance between the two partners. Partially as a result, they moved closer to the United States. He grasped onto a radicalized version of Germany’s pacifist values ruining relationships with other countries and endangering Germany’s security. Here’s a rough outline of Germany’s balancing act:

Back in July, PINR noted:

[...] that a Merkel government would “be careful not to create friction with the United States, and to upgrade Germany’s role in a revisited transatlantic relationship—making Berlin the chief continental U.S. partner as in the Kohl years.” Second, it would “try to reinforce German influence in Europe while taking care not to treat the E.U.’s newcomers as small or unimportant countries,” and acting as a catalyst for E.U. candidates such as Bulgaria and Romania. Third, it would “continue its energy and trade cooperation with Moscow,” although it would pursue a more cautious approach on the issue of promoting multipolarity or expressing opposition to Washington’s goals in the Middle East.

Two and a half months in, PINR is right on target. I noted in a past post:

Thus, Merkel must rebalance Germany’s foreign policy, distancing herself somewhat from France and Russia while moving towards England and the United States. The key to her trip wasn’t the individual meetings, but that she’s busy creating more room to maneuver. Don’t read too much into this, German foreign policy will merely move back towards the center and stay there. This trip is about rebalancing German foreign policy so she doesn’t have to spend so much time on it. Expect Merkel’s administration to be concentrated on domestic problems and stay on the fence internationally. Domestic reforms can’t be postponed any longer.

Thanks to Iran, foreign policy has stayed in the forefront of German politics however domestic reform is still and will continue to be a pressing issue. Bill from Dawn’s Early Light wrote:

Ms. Merkel, like Otto von Bismarck almost 150 years before, has positioned herself (all the while in a weak government) as the center of gravity for any reform and progress in Europe. She has distanced herself from the non-democratic Russians, usurped the stumbling French, and opened the door to the outsider British while affirming America’s role in European security. And all this with one tour.

Other such as Hero von Essens wrote:

“Under Merkel, Germany’s foreign policy focus will free itself of Schroeder’s shortsighted French fixation, and she will desist from the anti-American posturing which so disfigured Schroeder and Fischer’s tenure. … But the important socialists in Merkel’s government, such as the rabid anti-capitalist demagogue Müntefering, who is vice-Chancellor, will probably see to it that she can’t book any notable successes on these fronts. This is a dispiriting but fair reflection of Germany’s election results, which didn’t give Merkel the mandate to do more.”

Others such as those at the Belmont Club agree, however, how will Merkel pull all this off? How can she increase her political capital internationally, in the European sphere and on the domestic front? Internationally, she can position Germany as a bridge between Europe and the US, acting as an honost broker. She can also, as she proved with the EU budget, do the same for the UK and France as well as possibly mediate between the US and Middle East. Domestically, Merkel will probably accept the reforms she can get, making progress in baby steps, and block the SPD when it can in order to blame it for any governmental failtures. And last but not least, as a chat with most Germans will tell you, the expectations for this government are pretty low, so no matter what, people aren’t going to be disappointed.

Lastly, and most recently, Iran has become a major factor in pushing Germany, and Europe for that matter, towards the US position. Just two days ago, Merkel virtually declared her own strategy of preemptive war:

Looking back to German history in the early 1930s when National Socialism was on the rise, there were many outside Germany who said, “ËœIt’s only rhetoric — don’t get excited’ . . . There were times when people could have reacted differently and, in my view, Germany is obliged to do something at the early stages. We want to, we must prevent Iran from developing its nuclear programme.

And, as the cartoon controversy continues, horrifying Europeans and hopefully convincing them of the dangers of Islamists, Europe will not only be convinced of taking a more forceful position in the Middle East but may be be left with no choice. In short, After two and a half months of a new Chancellor, Germany foreign policy couldn’t be looking better.