* The Iraqi government’s authority must have limits
* Control of Iraq’s finances and military should remain under US control
* Be willing to sack leaders who jeopardize long term goals
* Rule of law must be firmly kept above all
* Real economic reform is crucial to long term stability
* Promise to leave often, but only leave long after it’s possible. Think Germany, Japan, South Korea
* Invest significant money into postwar reconstruction
* Forgiving a considerable portion of Iraq’s debts are crucial, at least what Saddam racked up.
* International diplomacy (and interests) can’t be regarded in the long run

Second, the history used here strikes me as … niave and superficial, above all with respect to understanding the pre-British period and above all the degree of intervention pre-formal protectorate. The rule of the Consuls, for example.

Rather unimpressed in grosso modo.

“In conclusion, there seems to be ample evidence that the British did more harm than good and very clear evidence that they did more for Egypt than the Egyptians could at the time”

And less harm than the Egyptians would have done, most likely, if Farouk and Nasser were indicative of the indigenous leadership mean.

The Brits however, didn’t care about Egypt or the Egyptians so much as they did the Suez canal. Their primary concern was ” the lifeline to India” so they meddled less, helped less and cared less than elsewhere ( such as in Cape Colony where the British Government – or at least ppl like Milner – felt the need to wage an expensive war to preserve ” British paramountcy” and crush the Boer republics).