British Egypt and PNM Theory Part III

Part I | Part II

In Part II, we looked at what the British administration in Egypt achieved and promised to compare the aims of British policy in Egypt, their outcomes under occupation and after and analyze it in terms of PNM theory (connectivity and the 5 flows) and attempt to draw lessons from it for the US occupation of Iraq.

British Aims:

The British did not occupy Egypt for the same reasons it acquired many of its colonies. It’s reasons were:

1) Strategic location between England and India
2) British communication and transportation hub
3) The Suez Canal
4) Eypt’s huge foreign debt and governmental incompetence

British Achievements

The British quickly got the economy turned around, dramatically improved its efficiency and transparency and significantly reduced the rate of debt to revenue. They invested in public works and infrastructure like the Aswan Dam and railways. They fostered some industrialization which gave rise to a modern working class. Exports boomed, unemployment decreased, the population grew and the economy improved thanks to sound British financial policies.

So let’s look at the 5 flows and what the British accomplished. However, we must keep in mind that at that time period and during Globalization I, the importance and moreover the substance of the 5 flows were different.

People – Without modern mass transit, this flow was nowhere near as important in those days. During that era, the flow of from the Core to the Gap was the most important with the reverse being either slaves or indentured servants (both still important). British occupation did ensure the flow of Europeans to Egypt which was crucial. Railways were also quadrupled improving the internal flow of people.

Resources – Increased. At this time, resources like oil hadn’t attained its present importance and much of the world had yet to industrialize to the point of needing vast imports. However, the British did increase the available water through the Aswan dam which created 50% more land for agricultural use.They also raised exports and through the British occupation did increase goods from Britain to Egypt though I’m unable to measure how much.

Money – Increased. British occupation and the stability and security brought with it led to increased trade and lending only made possible by the British. Taxes were lowered and affordable credit was available to more Egyptians which helped foster economic growth.

Security – Increased. British occupation directly increased the flow of security from the Core to the Gap.

Ideas – Without mass communications, this flow was also not as important in those times. However, the proportion of the population attending schools also quadrupled.

Thus, in terms of how important (and technologically possible) the flows of that time were, Britain did increase the 5 flows overall. Yet:

Egyptian industrialization would have required protective tariffs that the British would not allow. Thus, although Egypt had a solid infrastructure, a sizeable local market, and an indigenous supply of capital, industrial development was stymied by a British trade policy that sought to protect the Egyptian market for British products and to maintain Britain’s near monopoly on Egyptian cotton.

Thus, despite the positive increases in Barnett’s flows, Britain did not modernize the country as much as it could have, a major impediment to future growth and ultimately to long term stability.

Politically, though the British administration of Egypt was far more successful than that of the Egyptians, they did not foster indigenous support for the parliamentary system. Of course, in all fairness, no one was doing that the time and it was not seen as a real priority. Colonization in those days, could be couched in terms of Christianity, Commerce and Civilization which of course focused mainly on economics, not politics.

Additionally, harsh treatment of the locals combined with the suppression of political dissent, whether youth groups, political parties or the outright overthrow of Kings all led to increased discontent ultimately paving the way for England’s exit. England of course was not interested in slowly weaning the Egyptians off their presence and pushing them towards being an independent democratic state. Had they slowly increased Egyptian participation and political power with the goal of eventual total Egyptian control, it seems likely they could have succeeded in what the US is now attempting to do in Iraq.

Lessons for the US:

• The Iraqi government’s authority must have limits
• Control of Iraq’s finances and military should remain under US control
• Be willing to sack leaders who jeopardize long term goals
• Rule of law must be firmly kept above all
• Real economic reform is crucial to long term stability
• Promise to leave often, but only leave long after it’s possible. Think Germany, Japan, South Korea
• Invest significant money into postwar reconstruction
• Forgiving a considerable portion of Iraq’s debts are crucial, at least what Saddam racked up.
• International diplomacy (and interests) can’t be regarded in the long run

British Egypt and PNM Theory

According to Barnett’s criteria for the effectiveness of a military intervention, creating enough security to attract substantial FDI, the British occupation was successful. In terms of increasing the flows of globalization (relevant to that time), it also succeeded. However, as soon as the English finally left, the country succumbed to a coup in 1952 which has lasted to this day. Whether the British can be blamed for that remains open because they did not truly aim to create the a constitutional monarch that would last but rather one that they could manipulate, ultimately leading to the nationalist backlash which ruined the country and doomed it to one man rule.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, there seems to be ample evidence that the British did more harm than good and very clear evidence that they did more for Egypt than the Egyptians could at the time. Yet, although they instituted drastic and successful financial reforms and reshaped the political system, they did not do so with the intention of creating a long term successful and independent state which is what was almost wholly responsible for the predictable nationalist backlash and coup.

While Victorian Imperialism and its “liberal empire” may be a good model for future action, less self-interest will be crucial to creating a system with real staying power. Additionally, international assistance not only through debt forgiveness but through aid and personnel (political as well as military) will be necessary and help to legitimize the occupation and lessen the chances of a nationalist uprising. However, no good examples of this have yet to arise. The fate of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are all still up in the air. And as the lessons listed above show, we must not be afraid to speak victorian but think pagan.

NOTE: Of additional interest are Paddy Ashdown’s seven principles of peacemaking from a speech he gave in June 2003. The speech can be found here as a .pdf and here as .html